The Changing U.S. Immigration Policy on the Nexus of Security and Economy: Extending Visa-Waiver Program and Advocacy-Coalition Framework

By examining the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) in the case of the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP), this article suggests that a dynamic foreign policy change on immigration issues is a function of trade-off between economy and security. In other words, when policy makers ensure that economic gains can offset security loss and vice versa, policy change in immigration issues is rapidly made. Two polarizing advocacy coalitions, security-concerned and economy-concerned, exist within the policy subsystem on the VWP and each coalition has different belief systems, policy actors and stakeholders.     

Choosing Coalition Partners in Belgian Local Government

Government formation is a crucial phase after elections. This article focusses on coalition formation in Belgian local government after the elections in 2006. Coalition theories have mainly been developed at the national level, but they are also applicable to the local level where there is no shortage of coalitions. This level offers the opportunity to not only test rather classic coalition theories such as minimum size theories or the coalitions’ incumbency status. In a federal state like Belgium we can compare the local coalitions with coalitions made at higher levels. The results show that the local political parties prefer to form minimal winning and minimum parties coalitions, but not the smallest coalition that is possible. Coalitions are also more likely to form when they represent the incumbent coalition. Finally, political parties prefer congruent coalitions with the federal and regional government.     

Coalitions and corporate choices in Argentina, 1976–1994: The recent private sector support of privatization

After sabotaging almost every privatization since the 1970s, the Argentine private sector suddenly began to support privatizations in 1991. While public choice approaches that stress the cost impact of policy can explain the anti-privatization behavior of the private sector prior to 1991, they are less successful at explaining this recent shift in behavior. This article explains this shift by focusing on political coalitions. By expanding (or reducing) the set of attainable outcomes, political coalitions shape the political choices of firms. Prior to 1991, the rent-seeking private sector led a huge multi-sectoral anti-privatization coalition that repeatedly preempted the Executive from privatizing. In 1991, this coalition disintegrated as a result of a reordering of economic institutions. Devoid of its traditional allies, the private sector chose to acquiesce to privatizations. Thus, political coalitions can be more important in shaping firm behavior than economic considerations such as the cost-impact of public policy or the size of rent markets. This article also explains why, in many countries confronting comparable anti-privatization coalitions, privatizations are likely to emerge with an unexpected mixture of competition-enhancing and competition-restricting policies. Javier Corrales is assistant professor of political science at Amherst College, specializing in comparative and international politics of Latin America. He is currently writing a book on the effects of executive-ruling party relations on the implementation of market-oriented reforms in Latin America. Newspapers and magazines (from Buenos Aires)ámbito Financiero Clarín El Cronista Comercial La Nación Noticias The Review of the River Plate     

Can constituent states influence foreign and security policy? Coalitional dynamics in India

Abstract

The Indian state has undergone significant transformation since the late 1980s, most notably the extensive decentralisation of power, with consequences for the formation and implementation of Indian foreign policy. This article explores the role of India’s constituent states explaining the extent and limitations of their autonomy and influence. It deploys and extends the state transformation approach to incorporate considerations of issue area and coalition type. Under coalitions led by typical national parties, subnational governments are less likely to influence foreign and security policy. Under the same coalition type, they are more likely to behave autonomously on non-traditional security issues such as sharing of water resources with neighbouring countries. They are less likely to behave autonomously on security issues such as the transnational expression of ethnic solidarity. Under coalitions led by atypical national parties or regional parties, subnational governments are likely to exercise a moderate level of autonomy and influence on issue areas such as transnational expression of ethnic solidarity. They are likely to exercise a high level of autonomy and influence on non-traditional security issues such as sharing of water resources. The framework is illustrated through Tamil Nadu’s activism on Sri Lanka, and West Bengal’s position on water-sharing with Bangladesh.     

‘“Keeping Tabs” on Coalition Partners’: a Theoretically Salient Case Study of Lithuanian Coalitional Governments

Portfolio allocation raises the potential for de facto abdication on a broad range of policy issues among coalition partners. Recent scholarship has addressed how parties in governing coalitions ‘keep tabs’ on each other in order to avoid such abdication. Two mechanisms have been identified: junior ministerial appointments and chairs of parliamentary oversight committees. We argue that the former is the most common method for intra-coalitional oversight in the Lithuanian parliament and that a combination of the two appears to be employed for monitoring the activities of the most important ministries. We conjecture that dependence on junior ministerial oversight is more likely among coalition partners in less institutionalised parliaments.     

