Gorton and the Re‐Making of Political Tradition in Foreign Investment Policy

This article examines the Gorton government's tentative, but significant role in reshaping Australia's approach to overseas investment, focusing on the role of the Prime Minister himself. Prime Minister Gorton and his Cabinet ultimately accepted the need to pursue a more overt form of economic nationalism for political gain. This provided a basis for subsequent governments to offer more direct, national government intervention in foreign investment decision‐making to the Australian polity. Historical accounts and more recent assessments are drawn on to make this case and point to the legacy of Gorton and his government in the political management of foreign investment in Australia. The approach to foreign investment that emerged during Gorton's government demonstrated to subsequent governments the worth of developing a calibrated response that appeared to address populist concerns while still enabling substantive and increasing investment inflows.     

Way Behind in Following the USA over China: The Lack of any Liberal Tradition in Australian Foreign Policy, 1970–72

The Liberal Party's failure to grant diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China in the early 1970s soon became a source of embarrassment, after President Richard Nixon announced US recognition in 1972. In pursuing the question of why the Gorton and McMahon governments were so wrong-footed, factors such as the role of the Democratic Labor Party (DLP) in domestic politics and the hierarchical bureaucracy in the Department of External Affairs are important. But one theme looms largest, and it is a theme dear to the hearts of Liberal foreign policy-makers, namely the dominant role of the American alliance. Nixon's administration excluded the Australian Government from its shifting thinking about China just as the Australians confirmed their dependence on a US lead before doing anything.     

Where Greens Support Conservatives: Lessons from the Rundle Minority Government in Tasmania 1996–98

This paper examines the Greens’ support of the conservative Liberal Rundle minority government in Tasmania (1996–98) in the context of Tasmania's political greening, and with an interest in the operation and experience of this government, and its policy impact in a number of key areas. Although Green support of a conservative government is a unique experience thus far in Australia's history, it is not unknown for Greens to support or even to serve in conservative governments elsewhere at the subnational and the national level. The paper begins by examining these circumstances, before turning to account for Tasmania's political greening, the Liberal‐Green minority government experience, its breakdown, policy impacts, and lessons relevant to the broader literature. It addresses the lack of attention to minority government and support parties in political scholarship, 1 and the experience of green parties participating in government at the subnational level.     

From “Endemically Pro‐Israel” to Unsympathetic: Australia's Middle East Policy, 1967–1972

The hardening of Australian Middle East policy toward Israel in the early 1970s is often attributed to the election of Gough Whitlam as Prime Minister. Whitlam's December 1972 victory may well have opened a new, problematic chapter. But the evidence suggests that a deterioration in Australia‐Israel relations occurred gradually in the aftermath of the 1967 Six Day War. This deterioration reflected changes in Australia's political leadership and change at the top of the Department of External Affairs (renamed Foreign Affairs in 1970). Individual decision‐makers such as Whitlam did play a significant role in determining Australian Middle East policy. As Prime Minister, Sir John Gorton was willing to put aside advice from External Affairs not to antagonise and risk disrupting trade relations with Arab states, and to offer heartfelt support for Israel. His successor Sir William McMahon vacillated under opposing influences of a department determined to secure Australia's trade interests on the one hand, and Australian Jewish leaders and Israel's envoys in Australia on the other. With the support of the Australian Jewish community, Israel sought to influence Australian political leaders — especially within the ALP — from turning away from Israel.     

“Rediscovery”, “Reinvigoration” and “Redefinition” in Perpetuity: Australian Engagement with India 1983–2011

For the past twenty‐five years Australia's bilateral relationship with India has been typified by an ongoing process of “rediscovery”, irrespective of whether Labor or Liberal administrations have steered foreign policy. This article explores the reasons why this might be the case by analysing Australia's foreign policy approaches to India spanning the period 1983 to 2011. It interrogates various Labor and Liberal strategies that have been mobilised to “reinvigorate” the relationship and searches for reasons why they have only been partially successful in strengthening Australia's rapport with India. The authors draw upon discussions with strategic affairs editors of India's major daily newspapers and current affairs journals to gain insights into Indian impressions of Australia from a political and foreign policy perspective.     

