马克思早期关于“主体”问题的三重视域转换——理念主体·世俗主体·无产阶级

“主体”问题是马克思早期思想的重要理论课题。《黑格尔法哲学批判》是青年马克思“主体”思想变革的起点。借助于主谓颠倒法，马克思揭露了黑格尔国家观的神秘性质，将主体的内容从抽象的理念置换成了经验性的存在，即完成了从“地上的神”到“现实的人”的主体转换。《德法年鉴》时期，马克思从之前的封建国家批判推进到了资产阶级国家批判，进而深化了对“主体”问题的思考。在与鲍威尔的论战中，马克思借助政治批判与市民社会批判，将宗教层面的主体（“犹太人”）还原为世俗层面的主体（“利己的人”），并提出了从“政治解放”到“人的解放”的理论逻辑。人的解放理论则为新主体的生成开辟了理论空间，并最终在《〈黑格尔法哲学批判〉导言》中提出了作为“非市民社会阶级的市民社会阶级”（无产阶级）。把握马克思早期关于“主体”问题的视域转换及其演进逻辑，对于理解马克思哲学的主体观具有重要意义。     

试析《精神现象学》中的“主体自返性结构”

《精神现象学》中所揭示的"主体自返性结构"是西方世界的根本性存在方式,当代哲学的有限性视域与这种结构的关系是"扬弃",而不是抛弃,对黑格尔哲学的批判必须是对整个西方哲学的批判。     

对认识主体能动性的思考

主体和客体范畴是马克思主义哲学认识论中一对最基本的范畴。随着哲学研究的深入，主体在认识中的地位和作用问题日益为人们所关注，认识主体的能动性的问题是主体性的主要表现形式之一，是认识论研究中的一个重要课题。     

论马克思在主体性问题上对西方其它哲学流派的超越

主体性思想在笛卡尔哲学中兴起,经历康德、黑格尔等德国古典哲学家的发展,虽高扬了理性的力量,但也走入了穷途末路.现当代哲学家着力解决传统主体性哲学的困境,然而,终究因为局限于"解释世界"而收效甚微.马克思哲学的主体性思想,以人的生产劳动为出发点和本体论基础,重构了丰富的主体性,克服了传统主体性形而上学的种种困境,为主体性的重构带来了新的思路.     

重思“颠倒”问题——马克思与黑格尔辩证法探究

如果仅把辩证法理解为一种通过内部矛盾斗争来发现事物运动、发展、变化规律的一种思维方法,那么研究"颠倒"问题的意义并不很大。但是,黑格尔的辩证法具有内容和形式上的一致性。内容是逻辑展开的必然结果。简单地把辩证法从思辨哲学中抽出来就破坏了黑格尔哲学的一致性。既然黑格尔发现了辩证法的真正规律,就不能简单地认为他用辩证法的逻辑推出了完全错误的内容。应该回到黑格尔哲学理论本身,发现其作为哲学前提的"自我意识"的思辨本性。马克思的真正意图就在于消解黑格尔"自我意识"的元价值,在现实的解放的意义上重新确立黑格尔的自由哲学。     

黑格尔系统阐述了否定之否定规律——兼与李德恩同志商榷

李德恩同志在《黑格尔并没有提出否定之否定规律——重新认识黑格尔哲学的三段式方法》(载《理论探讨》1986年第五期)一文中指出:“黑格尔哲学的三段式方法并不是对所谓否定之否定规律的猜测”,“必须把所谓否定之否定规律从黑格尔辩证法中清理出来,从而彻底清除对黑格尔哲学方法的长期误解。”我们不能同意李德恩同志的观点。我们认为,黑格尔不是猜测而是第一次在唯心主义基础上自觉、系统地阐述了否定之否定规律,简单回顾一下欧洲哲学史就不难发现这一点。     

浅谈笛卡尔哲学的认识论

西方哲学发展到近代一个最显著的特征就是哲学的中心问题由本体论向认识论转变.从笛卡尔的"我思故我在"这一原理出发,阐述其中包含的认识论意义;通过对普遍怀疑在笛卡尔哲学中作用的分析,揭示出笛卡尔的普遍怀疑与怀疑论的区别;并试图论述笛卡尔哲学在认识论上的突破.     

黑格尔并没有提出否定之否定规律——重新认识黑格尔哲学的三段式方法

如何认识黑格尔的辩证法思想,对唯物辩证法基本理论的探讨一直有着重要的影响。而要充分,合理地认识黑格尔辩证法,又往往必须首先正确认识黑格尔哲学的正、反、合三段式方法。对于这个方法,我国的学术界一直把它解释为关于事物的辩证发展或“一切从低级到高级过程”的所谓否定之否定规律。并认为,以三段式“猜测到”这一“普遍规律”是黑格尔哲学的一个“合理内核”(见《辞海》缩印本80年第一版。第19页;《哲学辞典》83年第一版,第32页)。笔者认为,这种传统观点是对黑格尔哲学的一大误解,如果在此基础上研究黑格尔哲学,尤其是他的辩证法,则必然要在黑格尔的哲学大厦中误入迷途。因此本文谈点浅见,试图证明黑格尔哲学的三段式方法并不是对所谓否定之否定规律的猜则。     

民法哲学是法哲学的起点——读黑格尔的《法哲学原理》

黑格尔的民法哲学思想主要体现在他的《法哲学原理》一书中。在他看来,民事主体自由意志的实现问题是民法哲学中最基本的内容,也是整个法哲学所围绕的一个中心问题,所以,民法哲学也就成了法哲学构成体系的最基本单位。民法哲学既是法哲学的逻辑起点,也是它的历史起点,在法哲学体系中具有基础性地位和作用。     

