Optimal Law Enforcement with Dissemination of Information

In this paper we discuss the implications of introducing imperfect information on the optimal law enforcement literature. We assume that individuals can be imperfectly informed about the probability of apprehension and about the sanction.Imperfect information about the probability and the sanction might pose a problem to criminal deterrence. If that is the case, there are clear incentives to disseminate information about law enforcement (probability and severity of sanction). However, note that individuals also have incentives to buy information about law enforcement: they may erroneously decide to become criminals (because they have underestimated the expected sanction) or they may erroneously decide not to become criminals (because they have overestimated the expected sanction).This paper proposed that it is optimal to complement criminal punishment with some disclosure of information.     

The Economics of Cruel and Unusual Punishment

It has sometimes been argued that one way to reduce the costs of law enforcement would be to reduce the probability of detection and conviction (hence saving those costs), while at the same time increasing the size of the punishment. Following this strategy would keep the expected costs (to a risk neutral criminal) of committing a crime constant and hence keep the deterrence level constant; it would have the benefit, though, of reducing costs to the rest of society.There are some well-known objections to such a policy. One such objection deals with marginal deterrence: A convicted murderer serving a life sentence with no chance of parole in a jurisdiction which bans capital punishment has nothing to lose from killing a prison guard—there is no marginal deterrence to the commission of a more serious crime or any additional crime for that matter. In fact, so long as there remains any upper limit to the amount of punishment that can be inflicted upon a convicted criminal, the only ways to create some type of marginal deterrence are to reduce the punishments for less serious crimes, which will either reduce the deterrence of those less serious crimes, or alternatively to require the use of more of society's scarce resources to increase the probabilities of apprehension and conviction.It is possible to reduce this marginal deterrence problem, however, by practicing cruel and unusual punishment on perpetrators of serious crimes, i.e. by raising the limits of allowable punishment. Anecdotal evidence suggests this practice is followed unofficially with child molesters and killers of prison guards and hence provides some additional deterrence against these crimes.Despite the theoretical validity of this argument, our society has chosen to impose a constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Furthermore, over time we seem to have lowered the threshold of what is considered cruel and unusual. Following Dr. Pangloss, the concluding section of the paper examines why rational maximizers would choose to give up this additional potential deterrence. The explanations depend upon an assumed positive income elasticity of demand for humanitarianism or for insurance against the costs of punishing the innocent. While there are some reasons to accept the humanitarianism argument, the insurance argument seems more persuasive.     

试论刑罚个别化的根据

刑事实证学派及目前的刑法理论普遍认为刑罚个别化的根据是基于犯罪人人身危险性的个别预防 ,本文认为刑罚个别化的根据应包括个别公正与个别预防两个方面 ,并且 ,个别公正是主要的依据 ,原因在于人与人之间意志自由的程度、犯罪原因等因素不同 ,这些因素在适用刑罚时都是应该予以考虑的 ,只有全面考虑这些因素才能使刑罚尽可能地做到公正 ;同时 ,刑罚这种社会制度的设立是有功利性的 ,在一般预防与个别预防的功利性选择上 ,应该偏重个别预防 ,个别预防的实现无疑应该以刑罚个别化为前提。刑罚个别化是实现个别公正和个别预防的最佳途径 ,也是必然选择。     

Deterrence and avoidance

This paper explores the effects of public enforcement, in general, and punishment, in particular, on crime levels if offenders can engage in avoidance activities. Avoidance reduces the probability or magnitude of punishment. In general, offenders can reduce their expected punishment either by substituting legal activities for criminal activities (the deterrence effect) or by increasing avoidance activities. This paper shows that increasing the direct costs of crime – by either increasing punishment or enforcement efforts – does not necessarily deter criminal activity and may actually trigger increased crime if avoidance is possible. Furthermore, this paper shows that increasing the opportunity costs of crime (e.g. by subsidizing legal alternatives or through educational and vocational programs) reduces both crime and avoidance and thus, in this respect, is advantageous. The conditions for these outcomes are identified, the economic mechanisms are explained, and an underlying intuitive approach for these results is proposed.     

Criminal Labelling,Publicity, and Punishment

This paper considers whether publicizing criminal labels is justified as a form of punishment. It begins by arguing that making criminal labels public is inevitably stigmatizing and that stigmatization is not, as is often implied, a defining aspect of censure, but needs independent justification. It argues that justifying grounds for public criminal labelling cannot be found in either the communicative account of punishment or deterrence theory. Rather, public criminal labelling should be understood as undermining of both the communicative and the deterrent functions of punishment. Recent empirical work is drawn upon to support the claims about public criminal labelling and deterrence.     

