Unity and conflict: Explaining financial industry lobbying success in European Union public consultations

This article examines the contingent nature of financial industry lobbying power in the context of the policy formation stage of six European Commission regulatory proposals. I argue that lobbying success is a function of how well finance is able to speak with a unified voice. Building on existing studies, I examine industry unity as explicit preference alignment between actors but also in terms of actors abstaining from stating preferences. Staying silent on an issue sends signals to policymakers about issue saliency and industry support. Using a novel dataset derived from document coding and interviews, I examine the impact of industry unity on lobbying success in shaping six financial regulatory proposals in the context of the European Union. My findings show that lobbying success is partially contingent on the extent to which finance is united behind a common position. Critically, however, lobbying success is also related to the nature of that position, whether supporting the proposal or whether in favor of strengthening or weakening regulatory stringency.     

Self‐interest in new wrapping: “Appeal to the public interest” as a topos in lobbying

This article explores public affairs and lobbying strategies that make public appeals beyond organizational self‐interest and instead focus on appeals to the public interest. While research has highlighted such appeals as a staple for lobbying campaigns, there is scant research exploring the communicative construction of this notion. Thus, this article uses the rhetorical concept of topos to explore how lobbyists attempt to fuse their private interests with a broader appeal to what is best for society. In particular, we discuss how different types of organizations have different rhetorical opportunities to ground their arguments. Finally, we discuss the democratic implications of appeals to the public interest as a standard lobbying strategy.     

Legitimacy through targeted transparency? Regulatory effectiveness and sustainability of lobbying regulation in the European Union

Regulating interest groups’ access to decision makers constitutes a key dimension of legitimate and accountable systems of government. The European Union explicitly links lobbying regulation with the democratic credentials of its supranational system of governance and proposes transparency as a solution to increase legitimacy and regulate private actors’ participation in policy making. This lobbying regulation regime consists of a Transparency Register that conditions access to decision makers upon joining it and complying with its information disclosure requirements. The extent to which transparency‐based regulatory regimes are successful in ensuring effective regulation of targeted actors and in being recognised as a legitimate instrument of governance constitutes a key empirical question. Therefore, the study asks: Do stakeholders perceive the transparency‐based EU lobbying regulation regime to be a legitimate form of regulatory governance? The study answers by building on a classic model of targeted transparency and proposes perceived regulatory effectiveness and sustainability as two key dimensions on which to evaluate the legitimacy of the Register. The arguments are tested on a new dataset reporting the evaluations of 1,374 stakeholders on the design and performance of the EU lobbying regulation regime. The findings describe a transparency regime that scores low in perceived effectiveness and moderate to low in sustainability. Citizens criticise the quality of information disclosed and the Register's performance as a transparency instrument. The Register did not effectively bridge the information gap between the public and interest groups about supranational lobbying. In terms of sustainability, interest organisations appreciate the systemic benefits of transparency, but identify few organisation‐level benefits. Organisations that are policy insiders incur more transparency costs so they instrumentally support transparency only insofar it suits their lobbying strategies and does not threaten their position. Insiders support including additional categories of organisations in the Register's regulatory remit but not more types of interactions with policy makers. They support an imperfect regulatory status quo to which they have adapted but lack incentives to support increased transparency and information disclosure. Targeted transparency proves an ineffective approach to regulating interest groups’ participation in EU policy making, constituting a suboptimal choice for ensuring transparent, accountable and legitimate supranational lobbying.     

Sharing natural resource management responsibility: Examining the New Zealand rock lobster co-management experience

Co-management, in which government and resource users share responsibility for managing a natural resource, is attracting considerable attention in both public policy and common pool resource research. However, little is understood about how this approach arises in a mature regulatory setting, or about its strengths and weaknesses. This study uses the experience of the New Zealand rock lobster (Jasus edwardsii and Sagmariasus verreauxi) industry to illustrate what co-management is and how it develops. This is followed by an assessment of co-management in this regime. Development of co-management is an evolutionary process that requires commitment from both government and industry. Strengthened property rights and management expertise provide the incentives and tools to develop a robust co-management regime. However the characteristics of the property rights bundle must be carefully matched to the regime’s biological, social, and regulatory setting.     

