The symbiotic tensions of the regulatory–carceral state: The case of cannabis legalization

Recent scholarship has emphasized the need to develop a polymorphic conceptualization of the regulatory state. This article contributes to this theory-building project by outlining a research agenda for exploring the symbiotic interactions and tensions between the regulatory and carceral morphs of the state. Using the case study of cannabis legalization reforms in the United States, we argue that the legitimation deficits of the carceral state stimulate the proliferation of new regulatory frameworks for governing social problems that were traditionally handled by the criminal justice system. We demonstrate how the polymorphic approach illuminates the ways in which the regulatory and carceral morphs of the state compete for influence over shared policy domains, but also complement and reinforce one another. Thus, rather than precipitating the demise of the carceral state, cannabis legalization reforms sustain a bifurcated governance structure perpetuating long-standing patterns of using drug law as a means for racialized social control.     

社会纠纷解决中的国家权力与社会权力

福柯的权力场理论认为,权力是一种生产性的互动结构,权力致力于生产、培育和规范各种力量,权力及其主体是多元的。“维稳政治”的本质是“（国家）权力维稳”,是依靠国家强制力对社会纠纷当事人进行胁迫与压制,其结果是越维稳越不稳。“治理政治”要求国家治理能力和治理体系现代化,社会纠纷解决的权力机制必须多元化、多样化,社会权力应当成为社会纠纷解决的基础性权力。在社会纠纷解决机制中,国家权力与社会权力是一种良性互动关系,不是命令与服从、领导与被领导关系。     

中央权威的宪政之道

中央权威是指中央权力在国家权力结构中所享有的独占性威望和最高强制力。中央权威的宪政之道是对国家法治战略之中央权力宪法安排的解读。社会主义法治意识形态是我国宪法精神的集中表达,是央地权力共同的价值基础和信仰支撑;从政策治国向依法治国转变是宪法之依法治国战略的基本要求,它为中央权威提供了更具连续性和公正性的合法性基础;落实全国人大及其常委会的最高监督权和加强中央司法权威的控制力,是宪法国家权力结构的内在需求,也是加强中央权威的根本宪政途径;宪法意义上的地方分权是地方权力对中央权威的一种回应性诉求,也是宪政权力纵向配置的一种内在机理。     

The British Regulatory State under the Coalition Government: Volatile Stability Continued

What have been the effects of coalition government on the British regulatory state? This article argues that the politics of regulation have been largely about a continuation of existing patterns, namely volatile stability rather than more far‐reaching change. The British regulatory state continues to be defined by boundary conflicts between the world of ‘politics’ and ‘regulation’, by conflicting calls for centralisation and decentralised autonomy, and by tensions between the wish to ‘reduce’ regulation and the realisation of inherent complexities.     

China's new generation trade agreements: Importing rules to lock in domestic reform?

Since the beginning of the 21st century we have witnessed a proliferation of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) in Asia Pacific. China has been at the forefront of this development. Initially, China's PTAs were very shallow and mainly aimed at building friendly relationships with developing countries. However, over time, China has started to negotiate deeper PTAs with developing and developed countries alike. This notable shift has thus far been understood to result from four broad motivations: China's desire to access key export markets; the facilitation of regional production networks; to address resource security concerns; and/or to further geostrategic interests and political influence. We propose that these motives are not sufficient to fully account for China's new generation trade agreements. We suggest that China is increasing its integration into the world economy to push for domestic marketization and reform by credibly committing to trade liberalization through PTAs. Deep and comprehensive PTAs oblige a country to follow a set of rules that leave little leeway to violate the terms. In order to successfully implement and enforce PTA commitments, China has also gradually strengthened its regulatory state by investing in regulatory capacity and capability in the field of trade policy. We test the plausibility of our argument through an in-depth analysis of the PTAs signed by China since 2000 and find evidence that China's PTAs are indeed in part driven by a desire to lock in domestic economic reform, which has gone hand in hand with a strengthening of its regulatory state.