Criminal solicitation,entrapment, and the enforcement of law

This paper examines the optimal use of criminal solicitation as a law enforcement strategy. The benefits are greater deterrence of crime (due to the greater likelihood of apprehension), and the savings in social harm as some offenders are diverted away from committing actual crimes through solicitation. The costs are the expense of hiring undercover cops and the greater likelihood of punishment. The optimal use of solicitation balances these factors. The paper also examines the justification for the entrapment defense, which exonerates those caught in a criminal solicitation but who otherwise had no predisposition to commit a crime.     

THE MISSING LINK IN GENERAL DETERRENCE RESEARCH*

Research on the deterrent effects of punishment falls into two categories: macro‐level studies of the impact of aggregate punishment levels on crime rates, and individual‐level studies of the impact of perceived punishment levels on self‐reported criminal behavior. For policy purposes, however, the missing link—ignored in previous research—is that between aggregate punishment levels and individual perceptions of punishment. This paper addresses whether higher actual punishment levels increase the perceived certainty, severity, or swiftness of punishment. Telephone interviews with 1,500 residents of fifty‐four large urban counties were used to measure perceptions of punishment levels, which were then linked to actual punishment levels as measured in official statistics. Hierarchical linear model estimates of multivariate models generally found no detectable impact of actual punishment levels on perceptions of punishment. The findings raise serious questions about deterrence‐based rationales for more punitive crime control policies.     

Facing the Consequences

Many philosophers endorse deterrence justifications of legal punishment. According to these justifications, punishment is justified at least in part because it deters offenses. These justifications rely on empirical assumptions, e.g., that non-punitive enforcement can’t deter or that it can’t deter enough. I’ll challenge these assumptions and argue that extant deterrence justifications of legal punishment fail. I begin by isolating, in a simplified form, important claims common to deterrence justifications. I then endorse an uncontroversial claim about punishment and explore its implications for enforcement. These implications undermine the simple versions of the deterrence claims. I then evaluate several modifications of the claims to see whether they can be improved upon. I argue that they can’t easily be improved upon. In the process, I examine contemporary deterrence research and argue that it provides no support for deterrence justifications. I conclude by considering objections.     

The Impact of Deterrence Policies on Reckless Driving: The Case of Portugal

In this paper, we test the effect of three different criminal deterrence theory policy tools: criminal certainty, severity, and celerity of punishment. Whereas most criminal deterrence studies in this field focus on the former two components of deterrence theory, this study also examines the potential deterrent effect of the latter component. Using a time-series design with monthly data, we estimate the effects of an increase in the threat of punishment for traffic offenses resulting from a general increase in fines for traffic offenses, an increase in the probability of getting caught with a blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) level outside the legal limits, and the enactment of an “on-the-spot” fine payment policy in Portugal. We find strong evidence to support a severity effect. An increase in the statutory severity of sentence maxima for traffic violations leads to a decrease in accident and injury rates—approximately an average 0.5 percent reduction in monthly accident and injury rates. Changes in the BAC levels and the mandatory swift payment policy did not produce any convincing deterrence impact.

Taking Deterrence Seriously: The Wide-Scope Deterrence Theory of Punishment

A deterrence theory of punishment holds that the institution of criminal punishment is morally justified because it serves to deter crime. Because the fear of external sanction is an important incentive in crime deterrence, the deterrence theory is often associated with the idea of severe, disproportionate punishment. An objection to this theory holds that hope of escape renders even the severest punishment inapt and irrelevant.

This article revisits the concept of deterrence and defend a more plausible deterrence theory of punishment—the wide-scope deterrence theory. The wide-scope theory holds that we must make the best use of all the deterrence tools available, including both external and internal sanctions. Drawing on insights from the early Confucian tradition, the article develops a deep deterrence theory, which holds that the most important deterrence tool involves internal, not external, sanction. It describes how internal sanctions deter potential offenses and why relevant policies need not conflict with liberalism’s respect for neutrality.     

Overview of penal response towards tax compliance in Nigeria

Tax offences and penalties are created to tackle tax non-compliance. Tax penalties bear civil liabilities while tax offences portends criminal sanctions. This paper employs the deterrence theory of penalty to determine whether tax penalties and enforcement agencies are effective in ensuring tax compliance in Nigeria. It is found that the dwindling economic situation in the country has diminished the deterrent effect of pecuniary tax sanctions. Hence, there is need to review the tax statutes. Corroborative effort between tax authorities would facilitate the probability of detection and punishment of tax offenders, thereby improving tax compliance in Nigeria.     

Reforming Natural Gas Fracking Regulations in 2017–2018: How Should States Enforce Regulations?

