Conceptions of National Security and American Entry into World War II

During World War II, official definitions of the requirements of United States national security were extended beyond the defense of the western hemisphere to include preventing any single power dominating Eurasia. This article challenges the commonly expressed view that this change was due to a belief that a strategy of continental defense would no longer suffice to protect the physical safety of the United States. The focus is on the period between Munich and Pearl Harbor when U.S policy moved away from the principle of non-involvement embodied in the neutrality legislation of 1935–37. The role in this process of the argument that America’s own safety was dependent upon the European balance of power, particularly because of the dangers posed by the development of aviation and the possible suborning of Latin America, is critically examined. It is argued that the broader conception of America’s security requirements reflected both a consciousness of the unique power of the United States to determine the outcome of the war and an implicit belief that the values and interests for which the nation should be prepared to fight extended beyond physical security.     

Henry Cabot Lodge,Hawaii, and the Shift from Continental to Hemispheric Defense

Over the course of the 1890s, the United States shifted from a continental defense model toward a hemispheric one. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (R-MA) was a leading proponent of this shift. Lodge was convinced that the United States needed to build a blue-water navy, acquire maritime bases overseas, establish its predominance in Central America, and push US influence out into the Pacific. The first test of this vision came not against Spain or Germany in the Caribbean, but against the possibility of British and Japanese influence over Hawaii in 1894–95. Domestic political and economic considerations acted mainly as a constraint on Lodge’s vision rather than as a basis for it. The main impetus was strategic, as he looked to safeguard an extended security zone for the United States in Atlantic, Pacific, and Caribbean waters. As he put it, “I would take and hold the outworks, as we now hold the citadel, of American power.”     

A Strategy for Success: Innovation Will Renew American Leadership

While the foreign policy discussion in the United States today is focused upon the Iraq War and Islamist terrorism, America also faces other, more long-term challenges to its physical security and economic prosperity: the threats posed by our declining economic competitiveness and our dependence on Middle Eastern oil. As in the past, America's ability to prevail over these challenges will depend on its technological and industrial leadership, and especially our ability to continuously recreate it. The United States needs a national strategy focused upon developing new technologies and creating new industries.     

韩国-东盟防务安全合作探究

韩国与东盟国家防务安全合作源远流长,近年来双方的防务安全合作更加活跃和全面,合作层次和水平不断攀升与提高。“新亚洲构想”与韩国东盟战略的转向、东盟国家“不均衡”的防务安全诉求,以及美国“战略东移”的强力刺激与影响,这些是促动韩国与东盟不断推进和加强防务安全合作的重要背景及动因。在短期内,韩国与东盟防务安全合作关系会继续发展和有所提升,但是难有实质性的突破。不过,韩国与东盟不断致力于推进和深化防务安全合作,尤其是暗合美国的新亚太战略、不断施展大国平衡战略的做法,势必会进一步加剧东亚地区军备竞赛风险,增添了新的不确定性、不稳定性和不安定性,不利于该地区的长期稳定和持久和平。     

Evaluating US defense posture in light of great power competition

This article seeks a debate on the future of the US defense posture in the Great Power Competition. It contains a robust list of defense initiatives to consider in improving the US defense posture. Since the United States is no longer in combat operations in CENTCOM, now is the time to focus on changing the US defense posture and program to meet the challenges of the emerging security environment. The article details where the United States stands and major changes that should be made, emphasizing both conventional and strategic nuclear forces.The US Navy’s fleet and end strength has been constrained for far too long and must be expanded to meet the geopolitical requirements of the Great Power Competition. The US Navy’s size deeply declined as a byproduct of the Cold War’s end and Department of Defense post-Cold War force design planning. The lesson learned here is simple and straightforward: navies can be reduced quickly but cannot be rebuilt quickly. The industrial, construction, and labor issues associated with shipbuilding require multi-year construction schedules, effective labor force management and dedicated, long-range management and executive planning.     

The Pivot in Perspective: American Naval Power,Then and Now

The article examines the reorientation of the defense policy of the United States, initiated during the Bush and Obama Administrations, toward giving increased priority to the Asia Pacific region. It begins with the historical perspective of the development of American naval power in the twentieth century. The world wars, in which Europe represented the primary theater of conflict, had the effect of shifting a greater share of American military assets toward the Euro-Atlantic theatre, while the onset of the Cold War after 1945 required the United States to develop a navy of truly global strategic reach in which Atlantic and Pacific commitments were kept in balance. With the diminished concern for European security since the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the People's Republic of China as a strategic competitor in the Asia Pacific region, the United States is required in an age of defense austerity to refocus attention again to the Pacific.     

Has-Been,Wannabe, or Leader: Europe’s Role in the World After the 2003 European Security Strategy

In December 2003, the European Union presented its “security strategy”, endorsed by all member states, to provide guidance for Europe’s common foreign security and defense policy. In substance, this document is not an expression of a growing strategic rift between Europe and the United States. One of the purposes it serves, however, is defining Europe’s own, separate “identity”. It reflects the increasing awareness that Europeans need to employ their power more effectively in the service of international peace and security, as much as politically possible. Disagreements on key issues remain in Europe, however, and the practical implications of the security strategy still need to be worked out.     

