Flexible modes of governance: Making CFSP and ESDP work

The European Union and the United States are on the verge of agreeing to a transatlantic free trade agreement. The proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership is aimed at boosting EU and US economic growth, but the negotiating partners have not excluded the defence sector from negotiations. Europe is at a tipping point regarding the rationale for its defence-industrial integration efforts. Any TTIP extending to the defence sector will raise questions about the nature of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, and, crucially, how it impacts the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Common Security and Defence Policy.     

Allies and Other Strangers: European Integration and the American “Empire by Invitation”

Current tensions between the United States and Europe have raised questions about the future of the transatlantic relationship, though historical analysis suggests that the good old days were not perfect either. This article considers the history of U.S.-European relations and concludes that they have always been complex, as neither Americans nor Europeans have been sure how an integrated Europe would fit into an Atlantic partnership. It concludes that the future of the West depends on Europeans’ developing on their own a clearer vision of the concrete shape and international role of the eu.     

Negotiating the EU–U.S. Open Aviation Area Agreement 2007 in the Context of Transatlantic Airline Regimes Since 1944

Between 1944 and 2002, the United States sought to create a competitive and commercially driven international civil aviation regime. It tried to peel away politically inspired regulations, which fragmented the marketplace, and deliver efficiencies and consumer benefits. In contrast with the American liberal tradition—albeit with limitations—the industry in Europe was over-regulated and largely based on subsidised state-owned carriers with international market quotas. Thus for many years Europe and the U.S. followed different paths; but political and economic dynamics conspired together in the 1980s and early 1990s to produce remarkable change in the European Community and, by 1997, there were the makings of a competitive and lightly regulated single market, which brought it close to U.S. practice. Since 2002, the United States has been less liberal in its airline policies; the EU has been more liberal. It would be an irony indeed if the great regime liberaliser since 1944 were now to become a force of regulatory conservatism that denied consummation to the vision of a transatlantic open aviation area that could be a magnet to draw in the rest of the world into a truly global commercial airline market.     

Britain, France, and America's Year of Europe, 1973

Britain's entry into the European Community in 1973 coincided with an American initiative aimed at redefining relations between the United States and Western Europe. This confronted British diplomats with a serious dilemma. They wished to maintain close collaboration with Washington and, for the sake of European unity, to expand on their recently achieved reconciliation with France, a country whose Gaullist elite rejected any further institutionalization of transatlantic relations. French reluctance to engage in a constructive dialogue with the Americans resulted in a fractious debate over the drafting of two seemingly innocuous declarations, and this was exacerbated by the mixed response of the Europeans to the outbreak of the fourth Arab-Israeli war and the ensuing energy crisis. Finally, at the Washington energy conference of February 1974, the British chose to work with the Americans, rather than the French, in seeking to mitigate the economic impact of OPEC's oil policies.     

Balancing against threats or bandwagoning with power? Europe and the transatlantic relationship after the Cold War

The United States has played an important role in European security since the early 20^th century. From the time of the end of the Cold War, this role has changed as a consequence of the lack of a common territorial threat and the overwhelming power of the United States relative to Europe. How have European states responded to the challenges of the American world order? Are they adapting their security policies to match the challenges of US security policy and the American world order? What are the implications of the European response for the transatlantic relationship? This article seeks to describe and explain European security behaviour in the American world through the prism of two realist theories: balance of power realism and balance of threat realism. Despite sharing a common starting point in realist assumptions, each theory allows us to tell a different story about Europe's position in the American world order as well as the opportunities and challenges it faces.     

跨大西洋关系:走向松散联盟?（英文）

The current transatlantic relationship between the United States and Europe exhibits a two-sided characteristic.Despite endogenous conflicts,the structural factors that maintain the resilience of US-Europe relations remain solid.The dual features will shape the direction of transatlantic relations for quite a long time,with the alliance sustained but becoming increasingly loose.     

