The Effect of Fiscal Decentralization on the Financial Condition of Municipal Government

This study examines the effect of fiscal decentralization between states and their local governments on the financial condition of municipal governments. There are strong theoretical arguments on both sides of the federalism debate about the benefits for and against decentralization. Most of the research in this area investigates economic and social welfare consequences of fiscal decentralization. There is limited research, however, on the effects of fiscal decentralization on the financial health of local governments. Using data from the nation’s 150 largest cities, this study finds that intrastate fiscal decentralization results in weaker financial condition for municipalities in those states.     

US bureaucratic politics and the decision to invade Iraq

Why did the second Bush administration decide to invade Iraq in 2003? This article suggests that the question can usefully be addressed by looking at the ways in which regime change in Iraq became part of bureaucratic politics within the US government – under successive administrations – following the unsatisfactory termination of the first Gulf War in 1991. It is contended here that the limitations on bureaucratic politics within the second Bush administration were important in that the path toward a presidential decision for invasion was cleared by the failure of the higher echelons of the national security bureaucracy under Bush to work effectively in exercising core functions of challenge and debate.     

How does ethnic diversity shape the design of intergovernmental fiscal relations? Evidence from China

This study examines how ethnic diversity shapes the design of intergovernmental fiscal relations in regimes such as China, where local accountability and resident mobility are largely absent. We argue that in these regimes, ethnic diversity largely captures potential social conflicts and instability, consequently requiring a higher level of fiscal centralization and regional equalization from upper-level governments to preserve social stability. Using provincial and sub-provincial level panel data from China for 1995–2019, we find strong supporting evidence that an increase in a province's ethnic diversity significantly increases fiscal centralization and the provincial government's fiscal equalization efforts. We also show that these effects tend to be stronger in provinces whose leaders have closer ties with the central authority and where local capture is less serious. Our study contributes to a better understanding of ethnic diversity's consequences on the policy choices governments make.     

Performance Management and Deficit Adjustment in U.S. Cities: An Exploratory Study

Performance management or PM has been promoted as a tool to transform government. Claims that PM will enable governments to “do more with less,” “increase efficiency,” provide “value for money,” and make “rational budget decisions” abound. Has PM helped city governments in the United States cope with the effects of the 2007–2009 Great Recession? Theory suggests that PM can provide the informational and analytical foundation necessary for city officials to implement comprehensive but conflictive budget-cutting and revenue-raising strategies. By facilitating deep expenditure cuts and tax increases, PM can indirectly influence budget deficits. Using data from a national survey of city governments and multiyear audited financial reports, the empirical analysis shows that PM cities favored what are essentially decremental responses to fiscal crises that lead to marginal changes in revenues and expenditures. Not surprisingly, there is no evidence that PM influences the size and change in budget shortfalls.     

Walking the fiscal tightrope: local government budgeting and fiscal stress

This paper discusses the components of local government budget processes and their relationship to fiscal stress. While many cities and counties are suffering from stressful fiscal situations, leading in some cases to bankruptcy filings or other severe measures, their budgets have to be balanced, unlike the federal government and some state governments. Using survey data from a large number of jurisdictions, this paper shows how local governments have developed budget processes which respond to these changing fiscal situations. Governments use computers, collect and analyze many different types of information, and use budgetary information for other management purposes in order to improve productivity. Budget processes are providing good information to local government decision makers which is helping them respond constructively to the fiscal crises of the 1990s.     

Centralization in the Marxist and in the Leninist tradition

The very different positions of Marxists and Leninists on the issue of centralization of political and economic institutions show that, though using the same terminology, they were committed to different ideologies. Leninists were modernizing revolutionaries in underdeveloped countries seeking their rapid industrialization. They relied on centralized revolutionary movements, which, in power, formed centralized bureaucracies that advanced industrialization through mass persuasion, regimentation and terror as well as central planning.Marxists, associated with multifarious labor movements in industrialized countries, hoped to advance and empower the working class. Marx and Engels were vague on the subject of centralization, but condemned bureaucracy and came to favor the decentralization identified with the Paris Commune. Karl Kautsky and Otto Bauer advocated the operation of industry by local governments, cooperatives and trade unions and only minimal state ownership and sharply attacked bureaucracy. Policies of centralization were appropriate to the character and goals of Leninist movements but inappropriate to those of Marxist ones.     

