Ownership Structure as Corporate Governance Mechanism: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

This paper examines the cross-sectional relation between ownership structure and corporate performance of a sample of 434 manufacturing firms listed on the Chinese stock exchange. Following the agency theory and taking other influential factors into account, such as firm size, leverage ratio, variance of sales, growth of sale and firm age, the results suggest that there is a strong relation between ownership concentration and corporate performance, measured by Tobin's Q. A further classification of owners reveals that while shares held by state play a negative role in corporate governance, domestic institutional and managerial shareholdings improve the firms' performance.     

How to increase the efficiency of bond covenants: a proposal for the Italian corporate market

Covenants are particular clauses in the debt contracts of firms that restrict business policy, giving creditors the possibility of putting precise actions into force (normally early repayment) when the covenants are violated. The main purpose of covenants given in the literature is to resolve the conflicts of interest between shareholders and bondholders. Lack of coordination between bondholders may, however, reduce the efficiency of these instruments. We propose an application of the Italian law allowing the insertion of a mandatory representation into the new financial hybrid contracts to give an investment firm the right to act with full power on behalf of the bondholders. We show the impact of this proposal using a formalised example for the issuance of a bond with a covenant for a firm.     

State ownership and control in the Czech Republic

We analyze the extent of the integrated control of the state over privatized firms during the post-privatization decade (1995?C2005) in the Czech Republic. During this period the integrated control potential of the state resembled a corporate pyramid. While pyramidal control was not fully utilized, the golden share in the hands of the state substantially enhanced its ability to control firms. In terms of corporate performance we show that state control resulted in declining and even negative corporate performance. Integrated state control was shown to be mostly inferior when compared with private types of ownership. State ownership positions are in striking contrast with the lack of capacity to push corporate performance in order to collect larger tax volumes. Lack of focus and inter-agency cooperation as well as the simple inefficiency of the state bureaucracy are the most likely reasons behind our findings.     

The legal profession of China in a globalized world: innovations and new challenges

ABSTRACT

The legal profession is undergoing fundamental changes; and this is the case not just in established legal markets. Based on a state-of-the-art sketch, this paper identifies and analyzes the latest innovation initiatives and alternative business models in China’s legal profession. It finds that, propelled by market demands and benefiting from technological advancements, the provision of legal services has become highly versatile today, giving rise to various alternative service providers, especially the rapidly rising online legal service portals. Because they are technically not law firms, the exclusivity requirements on lawyer ownership and legal service provision are not applicable to them. In the meantime, the competition for large corporate clients and lucrative business transactions is fierce and will continue to be so, not only within the club of big Chinese corporate law firms, but also between Chinese law firms and international law firms globally. In this course, some leading big corporate law firms in China are observed to have creatively incorporated key corporate features in running their business and compensating their partners, effectively deviating from the partnership?+?pure legal services regulation. Such market realities question the necessity and effect of the regulatory restrictions on law firm legal form and ownership structure, and call for an agenda for related research in the future.     

Corporate Governance in Spain (with an Application of the Power Indices Approach)

This paper describes the governance system of Spanish listed firms in the early 1990's. Although the institutional setting of the Spanish Stock Exchanges differs little from other European national markets, we found important differences in several aspects of corporate governance. In particular, some of the standard mechanisms of control (e.g. boards and institutional shareholders) do not play an active role, whereas ownership is relatively concentrated. Moreover, power indices suggest that controlling blocs of large shareholders are very likely to form. We thus conclude that the ownership of shares is a pivotal mechanism in the governance of Spanish corporations.     

