Do multiparty elections improve human development in autocracies?

Improvements in human development under democratic institutions are often attributed to electoral contestation. We evaluate the effect of multiparty contestation on infant mortality in the authoritarian context. Contrary to what extant scholarship argues, we find no evidence that multiparty elections in authoritarian regimes reduce infant mortality. Specifically, we show that electoral autocracies do not produce better infant mortality outcomes compared to closed autocracies holding no multiparty elections. We also demonstrate a non-monotonic effect of electoral competition on infant mortality: Infant mortality increases in levels of electoral contestation common in electoral authoritarian regimes and decreases only at levels of contestation that are nearly exclusive to democracies. Finally, we show that increases in infant mortality in electoral authoritarian regimes operate partially through increased political violence and reduced state capacity.     

Government co-option of civil society: exploring the AKP’s role within Turkish women’s CSOs

Mainstream academic and policy literature emphasizes the nexus between an active and vibrant civil society sector and greater political accountability. As a result, support for civil society has become central to international policy efforts to strengthen democracy in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region. However, the empirical evidence presented in this article questions the validity of this assumption. Drawing on information gathered through 38 in-depth qualitative interviews with women’s organizations from across the seven administrative regions of Turkey, and key representatives from the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), this article analyses the role of the AKP government in co-opting and influencing women’s organizations in Turkey. The results that emerge demonstrate that the government is actively involved in fashioning a civil society sector that advances their interests and consolidates their power. Independent women’s organizations report that they are becoming increasingly excluded from policy and legislative discussions, as seemingly civic organizations are supported and often created by the government to replace them. These organizations function to disseminate government ideas in society and to provide a cloak of democratic legitimacy to policy decisions. These findings and their implications have significant consequences for theory and policy on civil society and its role in supporting democracy.     

In-between liberal authoritarianism and electoral authoritarianism: Hong Kong’s democratization under Chinese sovereignty, 1997–2016

On the eve of the twentieth anniversary of the handover, Hong Kong’s transition towards a full democracy remains unsettled. Drawing upon the contemporary theories of hybrid regimes, this article argues that manipulations adopted by electoral authoritarian governments have become increasingly common in Hong Kong today. As Hong Kong’s elections, opposition activities, and media have been increasingly put under electoral authoritarian-style manipulations, the city-state is now situated in the “political grey zone” in-between liberal authoritarianism and electoral authoritarianism and its transition into a full democracy remains nowhere in sight. The case study of Hong Kong will help enrich the existing comparative literature on hybrid regimes by developing a new “in-between category” and offering an interesting case of democratization of sub-national polity.     

A distributional theory of economic democracy

In the twentieth century, while political democracy triumphed economic democracy failed both as an idea and in practice. A case for reviving the idea of economic democracy is made in terms of protecting political democracy. Economic democracy has conventionally been understood as a matter of bringing economic power under the control of collective political power. The idea is here reformulated as a matter of redistributing economic power between persons, of giving people a share in economic power directly rather than through elected representatives. Political democracy is assumed, which is to say that political power is under the control of the middle class. The question then is under what conditions the middle class might want and think it could use political power to redistribute economic power. The conclusions are that there is in advanced capitalist democracies considerable scope for the redistribution of economic power between the rich and the middle class. As for the empowerment of the poor, however, anti-poverty policies beyond the containment of poverty are unlikely to emerge today in countries where that did not happen under earlier historical conditions.     

Towards a universal framework for democracy assessment

Assessing the state or quality of a country's democracy has become an increasingly widespread undertaking over the past ten years, whether to construct league tables of democratic attainment, to explore correlations between democracy and economic condition or performance, or to identify likely recipients and projects for international aid. This article reports on a civil society-based programme and framework for democracy assessment in which the author has been involved, whose purpose is to contribute to public debate about a country's democracy, to monitor its progress over time, and to identify pressing areas for reform. Distinctive features of the methodology are the derivation of assessment criteria from clearly articulated democratic values, its relevance to new and established democracies alike, and the comprehensiveness of the assessment framework, covering citizen rights and the rule of law, institutions of representative and accountable government, civil society and participation, and international dimensions of democracy. The article explores the intellectual underpinnings of the assessment methodology in the universal validity of democratic norms and a common imperative for democratization in developed as well as developing countries; and argues for the framework's usefulness in teaching as well as research. It concludes with a brief report on the comparative findings from pilot assessments undertaken with in-country partners in eight countries from across the world.     