Designing a fiscal federal mechanism for the transition period: the case of the Russian federation

In countries undergoing economic transition, economic factors have caused discord between central and regional authorities. This paper explores the causes and consequences of fiscal conflicts between the federal and regional governments and discusses what elements in an optimal fiscal management would best preserve federal integrity. It provides a plausible game-theoretic representation of the power struggle between the center and regional governments in the Russian Federation. This representation describes the rules and political environment that served as a background for the budgetary wars of 1992 to 1994, the objectives of both the regional and federal players, and a history of game play during the transitional period.     

Popular Financial Reports as Fiscal Transparency Mechanisms: An Assessment Using the Fiscal Transparency Index for the Citizen User

Popular financial reports (PFRs) are intended to increase transparency by providing financial information to a non-technical, citizen audience. We examine the extent to which PFRs are meeting the goal of transparency by developing a 23-criteria fiscal transparency index for the citizen user (FTI-CU) and applying it to a sample of PFRs (popular annual financial reports and citizen-centric reports) issued by local governments in the U.S. These criteria are organized into five areas: comprehension, access, financials, appearance, and community-focused. The analysis finds that, while there are areas for improvement, the PFRs rated the highest in the access and appearance criteria.     

Planning,Budgeting, and Health Care Performance in Ukraine

Abstract

The Government of Ukraine has not pursued health care reforms now commonplace in the rest of Europe and Central/Eastern Europe that rely less upon centralized, state delivery of services and more on decentralized operational responsibilities and competition for services that increase patient choice. The Ukrainian health sector suffers from personnel overspecialization and facility overcapacity, resulting in high-cost, low productivity services. Budget funds are unavailable for operations and maintenance resulting in poor quality services. The state provides health care as a constitutionally-protected monopoly, relying on the traditional command and control model which ignores cost/quality competition options and responsibilities to patients. Overall, the system which produces these results is over-centralized, requiring achievement of physical service norms without providing sufficient funds. The centralized system does not monitor or evaluate services beyond narrow financial accountability and control requirements. The health care system is paradoxically over-centralized but unable to regulate or control local health care official decisions to ensure compliance with national standards. Needed are reforms in the health care policy and operational areas to produce the supply of services needed for national economic recovery. In the short-term, the budgetary framework can be improved as an operational/management guide through development of comparative information on results. Most of this information can be based on the economic classification consistent with the chart of accounts. Funding stability can be increased to improve expenditure control by implementing a new fiscal transfer formula that provides discretion (i.e., block grants) and performance criteria (i.e., outcome measures). In the medium-term, building on the technical foundation of physical norms and statistical reporting, the health care budgeting and financial management system should shift emphasis to: program planning, policy and management analysis, and public communications. The results of these reforms should lead to decentralized health care operations, service analysis, and delivery responsibilities. At the same time, the reforms should lead to proper centralization of responsibilities for strategic policy decisions, safety regulation, national standards, and program evaluation.     

An empirical assessment of local autonomy and special district finance in the US

In this article, we interpret local autonomy as a dimensional concept that includes local government importance, local government discretion, and local government capacity. Using longitudinal data from 1962 to 2012 covering all 50 states in the US, we examine how different dimensions of local autonomy affect the expenditure levels and debt levels of special districts. We find that the levels of debt and spending in special districts are lower when local governments have greater revenue diversification. However, fiscal decentralisation in the dimension of local government importance promotes the growth of special district finance. Moreover, our findings on local government discretion suggest that imposing too many fiscal constraints can affect the fiscal independence and capacities of local general-purpose governments. These constraints may also lead to the more extensive use of the fiscal power of special districts that are not subject to fiscal limits.     