Family-owned,limited close corporations and protection of ownership

Protected ownership and freedom of contracts are two basic parts of the institutional framework of successful countries according to Douglass North, winner of the Nobel Prize in 1993. The incentives to make long-term investments are strengthened if ownership rights are protected and freedom of contracts is a basic element in the process of efficient allocation of scarce resources. An important engine in prosperous societies is the family firm. Most companies in these societies can be classified as family firms and a major part of GDP is produced by family businesses. Consequently, how ownership is protected in family firms is an important issue.Three important factors of private ownership of property are the rights to determine use of owned assets, the return generated from them and to transfer the assets at mutually agreeable terms to a new owner(s).The incentives of a founder entrepreneur to put efforts into the establishment of a firm are determined by all the three factors. We will here pay special attention to the third factor, transfer of the ownership of the firm. The founder often places contractual restrictions on such transfers to ensure that the structure of ownership is stable and that the firm stays in the family. The possibility to do so is part of the freedom of contracts and is associated with the extent of ownership held as well as the incentives to invest in new businesses.This paper is primarily about how protection of family ownership can be achieved from a legal point of view and discusses the reasons to enforce these legal relationships in the future for second, third, fourth etc. generations of family owners.     

法经济学视角下“人走股留”条款之效力

本文认为,"人走股留"条款在有限责任公司的股东身份与雇员身份之间建立了必要性联系,最高人民法院以第96号指导案例对此类条款的司法适用作出回应,其个案裁判虽然妥当,但可参照适用的范围较为狭窄。基于对公司激励结构的分析可以发现,此类条款不满足资本多数决适用的前提。结合企业所有权和交易成本理论,此类条款在实践中发挥着帮助实现人力资本出资的功能。原则上通过资本多数决形成的强制转让条款对异议股东不生效。法院应审查企业的"人合性",关注相关价格条款与中小股东任职保障的公平性,最终决定条款效力。     

Hiring Teams,Firms, and Lawyers: Evidence of the Evolving Relationships in the Corporate Legal Market

How are relationships between corporate clients and law firms evolving? Drawing on interview and survey data from 166 chief legal officers of S&P 500 companies from 2006–2007, we find that—contrary to standard depictions of corporate client‐provider relationships—(1) large companies have relationships with ten to twenty preferred providers; (2) these relationships continue to be enduring; and (3) clients focus not only on law firm platforms and lead partners, but also on teams and departments within preferred providers, allocating work to these subunits at rival firms over time and following “star” lawyers, especially if they move as part of a team. The combination of long‐term relationships and subunit rivalry provides law firms with steady work flows and allows companies to keep cost pressure on firms while preserving relationship‐specific capital, quality assurance, and soft forms of legal capacity insurance. Our findings have implications for law firms, corporate departments, and law schools.     

我国国有公司股权结构及其法律改革——以公司治理效率为主要视角

公司治理结构是公司制的核心,而公司治理结构实质上是由股权结构决定的,当前各国公司的股权结构以提高公司治理效率为导向正在向＂相对控股＂趋同。在我国,国有股权高度集中是国有公司股权结构的基本特征,虽然股权集中在某种程度上有其优势,但我国国有股权的过于集中会损害公司治理的效率。因此,在分散化原则的基础上体现适度集中——即＂相对控股＂——同样应当成为我国国有公司股权结构的选择模式。要实现这一目标只能通过国有股的减持,包括国有股绝对量的减持、国有股相对量的减持和国有股限制性减持三种形式。无论哪种形式,在我国当前都需要法律的配套。     

Corporate Financial Performance and the Use of Takeover Defenses

This paper tests the hypothesis that the threat of a contested takeover improves corporate performance. This is done by a cross-sectional analysis of listed Danish firms with and without effective takeover defenses. Takeover defenses adopted by Danish firms mainly consist of dual class voting rights often in combination with foundation ownership. Using simultaneous equation estimation to deal with the problem of causation, the results show that unprotected firms do not outperform protected firms. This suggests that management in unprotected firms are disciplined by other corporate governance mechanisms than the market for corporate control, including the legal protection of shareholders.     

