Bureaucratic Decisions and the Composition of the Lower Courts

I delineate necessary conditions for the ideological composition of the federal courts to influence bureaucratic decisions independently of lawsuits and test for the relationship with data on the implementation of wetlands policy. Examining 18,331 decisions by the Army Corps of Engineers over whether to issue a permit for the development of wetlands between 1988 and 1996, I analyze whether these decisions were influenced by the composition of the appellate and district courts. The results indicate that judicial ideology significantly affects bureaucratic decision making. Specifically, a standard deviation increase in the liberalism of the lower courts decreases the probability that the Corps will grant a permit by 14%, which is comparable to the effects of long-recognized determinants of administrative behavior.     

The German Federal Constitutional Court and European Judicial Politics

With its decision on the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) has handed over another landmark ruling on European integration. The ruling made Germany's ratification of the Treaty conditional upon the passage of a new law giving the Bundestag greater oversight of European affairs. This and the consequences of stronger parliamentary oversight for the German government and the way it conducts negotiations at European level have been the focus of most early comments on the decision. No less important, however, are the ruling's potential repercussions on European judicial politics. Coming after a series of highly controversial judgments by the European Court of Justice, the FCC's Lisbon decision is clearly meant as a warning to Brussels and, above all, Luxembourg. The decision could undermine the Court of Justice's authority and encourage non-compliance on the part of national courts, thus bringing about a constitutional crisis at European level. Alternatively, the decision may compel the Court of Justice to reconsider some of the most controversial aspects of its activist jurisprudence and to exert more restraint in the foreseeable future.     

Policy Inventing and Borrowing among State Legislatures

Although a long literature has analyzed how policies diffuse or spread across the American states, scant attention has been given to how states invent or create original policy instead of borrowing existing policy from one another. In this article, I use state legislative policymaking with respect to renewable portfolio standards to examine when legislatures invent original policy instead of borrowing existing policy. I use a novel data set that includes the state adoption of hundreds of policy provisions, including their combinations, and I employ logistic pooled event history analysis to identify the determinants of inventing and borrowing. I find that government ideology largely predicts inventing, whereas electoral vulnerability predicts borrowing. The results suggest that ideologues spearhead invention and further suggest that democratic accountability works chiefly through promoting borrowing rather than blunting inventing.     

Policy innovation in local jurisdictions: Testing for neighborhood influence in school choice policies

Before making difficult decisions, individuals tend to collect information on decision makers in reference groups. With respect to policy innovations in a decentralized public sector, this may give rise to positive neighborhood influence on adoption decisions. In this paper, U.S. school district data are used to show that decision makers indeed are heavily affected by decision makers in reference groups. The policy innovation under consideration is inter-district public school choice. The results suggest that if a given district's neighbors' expected benefits from adopting school choice policies increase, this substantially increases the original district's probability of adoption. The paper thus supports the view that the diffusion of policy innovations is stimulated by horizontal interaction among local governments.     

“The Long and Winding Road”: A Comparative Policy Analysis of Multilevel Judicial Implementation of Work‒Life Balance in Spain

ABSTRACT

This article studies how processes of policy implementation and the impact of a multilevel European legal order shape social policies. By using an interdisciplinary approach to comparative policy analysis that investigates policy implementation through the critical study of judicial litigation, the article analyses the case of García Mateos on work?life balance in its different stages before Spanish and supranational courts. It shows that the implementation of work?life balance policy through litigation in Spain is a “long and winding road” paved with discursive and material opportunities and obstacles. While multiple pressures, actors, and framings at different governmental levels contributed to a favourable judicial decision on gender equality, norms about the gendered division of labour limited its transformative potential.     

The Context of Responsiveness: Resident Preferences,Water Scarcity,and Municipal Conservation Policy

The extent to which municipal policy is determined by the preferences of residents is a topic of growing importance. Recent work on the subject has challenged conventional wisdom and found that municipal policy is often, but not always, responsive to the ideology of residents. This paper takes up an important potential implication of these findings, exploring how resident ideology may interact with issue severity in the adoption of municipal policy. Hypotheses suggest that resident preferences will have the greatest effect in the presence of high issue severity and that issue severity will have the largest impact when residents have ideological preferences in line with policy solutions. I test hypotheses using municipal water rates, with models showing that the effects of resident ideology and water scarcity interact with each other to influence water conservation policy.     

