民主共和与宪政共和的历史叙事

西塞罗认为共同善是共和的核心价值,包括"公益"与"公法"两个方面,形成了理解共和主义的两个维度,一为积极肯定性;一为消极否定性,又受自由主义与民主主义思潮的影响,形成了民主共和与宪政共和。宪政共和要求共和国的政体构建是宪政的、法治的,分权制衡的有限政府,试图构建一种"防御性共和政体结构";民主共和要求共和国的政体构建是民主的,强调人民主权,强调公民美德,强调构建的是发展的有效政府,试图构建一种"发展性共和政体结构"。     

共和主义视界中的政治参与图景

政治参与是自由主义、民主主义和共和主义的公共选项,也是区隔三个"主义"的标志牌。政治参与,是民主主义和共和主义的必需品,在自由主义那里却成为最弱意的选择。共和主义政治参与立足于无支配自由和强自治自由之上,以塑造公民德性和共同善为旨归,诉诸商议民主,建构了积极政治参与观,并以此来矫正和弥补自由民主代议式政治参与之不足,为当代民主理想与谋划而奔走呼喊。     

无支配政府及其治理——论佩迪特的共和主义政府理论

菲利普.佩迪特是当代共和主义复兴运动的重要代表人物,他在阐释共和主义自由观——无支配自由的基础上,提出了无支配的共和主义的理想政府模式。无支配政府强调公民共治、论辩的民主,以实现公共善、公共利益为依归,公民性支持是建立无支配政府的社会基础。无支配政府的实质是一种后自由主义的政府治理模式。     

马基雅维利与古典共和主义

马基雅维利的政治思想具有复杂的形态,《君主论》与《李维史论》之间的矛盾存在多种看法。马基雅维利从以下几个方面对古典共和主义的议题做出了独特回应:在自由、共和政体与公共利益之间建立了紧密的联系;通过引入斗争的方式发展了混合政体理论;阐述了公民美德的重要性以及培养公民美德的各种方式和途径。从西方近代早期政治话语的竞争这一背景出发,可以获得对马基雅维利政治思想更为合理的解释。     

读《民主的不满——美国在寻求一种公共哲学》有感

桑德尔在《民主的不满》里指出,看似民主的美国,其实也面对着"自治的丧失"和"共同体的侵蚀"两个严重的问题,自由主义不能包治百病,而且面对着越来越多的挑战,这一切都需要回归共和主义,美国建国的传统是有着所谓的"塑造性政治",即在公民中培养自治所需要的品质的政治的基础,自治、美德、共和都是应有之义,美国未来的发展需要回归到一种政治参与的公共哲学。     

论公共领域理论对共和主义民主思想的修补作用

共和主义民主模式强调公民对政治平等普遍参与的重要性,这似乎使政治权威的合法性基础厚实了起来,但却由于在民主的落实和对公权的限制方面难以独立地建制化而存在着走向乌托邦和导致极权主义暴政的可能性。那么,积极的普遍的政治参与又该在哪里落实呢?公共领域理论所彰显的话语交往民主模式则为之提供了一种可行方案。     

略论孙中山“大亚洲主义”观

孙中山先生是中国民主革命的先驱,一生致力于推翻封建王朝,建立共和体制。孙中山的革命事业,不仅向我们昭示了其孜孜不倦的进取精神和非凡抱负,更为后世留下了伟大而丰富的政治财富。＂大亚洲主义＂即为其中内容之一,体现了孙中山致力于人类和平事业的杰出贡献。     

简论共和与民主的关系

在关于共和与民主关系的讨论中，有些学者有意无意地将共和与民主对立起来，抬高共和贬抑民主甚至主张以共和取代民主。对共和与民主及其关系进行简要的学术梳理，我们发现共和与民主是高度兼容和互相补充的，并不存在共和高于民主和用共和来取代民主的问题，民主与共和理应携手同行。     

美国制宪时期的共和观探微

关于美国制宪时期宪法性质的争论一直不绝于耳,而制宪者对"民主"、"共和"等概念的滥用更使这场争论变得扑朔迷离.通过不同语境下"共和"的内涵探析,使纯粹共和、反联邦党人的共和与麦迪逊的复合共和观得以疏理与阐释.基于对纯粹共和与反联邦党人的共和观的反思与批评,复合共和观力图保持权力与权利之间的平衡.本文分析了美国宪法创立复合共和制的历史逻辑及其宪政意义,以期为其他民主国家宪法的完善提供启示.     

