International Integration and Democratization: An Event History Analysis

This article examines the relationships between transitions to and from democracy and membership in major intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), ratification of key human-rights treaties, and integration into the global economy while controlling for a variety of domestic factors. The findings show that for the most part, participation in the major IGOs and the United Nations' human-rights regime has made little difference to the chances that countries would attempt or sustain democracy. Participation in regional human-rights treaties in Africa and the Americas is linked to better prospects for democracy, but this association appears to stem from regional trends of which those pacts are emblematic, rather than mechanisms specific to the pacts themselves. Finally, entanglement in the global economy – as indicated by thicker trade flows and membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and then World Trade Organization (WTO) – seems to have had a stronger effect on the prospects for democracy than these other forms of international integration, but not always in the beneficent direction posited by liberal theorists. While participation in the GATT/WTO is associated with better prospects for the establishment and persistence of democracy, foreign trade itself is linked to the persistence of domestic political regimes of either stripe, democratic and non-democratic.     

Outside looking in: non-accession to the WTO

Since its institutional birth in 1947, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) / World Trade Organization (WTO) has mushroomed from 23 original contracting parties to 157 members as of September 2012. Another 28 countries are currently observers, each at varying stages of the accession process. WTO members and observers cover some 99 per cent of the world's population and over 99 per cent of global trade. However, there are still 13 states outside the multilateral rules-based trading system. This paper argues that existing explanations of membership and accession do not fully explain why these states remain outside the WTO, with implications for membership in international institutions generally. The paper tests hypotheses of non-membership based on a lack of willingness (domestic support), ability (technical capacity) or external pressure, and augments these statistical findings with a comparative country-level narrative of WTO (non-)accession decision-making in two small island countries.     

Trade, institutions, and the timing of GATT/WTO accession in post-colonial states

Prior to 1995, when the World Trade Organization (WTO) superseded the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), a number of states took advantage of GATT Article XXVI:5(c), which allowed them—as former colonies or component territories of existing GATT members—to quickly and simply join the multilateral trade regime. The speed with which these post-colonial accessions took place, however, varied widely: some states joined immediately upon independence, while others joined much later. Still other post-colonial states passed on this opportunity, only to subsequently begin the longer, more onerous accession process required of other GATT/WTO applicants. Our paper seeks to explain this variation in the timing of post-colonial states’ accession to the GATT/WTO. We argue that three key variables explain the timing of accession decisions: 1) a country’s trade ties with existing member-states; 2) its existing preferential trade agreement (PTA) commitments; and 3) its domestic political institutions—specifically, the country’s level of democracy. Furthermore, we argue that the effects of these variables are conditional upon each other: post-colonial countries with more extensive trade ties to existing member-states were more likely to accede rapidly under Article XXVI:5(c), but only under specific conditions—namely, when they had not already locked in ties with key trading partners through bilateral or regional PTAs, and when they were governed by a more democratic regime. We test this argument empirically using an original dataset of 61 post-colonial states from 1951 to 2004. Our results strongly support this explanation of GATT/WTO accession and help to clarify the pattern of participation in the multilateral trading system that we have observed over the last half-century.     

Environmental effects of GATT/WTO membership: an empirical evaluation

ABSTRACT

One of the great questions for scholars of international relations and economics concerns the relationship between the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the natural environment. Does membership in the multilateral trade regime constrain environmental regulation and increase the environmental burden of national economies? Do countries pay a heavy environmental price for trade liberalization? Although this question has been debated extensively, there is little statistical evidence to contribute the debate. We provide a comprehensive statistical analysis of the environmental effects of joining the multilateral trade regime. We collected data on a variety of environmental policies, institutions, and outcomes that should be influenced by the General Agreementon Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO membership if the predictions of environmental pessimists or optimists are valid. A wide range of statistical models designed to identify the causal effect of the GATT/WTO on the environmental indicators shows that joining the GATT/WTO does not have negative effects on environmental quality.     

