Power,norms and theory. A meta-political inquiry

Realism criticizes the idea, central to what may be called ‘the priority view’, that philosophy has the task of imposing from the outside general norms of morality or standards of reasonableness on politics understood as the domain of power. According to realism, political philosophy must reveal the specific standards internal to the political practice of handling power appropriately and as it develops in actual circumstances. Framed in those terms, the debate evokes the idea that political power itself is lacking normativity until such time as norms are devised that govern its use. In contrast, this essay identifies a normative dimension internal to (the conquest and exercise of) power. Power depends on recognition and support in the form of belief. This dependence explains how an interest in power introduces a responsiveness to normative considerations into the domain of politics.     

Racial structural solidarity

Abstract

Effective political action against racial injustice requires a conception of solidarity based on the social and material reality of this form of injustice. I develop such a notion of solidarity by extending Iris Young’s notion of ‘gender as seriality’ to race. This notion of solidarity avoids the problems encountered by Shelby’s ‘common oppression view’ and Gooding-Williams’s non-foundational view. On Shelby’s ‘common oppression’ view, solidarity is based solely on the victims’ shared condition of oppression. According to Shelby, all victims of racial oppression can be reasonably expected to endorse a set of principles that will move them to common action. Gooding-Williams sheds doubt on the idea that such shared principles exist and defends instead a view of politics as action-in-concert, marked by reasonable disagreement, and a non-foundational view of solidarity constituted through the controversy of politics rather than given in virtue of pre-political commitments or interests. I argue that the problem with such a notion is that it is unable to link the material and social reality of the unjust structures to the forms of political action that would effectively transform social reality. My notion of ‘structural racial solidarity’ would avoid these problems.     

Partisanship and public reason

In the large body of literature concerning John Rawls’s Political Liberalism (1993) and his conception of public reason, little attention has been paid to the implications that the constraints of public reason have for partisans, i.e. citizens who participate in politics through political parties. This paper argues that even on the basis of a ‘mild’ understanding of Rawls’s conception of the constraints of public reason, which takes into account the various stipulations Rawls provided throughout his later work, when applied to partisans the constraints of public reason lose none or little of their hindering force. This seriously undermines the contribution that parties and partisans can provide to the change and the varieties of public reason that Rawls himself advocates as a response to social change and, therefore, to political justification and legitimacy. Parties articulate, coordinate and enhance societal demands which, without their support, may remain unheard and fail to change the acceptable terms of public reason and political justification. If the political speech of partisans is restrained, this potential for change (and, therefore, its contribution to political legitimacy) is seriously undermined.     

Political legitimacy

These comments take issue with two aspects of the treatment of Rawls in On The People’s Terms. First, I criticize the characterization of Rawls as downplaying political liberties and focusing instead on social justice. Second, I take issue with the claim that Pettit provides a more robust conception of legitimacy than Rawls. The basis for this claim is that Rawls, along with others in the Kantian tradition, downplays the question of legitimacy by ‘going hypothetical’. Yet in common with Rawls, Pettit’s republican conception of legitimacy imposes a stringent test of legitimacy that many democratic regimes would not pass. This leads him to propose a weaker standard of ‘legitimizability’ that appears to involve the same kind of counterfactual judgment for which Rawls is criticized.     

Herbert’s Herbivore: One-Dimensional Society and the Possibility of Radical Vegetarianism

Abstract

Careful reading of Herbert Marcuse’s texts, including Counterrevolution and Revolt, One-Dimensional Man, An Essay on Liberation, and Eros and Civilization, reveals his subtle attention to the human–animal dialectic and its role in human liberation. More specifically, animals mark the irrationality of advanced industrialized society for Marcuse, and his subtle but keen treatment of the animal question in politics provides an opening to radically rethink politics for animals and humans. Working from Marcuse’s critical theory, I explore the contemporary one-dimensional animal, which I argue imbricates both animals and humans in the violence and destruction that characterizes advanced industrial society. Using Marcuse’s concept of one-dimensional society and his discussion of animals as my theoretical framework, I specifically consider vegetarianism in its capacity to militate against the contemporary political economy of meat. I conclude that Marcuse’s insights point to a radical vegetarianism aligned with anti-capitalist politics that offers the development of sensuous, pleasurable, life-affirming sensibilities that support true liberation for both animals and humans.     