A look inside an emerging nuclear supplier. Advocacy coalitions and change in Argentine foreign nuclear policy

What light can foreign policy analysis (FPA) shed on how and when the balance of power between domestic coalitions in foreign nuclear policymaking changes and how these different balances directly affect policy outcomes? Drawing on interviews with scientists, technologists and career diplomats, this comprehensive examination of Argentine nuclear exports policy as public policy aims to depict when and how policies varied between 1976 and 2004, due to shifts in the balance amongst advocacy coalitions, albeit of incentives and constraints placed by international and institutional nuclear environments. The article provides a better account of how Argentine nuclear foreign policy changed under the influence of four competitive and contrasting advocacy coalitions: the pro-import substitution and protectionist coalition, the pro-technological autonomy and South-South trade coalition, the pro-business and commercial openness coalition and the antinuclear and pro-environment coalition.     

A Coalition of Coalitions: International Cooperation Against Terrorism

The term “coalition against terror” is commonly used, but is fundamentally misleading. Multiple coalitions against terror exist in different issue areasincluding military, financial, law enforcement, intelligence, and reconstruction. These coalitions are independent of each other, and yet inextricably linked, both enabling and constraining each other's actions. Actions taken by the military coalition can undermine the intelligence coalition, for example, by destroying documents and other information during attacks. Overlapping membership may also cause challenges, for countries who disagree with the approach of one coalition many restrict their cooperation with the others. A successful counterterror strategy must account for the interactions of the various coalitions, understanding how actions taken in one area may cause tradeoffs and unintended consequences in others.     

Coalition Politics in India: 2004–2009

Abstract

It is posited here that the coalition imperative of holding the alliances together just to keep in office leads to behavior that is not altogether ethically acceptable. This is not to say that all coalitions are bad by definition; they are not. The issue is: how many partners and what the minimum understanding among them are ideal to run the government? It is suggested that a large and unprincipled coalition on the one hand would debilitate a government, and on the other lead to political corruption and even blackmail. Contrarily, a smaller number of parties with some affinity in ideology and a common purpose would be beneficial for a stable democracy. To glean some insights, the United Progressive Alliance coalitions cobbled together by the Congress Party Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2004, and consequent to the 2009 elections, are studied here.     

HOW THE REINVENTING GOVERNMENT MOVEMENT IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION WAS EXPORTED FROM THE U.S. TO OTHER COUNTRIES

From an academic point of view, Reinventing Government (RG) is a weak book. But the judgment of the academic community leaves with an interesting problem:How can we account for the relative influence that RG ideas have acquired over public management practices and for the enthusiasm with which those ideas have often been received by bureaucratic reformers in many countries? To answer this question, the article develops an analysis that proceeds in two stages. In the first section, I show how RG ideas gained ascendancy in political circles because they altered the terms of discourse about government management and made new kinds of coalitions possible. The second part looks at the structure of the global management consulting industry to show how the consultants who advised the Clinton administration were able to rely on already existing international network of American-based consulting organizations through which they could preach their Reinvention gospel around the globe. The American domination of the world management consulting market; coupled with the growing use by states of external consulting services as a source of advice on management issues, allowed consultants to carry RG ideas into the heart of the policy process.     

Local Government Policy Evolution in New Zealand: Radical Reform and the Ex Post Emergence of Consensus or Rival Advocacy Coalitions

Between 1984 and 1993 New Zealand reformers followed a top-down strategy designed to minimize the opportunity for resistors to affect the reform process and preclude the ex post emergence of a stable alignment of rival advocacy coalitions. The evolution of the local government policy debate since the implementation of radical reform in 1989 suggests that these strategic goals may be more difficult to achieve than at first thought. The quest to make local government more efficient and democratic by making it more accountable has given way to a 'minimalist-activist' controversy over the comparative institutional advantage of local authorities and the role of trust in their relations with central government that has the potential to contribute to the eclipse of the post-reform consensus and the emergence of a 'advocacy coalition structure'.     

