Legislative Committees as Uncertainty Reduction Devices in Multiparty Parliamentary Democracies

Most research on committees in multiparty legislatures in parliamentary democracies focuses on their role in solving intra-cabinet delegation problems. Using a straightforward spatial model, this article discusses how committees can also solve uncertainty problems that arise in settings characterised by unstable coalitions, weak governmental agenda control and a lack of government change. In order to explore empirically how committees solve these problems, the article focuses on the success (and later decline) over the last 30 years of the sede legislativa, a law-making procedure that formalises ‘universalism’ in Italian legislative committees. The statistical results largely confirm the theoretical expectations.     

The Bipolar Voter: On the Effects of Actual and Perceived Party Polarization on Voter Turnout in European Multiparty Democracies

Despite the growing literature on polarization, students of comparative politics have not yet been able to reach much assured understanding of how party polarization influences voter turnout in multiparty settings, which often put on offer both centrist, and divergent mainstream and niche party policies. I evaluate how politically sophisticated and unsophisticated citizens with different ideological preferences respond to high and increasing party polarization by employing individual- and party system-level data from 17 European multiparty democracies. I hypothesize that high levels of actual and perceived party polarization increase voter turnout, and policy seeking, sophisticated citizens are more likely to turn out when polarization in party policy offerings in the short run increases their utility from voting. The empirical analyses show that high party polarization increases both politically sophisticated and unsophisticated citizens’ propensities to turn out. However, such positive effect for the most part comes from the between- and within-party systems differences in actual party polarization, rather than how individual citizens perceive that. The implications of these findings with respect to strategic position taking incentives of political parties and the effects of the knowledge gap between sophisticated and unsophisticated citizens on political participation and democratic representation are discussed in the concluding section.     

民愤的反思:刑事司法的阿基里斯之踵

民愤在刑事司法中扮演着重要角色。有时它能够对司法起到一定的外部监督作用,但是从根本上看,民愤违背了司法独立、司法理性、司法公正、司法权威等原则,可以说民愤是刑事司法的一个致命弱点。正确认识民愤有助于摆正舆论监督与刑事司法的关系,进而促进刑事司法公正。     

Space Matters: Designing Better Electoral Systems for Emerging Democracies

Although the holding of founding and subsequent elections is essential for any transition from authoritarian to democratic rule, the comparative literature on electoral system design is limited on the experience of "Third Wave" democratizers. This is especially true with respect to the interactive effects between the choice of electoral system and the spatial, i.e., geographic, distribution of the vote—a critical factor that shapes electoral outcomes in all societies, but particularly in emerging democracies because many are plural and agrarian societies. Political elites in these countries have also rarely considered the impact of alternative electoral systems when selecting a system for their country. This article addresses these gaps in the literature and practice by presenting a computational model known as a spatial decision support system or SDSS that both explores these interactive effects and facilitates electoral design. The utility of the model is then demonstrated with data from Kenya and South Africa—two emerging democracies where issues posed by the spatial distribution of the vote have given rise to demands for redesigning or modifying the electoral system.     

Center Parties, Party Competition, and the Implosion of Party Systems: A Study of Centripetal Tendencies in Multiparty Systems

Centripetal party competition is traditionally associated with the need to capture the median voter in a two-party system, whereas the existence of center parties is associated with centrifugal party competition. This article argues that the existence of a 'pivotal center party' leads to centripetal party competition in multiparty systems. A pivotal center party is so strong in electoral terms that forming a majority either to the left or to the right of it is unrealistic. Therefore, office-seeking political parties are forced on to a centrist course. This dynamic can be so forceful that the major parties to the left and to the right of the center party decide to govern in a broad coalition, and we may speak of an 'implosion' of the party system. The theoretical argument can explain party system developments in the Netherlands and Finland.     

The Government Agenda in Parliamentary Democracies

Lawmaking is a challenge for coalition governments because it inherently demands cooperation and compromise by parties with divergent policy goals. The jurisdictional system of cabinet government exacerbates the problem by providing parties the means to undermine the coalition bargain in the pursuit of their own policy interests. In this article, I explore whether arrangements that allow partners to police one another induce compromise on one of the most important decisions taken by a government—the organization of the policy agenda. In an analysis of original data on the timing and policy content of over 800 government bills from four European democracies, I show that coalition governments pursue a largely "accommodative" agenda. Policy initiatives dealing with issues that are more attractive to all partners in the coalition are likely to be given priority on the agenda, while those dealing with relatively unattractive issues are likely to be postponed .     

