If it Weren't for Those ?∗!&∗@!∗ Nader Voters we Wouldn't Be in This Mess: The Social Determinants of the Nader Vote and the Constraints on Political Choice

Much has been written about the effect of Ralph Nader's recent experience in Presidential politics—in particular about the consequential election of 2000. The general view is that Nader's direct effect on that contest was to cost Gore the election and the indirect effect was to undermine popular and professional support for third-party challenges from the left. In this paper, we revisit this debate by contrasting Nader voters with both Nader-supporting Gore voters and non-voters using data from the 2000 National Election Studies. In line with some predictions, we find that the Nader voters had a tendency to come from privileged positions in terms of income and occupation and to embrace consistently progressive policy positions. More surprising is the fact that Latino voters were disproportionately attracted to Nader and that Nader voters were mobilized to vote in numbers far higher than has been previously reported. This mobilization effect is also evident in Nader-supporting Gore voters under the age of 34. A final analysis suggests that little separates those Nader voters who were divided in their support for Gore.     

Sincere and strategic voters: An Israeli study

The theoretical literature on voting behavior has shown that a rational voter may sometimes decide to vote for a candidate or party that does not constitute his or her first preference. Such voters are traditionally called strategic voters, in contrast to voters who act sincerely, i.e., those who always vote for their first preference regardless of how others are likely to vote. After discussing some of the problems associated with the definition of these two types of voters and suggesting a new operational definition, some attitudes and characteristics of these two types of voters are investigated. It was found that strategic voters constitute a very small percentage of the entire electorate, that their education level is significantly higher than that of sincere voters, that they tend more often to believe that polls influence voters' decisions and hence tend to delay their own final voting decision, that they tend more often than sincere voters to support small parties but do not tend more often than sincere voters to switch the party they decide to support from one election to the next, and that there is no significant difference between them and sincere voters regarding which governing coalition should/will form following an election.     

Going Maverick: How Candidates Can Use Agenda-Setting to Influence Citizen Motivations and Offset Unpopular Issue Positions

Holding an unpopular position on an issue important to voters can endanger a candidate??s electoral success. What is the candidate??s best agenda-setting strategy? To focus on other issue positions congruent with the same ideological stereotype, shoring up support among like-minded voters? Or to ??go maverick?? by discussing some issues that signal liberal positions and some that signal conservative positions? Existing voting models suggest the answer depends on voter preferences, since going maverick should have symmetric effects??support among voters who agree with the candidate??s positions will decrease, proportionally, as support increases among voters who disagree. We argue, however, that stereotype incongruence prompts these voters to process information differently, yielding asymmetric effects. We test our expectations experimentally, using a fictional candidate webpage to show how the benefits of going maverick can outweigh the costs.     

A neo-Downsian model of group-oriented voting and racial backlash

We extend the standard Downsian framework to suppose that voters consider the identity of each candidate's supporters when deciding whom to support, rather than considering only the announced policy positions of the candidates. In particular we posit the existence of a class of voters whose support for a candidate reduces support by some other voters for that candidate. Our most important result concerns the conditions under which the addition to the electorate of new voters on one side of the policy spectrum shifts the equilibrium toward the opposite direction. The model can explain why enfranchisement of blacks did not immediately help the election of liberal candidates.     

Sticking to the Union? Nationalism,inequality and political disaffection and the geography of Scotland’s 2014 independence referendum

Scotland’s 2014 Independence Referendum affords a rare opportunity to examine public support for the break-up of a long-established, stable democracy. Analyses of support for Scottish independence reveal that while issues of national identity loomed large in the vote, they were not the only factors involved. Questions around the economic and political direction of the state, and around uneven development, ideology and trust in established politicians also influenced voters’ decisions. Partisanship also mattered, as voters were more likely than not to follow the lead of their party in what had become a highly partisan contest. But some parties – especially Labour – saw large minorities of their supporters vote against the party’s line to support independence.     

Explaining the electoral effects of public investments: The case of the expansion of the underground in Madrid, 1995–2007

According to the literature, governments have strong incentives to use the public budget tactically in order to either obtain the electoral support of new voters or strengthen the loyalty of their traditional supporters. Yet vote‐seeking strategies only become rational when voters follow their self‐interest and reward governments when their constituency benefits from public transfers. The literature has focused on the governments' incentives, largely ignoring the importance of knowing whether the electorate is responsive to public investments. This study tests empirically whether incumbents strategically use public investments to gather more electoral support; and whether voters take these investments into account at the polls. These two questions are pursued simultaneously by using as a case study the expansion of the underground network in Madrid, Spain. Only a little evidence is found to support the idea that regional governments constructed new metro stations in neighbourhoods where they had more to gain electorally. Also, the inauguration timing strictly followed the electoral cycle, something that indicates a strategic calculus on the part of the incumbent. However, the models are also consistent with the idea that the government's investments were primarily driven by motives of efficiency. Indeed, although governments are tempted to follow vote‐seeking strategies, they are also aware that they cannot deviate too much from an efficiency‐based allocation of public resources. From the perspective of the voters, robust evidence has been found to show that regional voters rewarded this policy at the neighbourhood level. Neighbourhoods that received new metro stations voted in higher numbers for the incumbent than those quarters without new investments. All in all, these findings may have some implications for normative democratic theory.     

