Juror decision making

Much of the research on juror decision making is concerned with whether jurors are swayed by irrelevant-or extralegal-issues in their judgments of defendants. Such studies examine whether jurors' attitudes and victims' and defendants' characteristics have a measurable impact on these decisions. Yet, in the typical study, evidential issues are either poorly measured or ignored, hence the effects of extralegal issues may be exaggerated. Moreover, jury simulations are often chosen to study these questions despite critics' concerns about the generalizability of the results. The present study uses data gathered from actual jurors to assess whether the emphasis on juror competence is justified. The results indicate that these jurors' decisions are dominated by evidential issues, particularly evidence concerning the use of force and physical evidence. Jurors were considerably less responsive to characteristics of victims and defendants, although some of these factors significantly affected their decisions.The research reported here was supported by the National Institute of Mental Health under grant No. R01 MH29727 and the National Institute of Justice under grant No. 82-IJ-CX-0015. The author would like to thank Douglas Smith, Barbara Reskin, and Lowell Hargens for helpful comments on earlier drafts.     

Juror decision making in eyewitness identification cases

The lay-person's knowledge of the factors that influence eyewitness memory was examined by evaluating the manner in which mock jurors integrated eyewitness evidence to draw inferences about defendant culpability and the likelihood that an identification was correct. Three hundred and twenty-one undergraduates viewed a videotaped trial within which ten witness and identification factors were manipulated between trials. Manipulation checks showed that subjects demonstrated superior memory for the evidence and the manipulated variables had their intended impact on appropriate rating scales. However, only one variable, witness confidence, had reliable effects on subjects' perceptions of culpability, on the perceived likelihood that the identification was correct, and on several other relevant dependent variables. Eight variables that have been shown to affect identification accuracy in the empirical literature had trivial effects on mock jurors' inferences. It was concluded that lay-people are insensitive to the factors that influence eyewitness memory.     

Juror decision making in the capital penalty trial

Two factors thought to influence jurors' penalty decisions in capital trials—the nature of the crime committed and the defense's portrayal of the convicted offender's character—were examined. Mock jurors were death-qualified and exposed to one of twelve simulated penalty trials. Each trial was comprised of one of three capital crimes and one of four defense strategies. Jurors were least punitive in robbery-murder conditions and most punitive in multiple murder conditions. A conceptual argument against capital punishment was the most effective defense; a mental illness defense was the least effective. Penalty decisions were mediated by three attributional variables: (a) juror perceptions of the defendant's volition, (b) juror perceptions of the defendant's future dangerousness, and (c) juror perceptions of the relative competency of the opposing attorneys.This article is based on the author's dissertation which received an Honorable Mention in the 1985 SPSSI Dissertation Prize competition. The research was made possible by grants from the University of California, Santa Cruz and Division 41 of the American Psychological Association. The author is indebted to Craig Haney, Elliot Aronson, and Dane Archer for their valuable suggestions and support.     

Determinations of negligence and the hindsight bias

Examined the hindsight bias in determinations of negligence inTarasoff-type cases. The sample of 297 community residents was asked to read clinical case scenarios involving treatment of potentially dangerous patients. Scenarios varied by outcome: (1) the patient became violent, (2) the patient did not become violent, and (3) no outcome was specified. Respondents rated the foreseeability of violence, the reasonableness of therapist actions, and negligence. It was hypothesized that respondents who were informed that the patient became violent would be more likely to find the therapist negligent than respondents in the other two outcome conditions. Findings supported this, and respondents in the violent outcome condition rated the violence as more foreseeable and therapist actions as less reasonable. Implications for mental health and legal professionals are discussed and future research ideas are suggested.     