Diluted regulations—a need to review the theoretical classification of the different lobbying regulatory environments

Regulation has been claimed to be acquired by the industry, yet while the economic regulation was often established with the approval and encouragement of the regulated industry, social regulation has usually been thrust upon industry following demands by public interest groups. Why would the social regulation still fail to produce behaviour, or results in accordance with the public interest, if the public interest groups initiated it? The failure to define clearly the concept of ‘public interest’ and the absence of adequately clear regulatory objectives would not provide all the convincing answers. The wish of the politicians to respond to a mischief before public concern dies down, seems to point towards the symbolic politics claims. Although lobbying is integral to democratic politics, it challenges the policy making process as the risks and opportunities associated with policy change are large. Lobbying regulations, belonging to the social regulations fold, have been observed as symbolic in Israel and are diluted by tricky loopholes. Recent research has used data from Centre of Public Integrity (CPI) in order to theoretically classify different regulatory environments. The CPI measures only what the law says, but it does not measure the outcome—the application of the law. This paper points out that the possible interaction of symbolic politics with social regulation may lead to the reoccurring legislative void, resulting in the dilution effect of the lobbying regulations, and it highlights the need to review the theoretical classification, and thereby, also the actual strength of the different regulatory environments. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Catholic Lobby: Structures,Policy Styles and Religious Networks

This article is about the place of lobbying by the Catholic Church in contemporary Australian federal politics. It builds on some previous attention by political scientists to Catholic political campaigning (eg, Hogan 1978, 1993 ; see also Byrnes 1993 ), but it is more comprehensive. Discussion of such lobbying uses various terminology and, like much lobbying, it can be viewed in a normative sense either favourably or unfavourably, as democratic or undemocratic. During the parliamentary debate in December 1996 on the anti‐euthanasia private members bill introduced by Kevin Andrews, for instance, Nick Dondas (Country Liberal, Northern Territory) alleged that ‘the debate has been driven by the Catholic community of this country’. To which his Catholic colleague Tony Abbott (Liberal, New South Wales), alleging that Dondas had blamed the bill on the ‘Catholic lobby’, responded that ‘those comments were beneath him’. ¹     

Institutional Arrangements and Logrolling: Evidence from the European Union

This article illustrates how voting rules used to pass a piece of legislation and the structure of the legislation, in terms of whether or not it has single or multiple issue dimensions, influence the frequency and the purpose of position changes in legislative negotiations. Through analysis of data on a set of legislative proposals negotiated in the European Union, I show that position changes are less common under unanimity rule than under majority rule. More importantly, I argue and show that when the negotiated legislation is multidimensional (i.e., contains multiple issues) and the voting rule is unanimity, position changing is a lucrative strategy for legislators. Multidimensional legislation creates opportunities for logrolling, and legislators’ veto power under the unanimity rule enables them to exploit these opportunities. Accordingly, under this scenario, legislators often engage in what I call a within‐legislation logroll and secure favorable legislative outcomes.     

Regulating Lobbyists: A Comparative Analysis of the United States, Canada, Germany and the European Union

Lobbying is central to the democratic process. Yet, only four political systems have lobbying regulations: the United States, Canada, Germany and the EU (most particularly, the European Parliament). Despite the many works offering individual country analysis of lobbying legislation, a twofold void exists in the literature. Firstly, no study has offered a comparative analysis classifying the laws in these four political systems, which would improve understanding of the different regulatory environments. Secondly, few studies have analysed the views of key agents—politicians, lobbyists and regulators—and how these compare and contrast across regulatory environments.
We firstly utilise an index measuring how strong the regulations are in each of the systems, and develop a classification scheme for the different 'ideal' types of regulatory environment. Secondly, we measure the opinions of political actors, interest groups and regulators in all four systems (through questionnaires and elite interviews) and see what correlations, if any, exist between the different ideal types of system and their opinions. The conclusion highlights our findings, and the lessons that can be used by policy-makers in systems without lobbying legislation.     

