中亚的政商关系:比较分析的方法

在大多数国家里,政府(政治与公共管理)与企业的关系对经济活动的运行、经济决策和企业战略发挥着显著的作用.在中亚的后苏联国家,现行的政商关系既是改革策略的内生结果,又影响着进一步的制度变革,表现出极大的差别.本文旨在理解哈萨克斯坦和乌兹别克斯坦的各种政商关系如何影响了这些国家市场经济制度框架的发展,重点考察了中亚国家政商关系的两个方面的内容:模式的内容(由代理人的偏好及其相对权力决定)和正式和非正式制度的一致性.     

欧洲一体化和后苏联一体化在东欧地区的相互作用

地处东欧的前苏联加盟共和国一方面自愿程度不等地参加了后苏联地区许多一体化尝试和行动,包括最初的独联体和后来的许多次区域一体化组织,另一方面,他们如同整个欧洲及其周围地区一样,又处于欧洲联盟的深刻影响之下.这两种制度体系(在东欧地区的战略有异)的相互作用对该地区所产生的巨大影响,不仅体现在对外经济政策上,而且也体现在独联体国家的经济发展和制度变革的一般过程上.本文分析了两种制度竞争在这一地区所产生的经济和政治后果,并探讨了制度选择的问题.     

哈萨克斯坦和乌兹别克斯坦独立以来的转型战略:悖论和前景

自苏联解体以后,中亚地区成了国际社会瞩目的焦点.作为曾经的苏联国家的一部分,目前该地区充满矛盾.地区内的两个大国--哈萨克斯坦和乌兹别克斯坦选择了不同的发展战略,导致了有趣而充满分歧的结果.取得独立后,哈萨克斯坦选择开放它的经济,而乌兹别克斯坦政府则专注于政治稳定和完全协调发展的经济.1990年代早期,乌兹别克斯坦的策略看上去更合理且更少痛苦,而哈萨克斯坦在那时遭受了严重的经济衰退.然而,到了世纪之交,哈萨克斯坦的经济表现远远超过了它的邻国.本文的目的是分析和比较哈萨克斯坦和乌兹别克斯坦独立早期所选择的两种不同的转型战略,以及评价未来几年里这两种战略的前景和它们所隐含的意义.     

哈萨克斯坦“祖国之光”党的组织体系和发展趋势

哈萨克斯坦是中国重要邻国,是"一带一路"倡议的支点国家。"祖国之光"党自2004年至今一直是哈萨克斯坦的执政党。2019年3月,纳扎尔巴耶夫辞任总统,但依然保留着党主席一职,这意味着"祖国之光"党将继续在哈萨克斯坦政治生活中发挥重要作用。基于在哈萨克斯坦实地考察的一手材料,本文从中央组织、地方和基层组织、党的干部、政党经费等四个方面,阐述"祖国之光"党的组织结构和运作方式,探讨其发展趋势。现有的文献在观察原苏各国政党转型和政治发展时,大多将议会式政党预设为比较样板和发展终点。然而,研究发现,哈萨克斯坦"祖国之光"党近年来重新采用了诸多列宁主义政党的做法,其政治发展受议会政治和列宁主义的双重影响。     

新欧亚主义之哈萨克斯坦民族国家建构

自1917年阿拉什奥尔达政府通过民族党纲提出"民族国家"原则,至2014年哈萨克斯坦首任总统努尔苏丹·纳扎尔巴耶夫在独立日庆典讲话中提出"永恒国家"精神,哈萨克斯坦的"国家"与"国族"概念、以及民族精神内涵和民族国家观,伴随着社会政治、经济及意识形态的转型,发生了明显的变化.而其目的 均在于:在多元文化与民族平等的原则基础上维护和促进族际合作,实现共同利益与目标;构建以哈萨克斯坦利益为核心的命运共同体,加强公民的"哈萨克斯坦人"身份认同,进而影响国际地缘政治格局.在此过程中,地理位置、国土面积、人口结构、经济实力、政治意愿、发展战略、联盟选择、国家认同与核心利益发挥了关键作用.     

