近代日本宪政党内阁研究

宪政党内阁在日本近代政治史上开辟了一个重要的历史阶段,以本届内阁为转折点,在此之前持续的萨长藩阀交替执政的政权模式宣告终结。作为近代日本政党内阁的首度尝试,宪政党内阁时期出现了猎官、内部倾轧、与藩阀势力妥协等一系列负面现象。由于宪政党内阁是由藩阀开明势力的代表——元老伊藤博文推荐产生,而以山县有朋为代表的诸元老鉴于当时藩阀政府难以掌控政权,故被迫在表面上同意宪政党组阁。因此,无论是在宪政党最初组阁还是在其施政过程中,都受到以山县有朋为代表的元老、官僚、贵族院、军部势力的掣肘,加之宪政党内部的明争暗斗,由此导致了宪政党分裂和宪政党内阁瓦解。     

社会民主主义与自由主义

作为西欧主要政党的政治意识形态,社会民主主义与自由主义有其对立的一面,也有相互影响、相互渗透的另一面。这在英国工党和自由党,德国社会民主党和联盟党的政治实践中已得到证实。社会民主主义政党和自由主义、保守主义政党之间达成的共识是西欧发达资本主义国家的社会主义运动在特定历史条件下与资本主义制度之间达成的妥协,其思想基础是社会民主主义和新自由主义的趋同,而导致这一妥协也有相应的客观条件。但是社会党存在一个“身份特征”问题,自由主义和保守主义政党方面也有其两难困境,作出已经产生新自由主义共识或社会民主党已经“新自由主义化”之类的论断还为时过早。     

政官关系与日本民主党政权的政策决定

基于“政治主导”的政治理念，民主党政权在政策决定过程领域推行政官关系变革。历经鸠山内阁、菅内阁与野田内阁，随着政官关系变革态势的减弱并遭受顿挫，民主党政权的政策决定过程反复变化。政官关系定位不准，不仅导致民主党政权的政策决定过程反复变化，也削弱了其决策效益与执政能力。     

岸田内阁官邸主导决策特征及其实施困境——以“经济安保法”的出台过程为例

为有效应对此前政权遗留的官邸决策弊端并谋求执政长期稳固，岸田内阁在政府决策上一方面延续官邸主导形式，另一方面在官邸决策过程中寻求兼顾与外部决策主体的意见协调。作为内阁“看板政策”推进的重要一环，在“经济安保法”的制定出台过程中，官邸主导的“延续性”及“协调性”特征均得到了明显体现。但在官邸主导的实地推进中，岸田内阁仍受到来自首相个人政治领导力“缺位”的严重制约，进而导致官邸主导实际政策效果整体不佳。加之制度及国内政治因素层面的相互影响，首相亦难以破解其在政治领导上的不力困局。伴随执政基础的长时期弱化，岸田内阁推进官邸主导的整体前景也难言明朗。     

佐藤内阁时期“日台”关系

从 1 952年“日台条约”的签订到1 972年中日关系实现正常化为止 ,日本一直与台湾当局保持着所谓的“外交关系”。纵观这二十年 ,日本历经几次内阁更替 ,历届内阁虽然继续坚持对台保持“外交关系”的基本方针 ,但在具体的对台政策上却存在着差异。例如 ,吉田内阁、岸内阁与佐藤内阁都不同程度地采取了对台亲近的政策 ,而池田内阁、田中内阁却采取了对台疏远乃至断交的政策。其中 ,岸内阁和佐藤内阁尤以“亲台反华”而著称。岸内阁之所以“反华”是主要为了实现修改安保条约的外交目标 ,那么 ,佐藤内阁“亲台”的根本动因又是什么呢 ?本文拟…     

