Clientelism and polarized voting: empirical evidence

One must take country-specific institutional features into account when analyzing former communist countries’ transformation process to new political institutions. We do so for post-communist Albania, where the regional and cultural polarization that has existed for centuries has evolved to clientelism in the new democracy. We show how clientelistic parties give rise to very particular voting patterns. These reveal major differences across regions not only in party choice but also in voters’ responses to government policies. These responses depend on the party in government and on the region concerned. This is in sharp contrast with results obtained when applying the same model to a large number of more advanced democracies with similar electoral institutions. A proper evaluation of democratization in Albania thus requires looking beyond the formal institutions governing elections and taking clientelism and its effect on voter behavior into account.     

Endogenous economic voting: evidence from the 1997 British election

Using panel surveys conducted in Great Britain before and after the 1997 general election, we examine the relationship between voting behavior and post-election economic perceptions. Drawing on psychological theories of attitude formation, we argue that those who voted for Labour and the Liberal Democrats perceived the past state of the British economy under the Tory government more negatively than they had prior to casting their ballot in the 1997 election. Similarly, we posit that Labour supporters would view the future state of the national economy under Labour more positively than they had before the election. This indicates that, contrary to many assumptions in the economic voting literature, voting behavior influences evaluations of the economy as voters seek to reduce inconsistencies between their vote choice and evaluations of the economy by bringing their attitudes in line with the vote they cast in the election. It also means that voters’ post-election economic perceptions are, at least in part, influenced by and thus endogenous to their vote choice. This finding has two major implications: first, cross-sectional models of economic voting are likely to overestimate the effect of economic perceptions on the vote. Second, the endogeneity of economic perceptions may compromise the quality of economic voting as a mechanism for democratic accountability.     

Religion,language, race and ethnic voting

Why do some ethnic groups vote along ethnic lines while others do not? This article looks at whether the objective characteristics of ethnicity – in terms of language, religion and race – affect ethnic voting. I address three sets of questions: (1) are ethnic groups that are objectively different from other groups of their country more likely to vote ethnically? (2) is ethnic voting higher among groups that are linguistically, religiously and racially homogeneous? (3) do some ethnic markers, such as language, induce more ethnic voting than others? Using a dataset covering 142 ethnic groups and 49 democracies worldwide, I find that within-group similarity increases ethnic voting. On balance, however, there is little evidence that between-group difference or the identity of the ethnic dimension affect ethnic voting. These results suggest that a group's internal characteristics and the cohesiveness of its members play a key role in explaining its voting behavior.     

Economic voting in multi-level contexts: Evidence from Kerala and West Bengal in India

What determines electoral support for national incumbent parties and state-level challengers in sub-national pro-poor contexts? Based on survey data from the Indian states of Kerala and West Bengal, collected prior to the 2019 national election, we find that voters were more (less) inclined to vote for the sub-national incumbent relative to the national incumbent if their household economic conditions were perceived to have improved (deteriorated) relative to national economic conditions. Our findings indicate that voters in these settings correctly assume that the sub-national incumbent cannot be held responsible for changes in national economic conditions, but, at the same time, the existence of a strong welfare state at the sub-national level creates expectations that the sub-national government is responsible for personal welfare. Hence, the national election is used to assess the economic performance of both the sub-national and the national incumbent.     

Social identity and coethnic voting in the Middle East: Experimental evidence from Qatar

What explains widespread coethnic voting in the Middle East? The prevailing understanding revolves around clientelism: the view that MENA citizens support coethnic parties and candidates in order to most easily or effectively extract resources from the patrimonial state. Previous research has thus neglected non-economic explanations of ethnic-based preferences and outcomes in MENA elections, including social biases long identified in other settings. This study presents findings from a conjoint survey experiment in Qatar, where symbolic elections lack distributional implications. Consistent with expectations derived from social identity theory, results reveal strong favoritism of cosectarian candidates, whereas objective candidate qualifications do not affect voter preferences. Bias is especially strong in a policy domain – promoting religious values – that prompts respondents to consider the candidate’s ethnic identity. Findings offer clear evidence that ethnic-based voting in Qatar and likely elsewhere is not merely epiphenomenal but can reflect actual preferences for members of social in-groups.     

Analytical thinking,prosocial voting,and intergroup competition: experimental evidence from China

Public Choice - We investigate whether and how analytical thinking affects Muslims’ prosocial voting towards in-group (fellow Muslims) and out-group (Han Chinese) members. We conduct an...     

