Procedural Justice and Conflict Management at School

In this research, we explored the contributions of perceived procedural justice (PPJ) to the conflict management behaviors of adolescents when they experience conflict with their teachers. We tested an extensive model to determine how PPJ contributes to conflict management. We also extended research on PPJ to examine its impact on adolescents. Our results, acquired from a large and diverse sample of 256 high school students, indicate that PPJ had an impact on adolescents' approach to managing conflicts with their teachers. Students who perceived that their teachers' decision processes were just were less dominating and more avoiding, obliging, and compromising. In addition, we found that students' perceptions about the legitimacy of their teachers' authority mediated the relationships between PPJ and conflict management style. This study contributes to the rather scarce research on PPJ's role in conflict management and should be useful for educators searching for constructive, relationship‐based tools for conflict management.     

The Effects of Perceived Procedural Justice on Conflict Management between Spouses,and the Mediating Role of Dyadic Adjustment

In this study, we examined the role that perceived procedural justice (PPJ) plays in the conflict management behaviors that intimate spouses adopt and endorse. In this context, PPJ has been defined as the degree to which one perceives that his or her spouse makes decisions fairly, considerately, and in a participatory manner. To test the impact of perceived procedural justice on conflict resolution behavior, we applied the dual‐concern model of conflict management style. In an experiment in which participants read fictional scenarios and predicted spouses’ responses, we found that perceptions of strong PPJ enhanced the prediction of integrating (problem solving), compromising, and, to a lesser degree, obliging behavior. Perceived procedural justice also caused a reduction in avoidance behavior, but no effect we found on dominating (competing) behavior. In a following correlational study, we also found that PPJ positively correlated to enhanced integrating, compromising, and obliging behaviors, and these correlations were partially or fully mediated by the degree of “dyadic adjustment,” which is a measure of relationship health. In addition, in this second study, we found no correlation between perceived procedural justice and dominating or avoiding behavior. In both studies, participants either predicted or chose collaborative behaviors more than non‐collaborative ones. We conclude that the perception that one's partner is behaving in a procedurally just way can enhance active and egalitarian collaboration in marriage and other intimate partner relationships, but that the absence of PPJ does not seem to encourage active non‐collaboration, particularly not highly self‐centered dominating behavior.     

Beyond the Thomas–Kilmann Model: Into Extreme Conflict

This article discusses an extension to the Thomas–Kilmann conflict mode instrument (Thomas and Kilmann 1977) designed specifically for conflict situations in which strong negative emotional relationships are at play. The Thomas–Kilmann (TK) model is widely used to help participants (disputants and mediators) identify how two basic conflict characteristics interact to influence how stakeholders shape their actions with regard to their interests. Essentially the TK Model is built on the premise that the two salient conflict variables are the relative importance of the relationships at hand and the substantive issues being discussed. These variables are illustrated with a simple matrix that shows how each party will interact with the other based on the relative importance it places on these variables. Graphically illustrating where the behaviors fall on the matrix can explicate parties' behaviors to add a new perspective that may change the dynamic of the conflict. But the TK Model does not address scenarios in which individuals have very negative or destructive relationships, and sabotage, blocking, and exclusion are behavioral norms. Hence, we developed the Baumoel–Trippe (BT) Extension to the TK Model to address the highly negative and often identity‐based conflicts that are often found in the world of family business. Accordingly, the BT Extension to the TK Model explores conflicts in which the relationships are not merely unimportant or uncooperative, but where they become negative to downright vengeful. There is so much at stake for family business stakeholders that the family relationships may become so adversarial that the very business and family harmony all parties value are at risk. With our extension of the TK Model, we seek to provide insight into how decisions might be made when stakeholders are in highly negative, conflictual relationships.     

External Intervention in Ethnic Conflict

Recently, ethnicity has received greater attention from international conflict scholars. This study explores a new aspect of how ethnic composition of states and the power of ethnic kin affect external state interventions in ethnic conflicts. Here it is hypothesized that states with dominant ethnic groups but still-significant ethnic minorities are expected to be more prone to intervention in ethnic conflict than states without one of these two characteristics. A new measure is proposed to capture such variation in ethnic composition more precisely. Looking at large-N panel data, it is found that ethnically fractionalized states with dominant ethnic groups are indeed the most likely to intervene in ethnic conflicts. Additionally, the power of the embattled ethnic kin minority, as determined by its settlement patterns in the host state, also increases the likelihood of intervention. Traditional variables like proximity and capability retain statistical significance. However, ethnic variables have the strongest effects on interventions in ethnic conflict.     