Policy representation

This paper examines the extent to which conditions for the 'representative party government' model of representation exist in the EU. It suggests that, although application of the model is obviously limited, there is some support for its relevance. Using surveys of voters and candidates for the European Parliament the paper shows that some policy positions of representatives are constrained more by their party group than their nationality, and to some degree there is obvious congruence between the opinions of candidates and their voters. This is particularly so with respect to left–right orientation; far less with respect to European Monetary Union where elites appear much more enthusiastic than their electorates.     

The effect of socioeconomic policy and competence messages on populist radical right support: Evidence from a pre-election survey experiment

Does highlighting socioeconomic policy considerations or mainstream parties’ government competence reduce support for populist radical right (PRR) parties? Such “defuse” messages may attract PRR voters without alienating mainstream parties’ core electorate and thus, have advantages over an accommodative strategy. This study tests four “defuse” messages in an original survey experiment on a sample of 1,786 likely PRR voters in the context of the 2017 German federal election. The findings show that potential PRR voters are hardly swayed by these messages. This result is in notable contrast to findings from prior experimental studies about the malleability of PRR support. Exploratory analyses suggest that some of these null findings may mask heterogeneities. Both respondents who were surveyed during the first days of fieldwork and those with less political knowledge responded to some treatments in the expected way. Overall, these findings point to a limited responsiveness of PRR voters to “defuse” messages.     

Hold your nose and vote: corruption and public decisions in a representative democracy

This paper analyzes how corruption alters policy decisions in democracy, and examines whether this distortion can result in a long-term persistence of corruption even when the voters are well informed and rational. By applying a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy, the paper analyzes how corruption distorts the allocation of resources between public and private consumption, altering the policy preferences of elected and nonelected citizens in opposite directions. The outcome is a reduction in real public expenditure and, if the median voter??s demand for public goods is sufficiently elastic, a reduction in taxes. In this case, some citizens benefit indirectly from corruption. The paper also presents some empirical evidence that, in democratic countries, corruption results in lower tax revenue, and proceeds to show that, when this occurs, citizens anticipating a shift in preferences in favor of public expenditure may support institutions that favor corruption. This result complements the findings of other studies that have attributed the persistence of corruption in democracy to some failure on the part of the voters or the electoral system. It also bears implications for developing effective anticorruption strategies and for redefining the role that can be played by the international community.     

Committed or Conditional Democrats? Opposition Dynamics in Electoral Autocracies

In electoral autocracies, opposition coalition formation offers the best hope of getting to democracy. Yet forming electoral coalitions also entails convincing opposition voters to ignore compromises and engage in the cross‐party voting necessary for opposition victory. To what extent are voters committed to defeating the autocratic incumbent even if it would result in dislikable outcomes? A survey experiment in Malaysia finds that opposition voters overwhelmingly express pretreatment support for the opposition coalition. But when exposed to a treatment vignette about which member party might lead the next government, many voters retract their support. Specifically, voters’ support for the coalition declines when their least preferred member is expected to control the government and when they can vote for a closer ideological alternative outside of the coalition. Although voters are committed to opposition unity and democratic transition, that commitment is sensitive to the anticipated consequences of an opposition victory.     

Candidates’ policy strategies in primary elections: does strategic voting by the primary electorate matter?

Empirical research reports conflicting conclusions about whether primary election voters strategically account for candidates’ general election prospects when casting their votes. We model the strategic calculations of office-seeking candidates facing two-stage elections beginning with a primary, and we compare candidates’ policy strategies in situations where primary voters strategically support the most viable general election candidate against candidate strategies when voters expressively support their preferred primary candidate regardless of electability. Our analyses—in which the candidates’ appeal is based on their policy positions and their campaigning skills—suggest a surprising conclusion: namely, that strategic and expressive primary voting typically support identical equilibrium configurations in candidate strategies. Our conclusions are relevant to candidates facing contested primaries, and also to political parties facing the strategic decision about whether or not to use primary elections to select their candidates—a common dilemma for Latin American (and some European) parties.     

Policy representation

Abstract This paper examines the extent to which conditions for the 'representative party government' model of representation exist in the EU. It suggests that, although application of the model is obviously limited, there is some support for its relevance. Using surveys of voters and candidates for the European Parliament the paper shows that some policy positions of representatives are constrained more by their party group than their nationality, and to some degree there is obvious congruence between the opinions of candidates and their voters. This is particularly so with respect to left–right orientation; far less with respect to European Monetary Union where elites appear much more enthusiastic than their electorates.     

