Political pressure and regulatory control

Conclusions of previous regulatory studies addressing the impact of fines on firm's behavior are contradictory. A simple game theoretic model is developed which uses continuous payoff functions to reconcile these contradictory conclusions. The game suggests changing the fine shifts the reaction functions of both the regulatory agency and the firm. The nature of such shifts are partially caused by political pressure different interest groups place on regulatory agencies. Competing goals within the agency also help explain why such shifts occur.     

The efficiency of regulatory arbitrage

Public Choice - Classic public choice skepticism about the regulatory state, based on theories of rent-seeking, rent extraction and regulatory capture, is based on the unrealistic, and usually...     

Public opinion and regulatory behavior

This paper measures the responsiveness of a public agency to changes in public opinion. In particular, it shows that the number of compulsory directives issued by the Federal Aviation Administration to the airline industry (a) rises following an increase in public concern over aviation safety, as measured by the amount of newspaper coverage accorded the issue; (b) falls following a presumed increase in industry opposition to such directives, as measured by the number of aircraft accidents that occurred in previous periods; (c) does not increase following an increase in the number of safety defects discovered, as measured by the number of accidents and flights occurring in earlier periods.     

The effectiveness of regulatory disclosure policies

Regulatory transparency—mandatory disclosure of information by private or public institutions with a regulatory intent—has become an important frontier of government innovation. This paper assesses the effectiveness of such transparency systems by examining the design and impact of financial disclosure, nutritional labeling, workplace hazard communication, and five other diverse systems in the United States. We argue that transparency policies are effective only when the information they produce becomes “embedded” in the everyday decision‐making routines of information users and information disclosers. This double‐sided embeddedness is the most important condition for transparency systems' effectiveness. Based on detailed case analyses, we evaluate the user and discloser embeddedness of the eight major transparency policies. We then draw on a comprehensive inventory of prior studies of regulatory effectiveness to assess whether predictions about effectiveness based on characteristics of embeddedness are consistent with those evaluations. © 2006 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management     

On the accuracy of regulatory cost estimates

This study compares ex ante estimates of the direct costs of individual regulations to ex post assessments of the same regulations. For total costs the results support conventional wisdom, namely that the costs of regulations tend to be overestimated. This is true for 14 of the 28 rules in the data set discussed, while for only 3 rules were the ex ante estimates too low. For unit costs, however, the story is quite different. At least for EPA and OSHA rules, unit cost estimates are often accurate, and even when they are not, overestimation of abatement costs occurs about as often as underestimation. In contrast, for those rules that use economic incentives, unit costs are consistently overestimated. The difference between the total‐cost and the unit‐cost results is caused by frequent errors in estimates of the effects of individual rules, which suggests, in turn, that the rule's benefits may also be overestimated. The quantity errors are driven both by difficulties in determining the baseline and by incomplete compliance. In cases of unit‐cost overestimation, unanticipated technological innovation appears to be an important factor — especially for economic incentive rules, although procedural and methodological explanations may also apply. © 2000 by the Association for Public Policy and Management.     

Banking regulation,regulatory capture and inequality

Public Choice - Regulation of the banking and finance industry may lead to a more equal distribution of income if regulators pursue goals in the public interest. Alternatively, the economic theory...     

A discounting framework for regulatory impact analysis

This article presents a methodology designed to facilitate the systematic comparison of alternative discounting procedures for the costs and benefits of industrial regulatory activity. A discounting framework developed by Bradford is adapted for use in the context of industry regulation. Within this framework, the choice among the various discounting procedures is reduced to a choice between assumptions about various economic and financial parameter values. As an illustration of the way in which the framework can be applied, the article includes an examination of the validity of parameter assumptions implied by the discounting approach currently used by regulatory agencies in their analyses of regulations affecting the motor vehicle industry. Several hypothetical programs are analyzed to demonstrate the broad differences in program treatment that might be expected if this current discounting approach were replaced by procedures generated within the framework from more reasonable parameter assumptions. Sensitivity of the benefit/cost calculations to uncertainty about underlying parameters is also briefly discussed.     

Treasury Department regulatory material under the tax code

The legislative process in the tax field and the administrative process for the issuance of regulatory and interpretative material by the Treasury Department are closely coordinated. The same persons and interests both inside and outside of Government are involved in both processes. There is thus continuity of expertise, understanding of what is at stake, adversary viewpoints, and Washington knowhow. The preparation of administrative material within the Treasury is a task for those technical personnel and policy officials who in varying degrees also have a voice in the preparation of the Treasury's legislative position and the legislative development of statutory language. The outside forces who watch legislative activity also closely watch administrative activity and seek to shape the latter just so they do the former. The response of the Treasury is much the same in both situations, and governed by the policies, attitudes and predilections of tax policy officials and career personnel.