The Russian Constitutional Court and the Communist Party case: Watershed or whitewash?

Constitutional Courts stand at the interface between law and politics, as the newly formed Russian Constitutional Court exemplified during Russia's time of troubles between 1991 and 1993. One Constitutional Court case from that period had particular significance. The Russian court considered the constitutionality of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Russian Communist Party (CP RSFSR). The seven month long hearing tested the court's stamina and resolve. Described before it began as ‘Russia's Nuremberg’, was the Communist Party case a turning point in Russia's relationship with her past, or was it a staged showpiece with no real impact? This paper explores the Russian Constitutional Court's longest case and its effects.     

Russian Regions in Expanding Europe: The Pskov Connection

BARGAINING OVER POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POWER between the federal government in Moscow and the 89 subjects of the Russian Federation is now widely considered as critical to the success of Russia's democratic and free market reforms, if not to Russia's enduring viability as a state.1 The key challenge to Moscow, and to Russia as a whole, is how to harmonise different levels of political control so that economic growth could be accelerated and social tensions eased in the regions. This challenge is aggravated by the absence of reliable institutions (understood as enforceable rules of the game) regulating centre-periphery relations and the ideological and organisational disarray at the centre itself. In the regions along Russia's post-Soviet borders in particular, this problem is further complicated by a tension between geopolitical insecurity and powerful incentives for trade and economic development coming from outside Russia's borders. Relations between Moscow and the outlying regions thus become a truly 'intermestic' issue, affecting both Russia's internal post-Soviet institution building and the mode of Russia's integration into the global economy. The politics that shape relations between the Russian regions and Moscow are therefore part and parcel of Russia's evolving relations with the outside world, and the policies of regional elites are part and parcel of an increasingly complex fabric of Russia's foreign relations.     

Russia's quest for respect in the international conflict management in Kosovo

This article examines the emotion-based status-seeking logic in Russia's foreign policy vis-à-vis the West, presenting the example of Russia's reactions to NATO's military campaign against Serbia in 1999. It is argued that Russian assertiveness in combination with expressive rhetoric must be understood as a result of the ruling elite's need to have Russia's identity and self-defined social status as an equal great power in world politics respected by its Western interaction partners. Russia's reactions to NATO's intervention, which was not authorized by the UN Security Council, must be read as a strategy coping with the emotion anger about the perceived humiliation and provocation of status denial and ignorance by the West. We find various elements of such a coping strategy, among them the verbalization of the feeling of anger among Russian political circles and the media; uttering retaliation threats, but no ‘real’ aggressive, retaliatory action; minor and temporary activities aimed at restoring Russia's image and status as an influential an equal power. On the surface, the Kosovo episode did not result in any visible break or rift in the Russian–Western relationship. However, emotionally it has lead to a significant loss of trust in the respective partner on both sides.     

Who is to Blame? Agency,Causality, Responsibility and the Role of Experts in Russian Framings of Global Climate Change

This article analyses the politics of Russian climate change by pinpointing how global warming has been framed over a seven year period in a government-owned, leading daily newspaper, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, and how climate experts have intervened in such framings. Russia's climate politics is first summarised and then three framings of climate change are identified and examined. Secondly, the role that expert voices play in the framing of climate change is discussed. The article concludes with a presentation of key findings about scientists' involvement in public debate and hypotheses about the overall trajectory of Russian climate politics.     

Muslim leaders in Russia's Volga-Urals: Self-Perceptions and Relationship with regional authorities

Islamic politics in Russia's Volga-Urals has been affected by the self-images of some of the regional communities, such as Tatarstan as ‘the cradle of Russian Islam’, Astrakhan as ‘Russia's southern outpost’, and Perm and Buguruslan as remote peripheries of the Islamic world. Moreover, some regional authorities, such as Astrakhan and Orenburg, have tried to use Muslims to stabilise the ethnoconfessional situation of the regions and also make them a bridgehead for economic ventures on the Caspian rims and western Kazakhstan. In contrast, the authorities in highly industrialised and politically stable Saratov and Perm have not been interested in intervening in regional Muslim communities. Thus, Islamic politics in Russia may have much wider and varied political connotations than is usually conceived under the term ethnoconfessional politics.     