文本与解释：明治宪法研究刍议

就文本解释来说，文本自身、文本的效果及影响等共同构成解释者的认识对象，解释者难以完全知晓文本的原意。宪法文本同样如此，尤其如明治宪法条文简单，解释时有必要借助条文外因素。明治维新后，一君万民成为日本施政的思想认知基础(根本性政治基础),天皇亲政与“公议”原则被导入明治宪法并逐渐制度化。明治宪法采取天皇主权下的职能性分权，议会参与立法却非立法权主体，预算的非法律性也限制了议会的预算权，但宪法第六十七条为政府与议会的妥协提供了可能。在宪法运行中，元老、内阁统一，统帅权独立等政治惯例补足了宪法条文与实际政治间的乖离，促使宪法解释和政治实态的阶段性变化。研究明治宪法，不能囿于文本，还应考察其产生的语境、政治家行动、法律法规、宪法解释及社会舆论等要素。     

韩国民自党工作代表团访华

韩国民自党工作代表团访华应中国国际交流协会邀请，以韩国民主自由党第二副秘书长赵富英为团长的韩国民自党工作代表团一行六人于１９９３年１１月９日至１４日访问了中国。该团访华期间，全国政协副主席、中国国际交流协会会长吴学谦会见了代表团，双方就发展两国关系问...     

中国共产党代表团访韩

中国共产党代表团访韩应韩国民主自由党的邀请，由中国共产党中央对外联络部部长李淑铮为团长的中国共产党代表团于３月２７日至４月３日访问了韩国。李淑铮部长率领的中国共产党代表团此次对韩国的访问，是中国共产党方面派出的第二个访韩代表团。１９９４年３月，以中联...     

日本教育改革如何达成共识

涉及群众利害的事业能否顺利完成，全凭众人是否能够达成共识。日本教育改革的呼声起于20世纪70年代初。20世纪80年代中曾根内阁作为国家任务去抓。设置临时教育审议会确定改革的基本方针。在首先确定议事规则、关键概念的含义后开展具体审议。临教审内部各个分会间，临教审与内阁高层、与社会各界通过各种会议以及征文、发行刊物等方式，收集和扩散各种意见和看法，通过3年审议提出4次报告，内阁以最终报告为基础确定了教育改革大纲。充分的讨论和争辩是达成共识的有效途径，寻求共识虽然费时但保证了决策慎重。在社会共识基础上的决策可以避免朝令夕改、最大限度减少决策失误造成的无可估量的损失。     

三木内阁的“等距离外交”与中日缔约谈判

三木内阁试图利用中苏矛盾在两国之间奉行“等距离外交”，一方面表示要全力推进中日缔约，稳步发展中日友好关系，以此提高对苏交涉地位；另一方面又不想开罪苏联，在中日缔约上施加种种限制，积极推动日苏对话，以增加对关战略博弈的资本，加重对中国谈判的筹码。三木内阁企图从中苏对抗中渔翁得利、两头通吃的作法反而使日本在苏联的压力下陷入被动，也引起了美国的反感和否定，从而使其推行的“等距离外交”在实践中四处碰壁，而不得不草草收场。     

Post-Cabinet Careers of Regional Ministers in Germany, 1990–2011

The study of ministerial careers in Germany is rather new. So far it has been mainly restricted to the federal level and to the career pathways up until cabinet exit. This article, by contrast, concentrates on the post-cabinet careers of regional ministers. Drawing from the scarce literature we first sketch out career patterns of regional ministers prior to and during their time in the regional cabinet. The main focus, though, is on the post-cabinet biographies of all regional ministers in the sixteen German Länder since unification. Our empirical analysis reveals the regional cabinet as the career apex for most ministers. Looking at those ministers who do move up the political ladder after leaving the cabinet shows a clear preference for the national over the European level and the executive office over the legislative mandate. Variation in post-cabinet careers seems not only to be influenced by party, Land and ministerial office (Prime Minister vs normal minister) but also by the causes and circumstances of exit from the cabinet (exit type). These empirical results represent a first step into a new research field – lying waste since Blondel's early attempt in 1991 – and will hopefully provide a starting point for more comprehensive and comparative analysis.     