Setting the Agenda or Responding to Voters? Political Parties,Voters and Issue Attention

Why do political parties prioritise some policy issues over others? While the issue ownership theory suggests that parties emphasise policy issues on which they have an advantage in order to increase the salience of these issues among voters, the riding the wave theory argues instead that parties respond to voters by highlighting policy issues that are salient in the minds of citizens. This study sheds new light on the selective issue emphasis of political parties by analysing issue attention throughout the entire electoral cycle. On the basis of a quantitative text analysis of more than 40,000 press releases published by German parties from 2000 until 2010, this article provides empirical support for the riding the wave theory. It shows that political parties take their cues from voters by responding to the issue priorities of their electorate. The results have important implications for political representation and the role that parties play in democracies.     

The Populist Radical Right and European Integration: A Comparative Analysis of Party–Voter Links

This article analyses the links between populist radical right parties and their voters regarding European integration in 11 European countries. It does so by using data from the 2008 European Social Survey and the 2006 UNC-Chapel Hill Expert Data Base on political parties and European integration. In addition to mapping the Eurosceptic orientations of political parties and their voters, the article examines the degree to which attitudes towards the EU and voting for populist radical parties are connected to each other. The results lend support to the hypothesis that most populist radical right parties have managed to establish links with their voters regarding European integration. The analysis also shows that links between populist radical right parties and their voters tend to be stronger for those parties that adopt more extreme negative positions towards European integration.     

An alternative approach to explaining political popularity

Previous empirical work on the relationship between political popularity and economic events has either not attempted to model the alternative policies of the different parties, or has modelled them in a rather simplistic manner. It has also typically assumed that voters are backward-looking in contrast to recent work on expectations theory. An approach is outlined which is based on a forward-looking comparison of the parties and incorporates the effect of news. An alternative derivation relying on the evaluation of the stock of goodwill built up for each party is also suggested. Empirical evidence from the Gallup opinion poll provides some support for these hypotheses.     

Red Europe versus no Europe? The impact of attitudes towards the EU and the economic crisis on radical-left voting

The 2014 European Parliament election saw a relatively large increase in the size of radical-left parties (RLPs), particularly in Western Europe. This article aims to provide new ways of thinking about the dynamics of radical-left voting by analysing the changing role of attitudes towards the European Union in explaining support for RLPs at European Parliament elections during the Great Recession. It is argued that the Europeanisation of economic issues during the financial crisis, together with the particular kind of Euroscepticism advocated by these parties, have enabled them to successfully attract a heterogeneous pool of voters. Using the 2009 and 2014 European Election Studies, it is shown that the effect of negative opinions about the EU on support for RLPs increased significantly during the crisis. In addition, support for RLPs also increased among voters with positive views of the EU who were nevertheless highly dissatisfied with the economic situation.     

The VP-function: A survey of the literature on vote and popularity functions after 25 years

VP-functions explain the support for the government at votes and polls by economic and political variables. Most studies analyze macro time series. We also cover studies of individual voters, socio-economic groups and regional cross-sections. The theory starts from the Responsibility Hypothesis: voters hold the government responsible for economic conditions. It works in two party/block systems, but not else. Voters in most countries are found to be sociotropic. Egotropic voting also occurs. Voters' myopia is well established. Voting is retrospective as expectations are static. It costs the average government almost 2% of the vote to rule.     

Exit to the right? Comparing far right voters and abstainers in Western Europe

This article compares far right voters in Western Europe with citizens who abstain from electoral participation. Political dissatisfaction is thought to motivate both forms of political behavior. Low levels of formal education are also significantly predictive of both abstention and far right support. This study implements a multilevel multinomial logistic regression comparing nonvoters, far right voters, and voters for other parties from 2002 to 2012. The results suggest that common predictors distinguishing far right voters, such as education and political distrust, do not distinguish far right voters from abstainers. However, measures of social integration, including union membership, self-reported social activity, and trust in other people, are positively predictive of far right over abstention. Conversely, far right party voters and voters for other parties display similar levels of political interest and social integration. Other issues, such as Euroskepticism and anti-immigrant attitudes are more common among far right voters, and distinguish them from both other voters and those who just stay home.     

Ethnic minority voters in the UK 2015 general election: A breakthrough for the Conservative party?

It was widely reported that the 2015 UK general election represented a breakthrough election for the Conservative party among ethnic minority voters – specifically that their vote share among minorities increased, and overtook that of Labour for the first time among some groups. I show that analysis using more representative data yields markedly different results. Looking at (i) party preference from 2010 to 2015, and (ii) reported vote shares from a nationally representative probability survey, I show that the Conservatives increased their support among Hindus - but the Labour party gained in support elsewhere. This is due to movement away from the Liberal Democrats, 2010 minority supporters of the Liberal Democrats moved to supporting Labour rather than the Conservatives in 2015 at a ratio of 2:1. There is also considerable individual-level volatility in party support among ethnic minorities, which is masked by a high level of stability at the aggregate level.