Populist polarization and the slow death of democracy in Ecuador

This article analyses how the interactions between a strong populist government in Ecuador and a weak, divided, and inefficient internal opposition in a context of weak liberal institutions could lead to what Guillermo O'Donnell termed “the slow death of democracy”. Rafael Correa was elected with a substantive project of democratization understood as economic redistribution and social justice. His administration got rid of neoliberal policies and decaying traditional political parties, while simultaneously co-opting social movements, regulating civil society, and colonizing the public sphere. Because the judiciary was subordinated to Correa, social movement activists, journalists, and media owners could not use the legal system to resist Correa's crack down of civil society and regulation of the privately owned media. They took their grievances to supranational organizations like the Organization of American States. When these organizations stepped in to challenge Correa, his government denounced imperialist intervention in his nation's internal affairs, and advocated for the creation of new supranational institutions without US presence.     

The puzzle of populism in Iran’s electoral politics

The article examines the impact of an unsettled electoral market and evolving political predispositions on the rise and fall of populism in Iran. The article argues that the absence of a polarized electoral contest between reformists and conservatives paved the way for the victory of the populist candidate in the 2005 presidential election in Iran, while the deep economic recession resulting from conservative administration policies created a long-term political experience which influenced voters and led to the victory of the pragmatist candidate in the 2013 and 2017 elections. Quantitative analysis indicates that in the 2005 election, the struggle between conservatives and reformists did not impact the competition between candidates, and consequently depoliticized attitudes, for example distributive demands, ideology, and anti-ruling elite sentiment gained significance, whereas polarization between conservatives and a coalition of reformists and pragmatists enhanced the role of partisanship and triggered the fall of populism in the 2013 election.     

米留可夫的自由主义思想浅谈

1905年，俄国历史上最大的资产阶级政党——立宪民主党成立，其政党领袖米留可夫试图引导俄国走上他所倾心的君主立宪制道路。在与沙皇政府和列宁等人的论战中，米留可夫成为俄国自由主义的代表，即将经典的传统自由主义应用到俄国的理想实践中，结合俄国文化土壤中所特有的东西，通过不流血的和非暴力的改良道路实现国家的进步。     

Stateness problems or regime unification? Explaining obstacles to democratization in Burma/Myanmar

The fact that Myanmar is not democratic is too often taken as a given in international policy discourse without analysis as to why it has not democratized or what conditions might allow for democratization. Plausible theories to explain Burma's authoritarian politics include poor levels of economic development, colonial history, regional geopolitical factors, problems of state formation and the unification of the military. Determining which theories have the most explanatory power is important because different understandings of Burma's authoritarianism steer one toward some remedies and away from others. In this paper, I argue that problems of state formation – ‘stateness’ in one strand of the democratization literature – and ‘regime unification’ theories stand the best chance of explaining the lack of democracy in Myanmar. I examine the logic and evidence for each theory and conclude that while both explain some of the status quo, ‘stateness’ had more explanatory power before 1988 but in post-1988 Myanmar, ‘regime unification’ explains more.     

Authoritarian Regimes and Pro-Democracy Semi-Oppositions: The End of the Portuguese Dictatorship (1968–1974) in Comparative Perspective

This article discusses the conditions of failure and success of pro-democracy semi-oppositions to authoritarian regimes through a comparative study of the last phase of the Portuguese authoritarian regime (1968–1974). It specifies and reformulates Juan Linz's concept of semi-opposition. In Portugal, contrary to Linz's argument, the moderate pro-democracy semi-oppositions participated in the regime's electoral moments and tended to take the greatest possible advantage of these periods so as to discredit the regime and to demonstrate that it could not be transformed from within. In order to make sense of this paradox, scholars should look at the institutional legacies and frameworks of authoritarian regimes. Specifically, we argue that the Portuguese semi-opposition failed because the institutional heritage of the Estado Novo, at the moment of the leadership succession, provided no opportunities for a reformist democratizing coalition to assert itself and promoted instead the radicalization of the semi-opposition. Paradoxically, it was the more liberal institutional framework of the regime that made a political change guided by the democratic semi-opposition impracticable.