The unfinished business of perestroika: Latvia's memory politics and its quest for acknowledgment of victimhood in Europe

In the 25 years since the re-establishment of Baltic independence from the Soviet Union, there has been no conclusive public conversation, or “coming to terms with the past” with respect to crimes against Latvian and other persecuted groups under Communism. This paper examines how national politicians, members of the European Parliament in Brussels, representatives of Latvia's Russian-speaking minority, and the Russian government have engaged in a difficult, long-overdue conversation. Conflicting historical narratives about victimhood are at the heart of these disagreements. Special emphasis is given to Latvia's historical narrative, its development over the past 25 years, and the way it challenges Russia's interpretation of history. I argue that Latvian memory politics at the European level are a continuation of Latvia's quest for acknowledgment of its victimhood, thereby trying to finish the process started in the late 1980s when Balts first demanded acknowledgment of human rights violations they had suffered under the Soviet regime. Latvia's methods of transitional justice are examined, arguing that its memory politics at the European level are an extension of steps taken at the national level to come to terms with the past and to increase its negotiating power against Russia's neo-Soviet historical narrative.     

A Russia that can say “no”?

A rather consistent picture of Russian domestic politics and foreign policy in Putin's second presidential term emerges from the four works discussed. Elements of authoritarian rule, welcome or at least acceptable to large segments of a public weary of the political and economic disorder of Yeltsin's time, combine with Russia's growing energy-driven economic strength to provide a stable environment, and broad support for the regime. These strengths are expressed externally in a more assertive foreign policy, whose manifestations in both trade and security areas pose challenges for the US, and its EU and NATO allies.     

‘Mimicking’ the West? Russia's legitimization discourse from Georgia war to the annexation of Crimea

The 2008 Georgia war represented a turning point in Russian foreign policy. It was for the first time since the dissolution of the Soviet Union when Moscow invaded an independent country and for the first time when two members of the Council of Europe fought against each other. A premiere for Russian post-Soviet foreign policy was registered in 2014 too. The annexation of Crimea represented the first incorporation of foreign territories by Moscow since World War II. These two events generated the West's protest and blatantly contradict Russia's proclaimed foreign policy discourse centered around the respect for states' sovereignty and equality of actors in the international system. Starting from the assertion that the formulation of Russia's foreign policy is determined by the West's international behavior – Moscow looking whether to emulate or to find alternatives to it; the present paper will compare Russia's legitimization arguments for the 2008 war and the 2014 annexation of Crimea trying to assess how Moscow answers Western criticism and whether there is a continuity in Russian official legitimization narratives.     

Status and emotions in Russian foreign policy

The importance of status concerns on Russia's foreign policy agenda has been increasingly observed. This preoccupation with status is particularly visible in Russia's relations with the West. Although strong claims about status in Russian foreign policy are frequently made in public and private by researchers, journalists, politicians, diplomats and other commentators, such claims often lack any closer theoretical or empirical justification. The aim of this introductory article is, therefore, to outline the basic components that form the research agenda on status. Status, if properly examined, helps us understand not only Russian foreign policy, put also present-day international politics and its transformation in a broader sense.In a first part, we identify the theoretical voids concerning the study of international status. In a second part we outline the drivers and logic of status concerns, considering in particular identity theories, psychological approaches and existing research regarding emotions. The presented research agenda on status, derived from International Relations and related theories, provides a well-structured tool-box for investigating the link between status, identity and emotions in Russian foreign policy vis-à-vis the West. In a third part we present the key questions rose by the contributors to this Special Issue and summarize their main findings.     

