The Voting System in the Council of the European Union. The Balance Between Large and Small Countries1

There is no foundation for the view that the balance between small and large member countries has changed through the successive enlargements of the EU. In most cases, the share of votes of the large countries is about 75 percent of what it would have been if the votes had been distributed in proportion to their population, and this figure has changed very little over the years. The great exception is Germany, which is due to the reunification. The effects of the enlargements and of a greater share of small and overrepresented countries have been borne to the same extent by all member countries. The relationship between the over/under-representation of small and large countries has not changed since 1958. The share of the total population needed for a decision by qualified majority has, however, fallen, particularly with the accession of Spain and Portugal and the German reunification, and the majority has in a way become “less qualified.” This will continue with the coming enlargements, but the widespread belief that the small countries could outvote countries with a majority of the population is erroneous. This article examines the changes in the system that were suggested during the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. A change of the same magnitude as these could be achieved through a simple formula based on objective criteria and would also eliminate the inconsistencies of the present system and the need for new negotiations at each enlargement.     

The European Council and The Council of the European Union: Shapers of a European Confederation

The European Council and the Council of the European Union playkey roles in the European Union. The European Council is largelyconcerned with system-steering, while the Council of the EUundertakes sectoral policymaking. What is common to these rolesis the balancing act carried out by both institutions. Bothhave to mediate the centripetal dynamics of integration, termedcooperative confederalism here, and the centrifugal dynamicswhich are found in the strongly entrenched territorial natureof power, centered on the member states. Using new institutionalistanalysis, the article illuminates different facets of the twoinstitutions1 functioning in mediating the two dynamics.     

Designing Fiscal and Monetary Institutions for a European Monetary Union

This paper explores the conditions under which aEuropean Monetary Union (EMU) is an optimum currencyarea. The scope for an EMU increases with theconvergence of structural and fiscal policies, smallmoney holdings, a conservative European Central Bank,and dependent national central banks. How nationalpolicies affect the rest of the union once the EMU hasbeen established is also investigated. The case forsurveillance of national structural and fiscalpolicies appears to depend mainly on the monetaryarrangements in the union.     

National parliamentary control and voting in the Council of the European Union

This article explores the different ways governments express dissent in the Council of the European Union (EU) through ‘No’ votes, abstentions and recorded negative statements. A game-theoretical model is presented that studies voting behaviour and analyses how the national parliaments’ levels of control over their governments’ EU policies affect it. It is concluded that governments that are strongly controlled by their parliaments are not more likely to express dissent. However, when they do express dissent, they vote ‘No’ more often. Parliamentary control depends on the presence of formal oversight institutions as well as the motivation of parliamentarians to hold their governments accountable. Empirical support is found in an analysis of votes on 1,387 legislative proposals that represent more than a decade of Council decision making in the period 2004–2014. This article contributes to the discussion on the involvement of national parliaments in EU affairs, and clearly distinguishes the different forms of dissent in Council decision making.     

Media relations in the Council of the European Union: insights into the Council press officers' professional practices

Government communication plays a key role in democratic societies as it helps public understanding of government policies and raises awareness of the roles and actions of decision makers. Within the European Union (EU) polity, communication plays a crucial role for citizens' support for the European integration process. Despite the increasing relevance of communication about major activities of the EU, studies on the EU institutions' communications are scarce, and very little is currently known about the external communication of the Council of the EU. Focusing on the media relations activities of the Council, this paper investigates the communication practices and roles of press officers working in the Council's General Secretariat as perceived by these government communicators themselves. Qualitative interviews with the press officers, analysis of Council documents, participation in their work processes and observations of their professional behaviour were used to establish the empirical basis of the study. The findings highlight the apolitical and reactive nature of these European civil servants' communication activities and identify some of the institutional and political challenges that they face in the performance of their professional duties. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Domestic adjustment costs,interdependence and dissent in the Council of the European Union

Liberal international relations theory posits that the behaviour of states is affected both by domestic interests and other states with which they are linked in significant patterns of interdependence. This article examines the relevance of this proposition to states' behaviour in the most powerful institution in the furthest reaching example of regional integration in the world today: the Council of the European Union. Compared to previous research, more detailed evidence is analysed in this article on the substance of the political debates that preceded Council votes. It is found that states' disagreement with both discretionary and nondiscretionary decision outcomes affects the likelihood that they dissent at the voting stage. Moreover, in line with the theory posited here, the behaviour of states' significant trading partners has a particularly marked effect on the likelihood that they will dissent.     

The Distribution of A Priori Voting Power in the EC Council of Ministers and the European Parliament

One of the most important decision making bodies in the EC is the Council of Ministers. In that voting body the member states have different voting weights roughly in proportion to the size of their populations. This article focuses on the voting power of current and prospective member states (Finland, Norway and Sweden) utililizing the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices of voting power. As the decision rules play a crucial role in the computation of these indices, the a priori voting power distribution is considered under various decision rules ranging from simple majority to near unanimity. We also discuss the a priori voting power distribution of various political groupings in the current European Parliament and in the hypothetical parliament which would have Finland, Norway and Sweden as new members. Although thus far the real power base in the EC is the Commission, the analysis of voting power distributions in the Council of Ministers and in the parliament sheds some light upon the relative influence that various actors might have in EC decision-making processes.     

