The politics of state compliance with international “soft law” in finance

Why do jurisdictions comply (or not) with international soft law in finance? This research systematically links international and domestic explanations of compliance by highlighting the “disjuncture” between the international standard‐setting process and the process of domestic compliance. Two causal mechanisms that affect compliance are identified. In the uploading stage, elected officials delegate the making of international soft law to domestic regulators; large, internationally active financial institutions mobilize extensively and, to a large extent, successfully. In the downloading stage, domestic interest groups team up with elected officials in order to resist compliance with international soft law that has negative distributional implications for domestic constituencies. These arguments are illustrated through a structured, focused comparison, and process tracing of the mixed record of compliance of the two main jurisdictions worldwide—the United States and the European Union—with the main international banking standards, the Basel Accords.     

The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through International Trade Agreements?

The flow of foreign direct investment into developing countries varies greatly across countries and over time. The political factors that affect these flows are not well understood. Focusing on the relationship between trade and investment, we argue that international trade agreements—GATT/WTO and preferential trade agreements (PTAs)—provide mechanisms for making commitments to foreign investors about the treatment of their assets, thus reassuring investors and increasing investment. These international commitments are more credible than domestic policy choices, because reneging on them is more costly. Statistical analyses for 122 developing countries from 1970 to 2000 support this argument. Developing countries that belong to the WTO and participate in more PTAs experience greater FDI inflows than otherwise, controlling for many factors including domestic policy preferences and taking into account possible endogeneity. Joining international trade agreements allows developing countries to attract more FDI and thus increase economic growth.     

Domestic legislatures and international human rights law: Legislating on religious symbols in Europe

This article examines the dynamics of domestic legislatures' application of international human rights law. Specifically, this article asks the following: What factors shape how domestic legislatures apply international human rights law while they enact national law and policy? Lawmakers have a variety of motives for invoking and deliberating international law. Given these motives, the article identifies two factors — civil society actors and legal experts and the flexibility of international law — that are likely to contribute to if and how national legislatures interpret and apply international human rights law while legislating. These factors are examined through case studies on religion in schools in the United Kingdom, Germany, and France. This article argues civil society actors and legal experts and the flexibility of international law inform lawmakers' estimation of political costs related to compliance and thus how they apply international human rights law to domestic legislation.     

Political Competition,Path Dependence,and the Strategy of Sustainable Energy Transitions

Previous research emphasizes the importance of path dependence for sustainable energy transitions, but their strategic nature is frequently overlooked. We examine formally how exogenous shocks, such as changes in international energy prices, interact with positive reinforcement factors, such as the growing strength of the renewables advocacy coalition. We find that political competition modifies the effect of path dependence on policy and outcomes. Specifically, while “green” governments can use positive reinforcement mechanisms to lock in policy commitments (by creating green constituencies), “brown” governments strategically underprovide public support for renewable energy (to avoid creating green constituencies). The effect of positive reinforcement also decreases with international energy prices. Our empirical analysis shows that (1) political competition conditions the policy response to exogenous shocks and market failures, while (2) governments strategically exploit path dependence for political gain.     

‘Somewhat more disruptive than we had in mind’1: The Boundary Commission for England's 2011 Proposed Redistribution of Parliamentary Constituencies

In February 2011 the UK Parliament passed an Act that both reduced the number of MPs to be elected to the House of Commons and significantly altered the rules for the definition of Parliamentary constituencies. After six redistributions in which organic criteria—MPs representing places with a community of interest—dominated the redrawing of constituency boundaries, the new rules gave precedence to an arithmetic criterion: all constituencies must have electorates within 5 per cent of the national quota (average). Seven months later the Boundary Commission published its initial proposals for a new set of 502 constituencies implementing these new rules. This paper evaluates the amount of change to the country's electoral map that this involves, identifies the main features of the new constituency configurations, and assesses their likely impact on UK political life.     

The servant of two masters: Electoral incentives in the Scottish Parliament

Scholars have pointed out the potential impact of different electoral systems on the incentives for representatives to cultivate personal versus party reputations. The mixed-member proportional system (MMP) allows us to examine the effects of electoral systems on legislators’ incentives. Scholars have argued that MMP may be the ‘best of both worlds’; however, MMP may lead to competing demands on list representatives if they are also allowed to run as constituency candidates, as happens in the Scottish Parliament. I show that this leads to different levels of committee activity—which I use as a surrogate for party activity—from constituency Members of Scottish Parliament (MSPs), pure-list MSPs (who are elected via the party list and do not run in constituencies), and dual-candidate list MSPs (list MSPs who also run in constituencies), and that the proximity of elections also affects committee activity for those who run in constituencies.     

