The Impact of Parliamentary Specialisation on Cosponsorship

This study seeks to establish the effect of parliamentary specialisation on cosponsorship of parliamentary proposals in parliamentary systems with high levels of party unity. Existing studies on presidential systems suggest that cosponsorship is mainly related to legislators’ policy preferences. It is proposed that in parliamentary systems cosponsorship is, in the first place, structured by the division of labour in parliamentary party groups: MPs who do not have overlapping policy portfolios will not cosponsor proposals. Other explanations, such as policy distance and the government–opposition divide, only come into play when MPs are specialised in the same field. This expectation is tested using data from the Netherlands, a parliamentary system with a clear division of labour between MPs. It is found that specialisation has a very large impact on cosponsorship.     

The Internet and Parliamentary Democracy in Europe

The overall aim of this volume is to investigate the impact of new information and communications technologies (ICTs), in particular the Internet, upon parliamentary democracy in Europe. Through a comparative study of four parliaments (the British, European, Portuguese and Swedish), our research addresses three important dimensions of the impact of the Internet on parliamentary democracy, namely, the practices, principles and rules related to the use of the Internet in a parliamentary context. It is hoped that, by comparing the experiences of the four parliaments and their Members, a European perspective on the development of and issues about ‘parliamentary e-Democracy’ can be established. The main sources of data and methodologies employed in this volume include a questionnaire survey, content analysis of parliamentary websites, interviews with parliamentarians and parliamentary staff and research workshops. Here we highlight the main features of the individual contributions included in this volume.     

Stability in Parliamentary Regimes: The Italian Case

Abstract: In this article, we distinguish legislative stability from government stability and argue that the character of the relationship that exists between them is a complex one in which various combinations are possible. We focus on Italy because of the manner in which it has combined legislative stability with government instability. Our findings indicate that the relationship between legislative and government stability in Italy is best seen as curvilinear, that the analysis of government stability must take the number of governments as well as the duration of governments into account, and that the attributes of the party system that stabilize the legislature destabilize governments. Given these findings, we discuss their implications for explaining stability in parliamentary regimes in terms of events, “strong parties,” and strategic calculation. We conclude that legislative stability should not be treated simply as a secondary or derivative effect of government stability and that Italy can serve as a benchmark for further study of the nature and determinants of the relationship between the two in other parliamentary systems.     

Brexit and Parliamentary Sovereignty

This note addresses the implications of R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union for the legal principle of parliamentary sovereignty, and argues that the strong restatement of the latter is the most significant feature of the decision. The aim here is to show how traditional principle in the Dicey tradition has been strongly applied against the competing claims of EU law, the royal prerogative, the referendum and devolution. However, the note also argues that the claims relating to parliamentary sovereignty could have produced a different result and that the most compelling feature of the case was the argument that was not forcefully put by the Government, namely that Parliament had already provided sufficient authority for the triggering of Article 50.     

Parliamentary Questions in Turkey

Political reasons for asking, and consequences of, parliamentary questions in the Turkish parliament during the 19th legislative period (1991–95) were investigated. Political reasons for asking questions were inferred from attributes of questions including the party affiliation of questioners, question content, referred authorities, and constituency linkages in questions. Political consequences were gauged by the substance of ministers' answers. Our findings reveal that both opposition parliamentarians and government ministers have strategies or behavioural patterns for using parliamentary questions to enhance their own political appeal. Parliamentarians ask either blaming or soliciting questions. Blaming questions are more likely to be (i) of oral type; (ii) directed to the PM; (iii) unrelated to the constituency. Soliciting questions are more likely to be (i) of written type; (ii) directed to the responsible minister; (iii) related to the constituency. In turn, ministers are more willing to give positive, concrete, or promising answers to questions that either beg for help or a solution or pertain to particular constituencies.     

The Timing of Cabinet Reshuffles in Five Westminster Parliamentary Systems

Despite their political prominence, cabinet reshuffles have not attracted a great deal of scholarly attention. We provide a theory of cabinet reshuffles that emphasizes both systematic and time‐varying causes. In particular, we argue that prime ministers employ cabinet reshuffles to retain power in the face of both intraparty and electoral challenges to their leadership. We use repeated‐events duration models to examine the timing of cabinet reshuffles in Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom in the period 1960–2001, and find support for several of our hypotheses.     

Legislative Bellwethers: The Role of Committee Membership in Parliamentary Debate

Political parties and legislators use legislative debates to establish their reputation, challenge rivals, and engage in coalition management, among many other tasks. Yet, existing theories on parliamentary debates have abstracted away from the need for information and expertise, which are costly to acquire. Drawing on the “informational” perspective on legislative organization, we address this problem by arguing that party leaders use committees as training arenas for their backbenchers. They task their assigned members with acquiring specific expertise and then rely heavily on those members during the corresponding debates. We turn to the Portuguese legislature, from 2000 to 2015, to discuss how saliency, government dynamics, and party size affect the use of experts. We test this theory using a novel approach to classify speeches that leverages the texts of legislation as training data for a supervised approach.     