From Ambivalence to Influence: Australia and the Negotiation of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

In early 1967 it appeared that the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva would successfully negotiate a multilateral treaty to curb global proliferation of nuclear weapons. This triggered an urgent review by the Australian Government of its policies on the civil and military applications of nuclear technology. The need to build a coherent response to a US expectation that its Pacific ally would sign the prospective Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty imposed discipline upon a hitherto ad hoc approach to nuclear policy development. Those in the new Gorton Government and the nuclear science bureaucracy who advocated the embrace of nuclear technology—in both its civil and military applications—fought, and ultimately lost, a battle against proponents of the NPT. The resolution of the struggle for supremacy within elements of the policy community impelled the Government to demand and receive concessions from the USA. Originally silent on how the NPT might be interpreted and operationalised in order to maximise support, the US now shared its views with the members of the Western Alliance. US willingness to compromise with Australia in this way exceeded what its Pacific ally had cause to expect and illustrates that middle powers can wield influence on a global scale when circumstances permit.     

Anti-immigrant mobilization in Russia's regions: local movements and framing processes

This article argues that increased anti-immigrant mobilization (the targeting of ethnic migrants to limit their rights and/or promote their resettlement) in Russia's regions is a consequence of local social movements adopting an anti-immigrant frame as part of their efforts to promote recruitment, acquire resources, and advance their movement's particular cause. Using the cases of Sverdlovsk's Gorod Bez Narkotikov (City Without Drugs) and Krasnodar's Cossack groups, it develops the argument and demonstrates specific ways in which an anti-immigrant frame is taken up by local movements. As a complement to existing studies of anti-immigrant sentiment or far right ideology, these cases highlight the practical politics of mobilizing support for anti-immigration causes in contemporary Russia.     

The Evolution of Malcolm Fraser's China Policy

This article explores the evolution of Malcolm Fraser's views on China. While Gough Whitlam is fondly remembered as a trailblazer for normalizing Australia‐China relations, Fraser was a pioneer in rendering a sense of bipartisanship in Australia's China policy. Fraser was not initially a Sino‐enthusiast, however. He came from a background of staunch anti‐Communism and throughout the 1950s and 1960s believed that China posed a major threat to stability in the Asia‐Pacific. The Liberal Party fiercely opposed the Whitlam government's decision to normalise diplomatic relations with China in 1972. Following the Whitlam dismissal in 1975, Fraser became Prime Minister and, in what seemed to be an abrupt departure from the Liberal Party's position, thoroughly embraced relations with China. As Leader of the Opposition, Whitlam called out the hypocrisy of the Liberal Party's radical policy shift. This study examines the domestic and international dynamics that shaped Fraser's views on China and ultimate adoption of a successful China policy. This is the untold story of a crucial turning point in Australia‐China relations under the leadership of a conservative government, in which a strong relationship with China became a cornerstone of bipartisan Australian foreign policy.     

Conceiving of Telecom: The Politics of Australian Telecommunications Reform 1967–1972

This article explores the politics of telecommunications reform between 1967 and 1972, during which time Labor developed a new policy approach that included committing to reconstitute the Postmaster‐General's Department as a relatively independent statutory authority. This represented the first serious attempt to reconcile the conflicting objectives of Australian policy: to provide affordable universal services by a government department expected to operate as a “business‐like” enterprise, and ended the political consensus about how national telecommunications should be delivered. The paper contrasts Labor's policy with the Liberal‐Country government's more incremental approach; and highlights a significant public policy shift that has received insufficient attention.     

Anti‐Conservatism: Paul Hasluck and Liberal Development in Papua New Guinea

In the continuing debates about the relative importance of conservatism and liberalism in the history of the Australian Liberal Party, one important dimension remains absent. Liberal developmentalism as an important anti‐conservative strand of thought was critical to the party's formative years after the Second World War as a party of government. The importance of this facet of liberalism is illustrated here by reference to the role of long‐serving Minister for Territories Paul Hasluck in overseeing development in Papua and New Guinea (PNG). Hasluck and the Australian Administration formulated policy intended to secure the indigenous population on rural smallholdings at higher standards of living before industrialisation's anticipated effects of proletarianisation could take effect.     

Nuclear diplomacy as niche diplomacy: South Africa's post-apartheid relations with the International Atomic Energy Agency

Since the termination of its nuclear weapons programme, commenced in 1989 and verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) in 1993, successive South African governments have consistently advocated the country's commitment to nuclear non-proliferation. South Africa has secured a niche role through norm construction and state identity for itself through its nuclear diplomacy with the IAEA. The article explores aspects of South Africa's nuclear diplomacy with the IAEA as an example of niche diplomacy. Therefore, it traces South Africa's diplomatic relations with the IAEA, starting with the IAEA's verification process and the implementation of a Safeguards Agreement (1989–1994) through the conversion of South Africa's research nuclear reactor (1991–2005); South Africa's position on greater representation for developing countries on the IAEA's Board of Governors; its ambition to be elected to the position of IAEA Director General (2008–2009); and its refusal to support the establishment of a nuclear fuel bank in Russia under the IAEA's auspices (2009–2010).     