EXPLAINING THE PRIVATIZATION BOOM: PUBLIC CHOICE VERSUS RADICAL APPROACHES

Public choice theories of bureaucracy, especially the budget maximization thesis, have been influential in stimulating the drive towards privatization in Britain and the USA. But these accounts are strangely silent about why changes in state agency practices have come about under'new right' governments. They apparently attribute the scope of change entirely to'virtuous' political direction overcoming previously inherent features of bureaucratic behaviour and democratic politics.
By contrast, a radical reconstruction of instrumental models of bureaucracy explains the privatization boom in terms of the primacy of bureau-shaping motivations in the welfare functions of policy-level bureaucrats. Privatization is seen as a development of earlier strategies (such as the separation of control and line agencies, the creation of'dual state' structures, and automation) by which the class interests of senior bureaucrats have been advanced at the expense of rank and file state workers and service recipients. An examination of divergences in the internal and social costs of public agency functions explains why legislators and policy-level bureaucrats (especially in control agencies) push ahead with the'inappropriate' privatization of public service delivery systems where overall social welfare is reduced.     

RESPONDING TO FISCAL STRESS: A STATE-WIDE SURVEY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN LOUISIANA. A RESEARCH NOTE

The early 1980s represented an era where fiscal stress, cutback management and retrenchment strategies captured the attention of public administration scholars and practitioners. Yet, lessons learned from that era should not be forgotten. This research note, containing information from a 1990s survey of Louisiana local governments, supports the position that rural governments suffer hardest in bad economic times and that precautionary measures should thus be taken to lessen the budgetary shortfalls which often result in either the cutback or the tota lelimination of services.     

Hardening Budget Constraints: A Cross-National Study of Fiscal Sustainability and Subnational Debt

This study explores the financial sustainability of subnational governments in four different countries. Scholars argue that subnational fiscal capacity helps local governments deliver better public services and provide public goods, which in turn helps to promote economic growth. While administrative control by the central governments contributes to reducing moral hazard from the soft budget constraints, bottom-up strategies to manage fiscal profligacy also need attention. The study first provides understanding about the characteristics of central-local governance and management of subnational government debt of each country. Then, we test our hypotheses regarding local fiscal capacity and administrative control, including political-economic factors that may affect debt spending by local governments. Our findings show that subnational fiscal sustainability improves when the central governments have clear rules to intergovernmental transfers in place and more (market) liberal policies, meanwhile when subnational governments have a more fiscal capacity and less intergovernmental transfers they are able to manage their debt more soundly.     

A Challenging State of Affairs: Public Administration in the Republic of Lebanon

ABSTRACT

This article highlights Lebanon’s administrative challenges and reform efforts, since the end of its Civil War (1975–1990). In recent years, Lebanon and international donors have worked to improve transparency, promote modern management techniques, and encourage the use of information technology throughout the public sector. Despite these efforts, Lebanon’s public institutions remain constrained by the centralization of power, corruption, outdated bureaucratic structures, and deficiencies in administrative knowledge. The success of future reform efforts will depend on whether the Lebanese bureaucracy can overcome the challenges created by regional political tensions, its Syrian refugee crisis, and an increasingly indifferent Lebanese public.     

Reconciling public administration and democracy: the role of the responsible administrator

This article considers whether the individual responsibilities of bureaucratic officials provide a useful means for reconciling the tension between democracy and bureaucracy. Three questions central to the proper definition of bureaucratic responsibility are examined: (1) What is the relation of bureaucratic responsibility to the view that proper bureaucratic conduct is essentially a matter of ethics and morality? (2) If the appeal to moral values does not ordinarily offer an acceptable guide to proper bureaucratic conduct, upon what principles does a theory of bureaucratic responsibility rest? (3) What issues arise in putting responsibility into practice within a complex organizational setting? The article concludes that a democratic, process-based conception offers the most useful way of thinking about the responsibilities of bureaucratic officials.

The tension between democracy and bureaucracy has bedeviled public administration. However one defines democracy, its core demand for responsiveness (to higher political authorities, the public, client groups, or whatever the presumed agent of democratic rule) does not neatly square with notions of effective organization of the policy process and efficient delivery of goods and services, which are central to the definition of bureaucracy. Responsiveness need not guarantee efficiency, while bureaucratic effectiveness and efficiency often belie democratic control.

This tension between democracy and bureaucracy persists, but that it is the individual administrator who directly experiences the tension is especially important as a guide toward a resolution of this conflict. Since divergence is central to this tension between democracy and bureaucracy, speculation about the responsibilities of bureaucratic officials—their individual places within the bureaucracy, particularly the administrator's thoughts, choices, and actions—provides fruitful terrain for resolving the question of bureaucracy's place within a democratic system of rule.