United States Hegemony and the New Economics of Defense

Liberal theory asserts that the need for cost-effective, technologically advanced weapons requires the United States to acquiesce to increasing defense globalization even as this restrains U.S. power. Realist logic dictates that the United States should resist defense liberalization to retain its self-sufficiency. This is a false choice; the United States encourages defense globalization in order to extend its international political influence. This paper proposes an alternate theory of technological hegemony that explains the U.S. policy of massive R&D investment in both the late Cold War and the current era of American preponderance. Modern weapons' complexity and economies of scale tend to produce monopolies, and the value chain for the production of these monopolistic goods is dominated by the systems integration techniques of prime contracting firms. In turn these prime contractors remain largely enthralled by U.S. market power. The United States gains international influence by controlling the distribution of these weapons. Put simply, technology with international political effects is likely to have international political origins.     

Strategic defense without star wars: The case for a defense‐emphasis arms control regime 1

This paper challenges two prevalent assumptions of the mainstream U.S. arms control community: first, that strategic nuclear disarmament? should be regarded as beyond the scope of serious superpower dialogue; second, that strategic defense (especially population defense) is inherently incompatible with the goals of arms control. It does so first by analyzing the events surrounding the Reykjavik summit—the occasion of the first direct negotiations on disarmament between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union. Next, while identifying grave flaws in the current design of the Strategic Defense Initiative, it will be argued that a defense‐emphasis arms control regime can provide the best long‐term means for addressing the problem of security in the nuclear age.     

美国国家安全认知的新视阈：人工智能与国家安全

人工智能作为一种革命性技术,正在从根本上变革国际社会的发展进程及方式。面对这一发展趋势,美国已将人工智能提升到国家安全的高度。人工智能对美国国家安全的影响主要存在于三个方面:首先,人工智能是影响和塑造未来美国国家安全的核心变量。人工智能能够优化美国在国际政治格局中的力量配比,弥合并纠正美国社会内部的分裂和失序状况,并助推美国军事实力实现“跨越式”发展。其次,有效克服人工智能的负面效应是确保未来美国国家安全的关键。人工智能可能引发诸多社会和道德问题,其固有的缺陷也将增加战争决策的风险成本,还可能增加武装冲突的频率和强度。最后,美国强调中国人工智能的快速发展对未来美国国家安全构成严重“威胁”。中美在人工智能领域的竞争已无法避免,美国认为中国正在试图“挑战”美国在高新技术领域的领导地位;为应对美国在人工智能领域对华遏制政策,中国应制定和形成人工智能研发以及应用规则和规范;通过制度化协调与合作来规制中美关系,努力避免“科技冷战”的发生。     

《中导条约》与全球战略稳定论析

《中导条约》是冷战期间美苏达成的一项重要军控条约,是全球战略稳定的支柱之一。2019年8月,美俄相继退约,引发国际社会极大关注。人们担心,条约退场将冲击全球战略稳定,刺激军备竞赛,影响欧亚安全形势,削弱国际军控体系。中国是美国退约重要借口之一,条约作废势必深刻影响中国外部安全环境。《中导条约》从诞生、发展到消亡,有着深刻的国际、国内和个人三个层面的演变动因,归根结底起决定性作用的是国际格局变迁。20世纪80年代,苏美攻守异势促成了《中导条约》的诞生;进入21世纪后,北约对俄的挤压以及中导技术扩散促使俄罗斯抛出条约全球化倡议;近年来,美国霸权地位相对衰落促其选择退约。但美俄两国政治形势变化及领导人更迭也深刻影响了条约的“生、住、变、灭”的时机和方式。戈尔巴乔夫的“新思维”改革与当时高涨的核裁军运动为签署《中导条约》提供了特殊的政治、社会背景。特朗普政府奉行“美国优先”理念,频频废约“退群”,《中导条约》随之沦为牺牲品。在不同历史时期,陆基中导在全球战略稳定中所起的作用不同。在20世纪60年代初,它是美苏中央威慑的支柱。在20世纪70~80年代,它是影响延伸威慑的重要因素。进入21世纪后,它成为俄罗斯对付美国导弹防御的斗争手段。当前,陆基中导在跨域威慑中扮演日益重要的角色。大国中导博弈正卷土重来,但它必将带有与以往不同的诸多新特点。     

National Security in the Post-Pandemic Era

The geopolitical implications of COVID-19 are profound in the near term, and will have a ripple effect throughout the U.S. economy and the foundations of U.S. power. It could be more strategically contagious over the longer term if it compels a sharp change in how Americans see their role in the world and adapts its conception of national security. This article presents both the economic and fiscal impact of the pandemic in the United States, as well as the likely consequences for national security investments and the Pentagon's budget. It offers three potential defense strategies, at three possible spending levels, to examine options for the next administration.     