Judicial Responses to Counter-Terrorism Law after September 11

The role of the courts is quite important, especially in the protection of individual rights and liberties. Many counter-terrorism policies implemented at the national level often infringe on these rights, and courts are the best line of defense against these violations of liberty. However, courts do not always rule in favor of liberty, sometimes ruling in favor of a strict government policy. This analysis seeks to explain the conditions that may lead courts to rule in favor of, or against, the government, arguing that political fragmentation is a potentially key factor in determining when particular case outcomes occur.     

Privatization and the Courts: How Judicial Structures Shaped German Privatization

This article examines how legal institutional structures shaped the process of East German privatization by the Treuhandanstalt. It argues that the courts, as an important venue for oversight and accountability, were central to achieving the rapid and narrowly defined privatization carried out by the agency. Moreover, the experience of privatization after 1989 suggests the courts played a far more important role in shaping economic policy than one would have expected from traditional scholarship on public agencies, the courts, or the German legal system.     

A theory of the conditional influence of the European Parliament in the cooperation procedure

I provide a public choice-based explanation of why the European Parliament is sometimes influential in the cooperation procedure. While a conservative Parliament can use its right of rejections to block a decision effectively whenever there is no consent in the Council, a Parliament in favor of change can successfully use its amendment right in the second reading whenever the constraints have been changed unexpectedly since the adoption of the common position such as to create an amendment win set. Then, the European Parliament can choose its most preferred policy in this set which is supported by the Commission, cannot be changed by the Council and is preferred against the status quo by a qualified majority in the Council.     

Outcome,Process and the Rule of Law

In this address, marking the 30th anniversary of the establishment of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Chief Justice Gleeson of the High Court speaks about several matters bearing upon decision‐making in administration and the role of administrative review. These include the impact of policy in individual decisions, and the relationship of merits review tribunals to courts. He notes that ‘one of the characteristic features of the context in which modern administrative law functions is a change in emphasis from the duties of public officials to the rights of citizens.     

Policymaking with Multiple Agencies

Authority over related policy issues is often dispersed among multiple government agencies. In this article, I study when Congress should delegate to multiple agencies, and how shared regulatory space complicates agency decision making. To do so, I develop a formal model of decentralized policymaking with two agencies that incorporates information acquisition and information sharing, delineating situations where legislators should and should not prefer multiple agencies. Greater divergence between the agencies' ideal points distorts information sharing and policy choices, but it may increase the amount of information acquisition. Congress achieves better policy outcomes by delegating authority to both agencies if the agencies have strong policy disagreements. If the agencies have similar policy preferences, however, then Congress may want to consolidate authority within one agency because this approach mitigates free-riding and takes advantage of returns to scale.     

How Solutions Chase Problems: Instrument Constituencies in the Policy Process

Public policies are composed of complex arrangements of policy goals and policy means matched through some decision‐making process. Exactly how this process works and which comes first—problem or solution—is an outstanding research question in the policy sciences. This article argues the emerging concept of an “instrument constituency”—a subsystem component dedicated to the articulation and promotion of particular kinds of solutions regardless of problem context—can help policy scholars answer this critical question and better understand policymaking. At present, however, there is only limited empirical evidence of the existence, accuracy, and relevance of the instrument constituency concept. This article clarifies and refines the concept through cross‐sectoral and cross‐national case studies, demonstrating its utility in aiding our understanding of policy processes and their dynamics, including the issue of how problems and solutions are proposed and matched in the course of policy adoption.     

Institutional reform and public attitudes toward EU decision making

In the face of the discourse about the democratic deficit and declining public support for the European Union (EU), institutionalist scholars have examined the roles of institutions in EU decision making and in particular the implications of the empowered European Parliament. Almost in isolation from this literature, prior research on public attitudes toward the EU has largely adopted utilitarian, identity and informational accounts that focus on individual-level attributes. By combining the insights from the institutional and behavioural literature, this article reports on a novel cross-national conjoint experiment designed to investigate multidimensionality of public attitudes by taking into account the specific roles of institutions and distinct stages in EU decision making. Analysing data from a large-scale experimental survey in 13 EU member states, the findings demonstrate how and to what extent the institutional design of EU decision making shapes public support. In particular, the study finds a general pattern of public consensus about preferred institutional reform regarding powers of proposal, adoption and voting among European citizens in different countries, but notable dissent about sanctioning powers. The results show that utilitarian and partisan considerations matter primarily for the sanctioning dimension in which many respondents in Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark and Sweden prefer national courts to the Court of Justice of the EU.     