Britain,France, and America's Year of Europe, 1973

Britain's entry into the European Community in 1973 coincided with an American initiative aimed at redefining relations between the United States and Western Europe. This confronted British diplomats with a serious dilemma. They wished to maintain close collaboration with Washington and, for the sake of European unity, to expand on their recently achieved reconciliation with France, a country whose Gaullist elite rejected any further institutionalization of transatlantic relations. French reluctance to engage in a constructive dialogue with the Americans resulted in a fractious debate over the drafting of two seemingly innocuous declarations, and this was exacerbated by the mixed response of the Europeans to the outbreak of the fourth Arab–Israeli war and the ensuing energy crisis. Finally, at the Washington energy conference of February 1974, the British chose to work with the Americans, rather than the French, in seeking to mitigate the economic impact of OPEC's oil policies.     

Transatlantic cooperation on terrorism and Islamist radicalisation in Africa: the Franco-American axis

Transatlantic cooperation on security has a long history. In Africa, transatlantic cooperation on security is basically between France and the United States. This paper asks why the two former competitors in Africa started to cooperate and also why they are so willing to engage militarily. The central argument in this paper poses that France and the US cooperate because it is indispensable to both parties. To France, the cooperation is indispensable because the US is the only power with sufficient financial means and with sufficient air-lift capacity to transport French and African troops into conflict-ridden countries. To Washington, cooperation with Paris is indispensable because the French authorities have unique access to intelligence and knowledge about large parts of Africa. By applying a foreign policy analysis framework, the paper analyses how perceptions of decision-makers, the role of personality and leadership, the role of government institutions and political systems have impacted the relevant decisions. It is emphasised that the two different decision-making systems – the French “state dominated” and the American “society dominated” – produce the same result, namely collaboration. It suggests that the perception of a serious threat from terrorism and Islamist radicalisation overrules differences in decision-making systems.     

Old Europe,New Europe and Transatlantic Relations

This article establishes the broader framework for the rest of the volume by addressing the contemporary context of transatlantic relations and secondly by establishing strategic culture as the conceptual tool for the collection. The article takes issue with realist/material explanations of recent transatlantic disputes, as posited, for example, by Rober Kagan, which tend to portray the transatlantic divide as the US on one side and Europe on the other. In fact Europe itself was very much divided over Iraq and the conduct of US foreign policy. Moreover, the sources of this division, manifest vividly in the notion of Old and New Europe, were based on cultural, historical as well as material factors and as such are best understood by invoking the concept of strategic culture.

Thoughtful Europeans know that Europe must unite in some form if it is to play a major role in the long run. They are aware, too, that Europe does not make even approximately the defense effort of which it is capable. But European unity is stymied and domestic politics has almost everywhere dominated security policy. The result is a massive frustration which expresses itself in special testiness toward the United States. (Henry Kissinger, 1969) ¹ 1 Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy: Three Essays, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1969, p. 69. ¹The author is grateful to several anonymous reviewers for valuable comments on a previous draft.      

New Structures of American Foreign Strategy Since 9/11--Seeking Cooperation with Asia-Pacific Countries

When George W. Bush entered the White House in early 2001,American foreign policy was based on unilateral principles and favored disengagement from global conflict resolution. The United States declared it's decision to withdraw from the Kyoto protocol, refused to negotiate with North Korea, and, in particular, it's pursuit of a national ballstic missile defense system,in face of global opposition, further reinforced the position of its unilateralism.The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 came as a shock to the world. The United States suffered not only physical casualties, but felt a psychological blow as well. For the first time since the 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States had been attacked at home. Unlike Pearl Harbor, the attacks on September 11 targeted civilians and the cornerstones of the American way of life- their financial and government centers. The terrorist attacks forced the Bush administration to re-examine it approach to foreign policy Seeking cooperation with other powers will be the new choice for American foreign strategy.     

Still the One? The Role of Europe in American Defense Strategy

According to the 2015 National Security Strategy, the United States continues to rely on Europe as its most likely, most capable military partner for dealing with the most vexing security challenges. However, the conventional wisdom in Washington holds that European allies are not terribly capable militarily or very willing to use force. So why would the United States rely on such lax partners? In fact, the evidence on European defense spending, capabilities, and willingness is decidedly mixed, with many positive trends among the negative ones. To build on the positive, the United States can bring to the table assets and resources necessary to facilitate the transatlantic partnership before it needs to be exercised.     