Politicized CSR: How corporate political activity (mis-)uses political CSR

In this article, we posit that corporate political activities (CPA) such as lobbying make use of corporate social responsibility (CSR) to advance instrumental goals. We juxtapose the theoretical foundations of the normative concept of political CSR and the strategic notion of nonmarket strategy to show that they are in opposition conceptually regarding the role of corporations in public policy. Using a systematic theoretical comparison along seven dimensions, we discuss the juxtapositions and identify the common ground of the two theories. Building on examples from the alcohol industry, we describe how CPA uses instrumental CSR to advance goals in public policy—we call this politicized CSR. Hence, we illustrate the shift from political to politicized CSR, a misuse of CSR for purposes of CPA, and discuss consequences for the theory and practice of public affairs and CSR.     

If you like the alternative vote (a.k.a. the instant runoff), then you ought to know about the Coombs rule

We consider four factors relevant to picking a voting rule to be used to select a single candidate from among a set of choices: (1) avoidance of Condorcet losers, (2) choice of Condorcet winners, (3) resistance to manipulability via strategic voting, (4) simplicity. However, we do not try to evaluate all voting rules that might be used to select a single alternative. Rather, our focus is restricted to a comparison between a rule which, under the name ‘instant runoff,’ has recently been pushed by electoral reformers in the US to replace plurality-based elections, and which has been advocated for use in plural societies as a means of mitigating ethnic conflict; and another similar rule, the ‘Coombs rule.’ In both rules, voters are required to rank order candidates. Using the instant runoff, the candidate with the fewest first place votes is eliminated; while under the Coombs rule, the candidate with the most last place votes is eliminated. The instant runoff is familiar to electoral system specialists under the name ‘alternative vote’ (i.e., the single transferable vote restricted to choice of a single candidate). The Coombs rule has gone virtually unmentioned in the electoral systems literature (see, however, Chamberlin et al., 1984). Rather than considering the properties of these two rules in the abstract, we evaluate them in the politically realistic situations where voters are posited to have (at least on balance) single-peaked preferences over alternatives. Evaluating the two rules under this assumption, we argue that the Coombs rule is directly comparable in that Coombs is always as good as AV with respect to two of our four criteria and it is clearly superior to AV with respect to one of the four criteria, namely criterion (2), and is potentially inferior only with respect to criterion (3). Key to this argument are two new propositions. The first new result shows that, under the posited assumption, for four alternatives or fewer, AV is always as likely or more likely to select the Condorcet winner than plurality. The second new result shows that, under the same assumptions, the Coombs rule will always select the Condorcet winner regardless of the number of alternatives.     

Optimal team and individual decision rules in uncertain dichotomous situations

In this paper, we consider the problem of determining the optimalteam decision rules in uncertain, binary (dichotomous) choice situations. We show that the Relative (Receiver) Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve plays a pivotal role in characterizing these rules. Specifically, the problem of finding the optimal aggregation rule involves finding a set ofcoupled operating points on the individual ROCs. Introducing the concept of a team ROC curve, we extend the method of characterizing decision capabilities of an individual decisionmaker (DM) to a team of DMs. Given the operating points of the individual DMs on their ROC curves, we show that the best aggregation rule is a likelihood ratio test. When the individual opinions are conditionally independent, the aggregation rule is a weighted majority rule, but with different asymmetric weights for the yes and no decisions. We show that the widely studied weighted majority rule with symmetric weights is a special case of the asymmetric weighted majority rule, wherein the competence level of each DM corresponds to the intersection of the main diagonal and the DM's ROC curve. Finally, we demonstrate that the performance of the team can be improved by jointly optimizing the aggregation rule and the individual decision rules, the latter possibly requiring a shift from the isolated (non-team) optimal operating point of each DM.Research supported by NSF grant #IRI-8902755 and ONR contract #N0014-90-J-1753.     