Property Rights and the Control of Strategy: Foreign Ownership Rules and Domestic Firm Globalization in Indian Industry

This study examines the influence of foreign ownership levels on domestic firms' exporting behavior in India. Foreign ownership is categorized according to the control exercisable at different levels of ownership by foreign shareholders. The degree of strategic control a foreign shareholder can possess is determined by the institutional structure of the Indian environment that firms operate in. The results show that, after controlling for a variety of firm and environment-specific factors, only when property rights devolve unequivocally to foreign owners do domestic firms display the higher export orientation that is consonant with the process of globalization of their operations.     

欧陆上市公司关联交易治理机制比较

上市公司关联交易治理重点因股权结构而异,英美等少数股权分散国家为管理层,包括我国在内的多数股权集中国家则为控制股东。鉴于控制股东所主导的关联交易具有利益冲突与经营效率的双重属性,欧陆国家的法律对其采取兴利除弊的治理策略。通过董事会和监事会审批机制确保决策效率,依靠司法任命特别检查人和派生诉讼机制维护少数股东权益,在公司集团中引入特别规则以提升公司价值,实现了公平与效率的动态平衡,值得我国借鉴。     

业主自治协议中专有权限制条款效力探析

管理规约及业主大会决议能否对业主专有权进行限制在实践中素有争议。专有权限制条款的存在源于实践的需要,承认其效力有正当性基础。与传统所有权相比,业主专有权具有特殊性,对其施加更多限制并不违背保护业主物权的理念,而业主自治协议则是限制专有权的合理方式。同时,专有权限制条款具有其弊端,有可能损害少数业主的利益,应当借助一定方法对之加以防范。我国应当借鉴美国做法中合理的成分,允许业主自治协议对专有权进行限制,同时确立效力规则对不当的限制条款进行规制。     

Corporate Ownership and Control in the UK: The Tax Dimension

While generally the impact tax has on patterns of corporate ownership and control has received little attention in the relevant academic literature, this paper argues that tax is potentially an important determinant of ownership patterns in large companies. The paper focuses on historical developments in Britain, where an 'outsider/arm's-length' system of corporate governance took shape during the twentieth century and became fully entrenched by the end of the 1970s. Taxes imposed on corporate profits, taxation of managerial and investment income and inheritance taxes help to explain why during this period blockholders sought to exit and why there was sufficient demand for shares among investors to permit ownership to separate from control.     

The changing of the guard: Top management characteristics, organizational strain, and antitrust offending

From within an organizational strain perspective, this paper examines the effects of managerial succession, CEO background, decentralized management, and product dominant strategies on the reported corporate antitrust offending levels of 43 basic manufacturing companies over a 22-year period. In the aggregate, findings suggest that past illegal involvement predicts future offending; companies headed by finance and administrative CEOs have higher offending levels than do firms headed by CEOs from other backgrounds; a turnover in top management generally decreases offending levels; the pursuit of product dominant strategies increases the number of anticompetitive acts; and offending levels are unrelated to whether new leaders are recruited from within or outside the firm, whether the CEO is also Chair of the Board of Directors, or whether management is centralized or decentralized. The effects of some variables on corporate offending interact with firm performance.     

Takeover Defenses’ Influence on Managerial Incentives

This article examines how takeover defenses influence managerial incentives with respect to long-term investments, excess liquidity and capital structure. The article presents a cross-sectional regression based on a sample of listed Danish firms and deals explicitly with the problem of causation between the variables. Takeover defenses adopted by Danish firms mainly consist of shares with dual class voting rights, which are often combined with foundation ownership. The article finds that protected firms have significantly less debt to equity. However, protected firms are not significantly more oriented towards the long-term and do not have significantly more excess liquidity.     