从扬弃黑格尔哲学的角度看马克思主义学说中的辩证法思想

马克思主义哲学有两个主要源头即黑格尔的辩证法思想和费尔巴哈的唯物主义。以马克思主义哲学的来源之一——黑格尔哲学为出发点,论述马克思主义学说中的辩证法思想。文章共分为三个层次,第一层次是马克思走向黑格尔哲学,第二层次是马克思走近黑格尔哲学即吸收了黑格尔唯心主义辩证法的思想,第三层次是马克思扬弃黑格尔哲学即抛弃了其唯心主义成分,吸纳了黑格尔真正的内在精神实质——辩证法思想。     

Fanon

Abstract

I argue that Franz Fanon can usefully be situated in the tradition of German Idealism in the sense that he takes from Kant and especially Hegel the conception of agency as something to be achieved through struggle for the ideal of humanity as self-determining. Fanon sees the suffering cased by colonial rule in Africa and elsewhere as deriving from the systematic deprivation of agency by the colonial power. Using the work of Hegel, Fanon seeks to reconstruct the emancipatory project of the black man in close analogy to Hegel’s master-slave dialectic. The violence which Fanon sees as unavoidable in such a struggle is not violence for the sake of violence but, following Hegel, the violence that constitutes the subject in the first place.     

Contemporary Conservatism, Human Nature, and Identity: The Philosophy of Roger Scruton

In this article I examine the role that the concept of human nature plays within the conservative philosophy of Roger Scruton. I argue that it is of fundamental importance for his approach to conservatism, as well as showing the influence on his views of Hegel and Wittgenstein. However, such an approach can cause many problems for the conservative, and I argue that Scruton's use of a theory of human nature to justify particular social arrangements makes his approach resemble the methods of e.g socialism and liberalism, precisely those theories he wishes to attack for being based on abstract theories of human nature.     

Marcuse’s Hegel: Hope and Despair in the Logic of Negation

Marcuse’s Reason and Revolution found a rich reception in the 1960’s field of Hegel/Marx commentary. This rereading challenges Marcuse’s reduction of Hegel’s dialectical logic to a logic of negation. It describes weaknesses in Marcuse’s Hegel paraphrases, and argues that Marcuse’s bold leap to a Revolutionary logic rejects Hegel’s method: turning instead to Kant’s transcendental logic, and leading his readers into an antinomy of hope and despair.     

Merleau-Ponty's Conception of Dialectics in Phenomenology of Perception

Although the fact that Merleau-Ponty has a dialectical approach in Phenomenology of Perception has been discussed in recent Anglophone readings, there has not been an explicit clarification as to how his varying usages of the term hang together. Given his repeated references to Hegel and to dialectics, coupled with the fact that dialectics are not part of the Husserlian phenomenology or Heideggerean existentialism from which Merleau-Ponty draws so much, the question of just what he does with the idea of dialectics presents itself. In this paper I argue that, in Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty saw Hegel as providing a model for the conception of rationality and meaning that must underpin the existentialist response to the problems bequeathed him by Husserlian phenomenology: namely, the problems of embodiment, perception and the constitution of the world. In connection with this, I suggest an interpretation of Merleau-Ponty's “existential dialectics” that focuses on his three principal uses of the term: 1) a “dialectic of objective thought,” 2) a set of existential-dialectical categories intended to capture the ontological structure of the “body-subject” as “being-in-the-world,” and 3) a dialectic at the cultural level concerning others and history.     

The Naturalistic Side of Hegel’s Pragmatism

Abstract

This paper contrasts the Hegelianism of contemporary neo-pragmatism (Brandom) and the Hegelianism of classical pragmatism as it has been reassessed in contemporary Deweyan scholarship. Drawing on Dewey’s interpretation of Hegel, this paper argues that Hegel’s theory of the spirit is in many aspects more akin to Dewey’s pragmatism than Brandom’s. The first part compares Dewey’s pragmatism with Hegel’s conceptions of experience and the theory/practice relation. The second part compares Dewey’s naturalism with Hegel’s theory of the relation between nature and spirit.     

东方哲学智慧与辩证法的新规律——谈“分合互动律”

黑格尔的欧式辩证法,侧重"分",即从"一分为二"的角度去说明矛盾存在于事物内部,并且是发展的动力。而中国哲学侧重"合",从"合二为一"的角度说明矛盾的性质及认识的规律。如果把矛盾的"分"与"合"、"一分为二"与"合二为一"结合起来,则可以在矛盾规律的本体论与认识论方面达到更高的境界。这就是"分合互动律"的含义。     

Reason and the Restlessness of the Speculative: Jean-Luc Nancy's Reading of Hegel

Abstract

This paper examines Jean-Luc Nancy's interpretation of Hegel, focusing in particular on The Restlessness of the Negative. It is argued that Nancy's reading represents a significant break with other post-structuralist readings of Hegel by taking his thought to be non-metaphysical. The paper focuses in particular on the role Nancy gives to the negative in Hegel's thought. Ultimately Nancy's reading is limited as an interpretation of Hegel, since he gives no sustained explanation of the self-correcting function of reason.     

齐克果论回归自我

在齐克果时代,黑格尔倡导的公共理性支配着西方世界的价值取向。齐克果认为,在这种价值取向中,人迷失了自我。为了找回自我,齐克果在伦理恐惧中走向亚伯拉罕。作为找回自我的代价,人成为孤独的个体。     

从古希腊到近代德国的整体国家观解析

整体国家观念肇始于古希腊的柏拉图和亚里士多德.希腊化时期到中世纪,西方人观察政治的立足点发生了重要转移,但整体国家观念并没有失去生命力,而是逐渐融入了世界国家概念之中.近代德国政治哲学则突破了个人主义国家观的樊篱,促使整体主义国家观念的回归.从古希腊到近代德国的整体国家观对后世影响深远.