Agency Fever? Analysis of an International Policy Fashion

In the last 15 years, the governments of many OECD countries have transferred a wide range of functions to new, agency-type organizations. Allowing for the fact that, for comparative purposes, it is difficult precisely to define agencies, and further acknowledging that in many countries agencies are far from being new, it nevertheless remains the case that there seems to have been a strong fashion for this particular organizational solution.This article investigates the apparent international convergence towards agencification. It seeks to identify the reasons for, and depth of, the trend. It asks to what extent practice has followed rhetoric. The emerging picture is a complex one. On the one hand, there seems to be a widespread belief, derived from a variety of theoretical traditions, that agencification can unleash performance improvements. On the other hand, systematic evidence for some of the hypothetical benefits is very patchy. Furthermore, the diversity of actual practice in different countries has been so great that there must sometimes be considerable doubt as to whether the basic requirements for successful performance management are being met.     

Is the Department of Homeland Security an Intelligence Agency?

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) applies a variation of the intelligence cycle – the process of planning, collecting, processing, analysis, and dissemination of information characteristic of intelligence agencies – to mitigate the risk of terrorist attack and respond to national security breaches. The intelligence cycle helps DHS encourage voluntary security measures, serve its customers, and avoid economic disruption, but the Department's program setbacks and failures illustrate the difficulty of applying the intelligence model to the needs of homeland security. The Department's particular means of producing intelligence and information challenge the conventional conception and definitions of the intelligence cycle.     

What Makes an Aboriginal Council Successful? Case Studies of Aboriginal Community Government Performance in Far North Queensland

Indigenous community governments are at the frontline of current efforts to ‘close the gap’ between Indigenous and non‐Indigenous living standards. Yet there is little empirical evidence about successful performance by these organisations and considerable scepticism about whether introduced Western governance models can ever be viable in Indigenous communities. To identify the governance attributes that contribute to successful performance, case studies were conducted at three Aboriginal councils in far north Queensland. The untested assumptions in current notions of ‘good governance’ were examined. Currently accepted good governance principles and practices were investigated to ascertain their actual causal relationship with council performance. The research further identified key contextual, historical and cultural factors that are important in shaping successful or unsuccessful governance. Practical strategies are suggested for policy‐makers and Indigenous leaders to build the performance of Indigenous community governments.     

Network Structure and Governance Performance: What Makes a Difference?

Comparing and evaluating the performance of governance networks are important tasks for researchers and practitioners of network governance and public administration. Limited by the lack of network data across space and time, the study of network performance and effectiveness at the network level is not on pace with advances in theories and methodologies in network analysis. With a novel methodology to measure clean energy governance networks using hyperlink network analysis across the contiguous United States, this article collects a large sample of self‐organizing policy networks in the same policy domain across geographic locations. This article proposes that governance networks with high overall bridging and bonding social capital perform better. Regression analyses show that network structures have statistically significant effects on governance outcomes. States with high average closeness and average clustering in their governance networks are more likely to have faster clean energy development.     

Does Agency Autonomy Foster Public Participation?

Allocation of public resources is an area in which considerations of both economic efficiency and democratic legitimacy are likely to be present. Public administrators are often blamed for being too devoted to the norms of bureaucratic ethos, such as efficiency, effectiveness, and top‐down control, and less so to the norms of democratic ethos, such as inclusiveness and bottom‐up decision making. This article examines whether managers in agencies with greater budget autonomy are more likely to include the public when allocating resources. Because participation offers an opportunity for agencies to enhance the legitimacy of their decisions, it is expected that the value of citizen input will increase with the degree of agency autonomy. Using data on the practices of citizen participation in budgeting in two state departments—transportation and environment—this study finds that agencies with a higher degree of autonomy tend to be more open to public comment than agencies with more centralized budget processes.     

Agency Termination in the UK: What Explains the ‘Bonfire of the Quangos’?

In October 2010, the UK’s Coalition Government announced a radical reduction in the number of public bodies in the UK. This research tests the impact of three factors identified in the termination literature as affecting agency survival: political turnover, age and agency type. The research found that advisory Non-Departmental Public Bodies were five times more likely to have been identified for abolition or merger than other agency types. The research also found that agency age was a factor, but that political turnover was not significant.     

What Makes a State Advocacy Structure Effective? — Conflicts Between Bureaucratic and Social Movement Criteria

State "advocacy structures"—agencies nominally designated to advance the status of collective social movements in public policy and society—must operate under conflicting criteria for "effectiveness." While government actors likely measure effectiveness as the ability to manage a policyissue—advancing policy influence by prioritizing and packaging demands —collective movements additionally or primarily emphasize structures' performance as representatives of the priorities and diversity of movements. This consequently leads to differing evaluations of agency "effectiveness." A case study of the Ontario Women's Directorate (OWD) analyzes the inherent conflicts and tensions between these two roles, particularly under repeated changes in government. The experiences of the OWD and other advocacy structures suggest that conflicting criteria are inherent and unavoidable in such institutions.     