Three questions need to be addressed if one accepts the premise that individual responsibility is central to locating the place of bureaucracy in a democratic order. First, what is unique about bureaucratic responsibility, especially in contrast to the view that these are largely ethical problems that can be resolved by appeal to moral values? Second, if dilemmas of bureaucratic conduct are by and large not resolvable through appeal to moral values, upon what other principles does a theory of bureaucratic responsibility rest? Third, what issues arise in putting responsibility into practice, especially within a complex organizational setting? This list of questions is not meant to be exhaustive but only a starting point for discussion.     

A Response to Fiscal Stress: Public Sector Employment Reduction across States during a Budget Crisis

This paper incorporates measurements of the four financial condition dimensions of cash, budget, long-run, and service solvency to explore the link between financial condition and public sector employment among states in the context of the Great Recession of 2008–2009. The finding is that the severity of this economic recession led states to reduce public workers as one type of fiscal response to cope with budget shortfalls. The results suggest that not all dimensions of state financial condition affect public sector employment.     

BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSIVENESS: EFFECTS OF ELECTED GOVERNMENT,PUBLIC AGENDAS AND EUROPEAN ATTENTION ON THE UK BUREAUCRACY

What determines the bureaucratic agenda? This article combines insights from models of bureaucratic behaviour with agenda‐setting models of government attention to test the effects of elected government, public, and EU agendas on the bureaucratic agenda. Using time series cross‐sectional analyses of subject and ministry coded data on UK statutory instruments from 1987 to 2008, I find strong effects for both the elected government and EU legislative agendas on UK statutory instruments. Furthermore, by breaking the data into different sets based on their relationship with the EU, several logical differences in these effects are found. These results include the EU agenda having exclusive influence on instruments implementing EU directives, and the UK agenda being the sole driver of bureaucratic attention on those instruments that mention the EU but do not implement EU legislation. This article opens a new avenue for research on bureaucracy by approaching it as a unique policy‐making institution.     

MODELLING BUREAUCRACY: THE CASE OF THE AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL BUDGET SECTOR 1982-1992

A substantial literature exists on the economic analysis of bureaucracy, which includes formal models of bureaucratic behaviour by Niskanen (1971) and Dunleavy (1991). This article develops hypotheses from those models about changes in size of bureaux over time and tests them against data on the Australian federal budget sector in 1982–83 and 1991–92. The models predict that bureaucrats usually will be able to influence the size or structure of their bureaux in line with their personal preferences. However, the Australian data suggest that the extent of such influence may be less than is assumed in either model and that the preferences of politicians are more influential than the models allow. One conclusion is that, if bureaucracy is to be modelled, a principal-agent approach will have more to offer than the neo-classical maximizing framework adopted by Niskanen in particular. A further conclusion, at odds with those of Niskanen and weakening his case for wholesale privatization, is that bureaucratic dysfunctions may be amenable to reform of the political and bureaucratic rules and systems.     

Risk Factors and Drivers of Financial Sustainability in Local Government: An Empirical Study

The current international crisis in public finances has made financial sustainability a key issue for governments. Although the European Union (EU) and other international organisations have recommended governments to monitor demographic and economic variables, few studies have considered the influence of these variables on financial sustainability. This paper seeks to identify and analyse the drivers and risk factors that influence the financial sustainability of local government. The findings identify both risk factors (unemployment and population aged under 16 years) and drivers (budgetary outcome) of financial sustainability, which may constitute a useful basis for decision-taking by managers and policy-makers.     

How does intergovernmental fiscal environment affect general fund balances of major American cities?

This study explores the extent to which intergovernmental fiscal factors affect fiscal reserves in municipal general funds. Statistical results from panel data of 87 major cities in the US for the period from 1995 to 2010 show that cities facing more restrictive limitations on local property taxation tend to maintain higher levels of unreserved general fund balances. Additional analyses also show that fiscally constrained cities accumulate surpluses in their general funds. This is consistent with the proactive approach in which municipal governments make fiscal decisions with the awareness of expected state constraints on their revenue-raising capacity. We call for consideration of relevant intergovernmental constraints in the determination of appropriate level of fund balances for municipal governments.