Accountability and global governance: The view from paternalism

A standard view is that global governance institutions require strong accountability mechanisms to perform effectively and legitimately. Yet these institutions are much better at preaching than practicing accountability. A standard explanation for this gap references interests. For various reasons, institutions and their creators would rather be less than more accountable, and they are quite content to live with the hypocrisy. This article points to an alternative possibility: the public interest. An article of faith is that modern governance should be staffed by relatively autonomous experts who use their specialized knowledge for the greater good; accordingly, they cannot be accountable to those who are affected by their decisions. Too much democracy, therefore, can be a source of dysfunction. Yet expert authority's virtues also can become vices; namely, insulation from those affected by their decisions can also be a source of dysfunction, most closely associated with the “iron cage.” Although the possibility that expertise is both a virtue (effectiveness) and a vice (dysfunction) is well known in the literature on domestic governance, it has been neglected in discussions of global governance. Indeed, the dangers of, and dysfunctions associated with the iron cage might be greater in global governance than in domestic governance precisely because of the absence of institutional checks that often are produced by a preexisting social contract between the rulers and the ruled. I probe this possibility in the area of humanitarian governance.     

Governance in Central Government: Reconciling Accountability and Capability

Governance structures in central government departments are poorly articulated. Departmental boards were imported from the private sector; in central government their remit and accountability are obscure, as is their role in relation to Permanent Secretaries and Ministers—whose leadership roles are also muddled. This brings costs for Ministers, departments and the public. Improvements have proved elusive, in part because an underlying confusion has been neglected—about how bodies subject to the almost unlimited democratic accountability of Ministers are to be governed. The confusion can be cleared up, principles of governance formulated, and concrete improvements proposed. These include: better articulation of Permanent Secretaries' presumptive leadership role; strengthened lines of external accountability; and more coherent provisions for the role and accountabilities of boards, and their relationship with Ministers, Permanent Secretaries, and the centre of government. Such changes should improve accountability, leadership, capability and delivery.     

Civil Society in World Politics: How Accountable are Transnational CSOs?

Transnational civil society organizations (CSOs) are often said to lack accountability. Taking issue with this claim, we report the results of a study on the accountability regimes of 60 transnational CSOs engaging in political advocacy. We scrutinize their transparency, opportunities for internal participation, evaluations and self-regulation, complaint procedures, and their independence from the state and intergovernmental organizations. We find that most transnational CSOs are reasonably transparent and offer participatory opportunities at least for members. They are organizationally independent from states and intergovernmental organizations, but dependencies on public funding are striking in some cases. Independent evaluations of their activities are scarce and codes of conduct, often suggested as an avenue towards better self-regulation of CSOs, do not seem to play a major role in practice. We conclude that the debate over transnational CSO accountability should focus on the most critical issues. In the case of general interest organizations, this seems to be the danger of co-optation through public financing. Special interest organizations, by contrast, are highly independent but have deficits in external transparency, especially regarding their budget.     

American standards: definition and differentiation through nonprofit regulation

Nongovernmental organizations are deeply enmeshed in global governance, as promoters and, increasingly, subjects of regulation. Focusing on the proliferation of self-regulatory initiatives, this article asks: Why do NGOs adopt governance initiatives? Do their subsequent regulatory experiences match their expectations? It investigates these questions through the analysis of InterAction, the American international NGO alliance, and its PVO Standards. Based on interviews with NGO leaders, it emphasizes collective meaning over material benefit: American NGOs constitute themselves as American NGOs through standards, with which they underscore their professionalism and market orientation. These gains do not accrue equally, however, with large, central organizations perceived to benefit most from regulation.     

Contracting for Indigenous Health Care: Towards Mutual Accountability

In Australia and other industrialised countries, governments contract with the non‐government sector for the provision of primary health care to indigenous peoples. Australian governments have developed policies and funding programs to support this health sector, but the current arrangements are unduly complex and fragmented. The results of our study show that the complex contractual environment for Aboriginal Community‐Controlled Health Services (ACCHSs) and their funders is an unintended but inevitable result of a quasi‐classical approach to contracts applied by multiple funders. The analysis in this article highlights potential policy and program changes that could improve the effectiveness of funding and accountability arrangements, based on the use of an alliance contracting model, better performance indicators and greater clarity in the relative roles of national and jurisdictional governments.     