Taxing Higher Incomes: What Makes the High-Income Earners Consent to More Progressive Taxation in Latin America?

When do high-income earners get ‘on board’ with the fiscal contract and accept paying a larger share of the tax burden? Progressive taxes perform particularly poorly in developing countries. We argue that the common opposition of the affluent to more progressive taxation is not merely connected to administrative limitations to coercively enforce compliance, but also to the uncertainty that high-income earners associate with the returns to taxes. Because coercion is not an option, there is a need to convince high-income earners to ‘invest’ in the public system via taxes. Trust in institutions is decisive for the fiscal contract. Expecting that paid contributions will be used in a sensible manner, high-income earners will be more supportive of progressive income taxation. We study tax composition preferences of a cross-section of Latin American countries using public opinion data from LAPOP for 2012. Findings reveal that higher levels of trust in political institutions strongly mitigate the opposition of the affluent towards more progressive taxation.     

What is an algorithm? Financial regulation in the era of high-frequency trading

Abstract

In response to the flash crashes and market manipulations blamed on high-frequency trading (HFT), algorithms have been brought inside the regulatory perimeter. This paper focuses on the most ambitious regulation directed at the practice: the algorithm-tagging rule in the German High-Frequency Trading Act. Fifteen interviews with stakeholders in the Act’s implementation serve to reconstruct how regulators defined an algorithm and help pose the question of to what extent regulatory definitions and data need accurately to represent financial practices to be useful. Although tentative in its findings, the research suggests that the algorithm-tagging rule may be providing valuable signals in the noise to trade surveillance officers and having virtuous effects on the cultures of trading firms. The conclusion argues that sociologists of finance should adopt a more balanced approach when evaluating regulatory technologies and heed MacKenzie’s 2005 call to open up their black boxes.     

What determines preferences for an electoral system? Evidence from a binding referendum

Public Choice - Much has been written about politicians’ preferences for electoral systems, yet little is known about the preferences of voters. In 1993, New Zealand had a binding electoral...     

What Is Political Science? What Should It Be?

This paper examines the five myths that govern political science: that it studies politics; that it is scientific; that one can study politics cut off from the other social sciences and history; that the state is neutral; and that the bulk of the work in the discipline furthers the cause of democracy. Within political science, there have been three main approaches to criticizing these myths: a moderate one that treats the elements in these myths as more or less disconnected; a radical one that sees a systemic connection between these elements; and a Marxist one that names this system "Capitalism" and privileges the role of the capitalist state in explaining both politics and political science.     

What causes terrorism?

We provide an overview of empirical evidence on the determinants of terrorism, in particular focusing on the origins and targets of transnational terrorism. We also assemble several broad theoretical families that relate terrorism to, e.g., economic, political and institutional and demographic factors. We provide a critical discussion of the existing empirical evidence and refer to a number of areas of future research before describing some modest policy implications.     

What Is Governance?

This commentary points to the poor state of empirical measures of the quality of states, that is, executive branches and their bureaucracies. Much of the problem is conceptual, as there is very little agreement on what constitutes high‐quality government. The commentary suggests four approaches: (1) procedural measures, such as the Weberian criteria of bureaucratic modernity; (2) capacity measures, which include both resources and degree of professionalization; (3) output measures; and (4) measures of bureaucratic autonomy. It rejects output measures and suggests a two‐dimensional framework of using capacity and autonomy as a measure of executive branch quality. This framework explains the conundrum of why low‐income countries are advised to reduce bureaucratic autonomy while high‐income ones seek to increase it.     

Correction to: Taxing Higher Incomes: What Makes the High-Income Earners Consent to More Progressive Taxation in Latin America?

Political Behavior - The article Taxing Higher Incomes: What Makes the High-Income Earners Consent to More Progressive Taxation in Latin America?, written by Sarah Berens and Armin von Schiller,...     

What Explains Agency Heads’ Length of Tenure? Testing Managerial Background,Performance, and Political Environment Effects

There are a number of influences on how long an agency head serves. The importance of particular influences, in turn, depends on the prospective destination of the agency head: elsewhere in the public sector, the private sector, or retirement. The authors estimate survival models of agency heads’ tenure using panel data on British central government executive agencies from 1989 to 2012. Findings suggest that chief executives of poorly performing agencies are encouraged to retire sooner. There is no evidence that a change in political control increases the risk of any form of exit, suggesting that political pressure to leave is not substantial for this type of official. Outsiders—agency heads recruited from outside central government—are relatively difficult to retain for a longer time, such that potential shortfalls in suitable managers caused by retirements in an aging workforce may be difficult to make up by appointing from this source.