拉美国家的贸易开放度研究

贸易开放是经济现代化的基本特征之一,GATT以及WTO等一些国际经济秩序的基本构成机制进一步推动了全球的贸易自由化,背离这一秩序或者趋势的结果是无法从他国的市场开放中获得益处。在出口导向战略实施了多年之后,目前拉美主要国家的贸易开放到底达到了一个什么样的程度正是我们所困惑的问题。本文以亚洲7个国家作为参照组,研究了1995年至2009年拉美7个国家(阿根廷、巴西、哥伦比亚、智利、墨西哥、秘鲁和委内瑞拉)的贸易开放程度。主要结论是,最近10多年,7个拉美国家的贸易开放度有了显著而稳步的上升,但与亚洲国家相比,拉美国家的贸易开放程度普遍略低。本文对于研究拉美国家经济开放程度与经济增长、国际贸易体制以及国内产业发展之间的关系,特别是中拉经贸关系发展前景等问题都具有基础性和阶段性的意义。     

Divulging data: Domestic determinants of international information sharing

Information is a core input of governance that is often disrupted by the processes associated with globalization. To mitigate potential governance failures, states turn to information sharing – the exchange of sensitive data between governments. Such exchanges, however, come with considerable risks. Building on work in International Relations and organizational sociology stressing the importance of institutional similarity, we argue that states commit to information sharing based on their beliefs as to the reliability and predictability of potential partners – an assessment that involves a relative evaluation of domestic institutions. We test our argument on institutional similarity with a new dataset of mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) – a critical example of information-sharing agreements. The empirical analysis finds substantial support for our argument: states with similar legal institutions are much more likely to sign MLATs. The article contributes to a range of research concerned with the politics of globalization, especially as it relates to enforcement cooperation, the role of domestic institutions, and information flows.     

Who Can Reform the Labor Market? IMF Conditionality,Partisanship, and Labor Unions

Labor market reforms are critical for economic growth. Yet, they are politically contentious, and governments, more often than not, are faced with strong opposition from interest groups. Scholarly work shows that governments often rely on external intervention to implement politically difficult reforms. This is the case with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that typically conditions its financing on the implementation of required reforms. Do borrowing governments benefit from IMF programs to overcome domestic opposition to reform by organized interests? Utilizing a unique new data set on IMF conditionality, I show that partisan and electoral concerns and domestic alliances strongly affect the implementation of labor market reforms, even when the IMF imposes them. When faced with increasing number of strikes, left-wing governments are more likely to implement labor market reforms than center/right-wing governments. However, the left is less likely than the center/right to fulfill its international commitments during election years when labor groups are militant. These findings highlight the left’s unique ability to form pro-reform coalitions and the IMF’s conditional role in removing domestic political opposition to reform. Counter-intuitively, right-wing governments still struggle to reform the labor market, even during economic crises and under IMF programs.     

From the Outside Looking In: The Effect of Trading Blocs on Trade Disputes in the GATT/WTO

The increasing number and expansion of trading blocs is an important dimension of the contemporary international economy. This study examines the effects of such trading blocs on third parties and on the multilateral trading system. It is argued that trading blocs have negative economic effects on economic sectors in non-members' states. These sectors urge their governments to take political action vis-à-vis the trading bloc. Governments have several policy choices on their menu, and the attractiveness of these policies is determined by domestic and international incentives and constraints. I argue that filing a complaint in the GATT/WTO is an attractive and effective policy tool in the hands of third parties' governments. Thus, I hypothesize that the existence, deepening, and widening of trading blocs result in an increase in the number of complaints filed against their members in the multilateral trading system. I examine these propositions in the context of three important trading blocs—namely, the EU, NAFTA, and Mercosur—in the period 1948–2000. To test these hypotheses a time-series cross-section count model is performed. Controlling for conventional alternative explanations, the empirical analysis supports the theoretical framework.     

Seeking Escape: The Use of Escape Clauses in International Trade Agreements

In agreements that include flexibility enhancing mechanisms such as escape clauses, how do institutions realize the benefits of flexibility while preventing its abuse? The conventional wisdom is that escape clauses must be made costly, but I show this claim to be at odds with empirical observation. In the GATT/WTO, the institution where escape clauses are most prevalent, compensation following escape was only widespread in the 1950s. Since then, it has been progressively abandoned, in favor of appeals to exception. This alternative mechanism relies on an institution's ability to verify the severity and exogeneity of the domestic circumstances of states seeking temporary escape. Relying heavily on GATT archives, I show how early on in the institution, members had made the link between costless escape and increased monitoring, and pursued reforms to achieve both objectives. The success of members' ability to verify escapees' domestic circumstances is observed in the record of safeguard disputes throughout the GATT/WTO's history. Finally, I use the hypothesized link between verifiable information and the chosen escape mechanism to explain an otherwise puzzling GATT incident, that of French emergency trade measures in 1968.     