Evidence Based Policy: Principles of Transparency and Accountability

This article provides a practical guide for improving the quality of evidence‐based policy. Rather than adopting an approach that gives priority to particular types of research methodologies, this paper argues that evidence drawn from any methodology will improve if standards of transparency and accountability are followed in the process of gathering, analysing, interpreting, and presenting evidence for policy. The papers details what these standards of transparency and accountability mean in practice, how these standards can be achieved, and possible limits to their adoption.     

In Search of Public Accountability: The 'Wenling Model' in China

This article specifically attempts to answer two interrelated research questions: firstly, how do democratic consultation assemblies (DCAs) heighten public accountability in the current institutional setting of China's sub-provincial localities?; and secondly, what can be learned, from the Chinese case, in relation to achieving public accountability elsewhere? To address the first question, this article will explore two particular variations of the DCAs, and will focus on the interplay between the managerial and democratic accountability orientations to address the second question.     

Understanding multi-purpose hybrid voluntary organizations: The contributions of theories on civil society,social movements and non-profit organizations

Abstract

The paper offers a theoretical framework to study the conditions that lead to the emergence of multi-purpose hybrid voluntary organizations and the factors that influence their ability to mobilize resources and enlist commitment. These organizations are characterized by four interrelated attributes: (a) they set out as their mission to uphold and promote cultural values that are typically at variant with dominant and institutionalized values; (b) they offer services to members and the public that express their distinct values, using the services as a model and catalyst for social change; (c) in addition to their instrumental goals, they aim to meet the expressive and social identity needs of their members by promoting a collective identity; and (d) they evolve into hybrid organizations by having multiple purposes—combining to various degrees goals of value change, service provision and mutual-aid. Because they deliberately combine features of volunteer-run associations, social movements and non-profit service organizations, we articulate a theoretical framework that melds concepts and propositions from the various theoretical perspectives used to study each of these organizational forms. We argue that the expanded theoretical framework offers a more comprehensive and dynamic view of civil society and a better perspective to the study of third sector organizations.     

Audit for Accountability in China: An Incomplete Mission

This article argues against the conventional wisdom that accountability is the raison d'être of auditing activities. Audit, admittedly, is a part of the accountability architecture as it contributes to the financial health of a government and the effective management of public money. This does not mean, however, that audit necessarily generates accountability. China's experience with establishing a power audit regime shows that without enabling goals, impartial structural arrangements, and effective procedures, auditing for accountability only remains an incomplete mission.     

Legitimacy and the Rise of NGOs: the Global and Local in South Asia

We extend sociological institutionalist theory and draw on evidence from South Asia to develop a research agenda for studying how nongovernmental organization (NGO) legitimacy plays out in national and local arenas. After first presenting a sociological institutionalist approach to nongovernmental organizing, we extend it into three areas: national laws governing international and domestic NGOs, growth in domestic NGOs, and the situated interactions among international organizations, nation-states, local organizations, and other actors. (1) International and domestic NGOs are governed by national laws, and we sketch the history of such laws in South Asia to hypothesize a pattern of legal change leading to the present social concern about accountability. (2) Sociological institutionalism suggests that domestic NGO growth is related to the presence of international NGOs and can be interpreted as the diffusion of formal organization. (3) We conceptualize the situated interactions of the plethora of actors as a meso realm at the interface of the global and local. The interrelations of these actors are marked by tensions and conflict. There are many permutations of how they coalesce, not always along a global—local cleavage, and there is a need to examine the full range of interactions. We explore some of these and it seems that actors use accountability strategically in their conflicts with others. The ‘uses of accountability’ in contesting legitimacy within such situations is proposed as a fruitful research direction.     

