Measuring and Promoting Budget Transparency: The Open Budget Index as a Research and Advocacy Tool

Transparency in public budgeting has been a recognized principle of sound governance for a long time. Yet, reliable measures of budget transparency are hard to come by. This article introduces the Open Budget Index (OBI), a new tool based on surveys by independent researchers that compares key budget information published by governments across the world. Data from the latest survey, published in 2010 and covering 94 countries, reveal that on average, the state of budget transparency around the world is poor. Countries with lower incomes, weaker democratic institutions, and higher dependency on foreign aid and hydrocarbon sales tend to be less transparent. However, a number of countries have improved the quantity and coverage of the budget information that they publish, in some cases following civil society pressure based on OBI findings. More generally, OBI data help identify easy steps that governments and other actors could take to further improve budget transparency.     

Budget institutions and taxation

While a number of different studies have explored the effects of budgetary procedures and the centralization of the budget process on government debt, deficits and spending, few of them have explored whether such fiscal institutions matter for public revenue. This article argues that centralizing the budget process raises the levels of taxation by limiting the ability of individual government officials to veto tax increases in line with common-pool-problem arguments regarding public finances. Using detailed data on budgetary procedures from 15 EU countries, the empirical analysis shows that greater centralization of the budget process increases taxation as a share of GDP and that both the type of budget centralization and level of government fractionalization matter for the size of this effect. The results suggest that further centralizing the budget process limits government debt and deficits by increasing public revenues as well as constraining public spending.     

Indigenous institutions and local government in the Torres Strait

The relationships between local governments and Indigenous institutions in Australia are unstudied, despite both being oriented to the local level. Related research focuses on the performance of Indigenous local governments, Indigenous forms of governance and its relation to local government, relations between local governments and Indigenous communities, and the intercultural dynamics of Indigenous and Western governance frameworks in local governments. This article presents the findings of a study that examines relations between local governments and Indigenous institutions in the Torres Strait, a relationship that is framed by s. 9(3) of the Local Government Act 2009 (Qld) (LGA) that allows local governments to ‘take account of Aboriginal tradition and Island custom’. A framework adapted from health-related studies, consisting of three alternative policy approaches—mainstreaming, indigenisation, and hybridisation—is used in this study to characterise relationships between local governments and Indigenous institutions. Kinship and country, two important Indigenous institutions, are marginalised in Queensland's mainstream system of local government, which in turn creates obstacles for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people from participating and engaging in local government processes.

Points for practitioners

• Government that does not recognise the institutions which are fundamental to how Indigenous people govern will marginalise them from power.
• Indigenous institutions are legitimate actors whose voice must be considered within mainstreaming discussions.
• Representation within indigenous institutions influences local government relations.

     

Searching for a Role for Citizens in the Budget Process

Citizen participation in the local budget process is not prevalent, despite encouragement from scholars and professional organizations. This case study of two Kansas cities that have used a variety of input mechanisms in the budget process analyzes the effectiveness of citizen budget participation. Limited effectiveness was found, which may largely be due to the timing of the input, unstated or unclear goals, implementation difficulties, and political and environmental constraints. Citizen input appears to have had little effect on budget decisions, and neither city has institutionalized participation in the process. However, the input mechanisms serve other purposes, such as education and support for specific proposals. Describing the benefits as well as the difficulty of involving citizens in a meaningful way is beneficial to other governments as they wrestle with the issue of defining the citizens' role in the budget process.     

Models of Performance-Measurement Use in Local Governments: Understanding Budgeting, Communication, and Lasting Effects

While attention has been paid to a few cities and counties exhibiting effective performance measurement systems, most U.S. local governments have been active in the development and use of performance measurement for several decades. This research examines the effects of performance-measurement information on budgetary decision making, communication, and other operations of U.S. local governments. Data are drawn from a national survey of city and county administrators and budgeters that included nearly 300 governments. Findings indicate the use of performance measurement by local departments is pervasive, although survey respondents are less enthusiastic about measurement effectiveness. Study results show subtle distinctions between city and county officials in their use of performance measurement for budgetary purposes and processes. Research findings indicate the consistent, active integration of measures throughout the budget process is important in determining real budget and communication effects in local governments.     

Budget Transparency, Fiscal Performance, and Political Turnout: An International Approach

This paper attempts, for the first time, to assess the relationships between budget transparency, fiscal situation, and political turnout using a comparative international approach. With this aim, the authors build a comprehensive index of budget transparency encompassing 40 budget features based on international standards for a sample of 41 countries. They find a positive relationship between national government fiscal balance and budget transparency: The more information the budget discloses, the less the politicians can use fiscal deficits to achieve opportunistic goals. The univariate analysis shows a positive relationship between political turnout and transparency. This result gives some evidence of a positive answer to the question raised by James Alt and David Dreyer Lassen: Does transparency affect political outcomes such as turnout? To some extent, that the more transparent the budget reports are, the more incentives people have to vote. With respect to three variables—transparency, government fiscal balance, and electoral turnout—three clusters of countries arise: low transparency–fiscal imbalance, low transparency–small fiscal imbalance and high transparency–fiscal surplus.     

