Japan as America’s global partner: Problems and prospects

The concept of global partnership remains a central theme in the conduct of U.S.-Japan relations in the post-Cold War world. This article critically evaluates Japan’s performance and potential as a global partner for the United States. It notes the qualified outcomes to Japan’s extended quest for a world role, its inability to lead by example in world trade and its preference for international status and contributions as a substitute for international political leadership. On the other hand the article recognizes the increasing significance of Japan’s human contribution to international peacekeeping, its willingness to tackle global problems in cooperation with the United States, and its potential to reduce security costs in Asia by means of foreign aid allocations, increased host-nation support for American forces and by promoting regional security dialogue. The article highlights Japan’s emerging identity as an Asian power and the problem of diverging U.S. and Japanese perspectives on democracy in the region. At the same time, it acknowledges the crucial importance Japan attaches to the continued American military presence in Asia and its desire to insulate the U.S.-Japan security relationship from economic and trade friction. The article concludes with the observation that Japan’s ability and willingness to operate as a global partner of the United States is much greater in some areas than in others. She is the co-author ofThe Political Economy of Agricultural Protection in Northeast Asia: East Asia in International Perspective (Allen and Unwin, 1986).     

Japan-Asia economic relations: Trade, investment, and the economic crisis

Japan has been and will continue to be an important economic player in the Asian region through its internationalization policy involving trade, foreign investments, aid, technical and other forms of economic cooperation. More recently, despite its own domestic problems, Japan has extended financial and other forms of assistance and support to the Asian economies which have been hit by the economic crisis. As it is in its interests that the Asian region survives and recover, Japan will indeed continue to lend a helping hand to Asia, either through unilateral or multilateral forms of assistance or both. Due to growing interdependence, Asia needs Japan and Japan needs Asia. This article analyzes Japan's economic relations with Asia. In particular, it hopes to present an overview of Japan’s involvement in Asia through trade and investments prior to the Asian economic crisis which began in July 1997. Moreover, this article provides an assessment of the crisis and identifies Japan’s responses and involvement towards the economic recovery of the crisis-hit economies in the region. The article draws from earlier versions of various papers presented at conferences and seminars in Washington, D.C. (1997), Japan and Mexico (1998), and Singapore and Thailand (1999).     

The politics of Japan’s rice trade

This article analyzes both the domestic and international political factors that affect Japan’s rice trade policy. Based on the analysis, this article suggests that although Japan will open its rice market soon, the rice trade liberalization is likely to proceed very slowly and will be accompanied by a temporary surge of nontariff barriers. Domestically, a national coalition of producers, distributors, nationalists, politicians, bureaucrats, environmentalists, and consumers will delay and distort any rice trade liberalization program. Internationally, the pressure to further reduce rice trade barriers will decline due to the controversy over agricultural trade liberalization in the GATT negotiation, the lack of significant political pressure by politicians and interest groups within the United States, and Japan’s record of trade liberalization, especially in agricultural trade. He is the author ofInstitutions and Global Competitiveness (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994).     

Awkward Talisman: War Memory,Reconciliation and Yasukuni

Yasukuni Shrine resonates with talismanic symbolism for both its critics and proponents and that is precisely why it is so controversial within Japan and between Japan and its neighbors. Controversy over Yasukuni is rooted in the broader historical debate about war memory, responsibility, and reconciliation. Competing narratives about this past send mixed signals to neighbors and prevent reconciliation. Despite Prime Minister Koizumi’s six visits, Yasukuni is an awkward talisman and many Japanese, including conservatives, oppose these visits. The Shrine’s image has been cast and no amount of artful repackaging will obscure its indelible links with Japan’s discredited Imperial ideology and the costs it exacted. The Yasukuni dilemma involves shifting the focal point of official war remembrance away from the Shrine to a secular war memorial where people and officials can pay respect to the war dead free from political agendas and historical baggage.

“A disagreement between allies”: The United Kingdom,the United States,and the Soviet-Japanese territorial dispute, 1945–1956

Russian-Japanese relations are frozen in time by their territorial dispute over the Kuril Islands. In untangling the dispute, scholars have studied the history of Russo-Japanese relations, the USSR’s annexation of the islands in 1945, and the role of the United States as the USSR’s erstwhile wartime ally and Japan’s postwar partner. The United Kingdom, a key player in 1945, has been neglected in these studies. This article analyzes the evolution of the British position on the Soviet-Japanese territorial dispute from 1945 to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1956. The article reveals the marked divergence in this position from that of the United States, proceeding from a disagreement over the interpretation of the 1945 Yalta Agreement. In addition, the article highlights the manipulation of the territorial dispute by the United States to further its own political and security objectives and the British reaction to these maneuvers. Her recent publications includeBack in the USSR: Russia’s Intervention in the Internal Affairs of the Former Soviet Republics and the Implications for United States Policy Toward Russia (with Pamela Jewett) (John F. Kennedy School of Government, 1994).     

