The liberian civil war: new war/old war?

The Liberian civil war has been portrayed as a primary example of ‘new wars’, drawing attention both to the economic motives and the global character of the conflict. However, to focus excessively on material explanations and greed-inspired motivations of actors may lead to one-sided explanations of conflict. This article suggests that there is little ‘new’ about the Liberian war. Rather, it can best be understood as a violent expression of the tendencies, organisation and attitudes towards identity, society and class that have underpinned Liberia since its formation in the 19th century. The ‘new war’ literature helps us to understand one important dimension of the Liberian conflict. However, too much emphasis on this dimension may also lead scholars and policy-makers to neglect the ideational aspect of conflict. These are of immense importance to a full understanding of civil war and its dynamics.     

A social theory of war: Clausewitz and war reconsidered

This article presents a new theory of war that is grounded in the insights of Clausewitz on the social nature of conflict. Clausewitz had argued that war is a political process; he therefore distinguished between ‘war’—understood in political terms—and warfare—understood as fighting. He then created a typology covering a spectrum of war ranging from total to limited, the political stakes of a conflict determining where it would fall on the spectrum. I develop and modify this basic framework by arguing that the social organization of the actors has a determining role in predicting the stakes of war. I then show how this framework helps us understand some key problems in the political science literature on war and conflict. I attempt to show two main things: (1) that there are different types of wars (and that these differences are not necessarily related to the standing of the actors, i.e. the presence or absence of sovereignty); and (2) that how war and warfare are related is more complicated than previously understood and that this has implications for the political science literature on order, conflict and violence.     

Humanitarian dilemmas in peace and war

Humanitarian assistance is becoming more complex and the environment in which it operates more competitive. Nevertheless, humanitarianism is shielded from such pressures by a set of principles that are reflected in International Humanitarian Law (IHL) which all governments ostensibly accept. The issue for the wider international community as well as for donor and recipi ent governments and humanitarian organizations is whether such principles can endure in light of the dilemmas posed in times of conflict and post-conflict. Humanitarian Dilemmas in War and Peace explores the dilemmas that humanitarianism not only confronts but also creates in seeking to protect and preserve life of the disaster and emergency-affected. In so doing, it views humanitarianism from three perspectives: (i) humanitarian principles in times of conflict; (ii) humanitarian principles from the perspective of many within the Group of 77; and (iii) humanitarianism from the perspective of institutional survival. The opinion piece concludes that, despite the dilemmas suggested by these perspectives, humanitarian principles can be upheld even amidst the complex and com petitive aid environment. It would require inter alia a more focused definition of humanitarian action, mechanisms that hold humanitarian organizations to higher standards of accountability, a commitment to more consistent and coherent advocacy and greater strategic perspectives to anticipate and respond to factors creating large-scale human vulnerability.     

Victory in scholarship on strategy and war

When policy-makers use force to achieve political ends, they use the word ‘victory’, yet its meaning is frequently left unclear. Policy-makers are using force for new purposes (peace operations, preemption, state-building, democracy promotion, counterinsurgencies and counterterrorism), but the language and thinking on victory in these new situations has not kept pace with the times. The essential problem is that the term ‘victory’ is an imprecisely defined concept for guiding decisions about military intervention. Everyone, from scholars to policy-makers, should understand that the failure historically to develop a precise concept of victory weakens the ability of policy-makers to use force effectively and contributes to confusion when societies debate whether to use force. This article seeks to make three fundamental contributions towards reducing the ambiguity that surrounds the term ‘victory’ in the strategic studies literature. First, it establishes the renewed importance of the question: ‘what is precisely the meaning of “victory?”’ Second, it presents a typology for understanding the nature of victory. Third, it uses this typology to reevaluate the contributions of prominent and lesser-known thinkers in strategic studies whose ideas have contributed to the scholarship on what it means to achieve victory in war.     