Adapting to democracy: Societal mobilization and social policy in Taiwan and South Korea

Democratic transition and institutional change do not necessarily guarantee greater political inclusion, particularly when it comes to the policy influence of civil society groups. Rather, political inclusiveness requires strategic adaptation among societal actors. Actors need to seize upon opportunities endemic to political change. This article provides a comparative analysis of health care reform in democratizing Taiwan and South Korea, focusing on two social movement coalitions, the National Health Insurance Coalition in Taiwan and Korea's Health Solidarity. Both movement coalitions were critical in shaping welfare reform trajectories in Taiwan and South Korea during the late 1990s, despite having been shut out from earlier episodes of health care reform. I argue that these groups (1) strategically adjusted their mobilization strategies to fit specific political and policy contexts, (2) benefited from broad-based coalition building, and (3) effectively framed the issue of social welfare in ways that gained these movements ideational leverage, which was particularly significant given the marginal place of leftist ideas in the postwar East Asian developmental state model. Joseph Wong is assistant professor of political science at the University of Toronto. He is the author ofHealthy Democracies: Welfare Politics in Taiwan and South Korea, published by Cornell University Press. Wong received his Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. The author thanks Edward Friedman, Jay Krishnan, Ito Peng, Richard Sandbrook, Linda White, along with the three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Thanks also to Uyen Quach and Nina Mansoori for their research assistance.     

Beyond Boom and Bust: External Rents,Durable Authoritarianism,and Institutional Adaptation in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

Drawing on recent critiques and advances in theories of the rentier state, this paper uses an in-depth case study of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to posit a new “supply and demand” approach to the study of external rents and authoritarian durability. The Jordanian rentier state is not exclusively a product of external rents, particularly foreign aid, but also of the demands of a coalition encompassing groups with highly disparate economic policy preferences. The breadth of the Hashemite coalition requires that the regime dispense rent-fueled side payments to coalition members through constructing distributive institutions. Yet neither rent supply nor coalition demands are static. Assisted by geopolitically motivated donors, the Hashemites have adapted institutions over time to tap a diverse supply of rents that range from economic and military aid to protocol trade, allowing them to retain power through periods of late development, domestic political crisis, and neoliberal conditionality.

Explaining collaboration in consensual and conflictual governance networks

The conditions under which policy beliefs and influential actors shape collaborative behaviour in governance networks are not well understood. This article applies exponential random graph models to network data from Finland and Sweden to investigate how beliefs, reputational power and the role of public authorities structure collaboration ties in the two countries’ climate change governance networks. Results show that only in Finland's conflictual climate policy domain do actors collaborate with those with similar beliefs and with reputational power, while only in Sweden's consensual climate policy domain do public authorities play central impartial coordinating roles. These results indicate that conflict is present in a governance network when beliefs and reputational power determine collaboration and that it is absent when public authorities occupy central roles. They also suggest that relative success in climate policy action is likely to occur when public authorities take on network manager roles.     

Analysing Local Policy Agendas: How Dutch Municipal Executive Coalitions Allocate Attention

Abstract

This article provides an analysis of the allocation of attention to policy problems on the local level, focusing on the executive agenda of six municipalities in the Netherlands over a 25-year period. It reveals that there is specifically a local politics of attention, showing differences between national and local policy agendas in specific policy areas. We did not find evidence that the political composition of the local executive coalitions leads to agenda differences, revealing the more problem-oriented and pragmatic nature of local politics. We did find evidence of an effect of institutional arrangements between national and local government on shifting patterns of attention, such as due to decentralisation. This shows that the local politics of attention is limited in scope and conditioned by the functions of local government and the institutional arrangements of policy making in the Dutch decentralised unitary state and that rearrangements affect these patterns of attention.     

The Stop Climate Chaos Coalition: climate change as a development issue

After the Working Group on Climate Change and Development recognised the challenge that climate change poses to development, a number of environmental and aid, trade and development organisations formed a new politically active coalition, Stop Climate Chaos (SCC), to demand that stronger climate laws be adopted in the UK. The coalition now frames the issue of climate change as a ‘global climate justice’ one, emphasising the severity of the issue for people in poor countries, who will suffer the worst consequences, but have contributed least to it. The extent to which SCC member organisations address climate change as a global justice issue is explored through a content analysis of their websites, and a survey of participants in the SCC I-Count march, London, 3 November 2006. There is certainly evidence that environmental organisations are ‘facing South’, just as aid, trade and development organisations are ‘turning green’.     