Why (not) arrest? Third-party state compliance and noncompliance with international criminal tribunals

Why do some states comply with their legal obligations to arrest suspects indicted by international criminal tribunals (ICTs) while others do not? Research on this question has mostly focused on “target” states, like the former Yugoslav republics, where ICTs have intervened. In contrast, this article offers the first test of theories regarding ICT arrest-warrant compliance and noncompliance by third-party states. I examine the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and 26 third-party states implicated in the pursuit of the court's 91 indicted suspects. Using fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis, I find support for the procompliance influence of liberal democratic norms and foreign aid dependency on third-party states. I also find that noncompliance?—?something existing studies tend to leave untheorized?—?can be explained by the presence of either non- compliance constituencies or high official corruption. By testing several theories of compliance and noncompliance on a so far understudied class of cases, these findings provide support for the generalizability of a number of explanations in the broader literature on compliance with human rights obligations. The analysis also shows that problematizing noncompliance?—?and not merely reducing it to an absence of procompliance factors?—?can help us develop fuller explanations of compliance behavior.     

National Human Rights Institutions: Domestic implementation of international human rights law

Does adopting a National Human Rights Institution (NHRI) make states’ international commitments to not torture more constraining? Many researchers have explored international human rights treaties’ abilities to constrain leaders from violating human rights, some focusing exclusively on the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT). Thus far, findings are not promising unless certain domestic conditions apply such as sufficient democratic space to air grievances or independent judiciaries. This article continues to explore domestic conditions by focusing on another liberal institution—National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs). Torture is usually a secretive practice, and NHRIs act as information providers to potential mobilizers and domestic legal systems assuring international legal commitments are not empty promises. Using statistical analysis on 153 countries over the years 1981–2007, I find that when a country has ratified the CAT, the presence of an NHRI substantively decreases the chances the state will be an egregious offender.     

Treaty Commitment as a Signaling Device: Explaining the Ratification of the International Covenant on Economic,Social, and Cultural Rights

This study investigates the determinants of the ratification of International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). To do so, it proposes an explanation that postulates that states employ treaty ratification as a device to signal their resolve to implement polices required by the treaty at issue in order to appease demanding domestic constituencies, predicting that states with lower compliance capacity tend to commit faster than states with higher compliance capacity. Applying this explanation to the ICESCR leads to two expectations. First, the larger government spending a proxy of high compliance capacity is hypothesized to delay the ratification process. Second, states with the unitary system are expected to ratify the ICESCR more promptly because the centralized power structure in unitary states significantly restricts the pursuit of the policy autonomy by minorities at local level that the right to self-determination entails. The Cox proportional hazard analysis lends support to both hypotheses.     

Signed but Not Ratified: Limits to U.S. Participation in International Environmental Agreements

Why does the United States sign environmental treaties but not ratify them? U.S. presidents have negotiated and signed several environmental treaties that ultimately could not obtain Senate ratification. This article considers two alternative explanations. First, presidents may face divided government and upcoming elections; elections can increase uncertainty regarding ratification, because they upset majorities and change congressional preferences on issues. Such factors may have caused “involuntary” defection from international environmental cooperation. Second, compensation and compromise on enabling legislation could satisfy enough senators and their constituents to allow the legislation's passage. Failure to secure ratification may be a result of the president's overestimating the potential for negotiating a policy package capable of creating sufficient support to obtain Senate ratification. I compare domestic constraints on U.S. participation in three international environmental negotiations—climate change, biodiversity, and chemicals—to assess the alternative explanations. The cases exemplify how domestic institutions affect international environmental cooperation.     

The persuasive power of a Committee Chairman: Arthur Burns and the FOMC

This paper investigates persuasion as a means of influence for the Federal Reserve Chairman in meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). Using textual records of FOMC meetings, federal funds rate targets have been recorded for Committee members who served in the Arthur Burns era (1970–1978). Results show that Burns-member differences in stated funds rate targets were lower when Burns made recommendations early in the meeting, consistent with the hypothesis that the Chairman is persuasive. Additional results show that members’ tendencies to respond to Burns's recommendations were related to their personal and political loyalties.     