美国经济“衰落”的历史比较

比较美国历史上三次经济衰落,可以看出此次衰落虽然使美国从经济霸权的顶峰跌落下来,世界经济进入了多元发展的时期,发展中国家和发达国家之间,无论是经济规模还是经济内涵的差距,都将呈现缩小的趋势,但是美国经济目前依然强大,还会迎来科技革命新的浪潮,今后相当长时期美国经济仍然会进一步发展。     

Defense Industries and Global Dependency

The global defense industrial sector is a remarkably accurate indicator of the distribution of power in the post-Cold War international system. However, the defense industrial sector as a policy tool has received relatively little scrutiny, even though it not only reflects the international order, but also provides the United States with the ability to influence the foreign policy behavior of other states. The defense industrial sector is a powerful, if undervalued, diplomatic tool in the United States’ political arsenal.     

The birth of ANZUS: America's attempt to create a defense linkage between Northeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific

This article discusses the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand andthe United States) security treaty negotiations, with specialemphasis on the 1951 Canberra talks, and examines why the USentered into a formal security alliance with Australia and NewZealand. It argues that the US concluded the security treatywith Australia and New Zealand in order to obtain their politicalsupport for a proposed American peace treaty with Japan, whichwould allow unconditional revitalization of Japanese militarypower. It is also the argument of this article that the US createdANZUS as a means of consolidating its own strategic positionin Northeast Asia by committing Australia and New Zealand tothe defense of US bases and forces stationed on the Japaneseislands.     

Still the One? The Role of Europe in American Defense Strategy

According to the 2015 National Security Strategy, the United States continues to rely on Europe as its most likely, most capable military partner for dealing with the most vexing security challenges. However, the conventional wisdom in Washington holds that European allies are not terribly capable militarily or very willing to use force. So why would the United States rely on such lax partners? In fact, the evidence on European defense spending, capabilities, and willingness is decidedly mixed, with many positive trends among the negative ones. To build on the positive, the United States can bring to the table assets and resources necessary to facilitate the transatlantic partnership before it needs to be exercised.     

A Fragile Relationship: The United States and the Republic Of Korea

As South Korea became economically and militarily stronger and developed democratic institutions, the country was in a position to assume more responsibilities in its partnership with the United States. The necessary changes could be achieved only with difficulties. The efforts of the US administration to stop the nuclear proliferation by North Korea and South Korea's attempts to develop a policy of engagement towards the DPRK resulted in friction between the allies. The dissonance was amplified by efforts of the Rho Moo Hyun government to pursue a foreign policy that was less dependent upon the United States. The change of atmosphere was underlined by anti-American outbursts in South Korea. A new effort to strengthen the partnership is, however, reasonable. For South Korea the United States is still the indispensable ally as long as an attack by North Korea that probably has nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out. For the United States this alliance contributes to maintain America's paramount influence in East Asia. If both countries agree with this rationale they should take steps to accept basic assumptions and policies of the other side. To find a common position towards the nuclear efforts of North Korea is crucial. Even if both sides try to harmonize their policies, success is not guaranteed. Korean nationalism and American dynamics combined with occasional high-handedness are difficult obstacles.     

Global Threats and American Strategies: From Communism in 1955 to Islamism in 2005

America's current security threats—the insurgency in Iraq, Islamic terrorism, and Iran's efforts to obtain nuclear weapons—seem strange and unprecedented. Parallels can be drawn, however, between the security threats of 2005 and those of fifty years ago. The U.S. foreign policy developed to confront the communist threat offers lessons as we develop strategies to combat today's threat. Two contemporary perspectives on strategic issues—one conservative/realist, one neoconservative/idealist—apply lessons of the Cold War to today's U.S. foreign policy, but each has serious flaws. A third, neorealist perspective, suggests that by leveraging the divisions already present in the Muslim world, the United States can win the global contest against Islamic terrorism. However, this would require a transformation in American strategy that will not be easily achieved.     

大国安全与地区发展的悖论?——基于冷战早期美拉关系的考察

为了遏制共产主义的发展,战后初期美国积极在西半球编织反共防务安全体系。与此相比,美国对拉美国家的经济援助需求消极怠慢,对它们所面临的经济发展问题视而不见,采取了“贸易而非援助”的经济政策,激化了美拉矛盾。20世纪五六十年代,一些拉美国家实行了国有化和土改等民族主义改革,并同苏联加强贸易往来,反美反独裁的游击运动风起云涌。在美国看来,这与其在西半球的经济安全和反共战略相悖。为了化解危机,美国一方面以反共和集体安全为名,对“敌对”政权进行军事干预,另一方面也在不断调整自身政策,加大对拉美国家的经济援助力度。不论怎样,谋求和巩固在西半球的霸主地位始终是美国制定拉美政策的根本目的,安全和稳定是其维护的主要利益。在理论上,只有拉美国家的深层经济发展问题得到有效解决,才能消除不稳定的隐患,所以,美国国家安全与拉美地区发展是并行不悖的。但在现实中,由于拉美国家的既得利益集团与美国关系密切,美国不可能切实推进拉美国家的经济改革,同时美国又常以安全防务政策化解由经济发展引发的拉美问题,这种立场上的偏差注定了美国提出的经济改革方案的“无效性”,而仅仅是一种权宜之计。