辛亥革命与中国政治的现代化——纪念辛亥革命100周年

辛亥革命是中国政治现代化的开端，建立了中华民国，践行民主立国、共和建国、宪政治国，使中国政治从传统迈向现代，实现了政治形式合法化、政治结构理性化、政治行为多元化。辛亥革命的是非功过，至今招谤涉讼，但遗产丰富，启迪深刻：民主、共和、宪政是政治现代化的历史趋势，也是复杂的社会系统变革，需要立足现实实践，循序渐进，不断发展完善。     

‘New dissidents are but old Provisionals writ large’? The Dynamics of Dissident Republicanism in the New Northern Ireland

This article discusses recent developments in dissident Irish republicanism and some of the arguments advanced to explain its emergence as a factor in Northern Irish politics. In particular it considers those explanations which define these new armed groups as either the latest manifestation of a historically determined Irish republican tradition or simply as ‘residual terrorist groups’ left behind by Provisional republicanism's movement into the constitutional mainstream in the 1990s. It rejects these arguments as ahistorical and schematic, and instead suggests that the dynamics and trajectory of dissident republicanism are shaped instead by the inherent tensions and structures of ‘the new Northern Ireland’. It goes on to compare the contemporary political, social and economic forces that produce the dissidents with the conditions that created the Provisionals as in the early 1970s and concludes that whilst these new groups will continue to pose a threat to the ‘normalization’ of the new dispensation they will not be successful as their republican forebears in mobilizing a significant and sustained challenge to the Northern Irish state.     

Islamic Identity,Nationality and Republicanism in the Process of Islamic Awakening

This paper is going to identify and discuss necessary theoretical principles for reasoning current and future situation of subjects related to Arabic Islamic thoughts. This paper tries to consider typology of vocal groups at Islamic movements involved in the process of Islamic awakening. In this direction, firstly different research approaches will be considered and the main purpose is that how these researches observe the origin of formation of these groups and what is their emphasis in this regard. The key points of their reasoning will be explained and then the explanation, representation and re-definition of these groups are paid attention to. The main idea is that among all analyses and reasoning and view points, the key point is the importance of viewpoint of Islamism in these movements and any analysis will be unreliable reading without reading to this variable,     

European Monarchies: Guardians of Democracy?

How is it possible to account for the continuing presence of monarchy in advanced social democracies? Much traditional political science assumes teleologically that monarchies inevitably transform into republics as a higher form of governance. This comparative study of the eight main European monarchies maintains otherwise: monarchy is perfectly compatible with democracy, and can help strengthen citizens’ loyalty to the system of government. Provided it delivers a politically impartial head of state, monarchy can endure indefinitely with government and popular support. In practice, the countries studied are de facto republics, but with hereditary heads of state who occupy social roles beyond the reach of quotidian politics. Monarchy’s principal danger is not republicanism, but the pressures of conflicting expectations about what is required of royal families, and the relentless intrusions of modern media in an age when royalty and celebrity are in danger of being conflated. Responses to Covid-19 show how monarchs can speak to and for their nations in ways no partisan politician can.     

Republicanism, Freedom from Domination, and the Cambridge Contextual Historians

Philip Pettit, in Republicanism: a Theory of Freedom and Government (1997), draws on the historiography of classical republicanism developed by the Cambridge Contextual Historians, John Pocock and Quentin Skinner, to set up a programme for the recovery of the Roman Republican notion of freedom, as freedom from domination. But it is my purpose to show that classical republicanism, as a theory of institutional complexity and balanced government, could not, and did not, lay exclusive claim to freedom from domination as a defining value. Positive freedom was a concept ubiquitous in Roman Law and promulgated in Natural Law as a universal human right. And it was just the ubiquitousness of this right to freedom, honoured more often in the breach than the observance, which prompted the scorn of early modern proto-feminists like Mary Astell and her contemporary, Judith Drake. The division of society into public and private spheres, which liberalism entrenched, precisely allowed democrats in the public sphere full rein as tyrants in the domestic sphere of the family, as these women were perspicacious enough to observe. When republicanism is defined in exclusively normative terms the rich institutional contextualism drops away, leaving no room for the issues it was designed to address: the problematic relation between values and institutions that lies at the heart of individual freedoms.     