NGOs and Ethnic Conflict: Lessons from the Work of the Project on Ethnic Relations in the Balkans

This article examines the impact of nongovernmental organization-sponsored contact and communication on fostering peaceful solutions to ethnic conflict via case studies of the activities of the Project on Ethnic Relations (PER) in Romania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Serbia. It explores five operational principles that guide PER activity: creating credible, neutral forums for dialogue; maintaining momentum; working within political realities; encouraging indigenous solutions from within existing processes; and acting with the backing of powerful states. These principles explain PER's success as a "weak mediator" of ethnic conflicts. According to this analysis, PER also exhibits organizational characteristics that contribute to success, including nonpartisanship, area expertise and extensive networks of local contacts, and an ability to secure the trust of local actors.
A significant indicator of the success of PER activities is the establishment by conflicting parties of institutionalized mechanisms for addressing their differences. Contrary to the view that electoral competition contributes to conflict, this study finds that the possibility of achieving an electoral advantage by participating cooperatively in conflict resolution activities creates incentives for local actors to recognize opportunities offered by PER activities and leads local actors to heed PER's advice. Finally, the article offers a cautionary observation. While PER's perceived influence with major international actors may contribute to its local successes, once a state actor with the power to impose a solution has committed itself to ending a conflict, its preferences outweigh any local interests in determining the outcome and renders the efforts of a "weak mediator" such as PER irrelevant.     

Dimensions of Chinese foreign conflict and cooperation: A research note

Key mediation attributes, such as mediating actors, the strategy they choose, and previous mediation experiences, are widely thought to influence the nature of a conflict management outcome. But how and when these features shape outcomes is not a straightforward matter, and a standard analysis of these factors does not lead to their widely anticipated results. Why? We develop a new analytical framework that argues that a dispute's intensity alters the conflict management processes. Furthermore, in order to observe this variation, we also need to expand the traditional, dichotomous notion of conflict management outcomes (success or failure) to include a fuller range of observed results. Using the most recent International Conflict Management data set and our new analytical framework, we analyze the effect on conflict management outcome of mediator (a) identity, (b) strategy and (c) history. We find that directive strategies and international mediators are effective in resolving high intensity conflicts, procedural strategies and regional mediators are effective in resolving low intensity conflicts, and that mediation history always affects resolution. Our results have implications for both the study and practice of international dispute mediation.     

The Great Disconnect: Global Governance and Localised Conflict in the Cases of India and the EU

Academic scholarship displays a curious disconnect between two trends, connecting peace and governance issues. At the same time when conflicts tended to shift inwards (from inter-state to civil wars), global governance approaches seemed to decentre the management of peace and conflict outwards (from the nation state to international forums). This paper investigates this disjuncture by examining the European Union and India's governance strategies in different conflict contexts. It studies whether their strategies operate close to the global governance model and/or whether they are able to connect with and effectively support local peace initiatives in conflict-ridden areas.     

Seeking Sustainable Solutions: Using an Attractor Simulation Platform for Teaching Multistakeholder Negotiation in Complex Cases

We live and work in an increasingly complex and dynamic world. The demands of working in such environments require that negotiators understand situations of conflict and work with these situations in correspondingly complex and dynamic ways. Dynamical systems theory offers important insights and tools to enhance the understanding of difficult social conflicts, including the conceptualization of ongoing destructive conflicts as strong attractors: a particular form of self-organization of multiple elements comprising the mental and social systems associated with conflict. This article describes the pedagogical use of a computer simulation of conflict attractors (the attractor software) that allows participants to visualize and work interactively with the dynamics of conflict as they unfold over time. It further describes a negotiation workshop that employs the simulation to enhance participants' understanding of complex long-term dynamics in conflict and presents the findings of two outcome studiescomparing the effectiveness of a workshop that employed the simulation with one that employed a traditional integrative problem-solving method. While not definitive, these studies suggest that an understanding of the dynamical approach to conflict, supported by use of the attractor software, can promote the generation of more sustainable solutions for long-term conflicts.     

Just the Two of Us? Civil Conflicts,Pro-State Militants,and the Violence Premium

Quantitative literature discussing violence in civil conflicts tends towards a typical model of engagement between governments and revolutionaries. Whilst recent work has shown the significant impact of multiple anti-government groups, a further feature remains understudied—the role of pro-state militants. This article theorizes a “violence premium” when such groups arise, which leads to all connected groups devoting greater energy to conflict than they would in isolation. Employing duration analysis and data from The Troubles in Northern Ireland, where Republicans act as revolutionary insurgents, Loyalists as pro-state militants, and the British Army as government forces, the violence premium is empirically confirmed. Both Loyalists and Republicans deviate from their underlying strategies to attack more frequently when violence by their rivals increases, with Republicans and the British Army engaging in the same way. An extended analysis, accounting for the status of the victim, shows that the violence premium resulting from interaction between Loyalists and Republicans targeted only the civilian population of Northern Ireland, elucidating the sectarian component of The Troubles. These results show that including all conflict parties and considering how they are linked are important features in studies that aim to determine the net level of violence in civil conflicts.     

