Great Expectations: AI and Law as an Issue for Legal Semiotics

Trying to build computerprograms that can assist the practicing lawyerin solving concrete cases is scientificallychallenging and financially attractive. So far,the practical results of such endeavors arerather modest, but that may change. This paperexamines the possible impact in the future ofadvanced advisory software on the semantics andpragmatics of law. Two kinds of computerprograms are discussed, viz., expertsystems and dialogue models. It is argued thatsuch systems may affect adjudication in someimportant ways, and that jurists shouldtherefore develop a more critical attitudetoward the use of such systems. Furthermore, itis argued that the widespread idea that the useof computers leads to more objectivity is onthe whole mistaken. As to the role of computersin legal decision making, the final question isnot: can they do it? But: do we want to let them doit? All this does not mean, however, thatjurists should turn away from ArtificialIntelligence and Law. On the contrary,developments in that field can be highlystimulating for legal theory and legal semiotics.     

Legal Authority as a Social Fact

From a sociological point of view, theconceptual and logical relations between the norms oflegal order represent empirical and causal relationsbetween social actors. The claim that legal authorityis based on the validity of empowering norms means,sociologically, that the capability to enact andenforce legal norms is based on an empirical transferof power from one social actor to another. With thisprocess, sociology has to explain how a proclamationof legal rights by the creation of empowering normscan lead to the establishment of the factual power ofcoercion. This explanation reveals that legalauthority as a social fact is irrevocably dependent onnon-legal power, which is not created by legalempowering norms but is the empirical foundation forall legal authority and state power.     

The Semiotics of Memes in the Law: Jack Balkin’s Promise of Legal Semiotics

The jurisprudent Jack M. Balkin introduced the analogy of memes as a semiotic device for understanding the law. His notion of cultural software into which this device was inserted is developed first, followed by a development of memetic analysis and its several semiotic dimensions. After a brief treatment of the position of ideology in view of memetic analysis, and the corresponding notion of transcendence, Balkin’s explicitly semiotic setting for this doctrine is displayed. This method is then briefly applied to the civilian doctrine of patrimony, to supplement Balkin’s application of it to common law institutions.     

诸神之争、法制型支配与正当性——韦伯合法性理论的再认识

当韦伯以现代社会科学的视角对合法性与正当性的议题进行研究后,他对当下正当性等同于合法性的陈述几乎成了我们研究合法性与正当性的出发点,不论是反对还是赞同。但是,在韦伯的合法性理论中,作为正当性的合法性存在两种意涵,一种是与价值无涉的经验陈述;一种是与价值判断相关的倾向和论证。正是在对经验现象批驳的基础上,韦伯论证了法制型支配和领袖民主相配合下作为正当性的合法性之可能条件。当我们正本清源,对韦伯的合法性理论进行再认识,或许会产生新的启示。     

Armed Conflicts,Images of Law and Legal Semiotics

International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue internationale de Sémiotique juridique -     

Legal Issues Involved in Fighting Spam as a Means of Waging an Information War

While other countries, both those that border on the Arctic Circle and those that do not, rush to establish footholds in the polar regions, Russia has taken a lackadaisical attitude toward restoring and strengthening its influence along the Northern Sea Route even though one-quarter of its energy reserves lie in that region. Russia must reexamine its policy, and quickly, if the country is not to lose out in an intensified global contest over natural resources.     

论法律拟制、法律虚拟与制度修辞

法律拟制和法律虚拟是两个不同的法学概念,作为立法和法律运用的重要方式,两者本身预示着法律的修辞属性。法律拟制和法律虚拟分别勾连着立法和司法,从而可以在概念体系中进一步划分为立法拟制和司法拟制,立法虚拟和司法虚拟。这些概念都表明法律不仅是科学的、理性的、逻辑的规则体系,而且同时也是诠释的、诗性的、修辞的预设体系。因此,对法律不仅需要从科学、理性、逻辑的观点看,而且也要从诠释、诗性和修辞的观点看。只有把法律作为制度修辞,法律的逻辑推论才有展开的前提条件。     