The First Machiavellian Moment in America

Standard interpretations of early American political thought and of the classical‐republican tradition fit uneasily with an overlooked episode in the history of ideas: the reception of Machiavelli in seventeenth‐century New England. Some puritans there not only found ways to justify bad means for good ends but also adopted a deeper, properly political Machiavellism, upholding the priority of popular judgment over elite wisdom and of institutionalized accountability over discretionary political authority. Unlike the eighteenth‐century republicanism that has preoccupied modern scholarship, the theory of radical democracy associated with the first Machiavellian moment in America puts fundamental institutional reform and accountability with teeth on the agenda of democratic theory.     

Liberty, Nobility, Philanthropy, and Power in Alexander Hamilton's Conception of Human Nature

Alexander Hamilton's conception of human nature grounds his political thought. His predominately and radically liberal conception of human nature is based on Locke's concept of liberty, Hobbes's concept of power, and Machiavelli's concept of the "effectual truth." It thus stresses the necessary relation between self-interest and republican government and entails the repudiation of classical republican and Christian political ideals. But Hamilton's love of liberty is nonetheless rooted in a sense of classical nobility and Christian philanthropy that elevates even while contradicting his liberalism. The complex relation between liberty, nobility, philanthropy, and power in Hamilton's conception of human nature, in effect, defines his thought, reveals its assumptions, constitutes its strengths, and poses urgent problems. That complexity forms the spirit of his liberal republicanism.     

Without Regret: The Comprehensive Nature of Non-domination

In this article I examine Rawls's claim that there is no fundamental opposition between political liberalism and republicanism. I contend that Rawls's position is untenable in light of the necessary values and virtues that must accompany republican liberty as non-domination. Furthermore, I examine the 'regret' Rawls has toward some of the 'political virtues' of his approach and argue that if republicans were to have the same attitude, republican liberty as non-domination would be undermined. I conclude that republicanism is likely to be accompanied by values and virtues that affect the whole of an individual's life and therefore can be said to be a comprehensive doctrine.     

Quentin Skinner on the Proper Meaning of Republican Liberty

This article examines Quentin Skinner's revisionist project of reconciling republican liberty and negative freedom. His conceptualisation is analysed in the contexts of both contemporary political theory as well as a historiographical interpretation of Machiavelli. Skinner advances two claims: first, that Machiavelli's idea of liberty is negative freedom, and second, that republicanism shows that liberty is best maintained by the coercive use of the law. I argue that there are two conflicting concepts of the law underlying Skinner's theory. One regards the law as an invisible hand, while the other takes the law to be a liberating agency. Skinner's influence on the emerging juristic paradigm in republicanism is also considered.     

Federalism, Republicanism, and the Northwest Ordinance

The Northwest Ordinance, enacted by the Congress of the Confederationon 13 July 1787, addressed in its own way the two crises facingthe Framers in Philadelphia: the crisis of the Union and thecrisis of republican government. It gave government to the NorthwestTerritory, which had been created for the sake of the Unionand with an eye to the security of republicanism. That territorywas destined to be a matrix of new states, equal members ofthe Union and republican in form. The working out of those principles,commanded by the Declaration and foreshadowing the Constitution,is traced from Jefferson's plan of 1784 to the Ordinance of1787. The uncultivated and intractable character of the frontiersman,making his attachment to the Union and his capacity for self-governmentdubious, presented a special problem. It is seen how the NorthwestOrdinance, establishing government, procuring certain socialand economic conditions, and inducing proper habits and opinions,sought to make the expansion of the Union an extension of republicanism.     

A Strange Drift to the Right: The Civic Historiography of Michael Sandel

Michael Sandel's Democracy's Discontent strives to contribute to the project of "democratic theory," which aims to bring people together across ideological differences. Sandel wants to revitalize citizenship by uniting religious conservatives and those committed to a more just political economy through an appeal to the American tradition of civic republicanism. However, his project is fundamentally incoherent. First, Sandel's narrative conflates the republican and religious aspects of the American founding, ignoring the fact that civic republican political theory actually developed in direct opposition to the ideal of a Christian polity. Second, his version of civic republicanism deviates from the historic tradition in a way that renders it much more conservative than it actually was and might still be. Third, his reading of American history consistently highlights conservative themes. Consequently, Sandel ultimately undercuts the progressive aspects of his own vision, detracting from rather than contributing to the transideological aspirations of "democratic theory."