The trail of votes in Russia's 1999 Duma and 2000 presidential elections

Russia's array of political parties, based largely on Moscow-centered personalities with presidential aspirations rather than coherent policy programs, continued its seemingly directionless evolution in 1999 with the appearance of two new ‘parties’—Otechestvo and Edinstvo—each designed primarily to facilitate presidential aspirations. In contrast and despite wrenching economic changes, Russia from 1991 through 1996, at least, offers the picture of a surprisingly stable electorate in which the flow of votes across elections from one party or candidate to the next follows a coherent and not altogether unpredictable pattern. Aggregate election returns suggests that this pattern persisted through the 1999 Duma balloting to the 2000 presidential election. The KPRF, as well as Yabloko, won nearly as many votes in 1999 as in 1996, while the votes lost by Our Home Is Russia, the LDPR, Lebed's allies in 1996, and a bevy of other small and not altogether anti-reform parties nearly account for Otechestvo and Edinstvo totals. Here, however, we offer a close examination of official rayon-level election returns from both 1999 and 2000 and conclude that this picture of stability masks the importance we ought to attribute to the influence of regional governors and their abilities to direct the votes of their electorates in a nearly wholesale fashion. We argue, moreover, that this conclusion is important to the matter of reforming Russia's institutions so as to encourage a coherent party system. Specifically, rather than focus on electoral institutional reform, we argue that the principal culprit in explaining the failure of a coherent party system to materialize is the influence of Russia's super-presidentialism.     

Battle for Perceptions: Projecting Russia in the West

The article provides an analysis of Russia's image that the Kremlin has been projecting in Western countries in the years of Vladimir Putin's presidency. The negative character of Russia's image in the West was recognised as one of the major security threats for the country, and an energetic public relations campaign was launched to improve it. The article explores the core elements of this ‘constructed’ image, and examines how they are related to the self-images of Russia held by Russian political elites. Finally, it considers the implications of the ambition to create this ‘desired’ image for Russian foreign policy.     

Russia's perceptions and misperceptions of the EU Eastern Partnership

This article is devoted to the problem of the reaction to the Eastern Partnership by Russia's both the political establishment and the expert community. The question of reactions to the Eastern Partnership in the target countries has been extensively posed in academic literature. However, the question of Russia's reaction to the Eastern Partnership, one of the most important actors of the region, has been rarely raised by the academic community. A wide array of factors impacted Russian elites' perception of the Eastern Partnership – from problematic issues in the EU-Russia relations to the post-Soviet states' political and economic transformation. Studying the dynamics and peculiarities of Russia's perspective on the Eastern Partnership makes it possible to draw meaningful conclusions on the nature of Russia's phobias that fuel its domestic and foreign policy.     

“Soviet mentality?” The role of shared political culture in relations between the Armenian state and Russia's Armenian diaspora

Russia's Armenians have begun to form diaspora institutions and engage in philanthropy and community organization, much as the pre-Soviet “established” diaspora in the West has done for years. However, the Russian Armenian diaspora is seen by Armenian elites as being far less threatening due to a shared “mentality.” While rejecting the mentality argument, I suggest that the relationship hinges on their shared political culture and the use of symbols inherited from the Soviet Union in the crafting of new diaspora and diaspora-management institutions. Specifically, “Friendship of the Peoples” symbolism appears to be especially salient on both sides. However, the difference between old and new diasporas may be more apparent than real. The Russian Armenian diaspora now engages in many of the same activities as the Western diaspora, including the one most troublesome to Armenia's elites: involvement in politics.     

If not by tanks,then by banks? The role of soft power in Putin's foreign policy

This article considers the benefits of the recently developed concept of ‘soft power’ in understanding Russia's foreign policy. It argues that claims that Moscow is exercising a form of soft power imperialism in the former Soviet region cannot be fully supported by the existing evidence. To differentiate between the imperialist and stabilising objectives of Russian foreign policy the article analyses the Russian domestic discourse on exploiting soft power in foreign policy. It then compares the views of different schools of thought with Vladimir Putin's philosophy and foreign policy record. Finally, it selects for closer investigation Russia's policy in the Caucasus.     