While much scholarly work has been published on hydraulic fracturing regulatory frameworks, there is little discussion on the enforcement mechanisms of these regulations and statutes. This article explores state hydraulic fracturing regulations and the expansion of a criminal framework to enforce compliance. More specifically, this article takes a comparative look at fracking enforcement regimes in California and several states with the most hydraulic fracturing activities. First, the article discusses fracking's economic benefits and environmental issues. The article then analyzes federal regulations, (which essentially leaves the bulk of regulation and enforcement to state and local governments) and state enforcement systems in California and the four states with the most fracking wells (Texas, Wyoming, Pennsylvania, and Colorado). California, a state that is pushing for more renewable resources, has robust regulations under Senate Bill 4. In the end, states that rely heavily on fracking should reform the enforcement mechanisms to disincentive noncompliance. Regulatory regimes in the other states appear to have deficiencies that could be remedied by adopting stricter enforcement mechanisms—such as criminal sanctions—that would disincentivize noncompliance, which could lead to large-scale environmental disasters. This article postulates that a model system incorporating a variety of methods including increased criminal enforcement could provide for proper remedies, justice, and deterrence. An ideal enforcement framework for effective deterrence should focus on transparency, flexibility, trusted delegation, and proportionality.     

Plea bargaining and deterrence: An institutional approach

Previous economic analyses of plea bargaining have largely ignored its impact on the deterrence of crime. Instead, they have focused on the bargaining between a defendant and a prosecutor once a crime has been committed. This article remedies this deficiency by asking how the practice of plea bargaining influences the determination of criminal punishment and thereby the supply of crime by rational offenders. The key question examined is, how do the ex post objectives of prosecutors affect the ability of legislatures to implement criminal punishments aimed at achieving optimal deterrence? Various prosecutorial objectives are considered in answering this question.     

Criminal Contemplation,National Context,and Deterrence

Using random samples of adults from three European countries rarely surveyed about crime-related issues, this study seeks to identify, with more extensive indicators than is typical, individuals who are likely to contemplate the commission of criminal acts. Then, it assesses the contextual universality of deterrence claims by estimating the deterrent effectiveness of perceived formal and informal sanctions for theft and violence among crime contemplators in Greece, Russia, and Ukraine. With criminal contemplation taken into account, our findings confirm the patterns established in past research. Whereas the threat of formal punishment shows little deterrent effect, perceptions of informal sanctions appear to influence projected crime. However, supportive findings hold only in Russia and Ukraine. Overall, it appears that the deterrent effectiveness of sanctions may be to some extent contingent on cultural or contextual characteristics.     

The belief that guns deter crime and support for capital punishment

One of the many reasons for gun ownership in the USA is the belief that citizen gun ownership helps to reduce crime. The rationale for this belief can be linked to deterrence – the perception that the threat of harm from confronting someone with a gun outweighs the potential benefit from crime – and will reduce the likelihood of engaging in criminal behavior. Similarly, deterrence is often referenced as a reason to support capital punishment. This is the first study to explicitly link support for the individual threat of lethal violence and the state threat of lethal violence by testing the hypothesis that the belief that guns reduce crime is positively correlated with support for capital punishment. Tests using a 2010 survey support this hypothesis for general support of capital punishment and for support of capital punishment with the life without parole option. The theoretical implications of considering deterrence as a value-expressive argument are explored.     

对“刑罚的执行”法律定位的学理思考——兼论我国监狱法典的完善

在我国监狱法中 ,刑罚的执行被定位在与狱政管理、教育改造等并列的层次上。本文认为 ,这一定位是报应刑罚思想和新中国行刑领域中的“三位一体”观念的产物 ,很难自圆其说。无论从历史看 ,还是从逻辑看 ,刑罚的执行是狱政管理、教育改造等的上位概念 ,因此 ,监狱法应对刑罚的执行重新定位     

宽严相济刑事政策基本问题再认识

宽严相济刑事政策对惩办与宽大相结合政策的调整与发展,应是一项基本刑事政策。宽严相济刑事政策的内涵应解释为以宽济严,区别对待,宽严审时。其他刑事政策像＂严打＂政策,死刑政策,教育、感化、挽救政策是宽严相济刑事政策的题中应有之义。它不仅是刑事司法政策,而且还是刑事立法政策与刑事执行政策,贯彻实现于刑事立法、刑事司法与刑事执行全过程。     

我国未成年人犯罪刑罚执行制度研究——兼论社区矫正制度

未成年人犯罪刑罚执行制度的基本理念在于保护和教育,对此,我国目前的体制虽然取得了一定成效,但仍存在具体操作性不强、执行主体不清、责任主体不明等缺陷,缺乏系统化。而社区矫正恰是完善我国未成年人犯罪刑罚执行制度的优先选择,应对原有项目加以改进并进行整合,同时在立法上应进一步完善刑事法、构建特别法体系,完善慎逮制度、充分发挥暂缓起诉制度的保护和帮教作用,重构未成年人缓刑制度、取消对未成年人的劳动教养等。