New Public Governance in the Baltic States: Flexible Administration and Rule Bending

Abstract

The New Public Governance approach advocates a more flexible and participatory public administration as means to higher efficiency and increased legitimacy. Increasing flexibility and thereby public employees’ discretion, however, may pose a risk to equality and impartiality, core values in democratic and rule-of-law societies. Using a survey among Baltic public employees, this article explores this risk. We ask whether public employees’ preferences for flexible rule application go hand in hand with acceptance of bending the rules, even if it means a breach of impartiality. We find that this is the case. We also find that contrary to what the New Public Governance approach expects, neither citizen participation nor generalized trust works as a control on rule bending. On a positive note, however, we find that control mechanisms associated with Weberian Public Administration lessen acceptance for bending the rules.     

Public orchestration,social networks,and transnational environmental governance: Lessons from the aviation industry

This article contributes to current debates on the potential and limitations of transnational environmental governance, addressing in particular the issue of how private and public regulation compete and/or reinforce each other – and with what results. One of the most influential approaches to emerge in recent years has been that of “orchestration.” But while recent discussions have focused on a narrow interpretation of orchestration as intermediation, we argue that there is analytical traction in studying orchestration as a combination of directive and facilitative tools. We also argue that a social network analytical perspective on orchestration can improve our understanding of how governments and international organizations can shape transnational environmental governance. Through a case study of aviation, we provide two contributions to these debates: first, we propose four analytical factors that facilitate the possible emergence of orchestration (issue visibility, interest alignment, issue scope, and regulatory fragmentation and uncertainty); and second, we argue that orchestrators are more likely to succeed when they employ two strategies: (i) they use a combination of directive and facilitative instruments, including the provision of feasible incentives for industry actors to change their behavior, backed up by regulation or a credible regulatory threat; and (ii) they are robustly embedded in, and involved in the formation of, the relevant transnational networks of actors and institutions that provide the infrastructure of governance. © 2017 JohnWiley & Sons Australia, Ltd     

Complaining about rivals: Indifference,cooperation, and competition in the governance of advertising

What should rivals do when they see competitors breaking agreed rules within systems of self‐regulation? This study investigates compliant behavior among British advertisers to empirically answer this question. It analyses five years of complaints (n = 146,062) and adjudications (n = 4,832) published by the self‐regulatory body for the British advertising industry. The majority of firms adopt a strategy of indifference and rarely regulate their rivals. Highly engaged firms either adopt an angelic strategy as they use their resources to complain about their rivals; a deviant strategy as they are subject to a large number of complaints; or a predatory strategy as they attack their rivals through advertising regulation. This illustrates a unique form of regulatory capture in which a regulatory system becomes an arena of competition for some actors while continuing as a governance mechanism for others.     

The challenge of accountability in complex regulatory networks: The case of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill

A puzzle that faces public administrators within regulatory governance networks is how to balance the need for democratic accountability while increasingly facing demands from elected officials to optimize oversight of industry by utilizing the expertise of the private sector in developing risk‐based standards for compliance. The shift from traditional command and control oversight to process oriented regulatory regimes has been most pronounced in highly complex industries, such as aviation and deepwater oil drilling, where the intricate and technical nature of operations necessitates risk‐based regulatory networks based largely on voluntary compliance with mutually agreed upon standards. The question addressed in this paper is how the shift to process oriented regimes affects the trade‐offs between democratic, market, and administrative accountability frames, and what factors determine the dominant accountability frame within the network. Using post‐incident document analysis, this paper provides a case study of regulatory oversight of the deepwater oil drilling industry prior to the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon rig in the Gulf of Mexico, to explore how the shift to a more networked risk‐based regulatory regime affects the trade‐offs and dominant accountability frames within the network. The results of this study indicate that a reliance on market‐based accountability mechanisms, along with the lack of a fully implemented process‐oriented regulatory regime, led to the largest oil spill in US history.     

