International Cooperation in Global Satellite Climate Monitoring

A lack of consensus on the requirements for adequate monitoring of climate change by satellites makes it difficult to identify gaps in the collection of climate-relevant data and prevents national policy makers from taking into account global climate monitoring needs when planning the development of future satellites. Multiple international organizations undertake efforts to identify the high-level/system-level and technical requirements of such a system, and each of these efforts reveals gaps in global climate monitoring capabilities. These efforts require further coordination to achieve global consensus on the highest-priority monitoring needs. With regard to high-level requirements, this will require organizations to align and coordinate their efforts, considering both the most important types of measurements and the most efficient physical architecture for collection. Efforts at identifying detailed technical requirements for climate monitoring are duplicative and need to be consolidated. Coordination at the system level and consolidation at the technical level should be followed by prioritizing climate monitoring needs, allowing policy makers to invest in satellite systems that will realize the greatest contribution to global climate monitoring.     

International Politics: Scandinavian Identity Amidst American Hegemony?

International politics is often portrayed as a hegemonic discipline, dominated by US scholarship. Exploring the consequences of recent upheavals in world affairs for international politics research, the article suggests that the end of the cold war has exposed certain weaknesses in the US center which may be turned into advantages for the Scandinavian periphery. Specifically, Scandinavian researchers do not share the American preoccupation with theories predicated on bilateral and symmetrical relationships. Moreover, they are more prone to focus on subnational actors, they are more embedded in political science, they are generalists rather than specialists, their primary role is that of being observers rather than advisers, and they are in a better position to escape from the entrapment of an ahistorical current-events approach. In conclusion, foreign policy analysis, negotiation studies, and research on international cooperation are singled out as areas where Scandinavians have been successful and where their relative success can be accounted for, at least in part, by an ability to capitalize on the comparative advantages identified.     

America's Other Guantánamo: British Foreign Policy and the US Base on Diego Garcia

The British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) is one of Britain's most controversial Overseas Territories. Its indigenous people, the Chagossians, were exiled from their homes in the 1960s and 1970s so that BIOT could play host to a US military base on the island of Diego Garcia. Meanwhile, Diego Garcia has been tarnished by revelations regarding its role in the CIA's ‘extraordinary rendition’ programme and by allegations of torture. And earlier this year, an international tribunal ruled that the UK government had violated international law by pushing through a Marine Protected Area to cover the territory over and above the protestations of neighbouring states. In this article, I argue that allowing the resettlement of BIOT by the Chagossians would go a long way towards improving the way that the territory has been governed for the past five decades.     

International Technology Cooperation: The Problem of Commercial Rivalry

International technology cooperation promises to help countries exploit the potential of new innovations, but commercial rivalry between companies and governments raises obstacles to it. In this article, I present and solve a model of international technology cooperation. The formal analysis shows that a technology agreement must address two issues. First, governments must be able to induce companies to innovate. Second, governments must credibly commit to penalizing companies for failing to share new information produced through research. Based on these observations, I show that the potential for technology cooperation is maximized in symmetric settings between equally capable governments and companies. In practice, this observation warrants a policy focus on countries and industries that are already on a level playing ground. I also consider extensions to multinational companies and adverse selection problems. The formal analysis provides a solid foundation for practical policy implementation.     

When Doves Cry: International Rivalry, Unreciprocated Cooperation, and Leadership Turnover

Varied research traditions suggest that dovish leaders will be thrown out of office under harsh external circumstances. Below, I elaborate a model of rivalry maintenance that draws on and refines the insight from studies of leadership tenure and foreign policy. Specifically, I expect a leader who offers unreciprocated cooperation to a rival (a dove) to be more likely to be deselected from power than a leader that takes a harder line vis-à-vis the rival (a hawk). I test this expectation using event history techniques and data spanning the 1950–1990 time period and find strong evidence that dovish leaders pay an electoral price within a rivalry context. The findings suggest an internationally contingent domestic incentive to maintain rivalry and conflict over time .     

Lies, Defection, and the Pattern of International Cooperation

This article characterizes how incentives to lie affect international cooperation and the design of cooperation agreements. I study the optimal structure of cooperation agreements in an environment where the costs of cooperation fluctuate over time. Cooperation is complicated by the fact that the costs of cooperation are private information and participants can benefit from lying about them. When the extent of asymmetries of information between the cooperating governments can be measured in terms of the transparency of the political process, democracies face greater contracting opportunities than authoritarian regimes. However, this article shows that even under asymmetries of information, a limited extent of cooperation can be achieved when the design of cooperation agreements recognizes incentives to lie.