Bushwhacking the Ethical High Road: Conflict of Interest in the Practice of Law and Real Life

A long‐standing scholarly tradition regards professions, in general, and ethics rules, in particular, as “projects” of market control. It is no surprise, critics charge, that in the latest assault on the monopoly of the American legal profession–waged by multidisciplinary professional service firms–lawyers are hiding behind their ethics rules to protect their turf. In this article, I report on an extensive empirical study of conflict of interest in private legal practice and look comparatively at other fiduciaries, among them, accountants, psychotherapists, physicians, journalists, and academics. I investigate the role of ethics rules that seek to insure fiduciary loyalty in structuring the delivery of services. How does social and institutional change, roiling the fiduciary world, threaten disinterestedness and loyalty and how, if at all, do fiduciaries respond? How is the regulation of conflict of interest accomplished? Where are the conflicts rules most likely to be honored or ignored? What incentive structures encourage compliance? What are the costs and unexpected consequences of compliance? What is foregone? And is it all worth it? In what might come as a surprise to many, I find that the legal profession takes conflict of interest more seriously than many of the rest of us. As the title implies, legal practitioners largely travel alone, bushwhacking through the underbrush snarling the ethical high road. As critical scholarship predicted, lawyers do enjoy a monopoly at the end of the road. But this monopoly is achieved, not by restraint of trade or some other artifice or stratagem of market control, but by lack of competition. It seems that no one else is trudging alongside the lawyers. Lawyers are not necessarily more ethical than the others; they just behave more ethically–at least with respect to conflict of interest. The question is why. And what difference does it make?     

Board composition and corporate governance–A multivariate analysis of listed Danish firms

The article conducts a multivariate analysis using a sample of listed Danish firms in order to examine what describes board composition. This issue also relates to corporate law that stipulates the legal boundaries of board composition. In recent years, several European countries, including Denmark, have issued various codes for good corporate governance, in the form of soft law. Such initiatives have been launched, even though the questions of what describes board composition, as well as, the legal profession's influence on board structure, have not been fully uncovered. This study shows that four factors explain Danish board structure. These factors can be interpreted by the following dimensions; the lawyer oriented, the business person oriented, the internationally oriented and finally the traditionally oriented board. Thus, the paper shows that a higher proportion of insider ownership increases the first dimension, whereas a higher remuneration increases the business person orientation of the board. If firm size increases, the international dimension of the board increases and if a firm experiences less growth board structure becomes more traditional. classification G32 . K22     

Legal Environment,Firm-level Corporate Governance and Expropriation of Minority Shareholders in Asia

Claessens et al. (2000, Journal of Financial Economics 58(1–2), 81–112) show that corporate control is substantially enhanced by using pyramid structures and cross-holdings by firms in nine East Asian countries. Claessens et al. (1999, SSRN Working Paper; 2002, Journal of Finance 57(2), 2741–2771) provide empirical evidence regarding expropriation arising from the separation of cash flow from voting rights in Asian firms. Their analysis suggests a high degree of expropriation in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. We re-examine the problem of expropriation in Asian firms reported by earlier research. We explore firm-level governance-control structure interactions, and control-legal environment interaction for a set of Asian firms for which we are able to obtain relevant data for all the required variables. The major contribution of this paper is that it jointly examines ownership-control structure, firm-level governance and country-level legal protection available to external suppliers of capital. Using post-crisis data, we find a strong country effect in governance. In general, high control firms in countries with weak legal protection have lower firm-level governance scores in general. On the other hand, high control firms, in countries which have a stronger legal protection environment, signal their intention to not expropriate minority shareholders’ wealth by voluntarily adopting measures to strengthen their discipline and responsibility scores. Contrary to earlier findings, we do not find a relationship between control-ownership wedge and firm value. Furthermore, we do not find any relation between firm-level governance and firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q.     

Absorptive capacity and post-acquisition inventor productivity

Inventors often experience a low productivity after their company has been subject to a merger or acquisition (M&As). It is of central managerial interest to identify factors facilitating the integration of new inventive staff and thereby counteracting innovation declines after M&As. This paper provides empirical evidence into the role of acquiring firms?? absorptive capacity for the post-merger patent productivity of the acquired inventors. Based on a sample of 544 inventors employed by European acquisition targets in the period 2000?C2001 it is shown that the post-merger productivity of acquired inventors is significantly higher within acquiring firms with a distinct absorptive capacity. It can be concluded that absorptive capacity is a firm capability that enhances the integration of inventors after firm takeovers.