Striking a pose: Transparency and position taking in the Council of the European Union

In recent years, transparency (or the lack thereof) has become a central concern of the European Union and its attempts to increase the democratic legitimacy of the legislative decision‐making process. The claim regularly made is that increasing transparency increases the potential for holding decision makers to account. This study investigates the manner in which transparency in the decision‐making process affects the policy positions taken by negotiators at the outset of negotiations. The findings presented suggest that increasing transparency tends to lead to polarisation of negotiations, with negotiators taking more extreme positions when they know that their positions can be observed by outside parties. The implication of this result is that advocates of transparency should be aware that there is an inherent trade‐off between increasing transparency, on the one hand, and increasing the incentives to grandstand during negotiations, on the other.     

Roll call analysis of voting in the European Union Council of Ministers after the 2004 enlargement

Voting and coalitions in the Council of Ministers in the enlarged European Union are analysed for the period during which the EU had 25 Member States, based on Council's roll call records. In terms of frequency of voting in the Council, the new EU Member States did not differ from their older counterparts in any significant way. However, enlargement has had an impact on the Council interaction. A spatial roll call model shows that the Council's political space is comprised of two main dimensions. The first reflects the north-south cleavage found in the Council even before the 2004 enlargement, while the second is related to enlargement and indicates a cleavage between the new and old Member States. Thus in the enlarged Union, the north-south dimension is replaced by a north-south-east pattern.     

The Democratic Legitimacy of the European Union Committee System

This article investigates both the operation and the democratic legitimacy of the European Union committee system. This vast but rarely studied system is an important site of European governance, exercising an increasing amount of policy responsibility while also providing the essential arenas necessary for supranational problem solving. Despite their contribution to the success of the “European project,” committees are increasingly coming under attack, notably for their lack of democratic credentials. The article employs original empirical research based on interviews and internal documentary evidence to answer a timely question: does the EU committee system strike an appropriate balance between the values of system effectiveness and democratic legitimacy? Following the application of a set of democratic principles to EU committees, the article finds that a poor balance has been struck between effectiveness and democracy. The article concludes with some operational suggestions for improving this balance in the short‐to‐medium term.     

The institution of 'consensus' in the European Union: Formal versus informal decision-making in the Council

Abstract.  Although many have studied European Union (EU) decision-making in order to evaluate where the locus of power is, most studies have relied on the formal decision-making rules in the first pillar to theorize the workings of the EU. This assumption is somewhat problematic given that the informal norms of consensus are the primary mode of decision-making (81 per cent of decisions are made by consensus). This article examines the institution of consensus in the EU. It argues that the informal norm of consensus renders implausible the fundamental assumption of the rational institutionalist literature, challenging the validity of its claims. Finally, the costs and benefits to the EU's perceived legitimacy are examined with the argument that the putative benefits of consensual decision-making do not obtain in the EU and that the institution of consensus – the lack of voting and thus accountability – actually contributes to the perception of a democratic deficit in the Council.     

Coalition formation on major policy dimensions: The Council of the European Union 1998 to 2004

Using data of contested decisions in the Council of the European Union, combined with data on the position of member states on the left-right and support for European integration dimensions, this paper provides an overview of winning coalitions formed in the council in the 1998 to 2004 time span. It shows distance between the combined policy positions of winning coalitions to individual EU states within these coalitions and demonstrates that most winning coalitions in the Council have a large combined voting weight, minimal winning coalitions are rare, and ideological connectedness plays a much smaller role than expected.     

A Demos for the European Union?

The European Union's alleged shortage of democratic legitimacy is said to be caused partly by the polity's lack of a demos which makes it unsuitable for majoritarian decision-making. However, this problem is often overshadowed by – sometimes even confused with – the lack of public enthusiasm as regards European integration. But, although clearly related, these are not synonymous. The no-demos thesis focuses on the lack of a transnational political relationship between individuals and is related mainly to the legitimacy of the EU's decision-making processes , whereas the issue of popular support primarily relates to the legitimacy of European integration itself. In this article, I address the former by attempting to answer the following questions. Firstly, what do we mean when we say that the EU has no demos? Secondly, does the EU really need a demos, and if so, how can one be created?     

Voting and economic factors in French elections for the European Parliament

This article builds and estimates several econometric models that explain and forecast the outcomes of the French elections for the European Parliament. These models show the influence of the change in the local unemployment rate to explain the vote for the moderate Left and the moderate Right in the French elections for the European Parliament. These models appear to be accurate in forecasting the elections of the past, and their behavior for the 2009 French election for the European Parliament is satisfactory.     

An Alternative Constitutional Treaty for the European Union

We propose an alternativeto the Constitutional Treaty drafted by theEuropean Convention. Our proposaleffectively limits the domain of governmentat the Union level. It takes the incentivesof the European public actors into account.We propose a second chamber of EuropeanParliament composed of delegates of theparliaments of the member states and asecond court composed of delegates of thehighest courts of the member states. Theseinstitutions will be the guardians of thesubsidiarity principle. The principle ofthe separation of powers is implemented byabolishing the Commission's monopoly oflegislative initiative and by curtailingthe Council's legislative role. Treatyamendments will not be drafted by aninter-governmental conference but by aninter-parliamentary conference. We proposeto change the method of financing andintroduce referenda.