Voters AS A Hard Budget Constraint: On the Determination of Intergovernmental Grants

Recent empirical literature has shown that the determination of intergovernmental grants is highly influenced by the political bargaining power of the recipient states. In these models federal politicians are assumed to buy the support of state voters, state politicians and state interest groups by providing grants. In this paper we provide evidence that the fiscal referendum reduces the reliance of states on matching grants received from the central government and thus the possibility of interest groups and state bureaucrats to obtain more grants. If referendums are available, voters serve as a hard budget constraint.     

An Implicit Contract Theory of Intergovernmental Grants

A central puzzle in the economic analysis of intergovernmentalgrants in a federal polity is the conflict between the predictionsof the standard theory and empirical observation. Standard theoryhas no explanation for the widely observed fact that "moneysticks where it hits," that is, for the "flypaper effect" fromspecific, non-matching grants. This effect is observed whengrants that apparently are the economic equivalents of generalrevenue grants have the consequences to be expected from matchingspecific grants. We propose a resolution. Most grants are accompaniedby an implicit as well as an explicit contract between grantorand recipient. The purpose of these contracts is to influencethe behavior of the recipient, by making the size of the streamof grants conditional upon the recipient's responses to thewishes of the donor.     

社会建设视野下基本公共服务均等化的价值考量

加强社会建设是当前我国一项重大的战略任务.社会建设视野下基本公共服务均等化的价值主要在于以人为本,促进人的全面发展;公平正义,和谐发展;权利保障,共同富裕;关注民生、改善民生等四个方面.     

关于国家助学金工作中出现的问题及对策思考

在现行的高校助学体系中,助学金是帮助贫困生解决经济问题,顺利完成学业的一项重要资助政策。当前的高校对助学金工作十分重视,但是在助学金实际工作中存在着一些问题尚待解决,影响了助学金的效果。从助学金工作实际出发,提出当前助学金工作中存在的问题和难点,并分析问题产生原因,提出相应的解决对策,使助学金工作的顺利有效开展。     

Goal Conflict and Fund Diversion in Federal Grants to the States

Researchers using fiscal choice models have had limited success predicting fund diversion in federal grant programs. The application of a principal-agent framework to questions of fiscal federalism offered a potentially valuable alternative approach, but the traditional model employed by Chubb (1985) neglected potential variability in the degree of goal conflict between principals and agents. This article proposes an expanded framework, which incorporates the possibility of variation in goal conflict between participants in intergovernmental aid programs. The theory suggests that the level of policy congruence between recipient jurisdictions and the national government will determine the amount of grant funding diverted away from targeted policy areas. Findings from analyses of grant programs in two distinct policy areas support the hypothesis that grant effectiveness is partially a function of goal congruence. The relationship between intergovernmental partners is interactive, with the degree of policy agreement determining fund diversion in subnational jurisdictions, as well as the effectiveness of federal oversight activities. The findings have important theoretical implications for understanding both fiscal federalism and principal-agent relationships more generally.     

Incentive Effects of Expanding Federal Mass Transit Formula Grants

Public subsidies to industries firms incentives to alter their behavior. When calculating the effects of such programs, previous assessments of transit subsidies have not included the effects of these incentives on the firms' output. This article reports the responses of mass transit firms to the federal transit subsidy program and changes the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA 21) made to that program, as predicted by a structural model of output choice. TEA 21 increases bus service in medium‐sized cities by 6‐8 percent, butincreases service in large cities by only 1‐2 percent. The formula's incentive tier is weak, and the size of the subsidy depends little on whether that output results in increased ridership. The formula could be redesigned to provide stronger incentives to lower cost and increase ridership, thus encouraging a more efficient response from transit firms. © 2001 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

关于安防视频监控技术之设计

视频监控系统发展到今天,已经进入了网络视频监控的阶段,它主要是由视频监控前端和视频监控管理平台两大部分组成。视频监控管理平台的设计包括视频监控服务器、信息处理模块和业务功能模块的设计,网络监控客户端的设计包括数据接收模块、信令处理模块、用户界面设计。     

Federal Grants and Local Capital Improvements: The Impact of Reagan Budgets

Changes in intergovernmental grants for local capital improvements during the Reagan Administration are explored from a national perspective and from the experiences of two mid-sized communities, Tulsa, Oklahoma and Toledo, Ohio. Nationally, a roller coaster pattern was identified with a strong down-turn in the most recent data and a notable shift from redevelopment to expansion/development grants such as highway and airport construction. Locally, the first dilemma is that the change in the mix of grants available is having a greater impact on the older Toledo than the newer Tulsa because their capital needs vary. Yet as federal grants declined, both cities responded affirmatively by raising new local revenues for capital improvements. The second dilemma is that the differences in their wealth and needs make revenue enhancement more difficult for Toledo than Tulsa.     