Territorial Splits (Pemekaran Daerah) in Decentralising Indonesia, 2000–2012: Local Development Drivers or Hindrance?

Not many countries have experienced as fast a growth in the number of local governments as has present day Indonesia. This study examines how territorial splits under new decentralisation policy have effected local development. The paper also critically discusses what needs to change and improve in decentralisation policy to encourage local development. Territorial splits have reinforced spatial fragmentation and ‘local selfishness’, hindering rather than driving local development. Territorial splits have also been a substantial additional burden to the national budget, and have resulted in many conflicts, disputes and tensions at the local level. This paper recommends that there should be a comprehensive review into the practice of territorial splits and suggests that there is a need to make regional mergers a more attractive option for the efficient and effective provision of public services at the local level.     

Organizational Strategy and the Outcomes of Fiscal Retrenchment in Major Cities in the United States

This study examines if organizational strategy—specifically strategy formulation and strategic stance—influences the outcomes of fiscal retrenchment in city governments. Fiscal retrenchment is defined here as the process of responding to a budget crisis. Analysis of data from a 2015 national survey of municipalities in the United States with a population of 50,000 or more indicates that a rational planning process is associated with fiscal recovery, whereas a defender strategy stance, which emphasizes organizational stability and efficiency, correlates with continuing fiscal difficulties. Examining the complex interactions between strategy formulation, strategic stance, and environmental turbulence, the empirical analysis indicates that a rational planning process that results in a defending stance is associated with slower fiscal recovery, but there is limited evidence that the relationship between strategy and fiscal recovery is dependent on external economic conditions.     

Is The National Budget Controllable?

Previous scholarly analyses of national spending have shown a penchant for incre-mentalism in interpreting changes. They have also focused almost exclusively on annual national outlays or annual expenditures. This article argues that, in many cases, budget authority figures provide a better basis for analyzing the national budget. The author gathered annual budget authority (BA) figures from fiscal years 1969 to 1993 and used this BA data for an empirical test of budget controllability. If the national budget has or has not been controlled in the recent past, then it should help us to judge whether or not it is controllable now. Five potential major budget interventions from fiscal year 1980 to 1993 were tested using an interrupted time-series and two regression models. Different intervention results are anticipated depending upon whether one has a policy perspective that is incrementalist, international systemic, or domestic political. The analysis provides more support for the domestic political perspective than for incrementalist or international systemic views. Budget authority was found to be superior to outlays for linking budget results to policy decisions. The national budget responded appropriately to policy decisions in the recent past. In this sense, the budget was controlled and we should view it as controllable.     

Budget Deficits and Coalition Governments

This paper shows that compromise between different ideologicalmotivations within multiparty governments may result in a biastoward running budget deficits even if all parties in thecoalition prefer balanced budgets. The deficit bias increases withthe degree of ``polarization'' of the ideological motivations andgenerally decreases with the degree of concentration of powerwithin the government. Although the analysis is conducted assuminga proportional representation electoral system, the results willalso apply to majoritarian systems if the winning party comprisesideologically different constituencies. The relationship betweenbudget deficits and multiparty governments is investigated usingdata from a sample of eight European Union countries for the period1971–1990. Analysis on pooled data is partly in line with the theory.Time series within country analysis is less favorable: we findclear support to the theory only in the case of Italy.     

Participatory innovations and maxi-publics: The influence of participation possibilities on perceived legitimacy at the local level in Finland

Participatory innovations (PIs) have been introduced as one possible cure to democratic malaises. Empirical research on these mechanisms for citizen participation has, however, focused on their effects on individuals and policy outcomes, leaving aside their consequences for the wider public. This article fills part of the gap by examining the effect of PIs on perceived legitimacy. The article acknowledges that citizens value not only outcomes but also the inclusiveness of decision-making processes, and defines procedural fairness and outcome satisfaction as the key evaluative criteria behind perceived legitimacy. Both total number and type of PIs are considered as possible factors shaping legitimacy evaluations. By analysing data from 9,022 citizens in 30 Finnish municipalities, the article reveals that introducing PIs is not a simple fix for legitimacy of local governments. The type of participation matters, with discursive participation generating the strongest effects on procedural fairness. However, attention should also be paid to citizens’ awareness of participation possibilities.     

How to Succeed at Increasing Spending Without Really Trying: The Balanced Budget Amendment and the Item Veto

Congressional efforts at budgetary reform generally contain procedural impediments designed to limit profligate spending. In particular, the line-item veto and the balanced budget amendment are intended to limit the ability of legislators to pursue their constituents' interests through pork-barrel politics at the expense of the broader public interest. However, assuming that legislators remain motivated by local constituent interests, we argue that these reforms will promote unexpected results. The supermajorities requires by the line-item veto and the balanced budget amendment include incentives for log-rolling that promote – and may indeed increase – pork-barrel spending.     