伊拉克战后重建及问题

伊拉克战争的最终结果是 ,萨达姆时代的结束和一个新时代的开始。伊拉克战后重建主要包括 :政治重建、经济重建和安全重建等。战后重建的主导权被掌握在美国手中 ,由占领当局一手操纵和控制 ,美国主导的伊拉克战后重建进展十分缓慢 ,经济重建资金严重短缺 ,安全局势危机四伏 ,反美袭击一浪高过一浪。现状显示 ,战后重建难题远远多于战前和战时 ,移交主权、恢复国家主权、还权于谁 ?结束占领、审判萨达姆等 1 0大问题难以解决。伊拉克人发誓 ,只要美英联军不撤军 ,反美袭击就不会停止 ,战后重建将是一个长期的艰难过程。     

Civilian self-defense militias in civil war

To mitigate the costs associated with suppressing rebellion, states may rely on civilian self-defense militias to protect their territory from rebel groups. However, this decision is also costly, given that these self-defense groups may undermine control of its territory. This raises the question: why do governments cultivate self-defense militias when doing so risks that these militias will undermine their territorial control? Using a game theoretic model, we argue that states take this risk in order to prevent rebels from co-opting local populations, which in turn may shift power away from the government and toward the rebels. Governments strategically use civilian militias to raise the price rebels must pay for civilian cooperation, prevent rebels from harnessing a territory’s resources, and/or to deter rebels from challenging government control in key areas. Empirically, the model suggests states are likely to support the formation of self-defense militias in territory that may moderately improve the power of rebel groups, but not in areas that are either less valuable or areas that are critical to the government’s survival. These hypotheses are tested using data from the Colombian civil war from 1996 to 2008.     

Children of war in the Philippines

Political armed conflict has important ramifications in the lives of children as individuals and on social development more generally. However, the emotional problems faced by children during and after war or political violence are rarely considered in development literature and practice. This article recounts the experience of working with severely traumatised children in the Philippines, using the methods of Creative Process Therapy. The report shows how a Western therapeutic model was successfully modified for application in a Filipino children's rehabilitation centre, and suggests that this experience offers possibilities for appropriate replication in other settings.     

JFK's ambassadors and the cold war

The importance of sound representation abroad was plain to President J.F. Kennedy. This survey of Kennedy's diplomats is selective, confined to the three most telling cases in the Cold War drama: Moscow, New Delhi, London. The countries corresponding with these capitals shaped America's world, as chief rival, preeminent neutral and pluckiest ally. Ambassadors in distinctive posts do not constitute the whole of JFK's foreign policy, but this account do shed light on significant achievements, thereby challenging those critics who have attributed every manner of blunder to Kennedy. His diplomatic record may not have been as brilliant as court historians suggested. Yet, to JFK's credit, the practical effect of his ambassadors in three major countries was to advance US security and prestige.     

Thinking about terrorism and just war

Since 2001 a new urge to moralize the use of violence as an instrument of state policy has appeared in liberal democracies. The American idea of a War against Terror, and the European notion of confronting a global terrorist threat, have together merged with a discourse on humanitarian military action: the political/moral ‘responsibility to protect’ is no longer to be confined to one's own citizens. Renewed interest among academics in ‘just war’ theory, the tradition that seeks to humanize war through law, reflects this development. This article questions the assumption that there is an essential difference between war (civilized violence) and terrorism (barbaric violence). It argues that their similarity appears more clearly if we set intentions aside—such as the deliberate or accidental killing of ‘innocents’—and focus instead on three main facts: (a) modern war strategies and technologies are uniquely destructive, (b) armed hostilities increasingly occupy a single space of violence in which war and peace are not clearly demarcated, and (c) the law of war does not provide a set of ‘civilizing’ rules but a language for legal/moral argument in which the use of punitive violence is itself a central semantic element.     

Moral analysis and the Vietnam war

Francis X. Winters, The Year of the Hare: America in Vietnam, January 25, 1963‐February 15, 1964. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1997. xii, 292 pp./$? cloth.     

伊拉克战后的政治发展

伊拉克战后的政治发展主要集中于3项内容:恢复国家主权、实行联邦制和建立民主制度。政治发展的核心思想是反占领、捍卫主权和建立民选政府。主权是政治发展的保障,没有主权就无政治发展。美军没有尽快撤军的打算,占领状态致使伊拉克收回全部主权无期限地延迟。联邦制和民主制度的建立存在若干难题,伊拉克政治结构潜存着分裂因素,政治结构一直按照种族、教派分配权力,民族和教派意识得到强化,成为政治认同的原则,而国家政治认同被削弱,这使政治分裂的可能性增大。不可否认,美国在伊拉克推行民主难度很大,存在诸多障碍,前景并不乐观,但也不能排除由外力推动的伊拉克民主成功的可能性。