Yeltsin’s visit and the outlook for Japanese-Russian relations

The article clarifies a major misunderstanding prevalent among Americans, who tend to regard Japan’s request for the return of the Northern Territories as a narrow-minded, national-egoistic demand. Instead, the issue has become a global one. The author evaluates Yeltsin’s December 1992 visit to Tokyo, which has set a basic framework for further negotiation over the territorial disputes. Predicting optimistically the possible resolution of the dispute in the future, the author proposes concretely what may be done by the Japanese and the Russians. serves as first vice president of the International Council for Central and East European Studies (ICSEES). Dr. Kimura’s publications includeBeyond Cold War to Trilateral Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region: Scenarios for New Relationships Between Japan, Russia, and the United States (Cambridge, MA, 1992).     

Japan’s Quest for “Soft Power”: Attraction and Limitation

Japan is seeking to project its “soft power” through the allure of manga and anime in its public diplomacy. The production, diffusion and global consumption of manga and anime are driven by market forces and consumer tastes and not by the Japanese state. However, the latter is seeking to harness this popular culture to burnish Tokyo’s international image. Despite the attractiveness of Japanese pop culture and other more traditional forms of public diplomacy, Tokyo’s pursuit of “soft power” and a good international image is undermined by its failure to overcome its burden of history.

Japan’s new role in peace-building missions

Japan’s policy towards peace operations has been in a state of evolution. One of the issues on its peace operations policy was that the Japanese Government tended too much attention to possible tasks involving the Self Defense Forces (SDF). However, the Japanese society should consider the possibility of its participation in peace operations in the wider framework, such as multifunctional peace-building missions. In fact, the concept of peace-building is compatible with UN Millennium Declaration in 2000, and the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs also recommends that peace-building should be included as one of the priority issues in Japan's new policy on Official Development Assistance (ODA). Meanwhile, Japan will be required to participate in peace-building with the framework of multinational forces as well as the United Nations in the current post-9/11 era, such as its current mission in Iraq.     

构建“东北亚人类安全共同体”中的人类安全议题和国际机制探索

韩国朴槿惠总统自从2009年以来提倡"东北亚和平合作构想",并向美中等国家寻求支持。"东北亚和平合作构想"就是以韩国和朝鲜为主,包括美国、中国、日本、俄罗斯和蒙古等亚太国家和非国家行动主体,培养非传统安全或是软性安全热点问题合作。但该构想存在许多问题,如美国是否作为参与国加入,议题是否包含传统安全和制度化水平问题。如果美国加入,那么,东北亚区域固有的人类安全议题的选择混乱或将引起东北亚的认同性危机;议题的最终目标如果是传统安全,那么非传统安全或软性安全的重要性将被削弱;在制度化水平方面,习惯和惯例的制约性和实效性将成为问题。本文提出了作为东北亚区域内国家间的和平合作体,形成针对人类安全议题的"东北亚人类安全共同体"的方案,研究人类安全理论和国际机制并验证了其合理性。由此,确认了仅限于东北亚国家之间的人类安全范围内形成共同体的合理性。     

Preparing for the best: involving North Korea in the new pacific community

The United States, Japan, and South Korea should be considering ways and means to involve North Korea in regional cooperation. In the economic sector, the United States and South Korea might support the Northeast Asia Economic Forum and the Tumen River Area Development Project. The United States might also encourage Japan or South Korea to lead discussions on the possibilities of an Association of Northeast Asian Provinces, a Northeast Asian Development Bank, a regional labor market, and forums on regional transportation and communication, shipping and navigation, and air traffic management. All should support North Korea’s joining the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. The need to monitor or retrieve the dumped Russian nuclear submarine reactors in North Korean waters is a serendipitous opportunity for broaching multilateral environmental cooperation.     

Government and business in Thailand

Institutions linking state and society affect both political and economic processes. Particularly critical are those institutions tying business and government. The effectivess of these institutions helps to determine the relative success national economies achieve in exploiting the challenges posed by the international economy. The particular form of the institutions is a critical factor influencing the development of a country’s political system. This article addresses in general terms the differences between business-government ties in Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand) and Northeast Asia (South Korea, Taiwan) as well as the differences among the former group. The article then offers a more detailed analysis of the patterns of cooperation and conflict between business and government in Tailand. His publications includeJapan’s Emerging Global Role (author and editor) (Lynne Rienner, 1993).     

冷战初期日本南海政策及东南亚战略取向

冷战使日本在美国的全球战略中作用提升,成为反共"防波堤",其具有政治目的性的东南亚"经济外交"呈现出明显的海洋战略取向,且影响至今。因地缘利益、东南亚战略,日本南海政策的基本出发点自冷战开始后始终没变,即追随美国遏制中国政策,对南海诸岛归属问题上采取模糊态度和立场,这为后来南海周边某些国家侵占南海岛礁留下所谓借口。此时日本还曾插足于南海诸岛,由于海峡两岸对南海权益的维护使其非法行为无法为继,但随着经济的发展,日本越来越依赖南海航道和加大南海石油资源的开发,这决定其"关心"南海问题就是势所必然了。     

Japan eyes China

A research trip to Tokyo found contrasts between Japanese policies of engaging China economically and the U.S. emphasis on human rights. It also found distinct differences between Washington and Tokyo in assessing the present and future security threat of China in Asia. While the United States is apprehensive about increasing military power, Japan is more concerned with China’s political and economic stability.     