Russia's Response to Crisis: The Paradox of Success

Russia's recovery from the deep economic crisis it experienced in 2008–2009 did not deliver clear political dividends for the Russian leadership. This is because of the context in which the crisis occurred and the way that the leadership, particularly President Medvedev, and many of its critics described the crisis. The oil-fuelled boom that preceded the crisis had the effect of deepening it. Economic recovery based on rising energy prices looks like a failure, rather than a success, and highlights the underlying structural problems of the Russian economy. Arguments about the need for modernisation from within government exacerbated this perception. This seems to have weakened the connection between approval for the leadership and economic growth, a staple of pre-crisis politics.     

The Cossacks: A guarantor of peace or a land‐mine in Russia's federalism?

Russia's policy towards the Cossacks may prove detrimental to the development of federalism in Russia. Their rehabilitation is important for the rebirth of Russian culture. Yet, the Cossacks as a social‐military institution, may further harm the relations between ethnic Russians and non‐Russians in the Caucasus, which may revive the dispute over the preservation of the ethnic principle in Russia's federalism.     

Making a Difference? NGOs and Civil Society Development in Russia

The role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the development of Russia's civil society has been the focus of academic study since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. In light of this literature, this article aims to assess the impact of the movement that has most often been seen as very promising for Russia's future civil society development—the environmental movement—by utilising research undertaken in Samara Oblast’ of the Russian Federation. While the results do reveal some positive contributions to civil society development in Russia, they also exhibit many similarities with other studies in the extant literature, illustrating the relative weakness of Russia's social movements in the area of civil society development.     

Book reviews

Historically speaking, the self-identification process of Russia has revolved around the West–East axis. However, there has been a considerable asymmetry in the impact of these two poles. In this article I will argue that “the West” was a dominating concept in the self-narration of Russians and “the East” was mostly a function of the interaction between Russia and the West. The difference in the level of attention and emotions which Russia manifests towards the West and the East has been caused by the religious factor, which was crucial for shaping Russia's identity and her sense of uniqueness. While the West and Western Christianity presented a challenge to the Orthodox fundamentals of Russia's self-image, China was neutral in terms of religious identity. The negligible importance of the religious factor added to rationality in Russian policy towards China. In the article I analyze the Chinese factor in Russia's self-identification process in the context of Moscow's attitude towards the West and the East by using two main elements: identity and fear. Comparing the historical pattern with the present one, I attempt to determine the consequences of these two factors for the Russian Federation.     

EU–Russian Relations and Turkey's Role as an Energy Corridor

This article analyses the impact of EU–Russian relations on Turkey's role as a corridor for the transit of energy supplies to Europe. While the European Union (EU) has inherent leverage in its collective purchase of most Russian gas exports, market power has shifted in Russia's favour. Russian efforts to build new pipelines and widen downstream access have stimulated EU interest in diversifying energy imports and transit routes. In this sense, the EU has recognised Turkey's potential value as a secure and independent route for importing non-Russian energy supplies, which may in turn have an impact on Turkey's EU accession process.     

Market-Oriented Reforms as a Tool of State-Building: Russian Pension Reform in 2001

Despite domestic opposition and several policy alternatives, in 2001 the Russian government adopted a pension reform that was potentially costly and had uncertain long-term benefits. Demographic and fiscal pressures created the desire to reform and a more cooperative Duma made it possible to do so. These points do not explain why Putin chose the pension privatisation option. Russia's pension reform is best understood as part of a state-building strategy to diminish the role of powerful bureaucracies. Russia's welfare state was not merely the product of a powerful and popular president, but rather a tool to create a stronger executive.