On Sen on comparative justice

Against scepticism from thinkers including John Rawls and Thomas Nagel about the appropriateness of justice as the concept through which global ethical concerns should be approached, Amartya Sen argues that the problem lies not with the idea of justice, but with a particular approach to thinking of justice, namely a transcendental approach. In its stead Sen is determined to offer an alternative systematic theory of justice, namely a comparative approach, as a more promising foundation for a theory of ‘global justice.’ But in the end Sen offers no such thing. He does not develop a theory of justice and this is all to the good; for if values are plural in the way Sen suggests, then justice is not a master idea but one value among many, and it should be neither the first virtue of social institutions, nor the notion that frames all our reflections on ethical and political life.     

"Critchley is Žižek": In Defence of Critical Political Philosophy

Abstract

In an ironically ?i?ekian manner, this paper argues that Simon Critchley and Slavoj ?i?ek's apparent political disagreement (ludic reformist versus strident revolutionary) conceal a common set of preconditions and presuppositions. These presuppositions can be summed by the slogan "the for getting of political philosophy", which more specifically means the forgetting of the difference between philosophy and political life, and the reflective need to find mediations between the two. Critchley's turn to humour honours the notion that politics is about the realm of appearances, while ?i?ek's frank avowal of the "diabolical evil" of the subject of the death drive makes patently clear the dangers posed by a "politics of Truth".     

Can my religion influence my conception of justice? Political liberalism and the role of comprehensive doctrines

In his last works, John Rawls explicitly argued for an overlapping consensus on a family of reasonable liberal political conceptions of justice, rather than just one. This ‘Deep Version’ of political liberalism opens up new questions about the relationship between citizens’ political conceptions, from which they must draw and offer public reasons in their political advocacy, and their comprehensive doctrines. These questions centre on whether a reasonable citizen’s choice of political conception can be influenced by her comprehensive doctrine. In this paper I present two models of the relationship, which give contrasting answers to these questions, and defend the model that is more permissive with regard to the influence of comprehensive doctrines. This has important implications for our understanding of Rawlsian political liberalism, and reduces the force of objections that have been offered by theorists sympathetic to religion.     

Kant and the critique of the ethics-first approach to politics

Abstract

Contemporary ‘realists’ attack the Kantian influence on political philosophy. A main charge is that Kantians fail to understand the specificity of politics and neglect to develop a ‘distinctively political thought’ that differs from moral philosophy. Instead, the critics say, Kantians are guilty of an ‘ethics-first approach to politics,’ in which political theory is a mere application of moral principles. But what does this ethics-first approach have to do with Kant himself? Very little. This article shows how Kant’s approach to political theory at a fundamental level includes political institutions, power, and coercion as well as disagreement, security, and coordination problems. In contrast to realists, Kant has a fundamental principle, which can explain why and guide how we ought to approach the political question, namely the norm of equal freedom. Yet, Kant’s theory does not take the form of a moralistic ought addressed to the isolated individual, but concerns a problem that we share as interdependent beings and that requires common institutions. The fruitfulness of the Kantian approach, then, is that it can take the political question seriously without being uncritical of actual politics and power, and that it can be normative without being moralistic.     

Love is a Battlefield: Post-Political Control in an Era of Financial Crisis

This paper criticizes the ideology of deontological liberalism from the perspective of Marxist thought and employs the idea of temporality as an example of this critique. Deontological liberals like John Rawls argue that the liberal political order should be indifferent to ultimate ends. Consequently, Rawls constructs an "abstract" self that is defined apart from the concrete totality of a real human life. This paper argues, through Marx's essay "On the Jewish Question" that the liberal, bourgeois self is not "abstract" but exists in an instrumentalized society in which individuals treat themselves and others as means, not ends. Following this line of thought, the paper shows that the purportedly "abstract" or "empty" linear temporality of modern thought is actually commodified or instrumentalized time. The paper concludes with suggestions how "leisure" understood as non-instrumental or self-sufficient time could be an alternative to the commodified temporality of bourgeois culture.     

Political Communication and Disagreement Among Citizens in Japan and the United States

Patterns of interdependence among and between citizens add an additional level of complexity to a comparative analysis of democratic politics. In this article we examine communication and disagreement among citizens in Japan and the United States. We argue that a majoritarian bias in political communication operates in both settings, but it tends to perpetuate a system of one-party dominance in Japanese politics. Comparative studies of democratic citizenship have focused generally on the variation across national contexts in the political beliefs and values held by individuals. Our argument is that citizenship and the alternative cultures of democratic politics have less to do with the idiosyncratic beliefs and values that individuals carry with them and more to do with the contextually embedded nature of political communication. We address these issues using two community-based studies, one conducted in South Bend, Indiana, in 1984 and the other in Bunkyo Ward, Tokyo, in 1997.     