Asian Security without the United States? Examining China’s Security Strategy in Maritime and Continental Asia

Chinese President Xi Jinping has touted an Asian security architecture in which “it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia.” But does China really want to exclude the United States from the regional order? This article argues that previous answers are often insufficient because they do not account for sub-regional variation in China’s strategy. In maritime Asia, China seeks a significantly reduced role for the US and its alliances though major constraints limit the prospects for success. In continental Asia, however, the situation is more nuanced, with Beijing alternately ignoring, supporting, or hedging against US presence. The policy implication is that Washington should not overstate Beijing’s role as either a regional adversary or a regional partner. Rather, the United States needs to approach China on its own terms across sub-regions.     

Japan’s Bilateral FTAs: No Obstacle to Progress in the Doha Round

This paper examines Japan’s FTAs with Mexico and the Philippines in the context of parallel negotiations in the Doha Round. Although the limited results produced by these FTAs represent an inferior outcome to what might be achieved with multilateral trade liberalization, there is no evidence that these agreements have weakened the political will of Japanese export interests to push ahead with trade liberalization in the WTO or increased the leverage of protectionist interests in opposing that goal. The greatest hope for increased Japanese flexibility in WTO agricultural talks lies in accelerated reform of domestic farm policy rather than reduced emphasis on pursuit of FTAs.

The legacy of the Korean War: Impact on U.S.-Taiwan relations

If there had not been a Korean War, the Chinese Communists would probably have invaded Taiwan in 1950. After the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States began to reverse its hands-off policy toward the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan. The Korean War first compelled the United States to grant military aid to Taiwan and then put the island under U.S. protection. The war forestalled the deterioration of the ROC’s international status, but the legal status of Taiwan became undetermined in the eyes of U.S. policymakers. U.S. economic aid prevented Taiwan from sliding into an economic depression in the 1950s, and greatly contributed to the island’s later economic takeoff. He is the author ofThe Taiwan Security Triangle (Taipei: Laureate Publishing Company, 1989).     

朴槿惠政府东北亚和平合作构想的具体化和改进方向

2013年2月上台的朴槿惠政府提出了一项新的外交政策,即"东北亚和平合作构想",并在国内外进行广泛宣传和研究。"东北亚和平合作构想"为了解决包括区域外国家美国在内的,东北亚区域内各国间的"亚洲悖论",以非传统安全领域的"软安全"问题为中心,开展多边对话机制,并致力于最终形成一个东北亚安全共同体。但该构想尚处于理论起步阶段,对合作(安全)议题、区域范围(参与对象国)、行为主体、国际机制(制度化)、推进战略等问题没有具体界定,距离政策化也还有一段距离。其间朴槿惠总统(政府)向美国和中国介绍了"东北亚和平合作构想",但仅得到美国的消极理解和中国原则上的支持,并没有得到对该构想的实质和具体内容的理解和支持。"东北亚和平合作构想"应要进一步具体化、理论化,以此来得到东北亚各国一致认同且可实践的国际合作体制。     

North Korea’s nuclear issue

Given the unpredictability of North Korea’s leadership, and its capability to develop nuclear weapons, the North Korean nuclear issue has become one of the most important concerns in the region in the last few years, particularly for the United States, Japan, and, of course, South Korea. Up until January 30, 1992, when North Korea finally concluded the fullscope safeguards agreement, the focus of concern was the very fact that North Korea repeatedly had refused to conclude the obligatory agreement for more than six years since December 12, 1985, when it signed the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).     

China’s Surging Energy Demand: Trigger for Conflict or Cooperation with Japan?

This article revisits a conventional interpretation of Sino-Japanese energy relations from geopolitical and zero-sum viewpoints. Contemporary Sino-Japanese disputes over the East China Sea and their scramble over a crude-oil pipeline from Russia have drawn global attention to the intensification of the rivalry between the two giant energy consumers. Beijing and Tokyo, however, have gradually found common interests resulting from business opportunities, environmental countermeasures, etc. Russia’s failure in driving a wedge between China and Japan, and the United States’ proactive engagement in Asia-Pacific energy issues, appear to provide new opportunities in which the East Asian powers’ energy rivalry can be reduced.

Illusions of Relevance? An Australian Encounter with Malay History and Southeast Asian Security

A. C. Milner’s visiting inaugural at N.U.S. invites exploration of its author’s intellectual development, for he boldly claims a role for an Australian historian of Southeast Asia as a promoter of liberal governance for Southeast Asian societies, in face of militant Islamism. His earlier “postmodernist” commitment to “getting inside the Malay experience” constitutes some sort of precursor, but relativist scepticism fits as uncomfortably as does, in its own way, advocacy of Australian tolerance of Asian authoritarianism. In attacking Leifer’s Realism, the lecture seems ill-informed, while the post-war Oakeshott is scarcely relevant to the diverse societies of Southeast Asia.