Militarism and Dual-Conflict Capacity

This research note examines how domestic institutions can moderate the relationship between domestic and interstate conflict involvement. Previous work has found that military dictatorships are more likely to become involved in either domestic or international conflicts, compared to party-based autocracies. We argue that the same institutional explanations for why military autocracies are more conflict-prone also make them less capable of successfully carrying out multiple conflicts at the same time. Analyzing interstate and domestic conflict involvement on a sample of dictatorships over the period 1947–2004, we show that military autocracies dealing with internal armed conflict are less likely than their nonmilitary counterparts to become involved in an international conflict.     

Are Your Disputants Insecure and Does It Matter? Attachment and Disputants' Speech during Mediation

An exploratory qualitative study explored the effect of attachment styles on disputants' speech during real‐life mediations. Drawing on attachment theory, we classified disputants as secure or insecure individuals using a self‐report attachment‐style questionnaire. Subsequently, they entered their mediation sessions, where their entire speech was recorded. Qualitative analysis of their speech yielded consistent and sometimes striking differences that portrayed secure speech as remarkably more useful and enhancing toward resolution compared with insecure speech. The findings, presented with many examples, strongly indicate the relevance of attachment to the research of communication during mediation sessions. In this report, we also consider the practical implications of the association between attachment and disputants' behavior, emphasizing the role of mediators.     

Strategies,capabilities, and demands: Explaining outcomes in violent intrastate nationalist conflicts

The study of nationalist and ethnic conflict has undergone considerable growth since the end of the Cold War. Much of the effort has been focused on ascertaining the nature and origins of such conflicts, and less on their process and termination. Those studies that do focus on conflict termination have generally done so using case‐study or idiosyncratic methods. Hence, we do not yet have much large‐N or statistical evidence that might suggest broad trends in how such conflicts end, or even much experience in measuring the relevant concepts in a manner conducive to such methods. This paper will address these questions by introducing a theoretical framework that seeks to explain the outcomes of violent intrastate nationalist conflicts. It will discuss measurement issues for relevant independent variables, and present data for a group of 75 violent, intrastate nationalist conflicts from 1945–1996. This data will then be used to test propositions derived from the model. The aim is to provide a useful building block for the study of the process and outcome of conflicts which political scientists now recognize to be some of the most important for the coming century.     

A Structural Analysis of International Conflict: From a Communication Perspective

The study describes the structure of international conflict with the tools of network analysis to enhance the understanding of multilateral conflict-communication relations and to predict the conflict structure with existing international relations theories (liberal and realist) plus global communication variables. Using data obtained from the Correlates of War Project (http://cow2.la.psu.edu/), the structure of international conflict is described for the period 1993–2001 for 145 nations. The results indicate that this network is very sparse; 42 nations had no conflict, and 36 only one bilateral disagreement. The network is centered about former Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Russia, the United States, Iraq, and China. Most conflicts are regional. The paper also evaluates both the liberal, expanded liberal (with communication variables included), and realist (including Huntington's Clash of Civilizations Theory) perspectives as predictors of conflict. The results indicate that communication variables substantially enhance explanatory power of a predictive model, but the effects of the communication variables are inconsistent. A multiple regression model including history of colonialism and prior conflict, physical proximity and contiguity, whether or not a nation is a democracy, and the communication variables—international telecommunication, freight, and exports—accounted for 30.0% of the variance in the structure of international conflict and each variable was significantly related to conflict. The need for further research is discussed.     

Fuel to the Fire: Natural Disasters and the Duration of Civil Conflict

Do natural disasters prolong civil conflict? Or are disasters more likely to encourage peace as hostilities diminish when confronting shared hardship or as shifts in the balance of power between insurgents and the state hasten cessation? To address these questions, this study performs an event history analysis of disasters’ impact on the duration of 224 armed intrastate conflicts occurring in 86 states between 1946 and 2005. I contend that natural disasters increase conflict duration by decreasing the state’s capacity to suppress insurgency, while reinforcing insurgent groups’ ability to evade capture and avoid defeat. First, disasters’ economic impact coupled with state financial outlays for disaster relief and reconstruction, reduce resources available for counterinsurgency and nation building in conflict zones. Second, the military’s role in administering humanitarian assistance can reduce the availability of troops and military hardware for counterinsurgency, prompt temporary ceasefires with insurgents, or both. Third, natural disasters can cause infrastructural damages that disproportionately hinder the state’s capacity to execute counterinsurgency missions, thereby making insurgent forces more difficult to capture and overcome. The combination of these dynamics should encourage longer conflicts in states with higher incidence of disaster. Empirical evidence strongly supports this contention, indicating that states with greater disaster vulnerability fight longer wars.     