Region, Local Context, and Voting at the 1997 General Election in England

There has been considerable debate in recent work on voting patterns in Great Britain regarding the importance of regional effects: are these “real” or are they simply statistical artifacts of decision‐making processes at smaller spatial scales which are aggregated up to the regional scale if not incorporated directly into any modeling? Using a multilevel model design, this article reports on analyses of survey data for the 1997 general election in England which allows tests of whether regional variations are no more than aggregation effects. Individual voters are nested within households, neighborhoods, constituencies, and regions and when all of the smaller‐scale spatial levels are included in the model, the observed regional effects are statistically insignificant. At the 1997 general election, at least, regional variations within England in support for the three main parties—basically, a north‐south divide—are aggregation effects.     

Deliberation,Citizen Science and Covid-19

Rather than aiming to produce more ‘rational’ or more ‘other-regarding’ citizen judgements (the outcome of which is uncertain), deliberative democratic exercises should be re-designed to maximise democratic participation. To do this, they must involve citizens and experts, a novel arrangement that will benefit both cohorts. For the former, a more inclusive form of deliberation will offer an opportunity to contribute to political discussion and be listened to by people with political or policy-based authority. For the latter, it will provide a venue through which expertise can be brought to bear on democratic decision making without risk of scapegoating or politicisation. More broadly, deliberation that prioritises dialogue (over, say, opinion change) affirms the principle that political decisions reflect value judgements rather than technically ‘right’ or technically ‘wrong’ answers—judgements that are legitimate if arrived at through discussion involving the people due to be affected by the resultant policy. This article sets out the advantages of this form of deliberation—which bears some similarity to certain types of citizen science—in the context of the UK government’s responses to Covid-19; both the confused decision making evident to date, and the forthcoming re-opening phases that will prioritise or advantage some constituencies over others.     

Competency Costs in Foreign Affairs: Presidential Performance in International Conflicts and Domestic Legislative Success, 1953–2001

Numerous prominent theories have relied on the concept of “audience costs” as a central causal mechanism in their arguments about international conflict, but scholars have had greater difficulty in demonstrating the efficacy and even the existence of such costs outside the bounds of game theory and the political psychology laboratory. We suggest that the audience costs argument focuses too narrowly on the likelihood that leaders will be removed from office by domestic constituencies for failing to make good on threats. Instead, we argue that scholars should ground these arguments on Alastair Smith's ( 1998 ) broader concept of “competency costs.” Our analysis of presidential legislative success from 1953 to 2001 demonstrates the existence of foreign policy competency costs by showing that public disapproval of presidential handling of militarized interstate disputes has a significant and substantial negative impact on the president's ability to move legislation on domestic issues through Congress.     

“一带一路”推动的时空变革及面临的挑战和应对

伴随着"一带一路"倡议的推进,国内外一直有不同的声音。"一带一路"倡议的推进已取得丰硕成果,推动了全球化发展的时空大变革和利益共享的新型全球化合作机制。现在中国的经济环境与改革开放之初相比已发生重大变化,我们的思想观念也要随之进行调整和转型。国际环境已发生变化,逆全球化趋势突显,给"一带一路"倡议推进造成阻碍和挑战。通过将各种不同的声音加以辨析和回应,系统地解读新时期"一带一路"有关问题,并对"一带一路"成功之处及推动的重大变革加以提炼和总结,针对"一带一路"倡议风险规避和可持续推进提出应对策略。     

Doing Things Right: Effectiveness in Local Nonprofit Organizations, A Panel Study

This study investigates whether nonprofit organizational effectiveness is judged consistently by differing constituencies and whether changes in board effectiveness and overall organizational effectiveness (judged by differing constituencies) are the result of changes in the use of practices regarded as the "right way" to manage. The results show that different constituencies judged the effectiveness of nonprofit organizations differently, at both periods; that a change in the use of correct board practices over time, controlling for board effectiveness at time 1, was not related to board effectiveness at time 2; and that a change in the use of correct management practices, controlling for organizational effectiveness at time 1, was not related to organizational effectiveness at time 2, except for board members. Implications of the results are considered. Claims about best practices for nonprofit boards and organizations must be evaluated more critically. Finding the right fit among practices is more important than doing things the "right way.     