Japanese and American Perspectives on East Asian Regionalism

Regular convening of East Asian summits and rising concernsabout the American dollar have heightened interest in Asiancooperation. Japan will necessarily play a central role in regionalendeavors, and the United States must at least acquiesce ifregional coordination is to progress. Among American accounts,the most theoretically elaborate and systematically comparativeanalysis is A World of Regions, while Remapping East Asia providesthe most authoritative overview of recent developments. Japanese-languagestudies of East Asian regionalism agree that regional cooperationis far less institutionalized and rule-based in East Asia thanin Europe, but they include a wider range of opinion about thedesirability and feasibility of cooperation. Skeptics on theright warn that efforts to create a regional community wouldweaken the United States–Japan alliance, undermine universalvalues, and cede regional leadership to China. Optimists onthe left counter that regional cooperation holds out the onlyhope for ameliorating nationalist conflicts. Most numerous arecentrists arguing for active cooperation on economics and theenvironment, but only cautious moves on politics and security.Despite their caution, Japanese authors convey a sense thatchanges to the American-led global and regional order are occurringand likely will continue.     

Trilateral relations in a globalizing world. ASEM and the United States

Europe, the United States and East Asia are linked together through bilateral relations as well as a kind of trilateral relationship. There are three legs: Looking from a European perspective, the strongest relationship is the transatlantic relationship; secondly, there is a growing relationship between the United States and East Asia; and thirdly, the weakest link is the European-East Asian relationship.In this article I will focus, first, on this global triangle between East Asia, Europe and the United States. Secondly, I will discuss the question whether ASEM, APEC and ASEAN are competing or cooperating. Thirdly, I will analyze the question how the US looks at ASEM. Concluding I will argue that the US should take ASEM more seriously – not least because of US interests.This paper was written as part of a project on Backlash against Globalization that is supported by the Otto Wolff Foundation, Cologne, and The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington, DC.     

An Endangered Partnership: The Anglo-American Defence Relationship in the Early Twenty-first Century

Abstract

This article examines the contemporary Anglo-American defence relationship. It begins by setting the general historical and contemporary context, including the impact of the Iraq war, before focusing on the military dimension. The main body of the paper addresses UK/US military planning and operations, UK defence budgetary issues, nuclear weapons collaboration and the impact of changing strategic relationships between the UK, US and Europe. The author argues that the longstanding defence partnership is threatened by a number of factors, including interoperability problems, the UK's national and defence spending priorities, the likely impact of a decision to replace Trident and the decline in the importance of the transatlantic strategic partnership in NATO. The paper concludes that changing US strategic priorities and further reductions in Britain's military capabilities are likely to erode the perceived value of the Anglo-American defence partnership on both sides of the Atlantic.     

欧美对华政策协调及其局限

随着中国的持续崛起以及欧美对华政策的转型,中国因素在跨大西洋关系中的重要性更加凸显。为了应对中国崛起、巩固跨大西洋关系以及维护在国际秩序中的主导地位,欧美加快了对华政策协调的步伐,试图围绕意识形态、经贸投资、科技创新以及全球治理等议题协调共识并采取更加一致的行动。当前欧美对华政策协调也有别于过去“美主欧从”的模式,呈现出更具机制化和更全面的新特点。在协调的过程中,欧美对华政策出现了一定的趋同,但分歧也显露无遗。欧美对华认知与政策分歧、欧盟“战略自主”倾向以及“特朗普主义”遗产的影响都将对欧美协调的深度和效果构成制约。当今国际体系的特点和中国和平发展道路也决定了欧美协调难以复制冷战时期的遏制战略,“和平共处”是欧美协调和中美欧三边关系应该遵守的基本原则。     

Preparing for a Russian ‘Space Pearl Harbor’