Proportionality and balancing in WTO law: a comparative perspective

This article discusses the concepts of proportionality, necessity and balancing in the World Trade Organization (WTO) legal framework. These concepts are increasingly important in the context of services and establishment regulated by the General Agreement on Trade in Services. The role and meaning of proportionality, necessity and balancing are not clear. The emerging WTO case law is analysed in this article, which adopts a comparative approach, drawing upon proportionality and balancing tests in different national and international legal orders. It discusses how these tests could influence the interpretation and application of WTO law. A main argument is that trade-offs among competing norms and values are unavoidable in WTO dispute settlement, and that the proportionality analysis could contribute to making this process more transparent, rational and predictable.     

Ideas and interests in global financial governance: comparing German and US preference formation

Financial crises underline the necessity for more effective global governance. Despite the creation of the Basel II Accord, no agreement has been reached on the reform of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Why do governments only selectively agree to reform global governance? I argue that convergence and divergence of governmental positions cannot be explained solely by the logic of the international system, institutions or globalization. Instead, they strongly reflect domestic ideas and interests. Furthermore, the ability of governments to compromise internationally is influenced by the different impact of domestic ideas and interests. With regard to their prevalence in domestic preference formation, ideas prevail when governance affects lobby groups diffusely and poses fundamental questions on the role of politics in governing the economy. Interests prevail when lobby groups are affected directly and new governance concerns a specific distribution of costs. These arguments are tested on the preference formation of the United States and German governments on the IMF and Basel II.     

States Sued: Democracy,the Rule of Law,and Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)

Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) cases have increased dramatically in recent decades, and the institutions of investment arbitration to resolve investor-state disputes constitute the core of the modern investment regime. In this article, we seek to explain the variation in the host governments’ risk of being challenged by foreign investors before international arbitration tribunals. We argue that such risk is greatest at the intermediate level of democracy where some democratic elements such as elections are strong, but the system of rule of law remains weak. In those regimes, “regulatory risk” runs higher than in autocratic regimes as the host governments are under greater pressure for regulating matters of broad public concern. At the same time, more traditional political risk of arbitrary, discriminate, and abusive acts remains considerable at that level of democracy due to weak rule of law, exacerbating the former risk. Empirical analysis provides a good deal of support for the argument.     

Reaching Inside the State: International Law and Superior Liability

With the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Court (ICC), the international community has taken the most decisive steps yet to reach inside the state to protect individuals from and prosecute individuals for violations of international humanitarian law. After outlining the key developments in international law on this subject, I turn to the heart of the paper—an analysis of how these developments in international law should affect theory and research in international relations and comparative politics. To what extent should we expect that the international community would hold individuals accountable? Will individual leaders comply with international law? Most importantly, what factors will influence the level of enforcement of and compliance with international law? I conclude with suggestions as to how research on international law on individual liability should advance.     

The problems of ‘nation‐building’: imposing bureaucratic ‘rule from above’

With the problems of stabilising Iraq continuing under the ‘fully sovereign’ Iraqi interim government, which formally replaced the United‐States‐led transitional administrative authority on 28 June 2004, many critics have argued that the United Nations (UN) should play a much larger role in the transition process. This article suggests that while imposing an alternative set of external administrative ‘advisers’ might be popular with European powers, it is unlikely that greater UN involvement would make much difference to the people of Iraq. Using the example of the international protectorate of Bosnia, which is also a ‘fully sovereign’ state, where the UN plays a fully engaged role, it is clear that external enforcement can provide little legitimacy for Iraqi institutions. This article challenges the idea that the ‘rule of law’ can be imposed from outside by focusing on two areas of legal activism in Bosnia: constitutional change and property return. It suggests that the ‘rule of law’ approach sees legal or administrative solutions as a short cut to addressing political problems, fetishising the legal framework at the same time as marginalising the political sphere. Rather than more coercive external involvement in the form of pressures for more legislation and better law enforcement, the experience of Bosnia highlights the need for greater levels of political legitimacy, a need that runs counter to the logic of the ‘rule of law’ approach.     