社会规则理论与作为制度事实的法律

哈特的社会规则理论直接应对的是如何解释法律约束或法律义务的来源问题。他虽然在聚合行为和批判反思态度的基础上界定法律的约束力,但《法律的概念》实际上并没有阐明其中的内在机理。哈特的理论与约翰·塞尔有关制度事实理论之间存在密切的关联。在塞尔的理论中,制度事实因集体意向性、功能归属和构成性规则而产生,无论其原始材料为何。作为一种特殊的存在,制度事实及其逻辑结构本身就已经证明相关权力的存在。借助这一思路,法律也可以被视为制度事实,这种制度事实的原始材料是各种言行行为,而哈特的承认规则相当于构成性规则。如此一来,套用塞尔的理论,社会规则理论对法律的约束力解释力便可获得深化和加强。     

Russian Legal Culture: An Analysis of Adaptive Response to an Institutional Transplant

This article is an inquiry into Russian legal culture and is based on the assumption that any institution transplanted from one social environment to another will be reinterpreted and reshaped, so that it can be accepted into the receiving society. The process of adaptation creates an opportunity to examine the receiving society's established practices and way of thinking. To demonstrate their effects, this article explores the author's research findings carried out in two Russian towns where institutions of media self-regulation were set up. The findings are analyzed comparatively in order to identify how the key players in the two towns interpreted the initial ideas, established procedures and rules for the newly set up institutions, and defined the roles that were attributed to them. The results of the two-city case study are then used to interpret some specifics of the internal logic of the local legal culture.     

“A Short Genealogy of Realism”: Peirce, Kevelson and Legal Semiotics

Kevelson remains an important figure in legal semiotics, a co-founder, along with Bernard Jackson, of the International Roundtable for the Semiotics of Law, and of course a valuable and seminal commentator on Peirce in the legal domain. This paper will examine her claim, that through his collaboration with and influence on Oliver Holmes, Peirce should be regarded as a foundational figure in a history of legal realism and modern jurisprudence, and that a legal semiotic can be identified in and not only extrapolated from his seminal writings. This paper will contend that the relationship between Peirce and Holmes should be seen as perplexed and disputatious, rather than close and directly influential, as Kevelson argues. However, regardless of its limitations, Kevelson’s historical inquiry helps provide the ground for a contemporary and historical account of the full picture of a Peircean based legal semiotic and jurisprudence.     

Legal Principles and Legal Theory

Current legal theory is concerned with the presence of principles in law partly because they are at the core of Dworkin's criticisms of Hart's rule of recognition. Hart's theory is threatened by the possibility that the identification of some principles follows an extremely relaxed rule of recognition, or even no rule at all. Unfortunately, there is no conclusive test to ascertain what is the case in actual practice. On the other hand, the evaluative arguments which support Dworkin's proposal of principled adjudication are forceful but not conclusive. Moreover, since ultimate controversy over values is plausible, judicial discretion may sometimes be inevitable.     

Law as a Social Construction and Conceptual Legal Theory

Law and Philosophy - A currently popular view among legal positivists is that law is a social construction. Many of the same legal philosophers also argue that before one can study law empirically,...     

刑事陪审中法律问题与事实问题的区分

事实问题具有法律性,法律问题具有事实性,因此在理论上很难找到清晰而明确的标准准确地区分刑事陪审中的法律问题与事实问题。境外刑事陪审实践中对法律问题与事实问题之区分,主要是通过程序机制的方法明确法官和陪审员的具体职责,由此形成了一般裁定和问题清单两种不同的模式。我国刑事陪审中法律问题与事实问题的区分,既要遵循法哲学上有关诉讼中区分法律问题与事实问题的基本规律,又要充分考虑我国法律传统和司法实践等因素。     

事实的推导、预测与发现——经济人假设作为一种信息的限度与陷阱

在立法过程中,经济人假设对立法事实的发现有一定贡献,但只有在经济人拥有相同程度的理性或拥有同样的利益结构,且其利益构成的权重相同的情形和前提下,运用经济人假设对众多经济人的行为进行社会整体的评价和推测才是可行的,而由于经济人个体之间的巨大差异,这一前提在实践中并不存在,因此运用时须避免误入陷阱。