International Institutions and Domestic Compensation: The IMF and the Politics of Capital Account Liberalization

Certain governments have been faster than others in relaxing their restrictions on the cross‐border movement of capital. How can we explain the timing and extent of financial liberalization across countries since the 1970s? We argue that IMF stabilization programs provide a window of opportunity for governments to initiate financial reforms, but that policy makers are more likely to seize this opportunity when welfare expenditures are high. Large loans from the IMF shield policy makers from the costs of financial reform, while welfare expenditures provide credibility to the government's ex ante promises of compensation to individuals who are harmed by the reforms. We test this hypothesis on data for 87 countries from 1975 to 2002. We employ a spatial autoregressive error sample selection model which accounts for the nonrandom participation of countries in IMF programs as well as the processes of international policy diffusion. The results provide strong support for the interactive effect of IMF programs and domestic welfare expenditures on financial liberalization.     

Contesting the Governance of Capital Flows at the IMF

Financial crises can trigger different actors to reassess their ideas, interests, and policies, and sometimes change them. The Global Financial Crisis triggered a reassessment at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) regarding the utility of capital account liberalization and the management of capital flows. In 2010, the IMF embarked upon an official reassessment of these issues and in 2012 published an official “institutional view” on capital account liberalization and managing capital flows that gives more caution toward capital account liberalization and endorses the use of capital controls in certain circumstances. This article traces the political process that yielded the IMF's new view and draws out lessons for thinking about policy change in global economic governance institutions.     

Valence,Policy Ideas,and the Rise of Sustainability

This article introduces to policy studies the concept of valence, which we define as the emotional quality of an idea that makes it more or less attractive. We argue that valence explains why some ideas are more successful than others, sometimes gaining paradigmatic status. A policy idea is attractive when its valence matches the mood of a target population. Skilled policy entrepreneurs use ideas with high valence to frame policy issues and generate support for their policy proposals. The usefulness of the concept of valence is illustrated with the case of sustainability, an idea that has expanded from the realm of environmental policy to dominate discussions in such diverse policy areas as pension reform, public finance, labor markets, and energy security. As the valence of sustainability has increased, policy entrepreneurs have used the idea to reframe problems in these various policy areas and promote reforms.     

Market Visions: The Interplay of Ideas and Institutions in Chinese Financial Restructuring

In studies of transitional systems, negative economic outcomes are often associated with 'partial' or 'stalled' reform – a reform that signifies an institutional departure from standard market operation. Such departures are often traced to socio-political contestation or political preferences. Focusing on China's intertwined financial and enterprise reforms, this paper challenges that approach on two fronts. First, it argues that institutional change and resultant economic outcomes are driven less by contestation than by societally held assumptions regarding the nature of economic causation in market contexts. The analytical lenses that actors employ to understand their environment shape expectations about how markets function, influence the manner by which economic problems are diagnosed, and profoundly affect the ultimate institutional evolution of the system. Second, such lenses are necessitated by substantial uncertainties at the theoretical level regarding market function – uncertainties that make characterizations of economic behavior as 'irrational' highly problematic.