Budget Deficits in the States: Illinois

During FY 2009 and FY 2010, the State of Illinois was faced with significant fiscal challenges. The national recession was adversely impacting the state's economy, while the state had been struggling since the last recession with operating budget deficits and large unfunded pension liabilities. In the spring of 2009, the Governor's Office of Budget and Management estimated that in the absence of any intervention, there would be a $4.3 billion budget deficit in FY 2009 and a $7.3 billion budget shortfall in FY 2010. This paper discusses the magnitude and nature of Illinois' fiscal problems and the factors that have contributed to this situation. It also discusses Governor Quinn's proposed budget for FY 2010, as well as the legislative response. Although the state passed a capital budget and an operating budget, the outlook for the future remains uncertain. The operating budget significantly relies on one-time revenue and funding sources (including $3.4 billion in debt) and the state has approximately $100 billion in unfunded accrued liabilities for pensions and other postemployment benefits.     

Oil,elections and fiscal transparency

How does governments’ ability to gain financing from oil income affect their behaviour? Numerous studies have explored the effects of oil wealth on countries’ political characteristics, especially the level of democracy. Oil has also been associated with a significant electoral incumbency advantage across different political regimes. However, the relationship between oil wealth and incumbent governments’ behaviour, including election-year fiscal manipulation, has been studied to a lesser extent. This article argues that higher oil rents increase election-year public spending as they provide national governments both with direct revenue and increased financing opportunities. However, fiscal transparency mitigates this effect. Consequently, oil-induced electoral budget cycles decrease as fiscal transparency increases. Using a high-quality measure of fiscal transparency in a panel of countries, robust evidence in favour of this argument is found. The findings suggest that many of the previous results on the political effects of oil, including incumbency advantage, might run through an election-year spending channel, and that fiscal institutions might matter substantially for the political effects of oil.     

When Mayors Matter: Estimating the Impact of Mayoral Partisanship on City Policy

U.S. cities are limited in their ability to set policy. Can these constraints mute the impact of mayors’ partisanship on policy outcomes? We hypothesize that mayoral partisanship will more strongly affect outcomes in policy areas where there is less shared authority between local, state, and federal governments. To test this hypothesis, we create a novel dataset combining U.S. mayoral election returns from 1990 to 2006 with city fiscal data. Using regression discontinuity design, we find that cities that elect a Democratic mayor spend a smaller share of their budget on public safety, a policy area where local discretion is high, than otherwise similar cities that elect a Republican or an Independent. We find no differences on tax policy, social policy, and other areas that are characterized by significant overlapping authority. These results suggest that models of national policymaking are only partially applicable to U.S. cities. They also have implications for political accountability: mayors may not be able to influence the full range of policies that are nominally local responsibilities.     

The President's FY 1990 Budget: The Last Act in a Decade of Change

This article examines the budget requests of Presidents Reagan and Bush for fiscal year 1990, and how the federal budget has changed during the decade of the 1980s. The author concludes that the federal budget has become less controllable, as the priorities and composition of federal expenditures have shifted during the Reagan years. While the Reagan and Bush budgets do not differ significantly, the manner in which they were constructed does. The effort of President Bush to define his budgetary version of a "kinder, gentler" America may be more illusory than real. The author also traces the change in federal assistance to state and local governments, concluding that, apart from transfer payments, the federal role has markedly declined.     

Deficits, Soft Budget Constraints and Bailouts: Budgeting after the Norwegian Hospital Reform

In the 1990s, the Norwegian hospital sector was characterized by soft budgetary constraints and increasing budget deficits. This was one of the main antecedents of the 2002 hospital reform, where the central state took over ownership of the hospitals from the counties. Arguably, the centralization of ownership, financing and production would harden the budget constraints and increase the budgetary discipline. This analysis shows that this has not been accomplished. Instead, the production has been far above what was planned, and the deficits higher than ever. Two stages of the post-reform budget processes are analyzed: first, the stage where the central state set the budgets and sends signals of budgetary rules (whether the state sends signals of soft or hard budget constraints), and second, how the central state handled deficits in the hospital sector as they emerged (whether the hospitals was bailed out or not). The conclusion is that the central state neither set a hard budget constraint nor managed to stay firm as deficits turned up. It is argued that three mechanisms explain the prevailing problems of managing the hospital sector: uncertainty of the hospitals' financial situation during the transition phase; minority governments; and specific features related to the organization of the budgetary process in parliament.     

行政管理体制改革背景下市县分等研究

市县分等是行政区划改革的一项重要内容,同时又是理论研究与改革实践中的薄弱方面。在现阶段它是推进我国行政机构改革,降低行政成本,提高行政管理效率的有效途径。通过市县分等可确定不同市、县可设机构的范围,治理地方自设机构的膨胀,为政府机构人员编制管理提供科学依据和明确的量化标准。此外,实现分等有助高层政府及时了解基层县市的基本状况,强化中央对地方的管理。市县分等必须综合考虑人口、面积、经济规模、区位及政治地位等因素。