Political Parties,Australia and the U.S. Alliance: 1976-2016

ABSTRACT

What causes variation in the foreign policies of U.S. allies regarding their desired U.S. military role in their region and their troop commitments to U.S. military interventions? This paper addresses this question through documenting and explaining the sources of variation in Australia’s foreign policies regarding these issues over four decades. Treating the two major political parties in Australia and their respective leaders who self-select into them as endogenous, the paper argues that Australian foreign policy, whilst always supportive of the U.S. alliance, has systematically varied. This variation has correlated with the political party in power while the late Cold War and post-Cold War balances of power remained constant. While the Labor party has only been willing to send combat troops to large U.S. military interventions when the latter have a supporting United Nations Security Council Resolution, the conservative Liberal party has been willing to military intervene without this multilateral support. The Labor party, unlike the Liberal party, has also frequently proposed the formation and consolidation of multilateral regional institutions. These preferences render the U.S. to have been necessary for the Labor Party but sufficient for the Liberal party. Future Sino-U.S. armed conflict would provide a harder test of these hypotheses.     

“In the National Interest”: Australia's Approach to Nuclear Proliferation in a Changing International Environment

In the context of the ongoing international debate concerning the efficacy or otherwise of the NPT and IAEA in preventing or managing nuclear proliferation, Australia's undertaking to enter a nuclear cooperation agreement with the People's Republic of China (PRC), once identified as a “strategic competitor” of Australia's major alliance partner the United States (US), suggests that Australia's approach to proliferation issues is being re-evaluated. This paper argues, utilising an analysis of the relationship between the evolving US approach to nuclear issues and Australian policy, that the Howard government's evolving approach to nuclear issues can be characterised as an attempt to balance the competing imperatives of maintaining Australia's reputation as a nuclear non-proliferation standard bearer, regional strategic and economic considerations and the weight of the Australia-US alliance.     

Australian Support for an Independent Taiwan Prior to the Recognition of the People's Republic of China*

Australia's efforts between 1950 and 1972 to create an independent Taiwan are an important, largely overlooked element of Australia and Taiwan's international relations. Australia saw de jure independence for Taiwan as a means to support the US while pursuing the interrelated goals of accommodating the People's Republic of China (PRC) and minimising contradictions between US China policy and the policies of the UK and other countries important to it. Initially Australia favoured the establishment of a Taiwanese majority‐controlled state. This preference later gave way to greater support for an independent Republic of China on Taiwan under Chinese Nationalist rule. Australia nevertheless consistently justified its policy via reference to the principle of self‐determination for Taiwan's people — either immediately in the case of a Taiwanese Taiwan, or postponed into the indefinite future in the case of a Chinese Nationalist Taiwan. Championing Taiwan independence lost its utility for Australia when Sino‐ US relations improved in the late‐1960s to early‐1970s, and it became possible for Australia to make the concessions over Taiwan demanded by China without damaging its relationship with the US. This shift preceded the election of a Labor government committed to building a friendly relationship with China. Australia then dropped its policy of advocating Taiwanese independence, and established official relations with China in late 1972.     

The Challenges of Transitioning from Opposition to Government: Liberal Party Planning for Government 1983 – 1996

Studies examining opposition transition to government processes and planning usually emphasise the responsibility of oppositions as a legislative institution and the role of party leaders. However, such approaches place too much emphasis on notions of responsible opposition and party leaders. They de‐emphasise the importance of partisan considerations that shape transition planning or how party organisations have attempted to assert control over parliamentary parties. Drawing on archival materials, policy documents, and elite interviews, this study examines both public and internal transition to government strategies undertaken by the Liberal Party of Australia during their opposition years (1983–1996). The paper finds that while party leaders became more important over time, the party organisation's involvement remained significant. The Liberal Party transition planning focused primarily on cabinet processes, Australian Public Service (APS) organisation, particularly the senior bureaucratic level, and selecting political staff. In so doing, the Liberal Party anticipated many of the Hawke government's 1987 reforms to the APS. The Liberal Party was motivated by its desire to restructure the machinery and culture of government and to allocate sufficient political staff resources to government. Its aim was to better equip the party to achieve its political and ideological goals when next in government.     