Enhancing Public Accountability for Developing Countries: Major Constraints and Strategies

Many Asian countries are attempting to promote public accountability as a part of public-sector reform, but their situation remains unsatisfactory compared to advanced countries. Except for a few, many Asian developing countries are still struggling with political and socioeconomic weaknesses. Indeed, the nature of public sector reform in many Asian developing countries differs substantially from that of advanced countries. Furthermore, the concept of accountability is not interpreted equally throughout the world. Accordingly, the purpose of this article is to review the major constraints to enhancing public accountability in Asian developing countries and to discuss major strategies to promote such accountability from the perspective of developing countries. This article first reviews the concept of accountability and its development, followed by discussion of constraints in enhancing public accountability and public sector reform, key measures to enhance public accountability, and implications and conclusions.     

The Accountability Priorities of Australian Parliamentarians

Managerialist reforms to the public service, as part of the drive for improved efficiency and effectiveness, sought to reorient the accountability priorities of parliamentarians away from a supposedly excessive concern with process and results and more towards results (outputs and outcomes). To what extent, if any, have the accountability priorities of parliamentarians changed over the last two decades? Content analysis of a sample of estimates committee hearings dealing with six departments over three selected years (1986, 1992 and 2003) reveals a marked increase in attention to outputs and a correspondingly decreased focus on inputs (with little change in concern for process), thus confirming a managerialist trend. At the same time, Senators' explicit references to departments' budget documentation and annual reports fell away noticeably with the introduction of the outcomes and outputs framework which is therefore failing their accountability needs.     

Contracting in local public organizations: the institutional economics perspective

The institutional economics is one of the approaches to explain the utility of contracting of local public service provision. This paper described and critiqued the assumptions underlying institutional economics as it is used in organization theories. It also explains whether and why these assumptions hold in public sector organizations. Finally, it discusses implications from the institutional economics approach for the local agency. Local agencies taking new institutional economics perspective as the basis for its contracting decisions should take transaction risks and information asymmetry into account. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

行政问责制与行政自责文化建设

我国行政问责正由“权力问责”走向“制度问责”。而问责制要真正产生实效,必须有相应的行政问责文化来支持。在行政问责制的建立健全过程中,加强行政自责文化的培育十分重要和紧迫。为此,必须积极推进我国政治文明及行政文化的现代化进程,塑造公务员的现代品格,加快行政自责的制度化、法制化建设,营造良好的社会及政治环境,推进责任型政府建设。     

From Accountability to Assurance – Stakeholder Perspectives in Local Government

This article reports on research which sought to explore the understanding of accountability for performance amongst constituents of local government in Western Australia. Recent trends to increase the public accountability and financial reporting requirements for local governments underline the need to understand the value and use made of this performance information by local government constituents.     

NGO Accountability from an NGO Perspective: Perceptions,Strategies, and Practices

Extant research in the nonprofit literature focuses on non‐governmental organization (NGO) accountability, framing it relationally. We examine the interplay of several constitutive elements of NGO–donor relationships based on narratives of NGO executives and other staff: NGO perceptions of accountability and of their donors, their assumptions about donor perceptions of the NGO role and expectations of NGO accountability, and their responses to shifts in donor funding. We argue that perceptions and practices of accountability do not only determine to whom an NGO should be primarily accountable but also shape NGO behavior and alter dependence on donors. As such, accountability is not necessarily a consequence of a relationship, but more likely a constitutive element of the relationship. While a favorable response to donor interests might signify upward accountability, it might also suggest that NGOs are more assertive about managing their institutional environments, thereby mitigating their dependence on donors. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Decentralization in Tanzania: An assessment of local government discretion and accountability

A large part of the decentralization literature is fragmented along political, fiscal, or administrative lines. In this article we employ a diagnostic framework to draw these dimensions together in a coherent manner to focus on analyzing local government discretion and accountability in Tanzania. Tanzania seems to have a deconcentrated local government system with central appointees having large powers at the local level. Centrally‐funded mandates—such as constructing secondary schools—dominate local government plans and budgets. Central control over administrative functions has ensured that administrative decentralization is yet to occur. In the fiscal sphere, progress has been made in transparency and harmonization of transfers in the last 5 years but local governments still have some way to go in raising own revenues, being less reliant on transfers, and ensuring downward accountability. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.