The Formation of Cabinet Coalitions in Presidential Systems

Cabinet coalitions are central to the functioning of Latin American presidential systems. However, the reasons for their formation remain unclear. While recent studies suggest that presidents invite parties to the cabinet to facilitate governability and lawmaking, this study argues that the composition of cabinet coalitions is largely predetermined by commitments made before presidential elections. To analyze this argument, the study introduces the conditional logit model as a new empirical strategy for modeling cabinet choice under this type of regime. Based on a new dataset of 107 cabinets in 13 Latin American democracies, the study shows that pre‐electoral commitments strongly affect cabinet formation and thereby also confound the relationship between cabinet formation and governability.     

Do Minority Cabinets Govern More Flexibly and Inclusively? Evidence from Germany

A widespread view in political science is that minority cabinets govern more flexibly and inclusively, more in line with a median-oriented and 'consensual' vision of democracy. Yet there is only little empirical evidence for it. We study legislative coalition-building in the German state of North-Rhine-Westphalia, which was ruled by a minority government between 2010 and 2012. We compare the inclusiveness of legislative coalitions under minority and majority cabinets, based on 1028 laws passed in the 1985–2017 period, and analyze in detail the flexibility of legislative coalition formation under the minority government. Both quantitative analyses are complemented with brief case studies of specific legislation. We find, first, that the minority cabinet did not rule more inclusively. Second, the minority cabinet’s legislative flexibility was fairly limited; to the extent that it existed, it follows a pattern that cannot be explained on the basis of the standard spatial model with policy-seeking parties.     

日本外交的“钟摆”现象

日本民主党上台执政以来，在对美、对华政策上发生了一些明显变化，概括起来说，这些变化其实都是小泉下台以后的历任内阁对日本外交战略调整的继续。关于小泉以后至管内阁以前日本外交战略调整的过程，具体可以分3个阶段来考察：第1阶段是安倍、麻生的价值观外交所体现的“疏美防华”倾向；第2阶段是以“新福田主义”为特点的“亲美返亚”倾向；第3阶段是以鸠山的“友爱外交”为中心内容所表现出的“脱美入亚”倾向。其中，安倍的“疏美防华”仍然未消除冷战思维的阴影；鸠山的“脱关入亚”略带理想主义色彩；只有福田的“亲美入亚”具有现实性，预示着日本21世纪对美、对华外交战略的发展方向，也是菅内阁外交政策的方向标。     

A “Proactive Contribution to Peace” and the Right of Collective Self-Defense: The Development of Security Policy in the Abe Administration

Since the inauguration of the second Abe cabinet in December 2012, there have been many important developments in the area of security policy. This article examines each new policy and how it fits in to the National Security Strategy principles of a “proactive contribution to peace” and international cooperation. It concludes with a comparison of the new policies with those of other major world powers and a discussion of the main source of opposition to Japan's security policy.     

'Moves on a Chess Board': A Spatial Model of British Prime Ministers' Powers over Cabinet Formation

We use an institutional rational choice approach to help us understand how prime ministers in the UK make cabinet appointments and the implications for prime ministerial power. Assuming that prime ministers attempt to form a cabinet so as to get an overall package of policies as close as possible to their ideal, we show why the trade-offs they face are so complex, why apparently common-sense rules for making appointments might not always work well and why apparently strange choices made by prime ministers might actually be rational. Acknowledging the power prime ministers derive from their ability to appoint, we argue that the literature commonly fails to distinguish between power and luck, where lucky prime ministers get their way because they happen to agree with colleagues.     

Minority Presidents and Democratic Performance in Latin America

A widely accepted argument among scholars of Latin American presidential regimes is that interbranch cooperation is impaired when the president's party falls short of a majority of seats in the legislature. This argument fails to consider three factors that affect the performance of minority presidents: the policy position of the president's party, the president's capacity to sustain a veto, and the legislative status of the parties included in the cabinet. This article argues that the greatest potential for conflict in a presidential regime occurs when the president's party lacks the support of both the median and the veto legislator and no cabinet coalition holding a majority of legislative seats is formed. This hypothesis is supported using data on executive-legislative conflicts and on interrupted presidencies in Latin America during the period 1978–2003.