Class voting and the differential role of political values: evidence from 12 West-European countries

Influential theories of class voting assume that the phenomenon occurs because classes hold different political values, which in turn affect their party preference. However, we do not know how important this mechanism is. Hence, this article uses high-quality survey data from 12 Western European countries to study the association between class and voting. The results suggest that political values – including non-economic values – play a central role in accounting for this association, although substantial class differences persist even when holding political values constant. I furthermore argue that the relevance of this mechanism should vary by party family. Political values should account for class voting to the extent that parties give the voters clear signals on issues of relevance to the value orientations. As such, party behaviour not only affects the level of class voting, but the very nature of the link between class and voting. This article contributes first by testing one of the most important theories of the mechanisms behind class voting, and second by demonstrating how the parties’ behaviour affects this mechanism.     

Third party voting and the rational voter model: Empirical evidence from recent presidential elections

This paper attempted to demonstrate that a rational voter model as derived by Barzel and Silberberg (1973) can be used (with modifications) to explain third party voting in presidential elections. The empirical findings strongly suggest that the rational voter model is applicable in explaining third party voting. This conclusion likewise suggests that people who vote for third parties do so under similar motivations as people who vote for the major parties. Thus, people do not appear to regard votes for third parties as wasted votes or engage in the voting process in an irrational fashion. Lastly, votes for third parties represent the transmission of individual preferences by people who believe that their vote is important and that in the aggregate their signal may be interpreted as a signal to alter the direction of current policies as run by the major parties. Therefore, it does not appear from the evidence presented here that we should distinguish between or treat differently voting participation for the major parties versus the minor or third parties in presidential elections.The author expresses appreciation to Charles Campbell, Gary Pecquet, Paul W. Grimes, and James E. McClure for comments and criticisms. The usual caveat applies.     

Eyes on the ballot: Priming effects and ethnic voting in the developing world

Many countries include candidate photographs on ballots to facilitate autonomous, correct voting. However, the possible unintended consequences of these aspects of ballot design have not been sufficiently considered. We argue that photographs have the potential to increase ethnic voting, particularly by priming individuals to consider identity when making their electoral decisions. We conducted an experiment days prior to the 2011 Ugandan elections, in which subjects marked mock ballots including, or excluding, candidate photographs. We find that photographs increased ethnic voting, and our evidence indicates a priming effect, while ruling out learning as a likely alternate explanation. Subtle stimuli at the end of a campaign can affect ethnic voting in developing countries by altering identity salience.     

The single transferable vote and ethnic conflict: The evidence from Northern Ireland

There has been a long-running debate amongst constitutional engineers between those who favour the proportional representation of parties (usually via PR-Closed List systems) and post-election power-sharing (Lijphart) and those who favour attempting to induce pre-election inter-ethnic ‘vote-pooling’ (Horowitz) as a more effective and stable method of governing divided societies. Less attention has been paid to the fact that other options are available. A leading candidate amongst these is the Single Transferable Vote (STV), a non-categorical ordinal ballot system that may be capable of combining the essential ‘fairness’ of proportionality with the centripetal benefits of some inter-ethnic vote-pooling. Northern Ireland is the only divided society with extensive experience of STV elections. This paper examines the empirical evidence before and after the 1998 Belfast Agreement by examining the operation of the electoral system at the Northern Ireland Assembly elections of 1982, 1998, 2003, 2007 and 2011. The main findings are that prior to the 1998 Agreement inter-ethnic vote-pooling in Northern Ireland was very close to zero. Afterwards (1998–2007) terminal transfers from the moderate unionist UUP to the moderate nationalist SDLP averaged 32 per cent (and 13 per cent in the opposite direction). Although most transfers clearly remain within ethnic blocs, these inter-ethnic terminal transfers are a change with the past and suggest that STV may be an appropriate electoral system choice for some divided societies.     

The survival of interest groups: evidence from Germany

Abstract

Interest groups are important intermediary organisations that function as a transmission belt between societal interests and political decision-makers. However, while some interest groups survive over decades, others only last a few years. This article argues that the survival of interest groups depends on their ability to mobilise resources which is crucially affected by interest group type and the public salience of an interest group’s policy domain. The theoretical expectations are tested based on a novel dataset mapping the survival of 1699 interest groups registered at the German Bundestag between 1974 and 2012. Using event history analysis, it is shown that interest group type and public salience indeed affect whether interest groups survive. Sectional groups last significantly longer than cause groups, and interest group survival increases with the public salience of their policy area. The results have major implications for our understanding of interest groups and political representation in contemporary democracies.     

Interest groups,campaign contributions,and probabilistic voting

This essay develops a simple model to analyze the impact of campaign contributions on electoral-policy decisions of candidates for office. Interest groups here are firms that select contributions under the assumption that candidates' policies and opposing groups' donations remain unaltered. Candidates, however, recognize that their policy choices affect contributions. Campaign contributions are used by candidates to affect policy-oriented voters' perceptions of candidates' positions. In this framework the introduction of campaign contributions may affect candidates' electoral policies, and if they do then they benefit surely exactly one of the two interest groups.     