Network Powers: strategies of change in the multipolar system

Abstract

The multipolarity of the 21st century is fundamentally different from that of its harbingers because in the past decade change and innovation have been induced through sites of negotiation and by the establishment of intergovernmental foreign policy networks. New powers like Brazil, China and India have gained relative weight thanks to their status as agenda setters, brokers and coalition builders. This paper examines the relevance of different foreign policy networks such as India–Brazil–South Africa ( ibsa ) and Brazil–South Africa–India–China ( basic ) for their strategic approaches and argues that they are crucial vehicles for their ascension. Drawing on the work of Hafner-Burton et al, who raised the question of how states increase their power by enhancing their network positions, a typology of foreign policy networks is proposed: mediation, advocacy and substitution networks play important roles in today’s shifting global order. The paper analyses how the different network types work together and how particular states have adapted better to the new environment than others.     

The European Union's role in networks on removal of fossil fuel subsidies and disclosure of climate change information

This article deals with newly emerging international collaborative initiatives around two issues connected to climate change: removal of fossil fuel subsidies and improving climate information disclosure practices in the business sector. While networked initiatives on the gradual removal of fossil fuel subsidies and a multi-actor network on disclosure of climate change information do not explicitly mobilize collective actions around climate change, they supplement and reinforce a wide array of other transnational initiatives and partnerships around climate change mitigation efforts. Analysed networks equip transnational policy processes around the climate change issue, initially formed by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change's member states, with new policy tools to mitigate human-induced climate change and hugely expand the membership of policy-making at the international level. Newly emerging transnational networks in the area of fossil fuel subsidies removal and improving climate change information disclosure practices in the corporate world also strive for harmonization of policy methods and instruments across international boundaries. The experience of the European Union (EU) in promoting climate change actions among its member states and in sustaining collaboration with private actors can serve as an exemplary and learning tool for transnational policy networks across continents. And the size of the EU's market together with its governance structure provides it with a common legitimate voice at the international arena for climate change decision-making.     

Preventive veto and obstructive veto: the imposition of public policy by organizations on the margins of government

This article argues that powerful organizations at the margins of government (i. e,, contractors, franchisers, quangos, state-owned corporations, etc.) which provide vital public services are able to impose public policy on the electorate and elected officials in democratic countries. These organizations' enormous resources, including not only their tangible assets, but also freedom from accountability and dependent clientele, constitute both a source of power and vital vested interests. Illustrating with the example of the Kupat Holim Sick Fund of Israel, it shows how when these interests are significantly jeopardized, the organizations impose veto power: a preventive veto at the policy making stage or an obstructive veto at the policy implementation stage. Both types of veto enable them to appropriate the major instruments of policy making - allocation, regulation, and restructuring - from elected government. This ability undermines the traditional relationship between the electorate and elected and raises questions about the risks to democracy inherent in the proliferation of such bodies on the margins of government.     

ROMANIA: A CASE STUDY IN DELAYED PRIVATIZATION

ABSTRACT

Romania emerged from 45 years of communism with 12,000 enterprises in state hands. As the nation moved toward democracy and free market conditions, its new leaders created legislation to privatize at least half of the state owned enterprises. In the years 1990 to 1996, the actions to privatize state owned enterprises went slowly, even though outside organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and European Union urged speed in privatization. Until November 1996, former communists who had high positions under Nicolae Ceasusescu led the government. After 1996, with a reform coalition running the country, privatization speeded up and made a difference in the county's economy. Privatization continues even though the government changed hands again in 2000. Romania's delayed privatization program has so far precluded the emergence of a new group of powerful owners who become so strong they can stymie the long-term achievement of a fully reformed economy.     

Organizational perspectives on the formation and disintegration of terrorist groups

Abstract

This article treats terrorist organizations as political interest groups. Starting from the assumption that terrorists are rational political actors, it follows that organizational considerations will play a role in the formation and decline of terrorist groups, just as is the case in other political organizations. The effects of several factors, including recruitment, ability to provide selective and purposive incentives, the need for entrepreneurial political leadership, competition from other organizations, the ability to attract outside support, and the ability to form coalitions with other groups, are considered.