The Paradox of Proportional Representation: The Effect of Party Systems and Coalitions on Individuals' Electoral Participation

Empirical findings based on aggregate data have found that proportional representation (PR) has a mixed relationship with electoral participation. Large party systems, thought to be one of the benefits of PR in increasing turnout, instead depress turnout. This article examines two theories that seek to account for this paradox – that coalition governments resulting from larger party systems serve to depress turnout, and that larger party systems increase the complexity of the decision environment for voters. By combining individual-level data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems with contextual measures of effective number of parties, coalition structure and disproportionality, this article tests for interactions between the characteristics and attitudes of individuals and the contextual influences on electoral participation. The frequency of coalitions that violate the minimal-winning rule depresses turnout, especially among supporters of major parties. By accounting for variations in coalition governments, larger party systems appear, on balance, to enhance, rather than depress, individuals' propensity to vote. Limited evidence is reported that indicates that this participation-enhancing role of larger party systems is not evenly distributed across the electorate, as those lacking a university degree may find the decision environment created by larger party systems more complex.     

Death and Turnout: The Human Costs of War and Voter Participation in Democracies

War heightens public interest in politics, especially when human lives are lost. We examine whether, and how, combat casualties affect the decision to vote in established democracies. Drawing from social psychology research on mortality salience, we expect increasing casualties to increase the salience of death, information that moves people to defend their worldview, especially nationalistic and ideological values. By heightening the importance of values, we propose that combat casualties increase the benefits of voting. In particular, we expect the effect of combat casualties to be pronounced among the least politically engaged. Using both cross‐national data of elections in 23 democracies over a 50‐year period and survey data from the United States and United Kingdom during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, we found that mounting casualties increase turnout. Furthermore, as expected, we found the effect of casualties to be most pronounced among those least interested in politics.     

Politics and Unemployment in Industrialized Democracies

This paper provides an empirical appraisal of the influence ofpolitics on the evolution of unemployment rates in 13industrialized democracies (12 European Union countries andthe U.S.) from 1960 to 1999. We conduct new tests ofopportunistic and partisan business cycle models, using richerdata and more general specifications than previous studies. Incontrast to most previous studies, we pay particular attentionto the importance of labor market structure in conditioningthe influence of politics on unemployment. We also investigatethe relationship between political stability and economicstability. The results suggest the existence of partisan effects, withhigher unemployment rates prevailing under ``right'' partiesthan ``left'' parties. There is more support for ``rational''partisan models that embody transient partisan impacts thanfor models with permanent effects. We find evidence that unionpower is associated with higher average unemployment rates,but that centralized bargaining institutions tend to lowerunemployment rates. The evidence also suggests that morefragmented coalition governments are associated with higherunemployment rates than single party governments.     

The Continued Relevance of Local Parties in Representative Democracies

This article assesses the value of local parties. It asks why political parties value their local sections. It also considers the ways in which local parties can benefit society. Local parties act as a democratic training ground for party members, are a conduit for political communication and provide parties with a range of resources. They also act as problem solving agencies; they ensure that policy is responsive to local needs; they provide an additional channel of communication and accountability; and they link citizens with the state. The article ends with an appeal to party scholars to refocus their attention towards local parties.     

Cutting Public Expenditures in Advanced Industrial Democracies: The Importance of Avoiding Blame

This article examines three conditions for cutting public expenditures across a sample of 16 advanced industrial democracies: intent, ability, and need during the 1970s and 1980s. Unlike spending increases, cuts require purposeful action. A first condition, therefore, for cutting expenditures is that leaders intend to curb spending. Surprisingly, the results indicate that leftist parties are considerably more effective at cutting expenditures than parties of the right. Indeed, leaders appear to have most latitude when a feared course of action is considered least likely. A second condition is that of ability. Institutions constrain and facilitate leadership. The degree to which decision-making must be shared within the executive both helps and hinders budget-cutting across exogenous conditions. While oversized coalitions may impede losses, they may also facilitate them by sharing responsibility for unpopular measures and thus reducing electoral repercussions. Indeed, both party and institutional results point to the centrality of avoiding blame in the loss‐inducing process. A third condition for cutting public expenditures involves need. While objective economic indicators are not irrelevant, the issue of need is largely politically defined.