Interstate Banking: Current Status and Unfinished Agendas

In 1986, most of the centuries-old barriers against interstatebranch banking fell. By the end of the year, thirty-seven stateshad passed legislation authorizing some form of interstate branchbanking. Moreover, two federal judicial decisions had clearedthe way for interstate banking by restricting state regulatoryauthority over interstate branch banking when it is conductedeither through a shared-use automatic teller machine or by a"nonbank bank." These developments have dramatically changedthe nature of the business of banking, creating an entirelynew legislative agenda for states. High on the list of the itemsthat states must now consider are regulatory and tax parityamong competing financial institutions; multiple taxation offinancial institutions that do business in several states; taxavoidance by out-of-state banks; and out-dated jurisdictionalstandards.     

Impacts of Intergovernmental Financial Incentives on State Welfare Policymaking and Interstate Equity

Welfare policy in the United States is strongly influenced byintergovernmental factors. This analysis traces the effectsof federal financial incentives on state welfare policy decisionsacross programs and examines how changes in federal incentivesaffect state policy choices over time. The data indicate thathigher levels of federal participation are associated with substantialreductions in variance of welfare grants among the states andwith higher levels of interstate equity. These findings implythat significant shifts in welfare outputs would result froma devolution of responsibility for welfare to the states.     

Interstate Cooperation: The Roles of the State Attorneys General

State attorneys general are major participants in intergovernmentalrelations in the United States. This article presents six modelsthat may explain their interactions with each other and teststhree hypotheses associated with two models. Their interactionscomport with the cooperative and the innovation-diffusion models.Only limited evidence supports the hostility model and its associatedhypothesis. No evidence supports the mercantilist and competitivemodels. The response from only one attorney general suggestedhis actions are based on the benign neglect model. The conclusionis drawn that the cooperative activities of the attorneys generalhave produced a more harmonious federal system in terms of enforcementpolicies.     

互动与融合:国家治理与协商民主的内在逻辑

国家治理的本质是协商治理,协商治理的趋向是良政善治。国家治理的旨意与协商民主的内蕴具有紧密的关联性,即利益均衡是国家治理与协商民主一致的目标追求,公平正义是国家治理与协商民主相同的价值取向,主体平等是国家治理与协商民主同一的根本原则,公民精神是国家治理与协商民主共同的理念诉求。推进国家治理现代化需要协商民主提供承接载体,反之,发展协商民主也需要国家治理现代化架设运作平台。即,一方面加强社会主义协商民主建设有利于为国家治理创造稳定的社会环境,有利于提高国家治理过程中公共决策的质量,有利于国家治理过程中公共利益的实现;另一方面,国家治理现代化能够为社会主义协商民主建设疏通协商渠道、拓展操作场域、提供坚强保障。因此,国家治理与协商民主具有逻辑上的内在契合,二者在结构上是一种互动与融合的关系。     

The Politics of Governance Ratings

ABSTRACT

Some international organizations, and most prominently the World Bank, play a leading role in the supply of cross-country governance ratings. The paper draws on interviews of World Bank staff to understand why the World Bank produces cross-country comparable indicators and to bring to light the current controversies within the World Bank about existing indicators and future work on governance indicators. It also attempts to explain why so many external users rely on the Worldwide Governance Indicators, despite the limitations of these indicators and the large number of more meaningful, alternative indicators available. It argues that both robust and meaningful indicators and more qualitative research are necessary to give better reform advice to developing countries.     

Remaking the Chinese Leviathan: Market Transition and the Politics of Governance in China

Book reviewed: Dali Yang. Remaking the Chinese Leviathan: Market Transition and the Politics of Governance in China.
Reviewed by VICTOR SHIH     

State Taxation of Interstate Sales: Enforcement Problems and Prospects

In their search for additional revenues, state governments in recent years have turned greater attention to collection of use taxes. Growth in interstate mail order sales has vastly increased the potential yield from use taxes, but Supreme Court decisions have limited the ability of states to effectively collect the tax. States have attempted to overcome enforcement barriers by joining in interstate use tax compliance compacts, and promoting congressional legislation to overcome constitutional prohibitions.     

Regulatory Competition and the Politics of Financial Market Reform in Britain and Japan

This article examines the impact that the internationalization of jnance has had on the regulation of domestic securities markets in Japan and Britain. In particular, it seeks to explain the apparent incompatibility of two distinct trends: deregulation (and state retreat) on the one hand, and increased regulation and state involvement in markets on the other.
Much of the literature about the efects of internationalization on domestic policymaking has drfjculty explaining these two distinct regulatory frends. First, there has been no uniform "competition in regulatory laxity." Second, the United States does not appear to have exerted hegemonic influence over outcomes. Finally, domestic-level explanations which deny the importance of systemic-level influences on domestic policy choices are unable to explain the similarity of policy choices undertaken by governments with very different regulatory traditions.
I argue instead that regulatory reforms have been undertaken primarily for the benefit of a particular set of private economic actors—mobile consumers of financial services, including both holders of liquid investment capital and large multinational borrowers. Internationalization has systematically strengthened their influence over the policymaking process by making "exit" from one political marketplace to another a more realistic and more potent bargaining strategy than the alternative of exercising "voice."     

The State of the State: Comparing Governance in China and the United States

How do two world powers with starkly different governing systems share common accountability problems, and why? Does the cycle of administrative reform produce additional need for reforms that come full circle, eventually exacerbating problems without solution? Yongfei Zhao and B. Guy Peters of the University of Pittsburgh examine governance in the United States and China and point out that conflicts in government functions unique to each country result in strikingly similar accountability issues.     

Understanding America's Hesitant Steps Toward Financial Capitalism: Politics, the Depression, and the Separation of Commercial and Investment Banking

Few would disagree that the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 is thecontinental divide in American financial and banking history. Bydisallowing banks from getting involved in the investment bankingindustry, this Act imposed an institutional change that shaped howfinancial institutions conduct their business, even today in itsdecline. Conventional wisdom has it that the Act was enacted tocorrect the ``deficient'' financial system that existed during theperiod. In this paper we investigate whether this assertion can beempirically verified by analyzing the Senate vote on a predecessorof this Act (which included the clause separating commercialbanking from investment banking activities). Using multinomiallogits, we examine what may have motivated senators to vote for itspassage. The econometric evidence indicates that the Senate votewas significantly influenced by important interest groups(including national banks as well as manufacturing sectorinterests), despite the large populist outcry for financial marketreforms at the onset of the Depression.     

The Banking Crisis: Grid,Group and the State of the Debate

The banking crisis and the recession it induced provide a salient backdrop to domestic and international politics. ² The International Monetary Fund (IMF 2010) estimates that total banking losses between 2008 and 2010 exceeded US$2.3 trillion. This article uses grid‐group theory to review the existing literature on the causes of the banking crisis and, in doing so, distinguishes between hierarchical, individualist, egalitarian and fatalist accounts of what went wrong and of what needs to be done to prevent another crisis from occurring. It is argued that the existing reform agenda is underpinned by a hierarchical analysis of the causes of the crisis and that this risks narrowing the support base for the reform process.