Political polarization, congressional redistricting, and trade liberalization

During the last 50 years, political polarization in the US House of Representatives has intensified. One explanation for this trend emphasizes the importance of congressional redistricting. This paper analyzes the relationship between political polarization and redistricting in the context of two trade liberalization bills. The results of the paper indicate that redistricting has not contributed significantly to party polarization over trade policy although it has produced a partisan shift in favor of trade liberalization. Redistricting does not appear to impact political polarization largely because district-level characteristics currently are dominated by broader, national factors such as party affiliation. The results of the paper clearly demonstrate this point by showing that changes in party affiliation have a much greater impact on voting behavior than changes in district characteristics. The paper also finds, however, that institutional control of the redistricting process at the state level has influenced political polarization with respect to trade policy.     

Committee jurisdiction, congressional behavior and policy outcomes

The literature on congressional committees has largely overlooked the impact of jurisdictional fights on policy proposals and outcomes. This paper develops a theory of how legislators balance the benefits of expanded committee jurisdiction against preferred policy outcomes. It shows why (a) senior members, and junior members in safe seats, are most likely to challenge a committee’s jurisdiction; (b) policy proposals may be initiated off the proposer’s ideal point for jurisdictional gains; (c) policy outcomes will generally be more moderate with jurisdictional fights than without these turf wars. We empirically investigate these results examining proposed Internet intellectual property protection legislation in the 106th Congress.     

Strategic institutional choice: Voters, states, and congressional term limits

States’ choices on term limits are quantified as a multiple-categorical variable capturing variation in the type of limits passed. Measures of relative political influence in Congress explain much of this variation. Using 1992 data on the American states, the model controls for unobserved heterogeneity due to voter access to direct democracy in some states. At 2002 values for congressional tenure and federal spending, the model predicts approximately eight to ten additional states would choose to limit their own members’ terms but cannot under a Supreme Court ruling. We discuss implications for institutional federalism and the potential passage of similar political institutions across the states.     

The impact of complexity and reform on congressional committee output

Some investigators argue that recent reforms in Congress have made it more difficult for Congress to do its job, while others contend that growing complexity in the larger congressional environment has had this result. We test these competing explanations using selected measures of congressional committee inputs and outputs over a period of eight Congresses, 1961–1975. Analysis based on pooled time-series and cross-section data reveals that reform had no direct impact on our measures of committee inputs and outputs once the effects of underlying trends attributable to complexity in the external environment are controlled. Similar conclusions emerge when we compare committees in complex and noncomplex environments and also when we compare committees differentially affected by reform. We discuss methodological and policy implications of our findings.     

Voters and roll call voting: The effect on congressional elections

The subject of this research is whether ideological preferences play a major role in explaining voters' refusal to reelect some members of the U.S. House of Representatives. If ideological control is important, one would expect to find a large difference between the voting record of a rejected incumbent and his or her replacement. In distinction, whenever voters must replace a congressman or congresswoman because that person had died in office or chose to run for higher office, the hypothesis of ideological tracking implies that the newly elected member of Congress will resemble his or her predecessor. The data confirm these hypotheses and show, as well, that ideological control exists within parties and not only between them; that the degree of voters' ideological control is as great over senior congressmen and congresswomen as over junior ones; and that voters' concern about ideology has increased over the last two decades.     

How to vote,whether to vote: Strategies for voting and abstaining on congressional roll calls

This paper develops and tests a theory of voting and abstaining on Congressional roll calls. The theoretical model assumes that the voting behavior of legislators is oriented toward reelection, and that constituents vote retrospectively. Among the predictions of the theory are that supporters of a program are more likely to abstain than opponents, that conflicted legislators are more likely to vote on the losing side (but will abstain when the vote is very close), and that indifferent legislators will abstain when votes are not close but trade their votes when the outcome is uncertain. The empirical test is based on a series of votes on appropriations for the Clinch River Breeder Reactor from 1975 to 1982. We estimate a nested logit model of, first, the probability of voting for Clinch River, and second, the probability of abstaining from the vote, conditional on preferences regarding the program. All of the empirical results are consistent with the theoretical predictions, and most are statistically significant by conventional standards. The implication is that the abstention decision, as well as yes or no votes, can be purposive, and that the pattern of abstentions is not random among supporters and opponents.The authors gratefully acknowledge research support from the Brookings Institution and the University of Michigan School of Law, and useful comments on an earlier draft by Randall Calvert, Morris Fiorina, Rodney Fort, Amihai Glazer, Keith Krehbiel, Thomas Romer, Kenneth Shepsle, Rodney Smith, Barry Weingast, the UCI Public Choice Study Group, and the Hoover Workshop on Collective Choice.     

Local racial context,campaign messaging,and public political behavior: A congressional campaign field experiment

Local racial contexts influence public opinion and voting behaviors. This paper argues that differences in community racial demographics also change public political behavior and influence the effectiveness of different campaign appeals to change public political behaviors of white Americans. Using data from an experiment run by a congressional primary campaign, I examine the responses of white Republicans to display a yard sign of a white Republican running against a Latino Republican. Consistent with theories of racial threat, whites in Latino neighborhoods were more likely to be willing to post yard signs. Moreover, the results also show that the effectiveness of different campaign appeals varies by neighborhood racial context. These findings show that racial diversity affects the public political behaviors of white Americans and, more importantly, changes the effectiveness of different campaign appeals.     