哈萨克斯坦“突厥语国家一体化”构想与实践研究

加强同突厥语国家的交流与合作是哈萨克斯坦当前外交政策的重要方向之一。独立之初,哈萨克斯坦总统纳扎尔巴耶夫面对政治上的孤立和经济上的混乱,借助土耳其的支持和帮助,在探索哈萨克斯坦独立自主发展道路中提出“突厥语国家一体化”构想。该构想本质是从民族主义的角度为独立自主的哈萨克斯坦寻求发展的新路径,具有强烈的实用主义底色。继任总统托卡耶夫进一步推动这一构想的实践,该构想目前已广泛扩展到突厥语国家间的文化与经济合作、互联互通和对全球问题的关注等领域。哈萨克斯坦也在逐渐增强对“突厥语国家一体化”组织工作的使命感与责任感。聚焦哈萨克斯坦与土耳其关系,哈萨克斯坦作为独立的行为体,主动以“突厥语国家一体化”话语体系与土耳其形塑了高敏感性、高脆弱性的相互依赖关系。     

“新哈萨克斯坦”政治改革分析

哈萨克斯坦2022年“一月骚乱”后,托卡耶夫从纳扎尔巴耶夫手中接管了全部权力,成为实质上的全权总统。这标志着纳扎尔巴耶夫时代结束,托卡耶夫执政时代开启。托卡耶夫于2022年提出全新的政治、经济和社会改革方案,开启建设“新哈萨克斯坦”和“哈萨克斯坦第二共和国”。“新哈萨克斯坦”的政治改革以“先政治后经济”理念为指导,以“公正”为核心,以“强力的总统-权威的议会-负责任的政府”政体模式为目标,旨在打造新型国家管理体制和模式。实践证明,托卡耶夫的政治改革顺应了民情,符合哈萨克斯坦独立30年后的发展需求,取得了不错的效果,有助于社会稳定,也为哈萨克斯坦赢得了国际声誉。与此同时,由于改革触动了既得利益集团,加上国内和国际环境变化,实施过程中也面临一定困难。     

大国竞争、精英联盟与制度变迁——美国外国投资委员会的制度演进逻辑

20世纪七十年代以来,美国成为吸收国际资本最多的国家之一.在不同的大国竞争背景下,围绕着外来资本对国家经济和安全造成的影响,美国的国家精英之间产生了不同程度的分歧,并推动了美国外国投资委员会(CFIUS)及其外资监管制度的创立、强化与升级.文章通过区分美国面临的大国竞争类型和国家精英在投资政策上的偏好,构建一种大国竞争影响国内精英联盟的分化与组合,从而导致美国外资监管制度变迁的分析框架.通过追踪和比较分析CFIUS的三次制度演进,研究发现,在美苏安全竞争的背景下,与盟国的投资合作可以产生积极的安全外溢效应,国际导向型的经济与安全精英利益互补,维护了开放的投资政策;在美 日经济竞争时代,宽松的监管制度带来的即时安全效应下降,国内导向型的经济精英联合安全精英,强化了美国的外资监管制度;在中美经济与安全竞争双重交织的压力下,中国企业的在美投资交易产生了消极的安全外溢效应,美国国内精英联盟形成合力,进一步升级了美国的外资监管制度.CFIUS的制度演进从一个侧面揭示了美国虽然号称是自由市场经济的典范,但事实上仍在根据国际环境的变化来调整国家与市场的关系,并不断通过国家构建来应对外部竞争压力.     

中亚同质性背景下的哈萨克斯坦政府改革与治理研究

中亚五国在改革与治理过程中具有较多相近的初始条件,但在同质性显著的背景下,各国发展却出现了异质性结果。哈萨克斯坦以其突出的经济和政治成就远远领先于他国。这难以直接用西方学者的公共管理改革理论来解释,需要提炼出一个哈萨克斯坦在同质性背景下有别于其他中亚国家的独特改革模型,并在其政府的改革轨迹及具体措施中考察其推动和限制变革的关键因素和力量。这大致包括改革的理论基础、动态的制度背景、制度文化、领导能力和伦理等五个要素。在哈萨克斯坦政府改革与治理过程中,清晰的改革理念、对制度背景的准确把握,以及在制度文化塑造与领导力上的突出表现,是其成功的关键所在。但伦理建设上的不足导致哈萨克斯坦政府改革问题重重。对哈萨克斯坦政府的政策执行、政治民主化、腐败与政治认同等相关指标的测量结果显示,哈萨克斯坦政府改革与治理任重道远。     

从制度之战到经济竞争:国内政治与美国对华政策的演变(2009～2018)

美国的对华政策一直以来都是地缘政治与国内政治两种逻辑共同作用的产物。冷战后,由于国际体系结构与美国国内政治结构分别出现单极化与两极化的发展趋势,地缘政治逻辑在美国对华政策制定中的重要性显著下降,国内政治逻辑的影响则迅速上升。与之相应,经济取代安全成为中美关系的首要议题。自奥巴马政府执政起,随着中美两国步入战略竞争时代,地缘政治在美国对华政策制定中的重要性再次突显,并成为未来中长期中美战略互动的决定性变量。然而在这一宏观背景下,不同时期美国对华政策连同中美战略竞争的主题却是由美国国内政治所界定的:从奥巴马政府到特朗普政府,变化了的国内政治动因促使上述主题经历了从基于自由主义的规则约束与多边制度竞争到基于现实主义的合作型施压与双边经济竞争的演化。因此,美国国内政治的变化是观察今后美国对华政策走向的重要窗口。     