A normality bias in legal decision making

It is important to understand how legal fact finders determine causation and assign blame. However, this process is poorly understood. Among the psychological factors that affect decision makers are an omission bias (a tendency to blame actions more than inactions [omissions] for bad results), and a normality bias (a tendency to react more strongly to bad outcomes that spring from abnormal rather than normal circumstances). The omission and normality biases often reinforce one another when inaction preserves the normal state and when action creates an abnormal state. But what happens when these biases push in opposite directions as they would when inaction promotes an abnormal state or when action promotes a normal state? Which bias exerts the stronger influence on the judgments and behaviors of legal decision makers? The authors address this issue in two controlled experiments. One experiment involves medical malpractice and the other involves stockbroker negligence. They find that jurors pay much more attention to the normality of conditions than to whether those conditions arose through acts or omissions. Defendants who followed a nontraditional medical treatment regime or who chose a nontraditional stock portfolio received more blame and more punishment for bad outcomes than did defendants who obtained equally poor results after recommending a traditional medical regime or a traditional stock portfolio. Whether these recommendations entailed an action or an omission was essentially irrelevant. The Article concludes with a discussion of the implications of a robust normality bias for American jurisprudence.     

Juror decision making for juveniles tried as adults: the effects of defendant age,crime type,and crime outcome

This study examined the influences of the crime type (person or property) and the crime outcome (mild or severe) on mock jurors’ verdict and sentencing decisions for adult defendants and juvenile defendants tried as adults. Jurors read a trial summary depicting a defendant charged with aggravated robbery or second-degree burglary. The crimes had either mild or severe damage inflicted on the person or property, and the defendant's age was presented as 14 or 24. Neither the defendant age nor the crime outcome affected jurors’ verdicts; however, jurors were more likely to convict a defendant charged with a crime against a person. Jurors recommended longer sentences for an adult defendant, a defendant charged with a crime against a person, and a defendant charged with a crime with a severe outcome. The discussion explored these outcomes and the role of bias in jurors’ perceptions of defendants.     

Juror background characteristics and attitudes toward rape

Although numerous writers have discussed the importance of and link between juror characteristics and juror decisions in rape trials, anempirical investigation of the relationships between these characteristics and juror verdicts has not been made. Using data obtained from a sample of 896 citizens serving as mock jurors, the principal focus of the present research was on the correlations of jurors' background characteristics and their attitudes toward rape with their decisions in a simulated rape case. Results of the study showed that the jurors' background and attitudinal variables were associated with their decisions. In addition, the pattern of the correlations was quite stable as the characteristics of the case evaluated (in terms of defendant and victim race, victim physical attractiveness, victim sexual experience, strength of evidence presented, and type of rape committed) were found to have only negligible effects on these relationships. Other tests showed that only the attitudinal variables accounted for differences in the jurors' decisionsafter characteristics of the case had been considered. Further, as compared to background data, the jurors' views of rape were the most important predictor of their decisions. Implications of the role of jurors' views of rape in jurors' decisions in rape trials and the use of rape attitudes for selecting jury members in rape cases discussed.     

Estimating Juror Accuracy,Juror Ability,and the Relationship Between Them

This article advances a method based on standard test theories and measurement models to determine correct verdicts for jury trials, and to estimate juror accuracy, juror ability, and trial difficulty (and the relationships among them). With five vignette cases and 1,318 juror eligible adults as the subjects, the model consistently identified verdicts that accorded with the judge’s instructions on the law as correct. With the correct verdicts, the strength of the relationship between juror accuracy and juror ability was found to be substantial. These findings suggest that the assumption of equivalent accuracy of jurors underlying the Condorcet’s jury theorem (Condorcet, Essai sur l’Application de l’Analyse a la Probabilite des Decisions Rendues a la Pluralite des Voix, Paris, 1785) may be untenable for general cases where jurors of diverse dispositions and abilities serve together; and that the role of juror ability in determining the accuracy of legal decisions could be more significant than that of attitudes and values because, unlike attitudes and values, ability could affect juror’s legal decisions regardless of the type of the case.     