Today, the United States is susceptible to a “Space Pearl Harbor” more than at any other time. The United States depends on satellites more than any other country in the world for its most basic functions. Everything from military communications, to early missile warning systems, to civilian banking transactions is conducted, in part, through satellite constellations. The American way of war depends on instantaneous communication and coordination that satellite constellations provide. Take away these advantages and the United States military is made deaf, dumb, and blind. For a militarily weaker foe, like Russia, with grand geopolitical ambitions and a rapidly closing window of opportunity to accomplish its geostrategic ambitions, debilitating U.S. forces charged with defending Eastern Europe is essential. This essay assesses the threat that Russian co-orbital satellites—better known as Space Stalkers—pose to vital U.S. military satellite constellations in geosynchronous orbit, such as the Wideband Global Satcom constellation.     

The United States–EURATOM Agreement of 1958: The Cold War Impact

Drawing on declassified sources, this analysis examines how the Cold War influenced United States policy towards the creation of the European Atomic Energy Community [EURATOM]. In the 1950s, “the peaceful atom” became a crucial sector of the Cold War. To maintain American nuclear leadership, the Dwight Eisenhower Administration invited Western Europeans to enter into an active collaboration with the United States on peaceful uses of atomic energy. The United States encouraged the creation of EURATOM by promising that the Community would obtain more assistance in the nuclear field than any individual state. The Soviet launch of Sputnik provided additional impetus to the signing of the United States–EURATOM agreement, having strengthened American interest in a joint programme with EURATOM that would bring together American and Western European scientific and technical resources to counter the Soviet Union. The exegesis contributes to recent studies on the interaction between the Cold War and European integration.     

The United States Sale of Trident to Britain, 1977–1982: Deal Making in the Anglo–American Nuclear Relationship

This article provides a comparative analysis of the sales of the Trident nuclear missile system to Britain by the Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan administrations. Both governments viewed the Anglo–American nuclear partnership as a tool within their wider foreign policy kit and utilised the sale of Trident to influence British defence policy. For these reasons, each administration saw the Trident sale as part of an Anglo–American transactional defence relationship. This exegesis deepens understanding of the United States perspective on Anglo–American nuclear co-operation. Moreover, it is relevant to current debates on the replacement of Trident because it highlights the ramifications of Britain’s technical dependence and raises questions about the concessions that may have been made, or will need to be made, to the United States in exchange for the latter’s assistance with replacement.     

The American Role in European Defense Reform

In order to influence the direction and outcomes of defense reforms occurring across Europe, the United States needs to refocus its military-to-military engagement programs with its European allies. Instead of seeking to build partner capacity among the newest NATO members or aspirants, Washington will be better served by maintaining and strengthening interoperability with those allies that are adaptive and innovative, deployable and expeditionary, and capable of full spectrum operations—that is, allies such as France, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. This finding is based upon what Washington itself sees as the future of conflict and the kinds of coalition partner skills and abilities the United States will need to counter post-International Security Assistance Force International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) threats to U.S. and collective security. Given budget and force structure cuts facing the United States as well, the American military cannot afford to waste its limited security cooperation resources.     

Rising to the Challenge: Europe’s Security Policy in East Asia amid US-China Rivalry

ABSTRACT

China’s growing power and assertiveness towards its smaller and weaker neighbours has been a wakeup call for the European Union and its member states which, as a result, have stepped up their involvement in East Asia. EU security policy in the region shows many elements of alignment with the United States, but also differences. In North East Asia, the EU has adopted harsh sanctions against North Korea but, contrary to the Trump administration which continues to seek regime change, has left the door open for dialogue. Moreover, the EU supports the process of trilateral cooperation among China, Japan and South Korea, while Washington has traditionally been lukewarm towards a process that excludes the US and risks being dominated by Beijing. The transatlantic allies also show differing approaches with regard to maritime disputes in the South China Sea. While EU security policy in East Asia is largely complementary to that of Washington, in some cases Europe tends – albeit inadvertently – to favour Beijing.