Challenges to multilaterism free trade agreements

The establishment of free trade took place in the late 18^th and 19^th centuries and, after the Second World War, international trade through trade liberalisation gained increased importance. International organisations such as the General Agreement in Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the present World Trade Organisation (WTO) were then established to provide the institutional framework for a system of rights and obligations for trade in goods and services between countries. Nations worldwide are currently promoting trade liberalisation using various ways, multilaterally, regionally or bilaterally.     

Italian foreign policy in the post-cold war period: a neoclassical realist approach

Abstract

Drawing on a neoclassical realist approach, this article analyses the foreign policy conduct of different Italian governments from 1994 to 2008. Pressured by the post-cold war international system, these governments have been compelled to raise Italy's profile within the international system. However, the way in which successive governments have responded has differed markedly. By looking at variables located at the domestic level – elite perceptions of the distribution of power and government instability – it is possible to explain these differences. Neo-classical realism is seen as an advance on Waltzian neo-realism precisely because it allows room for domestic as well as international (or systemic) variables, and because it has a very specific focus on foreign policy as such.     

Think globally,buy locally: International agreements and government procurement

Do international treaties constrain national governments? The answer appears to be “yes” when it comes to the use of traditional barriers to trade, such as tariffs. Yet, while many governments have cut tariffs to comply with international agreements, they have often raised non-tariff barriers in their place. One increasingly prominent non-tariff barrier is discrimination in public procurement. Governments frequently discriminate against foreign suppliers in favor of domestic ones when buying goods and services. In an attempt to reduce procurement discrimination, international organizations, such as the World Trade Organization, have devoted ever more attention to members’ procurement practices. Additionally, a growing number of preferential trade agreements seek to regulate public procurement. It remains unclear, however, whether international rules are effective in changing governments’ purchasing behavior. Using original data, we find that neither multilateral nor preferential procurement agreements substantially reduce governments’ propensity to “buy national.” These results illustrate the difficulty of regulating non-transparent policy areas via international treaties.     

Resisting democracy assistance: Who seeks and receives technical election assistance?

Why are some developing countries less open to technical election assistance than to election observation? My argument about who seeks and receives technical election assistance is two-fold, taking into account the incentives of recipients and providers. On the recipient side, governments are less likely to request technical assistance when the political costs are high (autocracy) or the benefits low (strong electoral institutions). On the provider side, international organizations are less likely to provide such technical assistance when the government appears to lack political will for reform and full project implementation is unlikely. Statistical analyses of global data on technical election assistance by the United Nations covering 130 countries from 1990 to 2003 support this argument about political cost-benefit calculations in considering technical assistance. Case examples from Guyana, Indonesia, Haiti, and Venezuela illustrate some of these dynamics. My findings suggest that seemingly complementary international interventions (observation and technical support) can create different incentives for domestic and international actors. This helps explain why some countries tend to agree more often to election observation than to technical election assistance.     

Making Room at the Negotiating Table: The Growth of Diplomacy between Nation-State Governments and Non-State Economic Entities

The study of diplomacy has traditionally focused on relationships and interactions between the governments of nation-states, empires, principalities, and similar politicies. This state-centric view has been challenged in recent times by scholars who have sought to take into account the proliferation of different types of actors in the international arena. This paper address diplomacy between governments and non-state economic entities, a broad category of bodies extending from multilateral economic institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and GATT/World Trade Organization to consultative and knowledge-generating bodies such as the World Economic Forum and International Chamber of Commerce.     

International conflict,military rule,and violent authoritarian breakdown

ABSTRACT

Why do some transitions of power from military rule occur violently while others do not? What effect, if any, does the international security environment have on how violent breakdowns of authoritarian rule are? I argue a conflict-prone security environment ameliorates the commitment problem by ensuring an influential role for the military out of power. Therefore, when facing a domestic crisis in a threatening security environment, military leaders are more likely to peacefully cede power rather than wield violent measures to stay in office. Perhaps counter-intuitively, international conflicts thus lead to transitions of power from military rule that minimize violence and human costs. International conflicts do not have this moderating effect on other types of authoritarian rule.