Race and the decision making of juries

The relationship between race and jury decision making is a controversial topic that has received increased attention in recent years. While public and media discourse has focused on anecdotal evidence in the form of high‐profile cases, legal researchers have considered a wide range of empirical questions including: To what extent does the race of a defendant affect the verdict tendencies of juries? Is this influence of race comparable for jurors of different races? In what ways does a jury's racial composition affect its verdict and deliberations? The present review examines both experimental and archival investigations of these issues. Though the extant literature is not always consistent and has devoted too little attention to the psychological mechanisms underlying the influence of race, this body of research clearly demonstrates that race has the potential to impact trial outcomes. This is a conclusion with important practical as well as theoretical implications when it comes to ongoing debates regarding jury representativeness, how to optimize jury performance, jury nullification and racial disparities in the administration of capital punishment.     

Bail decision making and pretrial detention

Bail practices became the target of reform efforts during the 1960's and 1970's not only because of issues concerning economic bias against indigent defendants but also because of criticism of the bail decision itself. Questions were raised about the appropriate uses of bail (e.g., to prevent flight or pretrial crime, or to inflict pretrial punishment), the rationality of the criteria relied on by judges in deciding bail, and the discretionary allocation of pretrial detention through high cash bail. In this article, case law and statutes governing bail practices in the United States are reviewed first to characterize the ambiguous legal framework from within which bail judges must operate. Then bail decisions in a large urban jurisdiction are analyzed as a case study to discover the factors most influential in determining pretrial release options. It is inferred that, even after years of reform, community-ties measures do not play a major role in the bail decision or the determination of pretrial custody; rather, the nature of the charged offense appears most influential. A finding of special significance is that a large proportion of these decisions could not be explained systematically (i.e., a large share of variance remained unexplained). The article concludes by suggesting a guidelines approach to bail that could narrow disparity in bail options and the use of detention, enhance the rationality of the decision process and contribute to more equitable pretrial practices.Revised version of a paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, Toronto, August, 1978. This research was supported, in part, by a grant from the Statistics Division of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration to the Criminal Justice Research Center. Points of view or opinions stated are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.     

Jurors' interpretations and jury decision making

In arriving at their verdicts, jurors must determine what really happened in the case at hand. Their interpretations then guide their decision making and become influential in the group deliberation process. This article uses conversational data from simulated jury deliberations to describe jurors' practice of articulating schematic interpretations as accounts for their verdict choices, and as means for persuading other jurors. As jurors contribute additional interpretations during deliberations, the group decision-making task becomes more complex, deliberations las longer, and they are more difficult to resolve. A significant negative relation is established between the number of interpretations articulated and the jury's likelihood of reaching a unanimous verdict. Articulating multiple interpretations in support of a candidate verdict appears to militate against its unanimous adoption.I am endebted to Andre Modigliani and Joseph Sanders for their invaluable assistance on this project.     

Procedural justice and ethical decision making

Procedural justice, in the form of voice and respectful treatment by supervisor, and ethical decision making are examined in this research. Ethical decision making is hypothesized to be a direct function of moral intent, as indicated by willingness to use moral criteria in decision making. Moral intent is, in turn, expected to be a function of the decision-making context, including perceptions of voice, respect and trust between supervisor and subordinate, and moral climate. Individual moral development is also expected to have a positive effect on moral intent. Results generally support the model, with two exceptions. First, perception of voice has a negative effect on moral intent, while caring climate and respectful supervisory relations have the expected positive effect on moral intent. These results suggest either a compensatory model of ethical decision making or a complacency effect. Second, individual characteristics had very little effect on either the decision made or the level of moral intent developed, save for one decision. These results suggest an important overlooked variable, the salience of issues for procedural justice concerns.     

Preference for decision control in organizational decision making

Two studies examined preference for authority or subordinate decision control in dispute resolution and allocation procedures in an organizational setting. In both studies, a marked preference for the authority/subordinate sharing of decision control was found. In Study 1, nearly one third of respondents preferred that subordinates share decision control with supervisors in both dispute and allocation situations; for several of the situations decision sharing was the modal preference. The study also found a tendency to prefer subordinate decision control in disputes but supervisor decision control in allocations. In Study 2, again the most preferred procedure was one in which subordinates shared decision control with their supervisors. The procedure high in decision sharing was rated as the one most fair. It was also rated as more likely to improve relationships among members and to result in the best decision. Some differences in preference for decision control and decision sharing depending upon social factors predominant in the setting were found.     