Parliamentary influence in a new democracy: The Spanish congress

This study, based on elite interviews and quantitative data, examines the public policy‐making influence of the Spanish Congress since the formation of its new democracy (1979–96). Three of the factors considered in this study are derived from previous comparative legislative studies: (1) the size of or absence of majority representation of the government party in the legislative body; (2) the degree of party unity and party discipline; and (3) the existence of a specialised committee system. In new democracies, we must also take into account the malleable circumstances of the new regime. In Spain, the following also appear to have an impact on parliamentary influence especially: (1) the special requirements of the process of democratic consolidation; (2) the nature of legislation; (3) the formal rules affecting parliament; (4) the impact of membership in the European Union; and (5) Spain's asymmetric federal structure.     

Playing by the Rules: The Constraining Hand of Parliamentary Procedure

Parliamentary procedure has largely been neglected as a constraint on government. Political developments in the UK and a (contested) scholarly focus on institutions provide the basis for re-evaluating the consequences of procedure in the British Parliament. Procedure in both Houses of Parliament is well established and institutionalised. The capacity of procedural rules to constrain government is illustrated though empirical examples. Rational-choice theory and historical institutionalism are utilised to explain why rules endure, despite government having the political resources to change them. The 'price' of change can be too much for government in terms of time and intellectual resources, in terms of future prices and in terms of legitimacy. Consequently, procedure matters.     

Electoral Reform and Parliamentary Debates

The early twentieth century saw many democracies adopt proportional representative systems. The textbook explanation, pioneered by Rokkan, emphasize between‐party electoral competition; the rise of the Socialist vote share made Bourgeois parties prefer PR systems to maximize their seat share. While appealing, this account is not entirely compelling. Consequently, scholars are investigating within‐party explanations of support for such reforms. Particularly, Cox, Fiva, and Smith show how list PR enable party leaders to discipline members and build cohesive parties. Relying on roll‐call votes across the Norwegian 1919 electoral reform from two‐round single‐member plurality to closed‐list PR, they show that the internal party cohesion increased following the reform. We investigate how the Norwegian electoral reform changed the content of parliamentary speeches. Comparing speeches from MPs present both before and after the reform, we show how parties become more cohesive in parliamentary debates under list PR than they were under the single‐member‐district system.     

Public and Parliamentary Attitudes to Welfare

One of the core functions of parliament in the United Kingdom is arguably to represent the views of the people. While opinions differ as to the precise nature of this representation, one would expect to find a broad measure of comparability between public opinion and the opinions of those representing the public in parliament.

This article examines the extent to which shifts in political attitudes towards the welfare state have been reflected in public opinion, particularly since the election of New Labour in 1997. Using data derived from a series of interviews with MPs from all sides of the House of Commons, and information on public attitudes to welfare collated from the British Social Attitudes survey, it seeks to identify and explain areas of disagreement and consensus in public and parliamentary attitudes to welfare. It focuses in particular on questions regarding commitment to state welfare provision, priorities in welfare spending and attitudes towards funding for welfare services.     

Financial Indiscipline in Zambia's Third Republic: The Role of Parliamentary Scrutiny

Contrary to the thesis that claims weak legislative power vis-à-vis the executive is essential if economic modernisation and development are to be driven forward in third world countries, Zambia's developmental interests would be served by making the powers of parliamentary oversight of the public finances more effective. The problematic of 'financial indiscipline' in the public sector is analysed in terms of a nest of principal-agent relationships, between legislature and executive, political executive and bureaucratic executive, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development and the spending arms of government. Evidence from the Public Accounts Committee is used to illustrate the case for more enforceable mechanisms whereby government can be made accountable for the public finances. At the same time it is argued that more wide-ranging political changes are necessary if there is to be a significant reduction in 'financial indiscipline'.     

Introduction: Parliamentary Representation in France

The constitution of the Fifth Republic, adopted in 1958, was deliberately designed to weaken parliament. This trend was reinforced by the constant empowerment of the president and the bipolarisation of political life. For this reason, but also due to some of its specificities, French political science did not pay much attention to parliament and its members. The aim of the seven papers gathered in this issue is to fix this deficiency. They cover the main aspects of parliamentary representation in France, deliver the fundamental information and tackle the central questions about it. The papers use a wide range of data, methods and theoretical approaches. They deal with MPs' conceptions and practices of their mandate, their opinions on the French regime, their activities in the constituency, values, contribution to law-making and the use of parliamentary questions, as well as their perception by the citizens.     

Change of Political Allegiance in Parliamentary Life

Since Confederation in Canada and until the 39th federal general election of 23 January 2006, no fewer than 246 members of the House of Commons have changed political allegiance. This number includes only those in the federal portion of Canadian public life and only those in the Lower House of Parliament. At the time of writing, there were 16 Members of the House of Commons who, at one time or another in their careers, left one political party for another. The realities of floor‐crossing and the consequences of such an admittedly risky venture in public life must be assumed to affect parliamentarians’ views about the creation of rules, whether legal, political or mixed, in respect of changes of political allegiance. Through a close examination of the Constitution Act and other Acts of Parliament this article investigates whether such rules exist in Canada. It also provides an overview of recent attempts at codification and lessons learnt from foreign jurisdictions, such as South Africa and New Zealand. The article concludes by referring to Edmund Burke’s famous Address to the Electors of Bristol and observing that the logical consequence for current Canadian political life of Burke’s thoughts may be that a Member of Parliament must be free to vote according to their conscience and therefore may only be held to account to those who elected them until the following election.