The Ambiguity of Veto Power in Coalitions: German Liberals' Role as a Watchdog in Justice and Home Affairs and their Failure to Sell Stalemate as Success in the Federal Elections of 2013

The article demonstrates that the rigid use of veto capacity in coalitions causes risks for re-election. Justice was a high-salience domain of the German Liberal Democratic Party (FDP), which occupied this portfolio in its coalition with the Conservative majority in the federal legislative period from 2009 to 2013. By analysing several legislative projects the article shows that their contents or non-adoption were an effect of liberals' vetoes. This policy-seeking strategy provoked conflicts within the coalition and stalemate making it impossible to realise popular measures that would have enhanced the Liberals' reputation and the importance of the domain for the voters who were mainly interested in economic and social policy. Moreover, the Liberals' vetoes led to a loss of support from its major coalition partner in the pre-election campaign. Thus governmental parties have to trade off policy and vote-seeking goals in order to get re-elected.     

Iran's Nuclear Program and the Israeli-Iranian Rivalry in the Post Revolutionary Era

The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran led to a set of major shifts in the Middle East and an anti-Israeli stance became a central approach of the revolutionaries. Up to 1979, however, Tel Aviv had a close relationship with Tehran whose enmity with its Arab neighbours was anchored in a historical struggle for regional supremacy. Israel has remained an enemy of Islam and the Muslims for the revolutionary leaders and as Iran's power grew Israel's anxiety increased accordingly. A new division of power in the region and Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons led to a direct rivalry between Iran and Israel and consequently many Israelis have come to regard Iran and its nuclear program as an existential threat to Israel that has to be halted. This article explores the roots of enmity between these two countries, scrutinizes the threats of a nuclear armed Iran for Israel and attempts to determine what kind of measures might work to convince Iran to renounce its nuclear program. The article has four sections with the first section covering the history of the relations and the origins of hostility between Iran and Israel. The second section provides a brief overview of how the division of regional power led to direct rivalry between Tehran and Tel Aviv. The third section details Iran's nuclear program and examines its threats to Israel and the last section covers the current sanctions debate over what type of measures might work to compel Iran to renounce its nuclear weapons.     

Casey: Four Decades in the Making of Australian Foreign Policy

Richard Casey was involved in shaping Australian foreign policy for over four decades. Casey's attitudes, ideas, policies and actions towards the rest of the world are therefore an important part of a Liberal tradition in Australian foreign policy. To examine Casey's place in the Liberal tradition this article explores Casey's positions on the great international issues of two periods: the 1930s and the 1950s. The conclusion of the article is that three key ideas shaped Casey's foreign policy, and therefore also lie at the centre of the Liberal tradition; firstly, a strong attachment to the idea of the English speaking alliance; secondly, a realist perspective on international affairs; and, thirdly, a consistent strand of anti-communism.     

The 2007 Australian Federal Election: The Story of Labor's Return from the Electoral Wilderness

In an era of continuous campaigning, elections are seldom won in the final weeks of the formal campaign period. The 2007 Australian federal election saw voters dispatch a Liberal Party and Nationals Coalition government that had presided over a buoyant economy, and return the Australian Labor Party from the electoral wilderness it had occupied since 1996. The explanation of this revival in Labor's stocks can be traced to the Wheat Board scandal, the unpopularity of the labour market deregulation, and to a series of other political tribulations that the fourth Howard Government faced during 2005 and 2006. Initially their impact was masked by the failure of Labor's parliamentary leadership. But when caucus elected Kevin Rudd and freed him to position Labor as offering fresh ideas and a safe pair of hands, Labor seized a lead in the opinion polls and retained it throughout 2007. Rudd's tactical leadership of his party proved critical. This article describes how the 2007 campaign unfolded and the pattern of events which saw a refashioned ALP win an eighteen‐seat lower house majority.     

J.B. Chifley and the Indonesian Revolution, 1945–1949

This article traces the role of the Prime Minister, Joseph Benedict Chifley, in Australia's response to the Dutch‐Indonesian colonial conflict. It argues for Chifley's centrality to the formation of Australia's eventual policy to support Indonesian nationalist aspirations, a policy often in antithesis to the views of H.V. Evatt. This is significant because a focus on Evatt has distracted historians from ascertaining the causes of Australia's policy. Examining Chifley's attitude and role reveals that Australia's response to revolutionary Indonesia stemmed from an application to the Southeast Asian colonial question of a labourist and post‐war reconstructionist ethos, an idea of sweeping reform to rectify deep economic and social grievances.