Reply to critics

Abstract

This article provides a response to the contributors of this symposium. Notably, I respond to challenges pertaining to whether my account can: accommodate collective goods and collective choice and the complexities pertaining to intergenerational justice; be reconciled with the insights of relational egalitarianism and non-ideal theory; meet the requirement that it provides political action guidance instead of being practically irrelevant; be grounded in Rawls’ considerations about luck and justice; avoid implausible implications regarding ‘concern monsters’ and offensive preferences.     

Reconciliation Arguments in John Rawls’s Political Philosophy

Abstract

Recently debates about the worth of “ideal theory” have directed attention to the functions that an account of a perfectly just society can serve. One function is that of “reconciliation”: learning that a seemingly undesirable feature of the social world would exist even in the perfectly just society can show us the value that it has in the present as well. John Rawls has emphasized reconciliation as among the roles of political philosophy. For instance, Rawls claims that his theory of justice can reconcile us to the pluralism of liberal democracies. In this essay, I argue that Rawls’s political theory also can reconcile the inhabitants of liberal democratic societies to the fact that such societies may be cognitively confusing on account of their complexity. Then I contend that Rawls’s work offers valuable theoretical resources for analysing a society’s transparency or lack thereof.     

Addressing contradictory needs: the Lega Nord and Italian immigration policy

ABSTRACT

Cento Bull addresses the question of whether the Italian Lega Nord, when in government, pursues policies that contradict its rhetoric (politics of simulation or symbolic politics) or policies that are in line with its dominant discourse (politics of identity). Her analysis focuses on immigration policy because this is an area that links together economic issues (immigration is highly functional to the economy of those regions of Italy that form the Lega's strongholds) and identity issues (immigration is seen as visibly threatening cultural values and disrupting community cohesion). She argues that recent legislation in this area, approved in July 2009, is formally in line with Lega rhetoric but also that actual policy outcomes contradict both the party's rhetoric and the legislation itself. This confirms the validity of the concept of ‘simulative politics’ in so far as it refers to a societal practice of self-deception, rather than simply to practices of deception on the part of political actors.     

Love,activism, and the possibility of radical social change in Mostar

ABSTRACT

This article reflects on the meanings and possibilities of social change in Mostar, a city more often associated with the seeming impossibility of eradicating ethno-national divisions and corruption that paralyses it. It focuses on the under-researched politics of grassroots activism by drawing on Hardt’s and Negri’s work on the political potential of ‘love’ to shape and propel radical politics. Overall, the article reveals the lack of a cohesive agenda of grassroots politics in Mostar, and asks whether love (that creates and sustains political movement) can educate, patiently, to the revolution.     

Structural injustice and alienation: a reply to my critics

ABSTRACT

This author’s reply addresses critiques by Reinhard Wolf, Alasia Nuti, and Kimberly Hutchings of my 2017 book, Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics. First, I restate the normative and practical significance of focusing on challenges of structural injustice for resolving many serious and pressing problems in world politics, including climate change. Second, I begin to resolve some puzzles about the concept of alienation and its relationship to justice and reconciliation, by outlining two concepts of alienation, and distinguishing them from alienation as a cognitive-affective experience. Third, I clarify the limits and potential of decolonial political theory.     

Global democracy in a society of peoples

This paper explores the political structures suitable for the realization of John Rawls’ The Law of Peoples (1999). In particular, it explores whether Rawls’ principles and fundamental foundations recommend establishing global institutions and, if so, whether, and in what sense, these institutions should be democratic. It is often suggested, either implicitly or explicitly, that The Law of Peoples would operate through the bilateral and multilateral interactions of, ideally conceived, nation-states. This paper argues, on the contrary, that it would advise a series of democratic global institutions. The case is developed with respect to the idea of a global institution with the remit of regulating international trade and applied, in the contemporary context, to the World Trade Organization (WTO).     

Patterns of Disagreement in Democratic Politics: Comparing Germany, Japan, and the United States

An important ingredient in democratic politics is the experience of disagreement through social communication and political discussion. If people fail to encounter contrary viewpoints, their own views are never challenged, they are never forced to reconsider initially held opinions, and they are effectively excluded from democratic deliberation. This article examines patterns of political agreement and disagreement within the communication networks of citizens in Germany, Japan, and the United States. Several questions are addressed. Are there cross‐national differences in patterns of agreement and disagreement among citizens? To what extent are these patterns subject to individual attitudes, to the structure of communication networks, and to levels of aggregate support for particular preferences and opinions? Finally, what are the implications of disagreement for civic capacity and political engagement? Empirical analyses are based on cooperative election surveys conducted in each country during the early 1990s.