A comparative insight into the status of the lobbying regulation debate in Estonia

This paper focuses on different approaches towards regulating lobbying. Special attention is paid to policy formulation regarding lobbying regulation in Estonia. The Estonian case study is juxtaposed with the regulatory solutions of lobbying in Scandinavian and post-communist countries. The reason for choosing such a comparative framework is justified by the fact that these two sets of countries have chosen rather dissimilar approaches in interpreting the role of lobbying in society. As Estonia's policy decisions are often determined by both of these two spaces of political culture, the article polemicizes over the question of which path Estonia could take in terms of regulatory framework for lobbying. The analysis concludes with policy recommendations to Estonia as well as with suggestions for further theoretical research directions for understanding better the policy impact of lobbying regulations designed and implemented by post-communist states. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Do Group Decision Rules Affect Trust? A Laboratory Experiment on Group Decision Rules and Trust

Enhanced participation has been prescribed as the way forward for improving democratic decision making while generating positive attributes like trust. Yet we do not know the extent to which rules affect the outcome of decision making. This article investigates how different group decision rules affect group trust by testing three ideal types of decision rules (i.e., a Unilateral rule, a Representative rule and a ‘Non‐rule’) in a laboratory experiment. The article shows significant differences between the three decision rules on trust after deliberation. Interestingly, however, it finds that the Representative rule yields more trust than the Non‐rule and also significantly more trust than the Unilateral rule, when analysing the results at group level. These findings challenge the theoretical understanding by, for example, deliberative normative theorists that more inclusive, consensual and non‐hierarchical decision‐making procedures enhance trust vis‐à‐vis other more hierarchical decision‐making procedures.     

Determinants of Firm‐Level Lobbying and Government Responsiveness in Agricultural Biotechnology in China

Understanding what stimulates agribusiness firms to lobby the government and what makes the government responsive to lobbying are the two issues that have been discussed extensively in the debates concerning determinants of biotechnology policy. This paper examines the factors influencing agribusiness firms' lobbying and government response using econometric modeling on a new data set of 160 leading agribusiness firms in the food, feed, chemical, and seed industries in China. The results show that approximately 10% of agribusiness firms lobbied the government about biotechnology policy and regulations and over half of those that lobbied received a verbal or written acknowledgment from government agencies. Seed and feed companies are more likely to engage in lobbying than chemical companies. Owning GM patents not only has a positive impact on firms' lobbying activities, but firms with these patents are more likely to receive a government response to their lobbying efforts. The experience of selling GM products does not significantly influence lobbying activities or response from the government.     

Pressure or Information? Lobbying for Binding Renewable Energy Targets in the European Union

This article analyzes the European renewable energy industry's capacity for pressure‐based and information‐based lobbying and its strategies in two lobbying efforts: for a legally binding target of 20 percent renewable energy by 2020 (a proposal adopted by the European Council in March 2007) and for binding interim targets as a means to secure effective implementation of the 2020 target (a proposal that was not adopted). It finds that the industry has the capacity for information‐based lobbying but very limited capacity for pressure‐based lobbying. The article also discusses the effectiveness of the two lobbying types. It argues that information‐based lobbying is particularly effective early in the decision‐making process, and hypothesizes that early information‐based lobbying may compensate for limited capacity for pressure‐based lobbying and for information‐based lobbying that takes place later in the decision‐making process, but concludes that this strategy would have been unlikely to be effective in the second case.     

Business Power in Washington: The Insurance Exception

This article traces the scholarship on business political power from Bauer, Pool and Dexter, through Lindblom, to Graham Wilson and David Vogel. The prominent understanding now is that business was under attack in the 1960s and 1970s but has since recovered a privileged position. The variables common to this scholarship provide a framework for analyzing insurance industry politics. Drawing primarily upon the unisex case, the article shows that the insurance industry is not in control of the political agenda, does not enjoy the collaboration of federal elected officials, does not gain disproportionate benefits and usually does not make effective use of their lobbying resources. It argues that the industry's internal divisions and low public regard help explain its unprivileged position, and concludes that more attention to industry sectors will help refine what we know about the political power of business.