Diffusion through Democracy

Many argue that international norms influence government behavior, and that policies diffuse from country to country, because of idea exchanges within elite networks. However, politicians are not free to follow their foreign counterparts, because domestic constituencies constrain them. This article examines how electoral concerns shape diffusion patterns and argues that foreign templates and international organization recommendations can shift voters’ policy positions and produce electoral incentives for politicians to mimic certain foreign models. Experimental individual‐level data from the field of family policy illustrates that even U.S. voters shift positions substantially when informed about UN recommendations and foreign countries’ choices. However, voters receive limited information about international developments, biased towards the policy choices of large and proximate countries. Aggregate data on the family policy choices of OECD countries show how voters’ limited information about international models shapes government decisions: governments are disproportionately likely to mimic countries whose news citizens follow, and international organizations are most influential in countries with internationally oriented citizens.     

'Problems in International Environmental Governance' or 'A Policy Analyst Looks at the World…. this Being a Tale of How the Hopes of Mice and Men in Geneva Are Dashed in Canberra'

Concern about international environmental governance has shifted from the problems in having multilateral environmental agreements adopted to trying to ensure that the agreements which are negotiated are implemented, and that they produce positive environmental outcomes. This article argues that features of the international policy process which assist domestic policy adoption, especially scientific reductionism and moral suasion, can undermine the chances of policy implementation. This is often because business interests which are marginalised during policy adoption are more influential at the domestic level at which policy must be implemented. This asymmmetry is explained by suggesting that — rather than their being 'two-level games' (as Putnam suggested) — there are (in Lowi's terms) distinctive arenas of power at the the international and national levels. Improving policy effectiveness requires the distribution of power in each arena to be made more symmetrical.     

Legitimacy and the Rise of NGOs: the Global and Local in South Asia

We extend sociological institutionalist theory and draw on evidence from South Asia to develop a research agenda for studying how nongovernmental organization (NGO) legitimacy plays out in national and local arenas. After first presenting a sociological institutionalist approach to nongovernmental organizing, we extend it into three areas: national laws governing international and domestic NGOs, growth in domestic NGOs, and the situated interactions among international organizations, nation-states, local organizations, and other actors. (1) International and domestic NGOs are governed by national laws, and we sketch the history of such laws in South Asia to hypothesize a pattern of legal change leading to the present social concern about accountability. (2) Sociological institutionalism suggests that domestic NGO growth is related to the presence of international NGOs and can be interpreted as the diffusion of formal organization. (3) We conceptualize the situated interactions of the plethora of actors as a meso realm at the interface of the global and local. The interrelations of these actors are marked by tensions and conflict. There are many permutations of how they coalesce, not always along a global—local cleavage, and there is a need to examine the full range of interactions. We explore some of these and it seems that actors use accountability strategically in their conflicts with others. The ‘uses of accountability’ in contesting legitimacy within such situations is proposed as a fruitful research direction.     

The WTO's Appellate Body: Legal Formalism as a Legitimation of Global Governance

The creation of the Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) entails an unprecedented delegation of power to an international adjudicator, because the WTO requires states to ensure compliance of their domestic regulations with the sweeping obligations in WTO agreements. This is legitimized in some academic analyses and much political rhetoric in terms of the rule of law, suggesting that the role of the adjudicator is merely to apply the precise words of the texts agreed by states, according to their natural meaning. The AB has supported this by adopting a formalist approach that combines an objectivist view of meaning with a legalistic style of judgment. However, both the general structure and many of the specific provisions of the WTO agreements are indeterminate and raise issues of interpretation that were known to be highly contestable. Although the delegation of adjudication in its early phase was considered to be of a narrow technical function, in the current phase interpretation is more clearly seen to involve a flexible application of principles to cases in light of the policies involved. The AB's role would be better legitimized by adopting a more open epistemology and reasoning that could be accessible to a wider constituency. However, it is constrained by fear of usurping the political legitimacy of the governments to which it is primarily accountable, and governments, in turn, are motivated by a reluctance to admit to their domestic constituencies how much power has been transferred to supranational instances such as the AB.