住宅设计中的人文理念

随着我国经济社会的发展,住宅的设计理念正在发生着悄悄的然而又是十分显著的变化,这种变化表现在住宅的区位设计、住宅的内部空间设计和住宅的体型设计中,住宅设计中的人文理念日益凸显.     

Block Grants: A Perennial, But Unstable, Tool of Government

During 1995 and 1996, the Congress and the president gave considerableattention to block granting over $200 billion in federal intergovernmentalgrant programs, ranging from large entitlement programs to smallerprograms in housing, vocational education, and law enforcement.In the end, the record of successes was modest—highlightedby welfare-reform legislation that, in some respects, resembleda block grant and in others did not. The contrast between processand outcomes in this most recent block-grant cycle reinforcesthe point that block-grant prospects depend on fundamental fiscal,political, and programmatic forces that are separate from federalismconsiderations. The states' maturation as leaders in many domesticpolicy areas strengthens the performance rationale for blockgrants. The federal fiscal crisis will continue to stimulateinterest in block grants among fedeal as well as state policymakers.The proposals offering the greatest fiscal advantage (i.e.,Medicaid and AFDC) may not be those with the strongest performancerationale. Although recent congressional developments suggeststronger support for states, nationalizing forces remain embeddedin domestic policymaking. Thus, substantial questions remain,posing obstacles to a fundamental and sustained role for blockgrants in the federal system.     

Political Economy of Grant Allocations: The Case of Federal Highway Demonstration Grants

This article examines the political economy of U.S. federalhighway demonstration grant allocations. Demonstration grantsare a rapidly growing segment of federal highway grants directlyearmarked for a congressional district by Congress, unlike themajority of highway grants where Congress determines a formulaand allocates funds accordingly to states. Our empirical analysis,considering the period 1983–2003, suggests that a state'sability to attract demonstration project grants is positivelyinfluenced by its contributions to the highway trust fund andpolitical variables, and it is not affected by the formula highwayaid and vehicle miles traveled in a state.     

Intergovernmental Grants: A Formal Model of Interrelated National and Subnational Political Decisions

Intergovernmental grants are based on the interrelated choicesof: (i) the national government deciding whether to offer thegrant; (ii) the national government determining grant conditions;(iii) the subnational government deciding whether to acceptthe grant; and (iv) the subnational government determining policy,including spending levels, upon grant receipt. Empirically andtheoretically, scholars often study these decisions separately,leading to an incomplete understanding of grant-related behavior.This article develops a noncooperative game theoretic modelthat simultaneously captures all four of these decisions. Thisapproach helps to better explain puzzles surrounding intergovernmentalgrants, including the ‘flypaper effect,’ asymmetricresponses of recipient governments to grant increases and decreases,the grant-acceptance decisions of subnational governments, andtradeoffs between the size of grants and the strings that areattached.     

Targeting Federal Grants: The Community Development Experience, 1950-1986

This article examines the degree to which federal communityand economic development programs target federal assistanceto the nation's neediest communities. Grant allocations to citieswith populations of 50,000 or more were examined for six majorfederal urban programs during 1950–1986. Federal programsthat include both needs-based eligibility and allocational featureswere found to achieve the highest levels of targeting. The analysisfurther shows that while urban conditions in the nation's mostdistressed cities continued to deteriorate during the 1980sin both relative and absolute terms, grant allocations underthe major federal urban program, Community Development BlockGrants, have not responded to the changing incidence of urbanhardship.     

Targeting Benefits for Electoral Gain: Constituency Marginality and the Distribution of Grants to English Local Authorities

We model the spatial allocation of resources over constituencies as an optimization problem in which governing parties face uncertainty about voter preferences, but seek to increase their chances of getting re-elected. We show that a rational government should allocate extra resources to marginal constituencies and especially favour opposition-held marginals. We test this hypothesis on data about central government grants to larger English local authorities. We consider whether Conservative controlled and 'flagship' local authorities also benefit. Our empirical results suggest that the government allocated around £500 million more to local authorities containing marginal constituencies and around £155 million more to 'flagship' local authorities than they could have been expected to get on the criteria of social need and population.