哈萨克斯坦石油精英及其对能源政策的影响

哈萨克斯坦是一个经济结构严重受制于能源经济和依靠石油寻租的油气生产国。国有大型油气公司的高级主管对该国的能源政策具有举足轻重的作用。石油精英通过与政治精英建立非正式的关系网络,不仅影响本国能源部门的发展,而且还介入政治决策和政治制度。而哈萨克斯坦普遍存在着制度的不透明性、法律的不确定性和总统决定的随意性,助长并养成了非正式政治体制的固化,加强了威权主义的趋势,并进一步鼓励寻租和腐败行为的延续。     

Blogging Zhanaozen: hegemonic discourse and authoritarian resilience in Kazakhstan

Post-Soviet authoritarian regimes – particularly in Central Asia – have proved highly resilient since independence. Existing explanations for regime longevity should be augmented by consideration of non-material, discursive sources of political legitimacy. A robust authoritarian regime requires the production and circulation of a hegemonic discourse that is internalized by influential social groups. This type of dominant discourse has emerged in Kazakhstan, making it difficult for political opponents to promote alternative political imaginaries and mobilize popular support. State control over media is challenged by Internet-based platforms, but in Kazakhstan social media and blogging have also offered an opportunity for the regime to reproduce its own hegemonic discourse. This article uses a discourse analysis of posts by bloggers in the aftermath of a violent conflict in Zhanaozen in Kazakhstan in 2011 to demonstrate how central elements in the state discourse are reproduced online, even by independent bloggers, suggesting that an official discourse has the ability to maintain its hegemonic status despite widespread use of blogs and social media.     

State responses to reputational concerns: the case of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative in Kazakhstan

This article examines how reputational concerns drove the adoption of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in Kazakhstan. The article argues that Kazakhstan's decision to join EITI was largely driven by the government’s intention to use EITI as a rational governance tool to manipulate its political agenda to protect the regime’s legitimacy. However, norm adherence does not reflect effective compliance. The findings of EITI in Kazakhstan show that the adoption of EITI standardized requirements followed a specific internal logic that disconnects from the initiative’s initial purpose. The case of Kazakhstan further illustrates the limitations of external remedies to the ‘resource curse’ and emphasises the significance of vertical accountability in political regimes. The article urges scholars and policy advisers to further investigate how global governance arrangements are implemented at domestic levels, particularly in autocratic regimes.     

Constructing the homeland: Kazakhstan's discourse and policies surrounding its ethnic return-migration policy

A new political development that emerged after the disintegration of the Soviet Union was the adoption of ‘homeland stances’ by the newly independent states. Through the construction of the homeland image, the states of the region claimed responsibility not only for their own citizens, but also for a diaspora community of co-ethnics. Kazakhstan became one of these states and its leadership portrayed Kazakhstan as the homeland of the Kazakh diaspora. Furthermore, Kazakhstan's leadership developed far more active homeland rhetoric and initiated an ethnic return-migration policy as early as 1992. This paper will explore the discourse of Kazakhstan's leadership on the repatriation of its co-ethnics as well as the legal and political context that it created to achieve their smooth absorption into domestic society.     

The ideology of development and legitimation: beyond ‘Kazakhstan 2030’

The paper analyses the multifaceted discourse of development and nation-building in post-Soviet Kazakhstan. It addresses the regional clan–central elite relations and Nursultan Nazarbayev regime's legitimating agenda through the Kazakhstan 2030 Strategy for development. The economic developmental component in Nazarbayev's ideological discourses is primarily an exercise of control over regional economic and political elites and that helped building further legitimacy for the regime in various socio-ethnic constituencies on both the regional and central levels. Kazakhstan 2030 was deployed by the regime to substitute the Soviet version of ideology, legitimize the regime among various ethno-lingual audiences, and discipline the behaviour of regional elites. The paper shows how the study of elites’ interests can best explain the nature of national ideology and development projects.     

