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The distinctive relationship between bureaucrats and politicians in Britain has been much noted around the world and often used a model by reformers. However, both Conservative and Labour governments have displayed dissatisfaction with the bureaucracy and have made important changes in the "Whitehall model." Some of these changes have reduced the degree to which British politicians have been unusually dependent on a career bureaucracy that is insulated from partisan politics.  相似文献   

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The study of public sector budgeting, particularly at the state level, has been dominated by incremental models of decision making. As a result, the budget has not always been viewed as an effective management tool for governors and other senior state officials. However, there are several critical issues which state leaders repeatedly face and for which the budget is the principal instrument for implementing decisions. This article identifies four key issues for the strategic management of state government and relates alternative approaches to each issue to the nature of budgetary politics. The first section raises the issues in the form of four questions. The next sections present alternative answers and discuss their political implications. Where appropriate, examples from the state of New York are included.  相似文献   

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This article assumes that bureaucrats, like other actors, follow their interests. However, it is also recognized that bureaucrats in political environments face a multilevel game situation with unstable property rights, where priorities between institutional position and more pecuniary goods, e.g. budget maximization, especially in reform situations have to be made. Thus, bureaucrats realize that in order to obtain the latter, the precondition is a secured institutional position and that this position has to be obtained through a bargaining process involving transaction costs, externally due to negotiations with the political principals, and internally through union organization. Empirically, the phenomenon it examined in the case of the Danish day care system which went through a reform period during the late eighties and early nineties. It suggests that although demand for day care rose significantly during this period, day care workers (and their unions) worked for – and succeeded in – securing their institutional position.  相似文献   

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The Department of Defense (DoD) operates an extensive system of retail activities at military bases for active duty, retired, and reserve personnel and their families. DoD stores employ 96,000 civilian workers and sell $14 billion of goods and services annually at below-market prices. DoD resists efforts to reduce its role in retail activities, arguing that even within the United States stores with below-market prices are a cost-effective alternative to higher cash compensation for military personnel. This article examines the budgetary incentives that make inefficient, government-operated stores attractive to DoD and describes options that would change those incentives. Because most of DoD's retail stores are controlled by nonappropriated fund instrumentalities of the federal government, reforming those incentives could require changes in the treatment of these poorly understood federal entities.  相似文献   

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In theory, granting politicians tools to oversee bureaucrats can reduce administrative malfeasance. In contrast, I argue that the political control of bureaucrats can increase corruption when politicians need money to fund election campaigns and face limited institutional constraints. In such contexts, politicians can leverage their discretionary powers to incentivize bureaucrats to extract rents from the state on politicians' behalf. Using data from an original survey of bureaucrats (N = 864) across 80 randomly sampled local governments in Ghana, I show that bureaucrats are more likely to facilitate politicians' corrupt behavior when politicians are perceived to be empowered with higher levels of discretionary control. Using qualitative data and a list experiment to demonstrate the mechanism, I show that politicians enact corruption by threatening to transfer noncompliant officers. My findings provide new evidence on the sources of public administrative deficiencies in developing countries and qualify the presumption that greater political oversight improves governance.  相似文献   

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Conclusion The objective of this research has been to determine whether key budget participants see forecasting as making significant contributions to the budgetary process. The issue is important for at least two reasons. Budgetary tools will be used to the degree budget players perceive them as providing net budgettary benefits. Moreover, the continuing trend toward technological sophistication gives governments opportunities, red herrings or not, to incorporate the technology into the budget process. The issue is also very timely; with the demise of packaged budget reforms but not the values of budget reforms, there may be new opportunities for improving budgeting on a less grandiose, more piecemeal basis, such as using forecasts to analyze budgetary options. The findings here provide some insight into two questions concerning governmental forecasting. First, why do governments use complex methods? In support of previous research, since cities most dependent on intergovernmental aid tend to use complex forecasting, such methods may indeed be seen as a way to help cope with fiscal stress. Also, reflecting the ambiguity of current research, since cities tend to use relatively simple techniques regardless of the revenue source being forecasted, the source is at best a partial determinant of complexity. The most important predictor of complexity, however, was budget format; cities that emphasize reform methods, especially planning, tend to use the most complex forecast methods. The forecasting process was not as important as expected.Second, so what? Does forecasting influence budgetary choices? The evidence from the second part of the study suggest that it can, but within definable limits. Budget directors are more likely than councils to value outyear estimates, but both actors are much less likely to value long-term estimates. The survey results also indicate that revenue forecasts are not as useful for making political decisions as for making management decisions: the forecast is usually used as an internal document, is only sometimes intended to affect council decisions, and is not usually included in the budget. In short, the forecast may be most useful for making managerial decisions since that is what most cities want out of it. It also tends to be more useful if the budget format is less traditional. Finally, the findings indicate that forecasting may be more useful to management to the degree the council finds it politically useful. This is extremely important since it suggests that as powerful as technology may be, budgetary tools that do not meet political needs will be managerially confined.Clearly, more research is needed in this area. Does forecasting actually shape long-range plans? In the long run, will the forecasting effort change the ways cities budget? Can the availability of forecasting information strengthen one actor relative to another? These are important questions that need answering to clarify the impact of forecasting and other technologies on the budget process.  相似文献   