Collective decision making by committee

Implicitly or explicitly, economic decisions always contain elements of compromise. However, the bargaining models of economic theory treat only the two decision maker case with linearly aggregated priorities; i.e. compromise decisions under Pareto optimality and no side payments. Even then the relative importance of the decision makers remains indeterminate. This paper proposes a simplified bargaining model with three new features: (a) it allows multiple participants; (b) it uses optimal voting patterns to combine the policy proposals, rather than the policy priorities, to form those compromise decisions; and (c) it determines the relative power of each participant endogenously. Perhaps more important, the method does not depend on each decision maker knowing the preferences of his colleagues exactly.     

Discriminatory decision making at the legislative level

This paper is an analysis of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. Consistent with value-conflict perspectives, previous research on the social origins of drug legislation suggests that coercive laws occur when the behavior of minority and other subordinate groups become threatening. Liberalizing drug legislation is enacted when the interests of dominant groups seem juxtaposed to existing punitive legislation. The present analysis explores the process of legislative decision making when both subordinateand superordinate groups engage in drug-related behaviors which run counter to dominant norms and values. To do so, a detailed analysis of the congressional committee hearings and floor debates which preceded enactment of the 1970 Act was conducted. This analysis revealed that Congress did not pass a strictly coercive drug control policy at the risk of stigmatizing superordinate groups. Nor did it choose to liberalize drug penalties across the board. Congress perceived that strictly liberal policies might undermine both the instrumental goal of reducing illicit drug activity, and the symbolic goal of expressing general societal disapproval of illicit drug use. Instead, the legislation that emerged from congressional debates contained both liberal and coercive provisions reflecting the requirements of dealing with two targeted populations: young middle and upper class white drug users who became identified as victims of drug traffickers; and large-scale and professional drug dealers who became identified as enemy deviants—the true source and symbol of the drug problem. Liberal, and essentially discriminatory, provisions permitted the protection of the former from stigmatization as criminal felons. Coercive, but apparently nondiscriminatory, provisions provided the threat and potential for severe punishment of the latter. The discriminatory features of the 1970 Act are identified and explicated. And, the implications of the Act's provisions for race- or class-based decisions in the application of sanctions are discussed.     

Factors that influence jury decision making

Investigated whether information regarding the disposition of insanity acquittees and the defendant's mental state at the time of the trial, had a significant effect on mock jurors' verdicts. Two trials were used to assess whether results generalize across cases. participants read excerpts from a trial in which the accused's mental state at the time of the trial (symptom free, neurotic symptoms, or psychotic symptoms) and the disposition instructions (no instructions, indeterminate disposition, and capped disposition) were varied. Participants then rendered a verdict of guilty, not guilty, or not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD). Participants who thought the accused was psychotic at the time of the trial were more likely to render a verdict of NCRMD than guilty, and they were more likely to render a verdict of NCRMD than those who thought the accused was normal. No significant differences were found for disposition. Finally, a significant difference for verdicts was found between trials.     

Jury decision making in the capital penalty phase

There are large bodies of research on the deterrent value of the death penalty and public attitudes towards capital punishment. However, little is known about how jurors decide whether a particular defendant should live or die. This article briefly summarizes the case law that attempts to guide the discretion of jurors in the penalty phase of capital murder trials, reviews empirical research on penalty decision making, suggests a methodological strategy for investigating the penalty phase, and identifies several promising directions for future research. Four broad categories of research are identified: the effects of guiding juror discretion, comparisons of juries that vote for life with those that vote for death, the relationship between guilt and penalty phases, and models of decision making in the penalty phase. Several testable hypotheses are proposed.