Policy and Blame Attribution: Citizens’ Preferences,Policy Reputations,and Policy Surprises

Negativity bias suggests that the attribution of blame to governments, for alleged or actual policy failures, is disproportionately pertinent for their popularity. However, when citizens attribute blame for adverse consequences of a policy, does it make a difference which policy was it, and who was the political agent that adopted the policy? We posit that the level of blame citizens attribute to political agents for policy failures depends on three policy-oriented considerations: (1) the distance between a citizen’s ideal policy and the agent’s established policy position; (2) the distance between a citizen’s ideal policy and the agent’s concrete policy choice; and (3) the distance between the agent’s established policy position and her concrete policy choice. The inherent relationship between these three policy-oriented considerations renders their integration in one model a theoretical and methodological imperative. The model provides novel observable predictions regarding the conditions under which each of the three policy-oriented factors will produce either pronounced or subtle observable effects on blame attribution. We test the model’s predictions in two survey experiments, in Israel and in Germany. The results of both experiments are highly consistent with the model’s predictions. These finding offer an important contribution by specifying the ways in which individual-level preferences interact with politicians’ policy reputations and policy choices to shape blame attribution. Our model entails unintuitive revisions to several strands of the literature, and in the “Discussion” section we provide tentative support for the applicability of this model to other political judgments beyond blame attribution.

     

以政策贯彻政策:政策执行、创新与调适

政策执行本身是复杂而多样的过程,多数政策执行的真实情况,是要经过各级政策主体研究出台地方政策或实施意见,通过"以致策贯彻政策"逐级传导,最终化作具体项目和行动,使政策得以执行和落实."以政策贯彻政策",作为政策执行和创新的重要环节,过去并没有引起足够重视.加强对这个问题的研究,对于理解政策执行的理论与实践都具有重要意义.     

Presidential priorities,congressional control,and the quality of regulatory analysis: an application to healthcare and homeland security

Elected leaders delegate rulemaking to federal agencies, then seek to influence rulemaking through top-down directives and statutory deadlines. This paper documents an unintended consequence of these control strategies: they reduce regulatory agencies’ ability and incentive to conduct high-quality economic analysis to inform their decisions. Using scoring data that measure the quality of regulatory impact analysis, we find that hastily adopted “interim final” regulations reflecting signature policy priorities of the two most recent presidential administrations were accompanied by significantly lower quality economic analysis. Interim final homeland security regulations adopted during the G.W. Bush administration and interim final regulations implementing the Affordable Care Act in the Obama administration were accompanied by less thorough analysis than other “economically significant” regulations (regulations with benefits, costs, or other economic impacts exceeding $100 million annually). The lower quality analysis apparently stems from the confluence of presidential priorities and very tight statutory deadlines associated with interim final regulations, rather than either factor alone.     

Administration, Governance, and Policy Tools in Welfare Policy Implementation

Landmark welfare reform legislation passed in 1996 has been operating by legislative extensions since its expiration in September 2002. At this writing, reauthorization has been derailed by controversy over various legislative proposals. In this article, we contribute to the welfare policy debate by studying the importance of specific policy tools and the role of public administration in the dramatic fall in welfare caseloads from 1996 to 2000. Using administrative and survey data on welfare programs in 44 states, we test our theory that caseload reduction is a function of administrative commitments, policy design, and administrative actions linked to five sets of governance variables: environmental factors, client characteristics, treatments, administrative structures, and managerial roles and actions. We find strong evidence that administrative action to move clients into work, coupled with administrative commitments, can provide important links between policy goals and policy outcomes.     

Public Policy and Foreign Policy: Divergences,Intersections, Exchange

Policy studies tend to be divided between domestic matters and foreign affairs. Scholars seldom employ one another's literature, and they largely draw on different traditions within political science. This article explores the potential for cross‐fertilization and calls for greater integration of these related subfields. The argument considers the case for unity, parallelism, and overlap between domestic public policy studies and foreign policy studies. It examines the reasons for the divide and surveys a variety of attempts to find solutions for the problem of intersection at the boundary between national life and the international environment. It places the dichotomy in a broader context of political science as a whole and offers suggestions about potentially fruitful exchanges. It treats globalization and suggests that a theory of the state could be helpful to both tendencies in policy studies.     

Policy Community, Policy Network and Comparative Industrial Policies

This article explores ways in which the relationships between 'government' and 'industry' in the making and carrying out of policy can be compared cross-sectorally and cross-nationally. It draws attention to the accumulating empirical evidence which suggests a disjuncture between conventional characterizations of national economic and industrial policies and processes, with what actually happens in practice. It argues that more systematic attention needs to be given to the analysis of the norms of policy and behaviour at different policy levels. Using the concepts of policy community and policy network, it shows how policy networks can be identified, characterized and compared, and how relationships within networks are regulated by 'rules of the game'.     

Policy making and collective action: Defining coalitions within the advocacy coalition framework

Research on policy communities, policy networks, and advocacy coalitions represents the most recent effort by policy scholars in North America and Europe to meaningfully describe and explain the complex, dynamic policy making processes of modern societies. While work in this tradition has been extraordinarily productive, issues of collective action have not been carefully addressed. Focusing on the advocacy coalitions (AC) framework developed by Sabatier (1988) and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) as an example of a productive research program within the policy network tradition, this article (1) examines the potential of the AC framework, with its emphasis on beliefs, policy learning, and preference formation, to provide richer explanations of policy making processes than frameworks grounded exclusively in instrumental rationality; (2) suggests that paradoxically, however, the AC framework can more fully realize its potential by admitting the explanations of collective action from frameworks based on instrumental rationality; (3) incorporates within the AC framework accounts of how coalitions form and maintain themselves over time and of the types of strategies coalitions are likely to adopt to pursue their policy goals; and (4) derives falsifiable collective action hypotheses that can be empirically tested to determine whether incorporating theories of collective action within the AC framework represents a positive, rather than a degenerative, expansion of the AC framework.     

Economy,logic, and action

Interviewed by Richard Swedberg