The core of pure economic loss

Should loss of earnings be compensated? The established law and economics wisdom considers pure economic loss as a transfer of wealth from the victim to a third party, whose earnings increase as a consequence of the accident. Such transfers do not amount to a social loss and, hence, should not be compensated. We revisit these arguments and show that the social loss should be calculated by taking into account that: (a) pure economic loss often involves impairment costs resulting from the fact that valuable resources cannot be temporarily used and (b) the third-party earnings come at the cost of increased capacity. This increased capacity mitigates the expected harm and, hence, is a form of precaution. By taking into account these factors, we show that most pure-economic-loss cases do result in a socially relevant loss. In addition, we argue that the absence of a social loss is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the denial of compensation. The victim (or a third party) may have actually paid for protection against purely private losses. Thus, compensation should be awarded irrespective of whether national law treats the case under tort or contract (where compensation is undisputed). Finally, we offer considerations on the optimal design of liability rules.     

民法与经济法价值之比较分析

本文首先从经济关系层面出发 ,对民法与经济法的互动进行了分析。指出二者价值差异的根源在于经济思想、公平理念和利益观的差异。二者价值体系在总体上具有一致性、谐和性和互补性。同时揭示了他们间的文化与精神的互补、功能的相互矫正及调整对象的交叉。     

The morality of law and economics

The moral heart of normative law and economics is efficiency, especially dynamic efficiency that takes incentive effects into account. In the economic theory, justificatory argument is inherently at the institutional- or rule-level, not an the individual- or case-level. InMarkets, Morals, and the Law Jules Coleman argues against the efficiency theory on normative grounds. Although he strongly asserts the need to view law institutionally, he frequently grounds his criticisms of law and economics in arguments from little more than direct moral intuition about individual cases. He evidently holds that consent provides a better normative basis for law than does efficiency and he uses consent arguments to attack recommendations from scholars in law and economics. His own chief contribution, however, is to law and economics rather than to any alternative theory.     

The law and economics of AI liability

The employment of AI systems presents challenges for liability rules. This paper identifies these challenges and evaluates how liability rules should be adapted in response. The paper discusses the gaps in liability that arise when AI systems are unpredictable or act (semi)-autonomously. It considers the problems in proving fault and causality when errors in AI systems are difficult to foresee for producers, and monitoring duties of users are difficult to define. From an economic perspective, the paper considers what liability rules would minimise costs of harm related to AI. Based on the analysis of risks and optimal liability rules, the paper evaluates the recently published EU proposals for a Product Liability Directive and for an AI Liability Directive.     

对纯粹经济损失赔付规则的探析

纯粹经济损失是当今民法研习中的难点问题，由于表现形态各异，至今没有准确统一的概念。它同时涉及侵权法和合同法两大领域，导致很难获得赔付。然而这些不予赔付的理由并不充分，应该结合中国当前立法，采取适当的控制机制，在一定范围内承认纯粹经济损失的赔付问题。     

The law and economics of organ procurement

This paper presents an economic analysis of the organ procurement system in the U.S. and examines proposals to alleviate the shortage of transplantable organs. The paper's principal conclusions are: (1) Although non-market solutions deserve the highest priority, demand increases fueled by improvements in transplant technology will probably make some market-based solution necessary in the future. (2) Quality deterioration and coercion will not necessarily be worrisome problems under a market-based procurement system.     

Institutional law and economics

Behavioral economics provides one of the foundation for institutional law and economics (ILE). Improvement in predicting the performance of alternative laws will be built on ILE insights into how distribution affects productivity of labor and realization of joint gains. Our understanding of obedience to law as well as other categories of failure to be opportunistic (such as in high exclusion-cost situations) will be better understood from an ILE perspective that investigates learning to supplement specific sanctions.The boundaries of ILE inquiry encompass private property rights, regulation, and public spending and taxation since these are complements and substitutes. Public spending is not a good measure of the size of government, and regulation is not the opposite of freedom in the aggregate. This framework of ILE can usefully be seen as distinctive, even if all of its practitioners do not use the label and several of its propositions are shared with other paradigms. A better label might simply be institutional economics or political economy.     

The economic analysis of public law

Law and economics in the United States and Europe focuses on private law. With the exception of work on antitrust and corporate finance, public law has been largely ignored. Yet economics is central to the understanding of social problems, such as environmental protection and occupational health and safety. Lawyer-economists need to study the relationship between government structure and policy outcomes. Economists must consider goals, such as democratic accountability and participation, which do not fit an efficiency framework.Lawyers and public officials need to recognize the social benefits of efficiency. Such legal-economic analysis can reveal failures in the way public law accommodates the practical reality of today's pressing social problems. It can also suggest solutions. In particular, economics can help with the design of substantive policies and with the analysis of government structures and process.     

市场监管法属于经济法抑或属于行政法

市场监管法以市场监管关系为调整对象则属于行政法范畴,要使其能够真正发挥应有的作用,则必须以竞争关系为调整对象,并以有关国家机关为辅助机关,以司法救济途径为主的方式重新构建之。     

The economics of environmental law enforcement: end-of-life vehicles

Abandoned End-of-Life Vehicles (ELVs) have been an environmental concern for a long time in a number of countries. This article examines different ways to address the issue by changing the incentive structure for agents. Following (Polinsky A. M., & Shavell, S. (2000). The Economic theory of public enforcement of law. Journal of Economic Literature, 38, 45–76.) a model is used to compare a fine-based system with a deposit-refund system; a combination of the two is then considered. It is shown that when the environmental harm is relatively low and constant, a deposit-refund system is preferred. When cases of high environmental harm are included, the optimal choice would be a combined system.      

Conceptions of rationality in law and economics

Law and economics is going through a paradigm shift as the influential behavioral school is challenging and remolding its very foundation, i.e., homoeconomicus model. However, neither of the approaches captures the essence of interaction between entrepreneurial heterogeneous agents. The Misesian homoagens approach adequately addresses the deficiencies of the predominant paradigm, opening doors to a far richer legal-economic analysis incorporating real world dynamics of complex market processes.