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This article examines the work of the Fabian Society Commission on Future Spending Choices published in June 2013. The Commission is undoubtedly the most detailed and ambitious attempt by a centre‐left think‐tank to analyse the structure of UK public spending since Labour's 2010 defeat. The Commission makes an eloquent case for a strategic approach to UK public spending, filling the substantial void in thinking on the centre‐left since Labour's 2010 defeat. Inevitably, the proposals raise fundamental questions about the capacity of the British state and the constitutional framework of the UK political system to accommodate a long‐term, future‐orientated approach to public expenditure, which deserve to be properly aired and debated.  相似文献   

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This article asks, 'how do practitioners understand the relationship between the prime minister, ministers and the rest of Westminster and Whitehall?' We focus on three topics. First, we review tales of a Blair presidency. Second, we explore the governance paradox in which people tell tales of a Blair presidency as they recount stories of British governance that portray it as fragmented with several decision-makers. Finally, we argue that this paradox reveals the distorting influence the Westminster model still exerts on many accounts of British politics. It acts as a smokescreen for the changes in executive politics.  相似文献   

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Research in public policy and political economy has provided many insights in the evolution of public resistance against genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in the last two decades. But how does the partisan composition of a government, its programmatic orientation and the allocation of cabinet offices affect policy making in this specific area? We argue that the regulation of GMOs is determined by the ideological orientation of governments and the presence of parties with a specific ideological background in the cabinet. In addition, we hypothesize that the parties' control over relevant cabinet posts matter for GMO regulation. We test our hypotheses by using an innovative dataset that contains information on biotechnology regulation outputs of European governments in the time period from 1996 until 2013, the partisan composition and policy‐area specific positions of governments, and the party affiliation of key cabinet actors. The results show that the presence of a Christian democratic party in a cabinet increases the chances of a ban on biotech crops, in particular if it controls the Ministry of the Environment.  相似文献   

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This article examines whether Independent Regulatory Commissions (IRCs) received less budgetary support than executive branch Dependent Regulatory Agencies (DRAs) between the late 1970s and 2000. It also examines whether there were political differences in spending priorities between social and economic regulation. The principal-agent theory was used to explain why IRCs do not fare as well compared to DRAs in terms of budgetary support. The findings indicate that IRCs received less funding than DRAs in the social regulation field, supporting the principal-agent model of budgetary decision making. Political impacts were prevalent in all areas of regulation spending.  相似文献   

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Cremer  Helmuth  De Donder  Philippe  Gahvari  Firouz 《Public Choice》2004,119(3-4):335-358
This paper studies majority voting outcomes fora specific class of two-dimensional policies. One policyinstrument influences efficiency and the other redistribution.Absent the political process, the two dimensions can beaddressed separately. With a two dimensional vote, the twoaspects will interact in a non-trivial way. The illustrativepolicy we consider, requires taxing an externality-generatinggood and determining a budgetary rule which specifies theproportions of the tax proceeds that go to wage earners and tocapital owners. We show: First, a sequential vote wherein thetax rate is determined first and the budgetary rule second,always possesses an equilibrium and that this equilibrium isthe median-endowed individual's most-preferred policy. Second,the reverse sequential choice implies that the median-endowedindividual may, but need not, be decisive. Third, the``Shepsle procedure'' also implies that the equilibrium is thepolicy most favored by the median individual. Fourth, thisequilibrium constitutes, under certain circumstances, theCondorcet winner for the unrestricted simultaneous votinggame.  相似文献   

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