Limits of diaspority in Central Asia: contextualizing Dungan's multiple belongings

This article shows different ways of defining, understanding and performing ‘diaspority’ in the border region of Kordai (Kazakhstan) and Tokmok (Kyrgyzstan). Taking the example of Dungan people, as the Sinophone Muslims are known in Central Asia, both academic and political definitions of the concept of ‘diaspora’ are compared. This ethnographic account problematizes Kazakhstani Shaanxi Dungan ‘diaspority’. Together with this, the political definitions of ‘diaspora’ are also analysed. I show that while in China and Kazakhstan the definitions of the Dungans as a ‘diaspora’ of ‘China’ are somewhat complementary, once the Shaanxi Dungan emic perspective is taken into account, this concept becomes rather problematic. The kinds of diaspority defined by the states involved are ways of implementing particular cultural hegemonies that legitimate the two political regimes analysed in this article. Concurrently, this dual diaspority is used by the Dungan people in distinct ways in defining their own identities. Nevertheless, I show in this article that the ‘Chinese card’ is not necessarily played by all Dungans. Moreover, there are some Dungans for whom ‘Chinese-ness’ is not even relevant.     

Regime type versus patronal politics: a comparison of “ardent democrats” in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan

Kazakhstan is home to the longest serving ruler in post-Soviet Eurasia while Kyrgyzstan is among the region’s most competitive polities. Do these regime differences correspond to divergence in political attitudes, as an extensive body of literature posits? Are Kyrgyzstanis more likely to strongly support democratic ideals? Are Kazakhstanis less likely? Contrary to expectations, data reveal the two populations to be attitudinally indistinguishable when it comes to strong support for practices associated with democracy. Whatever country differences we find are minor or statistically insignificant. We explain this convergence by shifting focus away from the political features that distinguish the two nascent democracy versus consolidated authoritarianism to those that they hold in common. Notwithstanding major constitutional reform in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, politics there, as in Kazakhstan, remains fundamentally patronal, or patronage- based. Mass attitudes, we argue, align in many ways with the countries’ shared patronal politics, rather than with their contrasting regime types.     

Ethnic conflicts and environmental degradation in Central Asia. The Ferghana valley and northern Kazakhstan

This work seeks to demonstrate that the combination of ecological degradation, demographic pressure, and ethnic heterogeneity in Central Asia constitute a serious threat to the future stability of the region. The predominantly rural Ferghana Valley and Northern Kazakhstan suffer from shortages of water and land and from unemployment that leads to extensive out-migration to cities suffering from decline in their Soviet-era industries. The problem in the Ferghana Valley began with Tsarist conquest of the valley in 1876 and the subsequent imposition of cotton cultivation, which was greatly expanded by the Soviet Union. The Ferghana Valley, despite being a natural unit, was divided between Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan in the 1920s and 1930s, and remains divided between the independent states. The current population of 11 million is ethnically diverse, with Uzbeks in the majority and increasing most rapidly. Immigration from the Caucasus since 1950 added to the tension. Future peace will depend on such factors as whether the neo-Communist political regime chooses to incite ethnic hostilities, the manner in which land is redistributed, and the outcome of struggles for control of the flourishing narcotics trade. The northern Kazakhstan region was designated a pioneer wheat-growing region by Soviet planners in 1954. Russian and Ukrainian migrants established between 1954 and 1956 are today the predominant population sector, but feel their privileged position threatened by nationalist policies making Kazakh the official language and giving preference in employment to Kazakhs. Resettlement of Kazakhs from Mongolia, China, and Afghanistan in the region and the high Kazakh birth rate increase tensions. Grain production initially grew rapidly, but the mediocre soil and erosion-inducing constant dry winds have caused production to stagnate or decline. Regional disputes within Kazakhstan complicate the situation. Northern Kazakhstan, with its industrial development, is integrated more with the Urals and Western Siberia than with the rest of Kazakhstan. Serious ethnic conflicts in either Kazakhstan or the Ferghana Valley are likely to spill far beyond their local boundaries, embroiling much of the area in hostilities.     

Discourses of Russian-speaking youth in Nazarbayev’s Kazakhstan: Soviet legacies and responses to nation-building

ABSTRACT

Research into post-independence identity shifts among Kazakhstan’s Russian-speaking minorities has outlined a number of possible pathways, such as diasporization, integrated national minority status and ethnic separatism. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with young people in Almaty and Karaganda, I examine how Russian-speaking minorities identify with the state and imagine their place in a ‘soft’ or ‘hybrid’ post-Soviet authoritarian system. What is found is that Russian-speaking minorities largely accept their status beneath the Kazakh ‘elder brother’ and do not wish to identify as a ‘national minority’. Furthermore, they affirm passive loyalty to the political status quo while remaining disinterested in political representation. Russian-speaking minorities are also ambivalent towards Kazakh language promotion and anxious about the increasing presence of Kazakh-speakers in urban spaces. This article argues that two factors are central to these stances among Kazakhstan’s Russian-speaking minorities: the persistence of Soviet legacies and the effects of state discourse and policy since 1991.