对我国媒体与法院冲突的思考

媒体与法院的关系是“依法治国”所面临的一个重大理论与现实问题。从媒体追求信息实现其表达自由的本质来看,它并非具备裁判公平正义的功能,司法独立的意义不仅在于司法权不受其他政府机构的干预,而且也要独立于媒体所代表的舆论压力。协调与处理媒体与法院的关系,应以本土资源为基础,并有选择地适用域外经验,以实现媒体与法院的良性有序互动。     

Cheap talk or incredible commitment? (Mis)calculating transparency and anti‐corruption

Why do “tainted” politicians in high‐corruption countries adopt transparency and anti‐corruption policies that risk exposing their wrongdoing? Using the cases of freedom of information and public asset disclosure in Romania, we assess three explanations: that these policies are meant to be mere window dressing, facilitate bottom‐up monitoring, or ensure access to information for the ruling party if it loses power. We find that decision makers adopt transparency and anti‐corruption policies because they want to signal their integrity and because they underestimate their consequences. Because they assume they will be able to control implementation, decision makers discount the potential costs of damaging information being released. Sustained political competition can keep corruption and lack of transparency on the public and political agenda, shifting attention from policy adoption to implementation and leading to increased compliance. Since politicians miscalculate the consequences of their actions, signals that are intended to be cheap can end up being quite costly.     

The downstream consequences of long waits: How lines at the precinct depress future turnout

Researchers have increasingly paid attention to the impact that the administrative component of elections has on voter behavior. Existing research has focused almost exclusively on the effect that legal changes--such as voter identification laws--have on turnout. This paper extends our understanding of the electoral process by exploring how one aspect of the precinct experience--standing in line to vote--can shape the turnout behavior of voters in subsequent elections. I demonstrate that for every additional hour a voter waits in line to vote, their probability of voting in the subsequent election drops by 1 percentage point. To arrive at these estimates, I analyze vote history files using a combination of exact matching and placebo tests to test the identification assumptions. I then leverage an unusual institutional arrangement in the City of Boston and longitudinal data from Florida to show that the result also holds at the precinct level. The findings in this paper have important policy implications for administrative changes that may impact line length, such as voter identification requirements and precinct consolidation. They also suggest that racial asymmetries in precinct wait times contribute to the gap in turnout rates between white and non-white voters.     

The Diffusion of Human Trafficking Policies in the Post-Soviet Region: A Comparative Analysis of Policy Adoption in Ukraine,Latvia, and Russia

This paper analyzes how human trafficking policies diffused in the post-Soviet region. By adapting the diffusion of innovation framework to fit the international context, I examine whether human trafficking adoptions in the post-Soviet region were due to internal determinants and/or diffusion effects. A comparison of Russia, Latvia, and Ukraine found that internal determinants such as state commitment to human trafficking policy and interest group strength were more important to policy adoption than external pressures from the international community while state capacity and bureaucratic restructuring impeded policy adoption. I argue that policymaking, even in authoritarian regimes, is more nuanced than blind compliance with international treaties and shows that interest groups and policy entrepreneurs work within the constraints of national policymaking to adopt human trafficking policies.     

Macro Implementation: Testing the Causal Paths from U.S. Macro Policy to Federal Incarceration

Policy implementation is usually studied at the micro level by testing the short‐term effects of a specific policy on the behavior of government actors and policy outcomes. This study adopts an alternative approach by examining macro implementation—the cumulative effect of aggregate public policies over time. I employ a variety of methodological techniques to test the influence of macro criminal justice policy on new admissions to federal prison via three mediators: case filings by federal prosecutors, conviction rates in federal district courts, and plea bargaining behavior. I find that cumulative Supreme Court rulings influence the incarceration rate by altering conviction rates in district courts; however, I find only mixed evidence of congressional and presidential influence. The results suggest that U.S. macro policy influences bureaucratic outputs by altering the behavior of subordinate policy implementers; however, the Supreme Court may enjoy an advantage in shaping criminal justice policy.     

Ideological Competition and Conflict in the Judicial Hierarchy

Circuit splits, or conflicting rules across multiple U.S. Courts of Appeals, have important policy implications and dramatic effects on Supreme Court case selection, yet we know little about the incentives ideological lower courts face when deciding whether to initiate conflict. This article develops a formal model of a judicial hierarchy where lower court judges are subject to review by a high court with distaste for unresolved conflict, termed “split-intolerance,” and with uncertain preferences over policy. Lower courts may compete by investing costly effort in legal quality to make their rules more attractive. In equilibrium, lower courts may initiate conflict even when the odds of success before the high court are remote. Surprisingly, lower courts grow more likely to create conflict as the high court's split-intolerance increases; however, split-intolerance can also incentivize greater lower court effort. I present qualitative evidence illustrating the model's explanatory power.