War and Gender Inequalities in Health: The Impact of Armed Conflict on Fertility and Maternal Mortality

Recent studies have found significant excess mortality in women during and immediately after armed conflicts. This article directly assesses one of the most likely explanations, namely that war negatively affects reproductive health. Armed conflicts may contribute to sustain high fertility levels through increased social insecurity, loss of reproductive health services, and lower female education. Further, war's deteriorating impact on health infrastructure is expected to increase the relative risk that women die from complications associated with pregnancy and childbirth. These claims are tested in a global time-series cross-national study from 1970 through 2005. Three major findings are reported. First, armed conflicts are associated with higher overall fertility in low-income countries only. Second, maternal mortality rates are elevated, albeit moderately, in conflict countries. Third, conflicts in neighboring countries are associated with lower maternal mortality, possibly indicating that health interventions among refugee and host populations are relatively successful. While addressing one of the least successful UN Millennium Development Goals, this study also responds to the UN Security Council Resolution 1325, in which Article 16 specifically calls for the “Secretary-General to carry out a study on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls.”     

Reframing Sacred Values

Sacred values differ from material or instrumental values in that they incorporate moral beliefs that drive action in ways dissociated from prospects for success. Across the world, people believe that devotion to essential or core values — such as the welfare of their family and country, or their commitment to religion, honor, and justice — are, or ought to be, absolute and inviolable.
Counterintuitively, understanding an opponent's sacred values, we believe, offers surprising opportunities for breakthroughs to peace. Because of the emotional unwillingness of those in conflict situations to negotiate sacred values, conventional wisdom suggests that negotiators should either leave sacred values for last in political negotiations or should try to bypass them with sufficient material incentives. Our empirical findings and historical analysis suggest that conventional wisdom is wrong. In fact, offering to provide material benefits in exchange for giving up a sacred value actually makes settlement more difficult because people see the offering as an insult rather than a compromise. But we also found that making symbolic concessions of no apparent material benefit might open the way to resolving seemingly irresolvable conflicts.
We offer suggestions for how negotiators can reframe their position by demonstrating respect and/or by apologizing for what they sincerely regret. We also offer suggestions for how to overcome barriers by refining sacred values to exclude outmoded claims, exploiting the inevitable ambiguity of sacred values, shifting the context, provisionally prioritizing values, and reframing responsibility.     

The Evolution of International Conflict Resolution: From Cold War to Peacebuilding

Shaped by the changing nature of international conflict, the field of international conflict resolution evolved significantly throughout the latter years of the twentieth century and continues to be redefined. The end of the Cold War created space for a major transformation of the international conflict resolution field. This transformation was marked by three trends: (1) an expansion from a focus on superpower negotiating strategies to a wider peacebuilding agenda, (2) an increase in the role of nongovernmental actors as both disputants and third parties in international conflicts, and (3) a growing concern about human security in addition to state security, creating both tensions and opportunities for collaboration between governmental and nongovernmental bodies. This article presents a brief overview of each trend, as well as some concluding questions to frame the field's further development at this important juncture.     

Conflict Analysis and Conflict Resolution: Divorce or Friendly Mediation?

The interests, needs, and academic practices of conflict analysis scholars are often fundamentally at odds with those of conflict resolution scholar practitioners. In this essay, I make suggestions for new academic arrangements that could allow both groups to be productive and empowered in their theory building and teaching and also have positive impacts on the development of students and on global institutions and conflict environments.     

Conflict Expectations and the Paradox of Economic Coercion

Despite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions or what determines their success. These events are often explained away as "symbolic politics" driven completely by domestic-level factors. This article develops a simple game-theoretic model of economic coercion to show that both "senders" and "targets" of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behavior. Conflict expectations have a paradoxical effect on coercion events. First, senders that anticipate frequent conflicts will be more willing to initiate economic coercion, even if such attempts are costly. Senders that anticipate few conflicts will not threaten sanctions unless they incur minimal costs and the target would suffer significantly. While a robust anticipation of future disputes might make the sender prefer a coercive strategy, it also reduces its ability to obtain concessions. Target states that anticipate frequent conflict with the sender will make fewer concessions. Ironically, a sender will obtain the most favorable distribution of payoffs when it cares the least about its reputation or the distribution of gains. These hypotheses are tested statistically, with the results strongly supporting the conflict expectations model.