Internet voting and turnout: Evidence from Switzerland

Internet voting (i-voting) is often discussed as a potential remedy against declining turnout rates. This paper presents new evidence on the causal effect of i-voting on turnout, drawing on trials conducted in two Swiss cantons: Geneva and Zurich. Both Geneva and Zurich constitute hard cases for i-voting, given that i-voting was introduced in the presence of postal voting. However, this setting allows us to test some of the more optimistic claims regarding i-voting's ability to increase turnout. Empirically, we exploit the advantageous circumstance that federal legislation created a situation coming close to a natural experiment, with some of Geneva's and Zurich's municipalities participating in i-voting trials and others not. Using difference-in-differences estimation, we find that i-voting did not increase turnout in the cantons of Geneva and Zurich.     

Promoting ethnic equality in campaign messages: Survey experimental evidence from Nairobi,Kenya

In urban sub-Saharan Africa, leaders should appeal to voters of diverse ethnic backgrounds for electoral success. Yet, the political salience of ethnic inequality demands their attention to ethnicity issues in campaign messaging. This study examines the impacts on voter preference of appeals to ethnic equality by using a conjoint experiment conducted in Nairobi, Kenya. Appeals to ethnic equality were varied randomly as follows: (1) no appeal to ethnic equality, (2) appeals to equal opportunities for all ethnic groups (pan-ethnic appeal), and (3) appeals to opportunities for ethnic minorities (pro-minority appeal). The study found a substantial increase in support for politicians making appeals to ethnic equality, while pan-ethnic appeals increased voter support for candidates more than pro-minority appeals. Pan-ethnic appeals were more effective than pro-minority appeals because they bolster support from co-ethnic voters who are also from the candidate's party, while not alienating non-co-ethnic voters or voters affiliated with other parties.     

Strategic coalition voting: Evidence from Austria

Strategic coalition voting assumes that voters cast their vote in a way that maximizes the probability that a preferred coalition will be formed after the election. We identify three decision contexts that provide incentives for strategic coalition voting: (1) a rental vote of a major party supporter in favor of a preferred junior coalition partner perceived as uncertain to pass a minimum vote threshold, (2) avoiding a wasted vote for the preferred small party that is not expected to pass the minimum vote threshold, and (3) explicit strategic coalition voting to influence the composition and/or portfolio of the next coalition government. The results based on a nationally representative survey conducted before the 2006 Austrian general election generally support these hypotheses.     

Expressive voting and identity: evidence from a case study of a group of U.S. voters

The source of evidence on expressive voting has been experiments, in general conducted with students. In Why are Jews Liberals? Norman Podhoretz describes behavior that substantiates the hypothesis that people vote expressively to confirm identity. He does not use the terminology of expressive voting but his study is readily interpretable in an expressive-behavior context. Podhoretz describes liberal Jews in the U.S. as expressively voting contrary to self-interest to confirm allegiance to liberalism, which he terms a ??new religion??. Traditional Jews do not require the identity of the new religion and vote in accord with their self-interest. I propose another interpretation of voting by liberal Jews in which expressive utility is not contrary to self-interest.     

Cognitive dissonance and the effects of Voting Advice Applications on voting behaviour: evidence from the European Elections 2014

ABSTRACT

Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) – also known as Voting Engagement Applications – are online tools which inform users about their proximity to party positions before elections by indicating which parties are closest to the policy preferences of the individual voters. Referring to the theory of cognitive dissonance, this article examines the impact of using a VAA on voting behaviour by looking at the effect mechanisms. For the empirical analyses, we draw on data of a two-wave panel study we conducted before the European Elections 2014, thereby focusing on the German VAA – the Wahl-O-Mat. The findings show that irritation emerges if the preferred party is not positioned at the top of the VAA result list. In turn, a strong irritation can lead to a change in vote choice.     

Learning from the ethnic conflict and the internal displacement in Tripura in Northeast India

Conclusion The ethnic conflict between tribals and non-tribals compounded by the insurgency has disturbed the peace in the state for more than 20 years and also resulted in the internal displacement of thousands of people. In order to restore peace and to prevent future internal displacement it would be necessary to give to the tribals their due share in governance.     

Rising start-up costs of voting: political inequality among first-time voters

Abstract

Research on voting behaviour stresses that whether citizens become habitual voters depends on the very first elections in their adult life. This article focuses on the increasing participation gap of first-time voters with low and high levels of resources. Looking first at 14 European countries and second at long-term dynamics in Germany, the turnout rate of first-time and older voters over time is compared. It is shown that the turnout gap has increased substantially since the 1980s. In contrast, educational differences in electoral turnout among older citizens are still comparatively small. It is argued and shown that the turnout gap among the young is due to rising ‘start-up’ costs of voting, which affect mainly those who are resource poor.