Primary Voters Versus Caucus Goers and the Peripheral Motivations of Political Participation

Depending on their state of residence, Americans can participate in Presidential nomination contests either by voting in a primary or by attending a caucus. Since caucus participation requires more time and effort than primary voting, it has long been thought that caucuses must attract a more partisan, activist, and politically extreme cohort of citizens than primaries. This paper challenges the view that more burdensome electoral institutions necessarily ought to attract more politically engaged citizens. I propose a theory of peripheral motivations that predicts caucus goers and primary voters will not differ in terms of their political attitudes or interest, but they will differ in their levels of community engagement. The key insight is that many of the reasons why citizens choose to participate or abstain from politics actually have little to do with politics. Analysis of two surveys from the 2008 Presidential election substantiates the theoretical expectations.     

Loyal political cartels and committee assignments in Congress: Evidence from the Congressional Black Caucus

This study presents a political model whichsuggests that monopoly legislators form cartel-likeorganizations (referred to as ``memberships'') in aneffort to extract greater benefits in the politicalprocess. Based on a model by Coker and Crain (1994)that provides theoretical and statistical argumentsfor congressional committees as loyalty-generatinginstitutions, the instant research examines committeeplacement of ``members'' of the Congressional BlackCaucus (CBC) in the U.S. House by Democrat leaders.Voting records indicate that the CBC is uniform in itsvoting patterns, indicating cartel-like behavior.Because of this, the Democratic leadership in theHouse chooses to place CBC members on importantcommittees in order to support their policy agenda.The general finding of this study is that ``blackrepresentation'' may be greater than simply theproportion of seats held by black Representatives."Legislators differ substantially by virtue of their committeeassignments. Committees in Congress, and particularly in theHouse of Representatives, possess disproportionate power over thepolicy areas in their respective jurisdictions, have the rightto hold hearings, and recommend budget allocations for ...bureaus ..." (Grier and Munger, 1991: 25)     

Welfare and child support program knowledge gaps reduce program effectiveness

There is little research on knowledge of the policy rules that could affect individuals, either in general or in evaluations of new programs. The lack of research is surprising, given that knowledge gaps could limit the effectiveness of reforms or lead to incorrect inferences regarding the effects of a policy change. In this article, we use survey data to examine the level and sources of welfare participants' policy knowledge in the context of a substantial change in child support and welfare policy in Wisconsin. We find very low levels of knowledge of child support policy rules. Multivariate analyses suggest that people tend to learn policy rules by experience; we find less consistent support for knowledge being primarily imparted through interactions with caseworkers. A difference‐in‐difference analysis suggests that if participants had been more knowledgeable, program impacts would have been larger. Implications of this research for policy implementation and policy evaluations are discussed. © 2007 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management     

Need determination in AFDC program

This study summarizes the State policy with respect to the determination of need in the Federal-State program of AFDC. The areas discussed are the individual State definitions of need, the content of need standard, the types of persons included in the payment, the amount of income and resources allowed recipient families, the method of determining need, and a comparison of State food allowances with the Department of Agriculture cost figures. The cumulative effect of these policies on payments is also explored. The information in the report is based on data assembled for the biennial report of program plan characteristics early in 1978.     

Organizational meanings of program evaluation

Program evaluation has to be understood as an organizational phenomenon: it is a way of understanding and evaluating action in and between organizations. But it rests on assumptions about organization which need to be challenged, and which have to be understood as a particular framing of organizational activity which will facilitate hierarchical control. Attention needs to be given to the way in which ‘evaluation’ are used to structure organizational activity. This raises significant questions about the relationship between the analysis of organizational activity and the activity itself. ‘Colonel Cargill envies you because of the splendid job you're doing on parades. He's afraid I was going to put you in charge of bomb patterns.’ Colonel Scheisskopf was all ears. ‘What are bomb patterns?’ ‘Bomb patterns?,’ General Peckem repeated, twinkling with self-satisfied good humor. ‘A bomb pattern is a term I dreamed up several weeks ago. It means nothing, but you'd be surprised at how rapidly it's caught on.’ Joseph Heller,Catch 22     

Revenue-sharing voucher program (RSVP)

There has been a significant shift in government towards decentralized power and responsibility as exemplified by the State and Local Assistance Act. The trend occurs at a time when society faces the double challenge of encouraging more and better informed, public participation in decision-making, and also improving the efficiency in governmental delivery of services. A proposal is made to use general revenue sharing moneys to meet this dual challenge through a revenue sharing voucher program (RSVP). The program entails turning back to citizens the incoming funds in the form of vouchers to be allocated by them to various local government agencies. The implications for the City of Seattle are discussed as an example of the operation and the tradeoffs involved.     

Workers' compensation program experience, 1981

Although the workers' compensation program covered more workers and paid more in benefits in 1981 than it did a year earlier, the rise in both of these indicators was slightly smaller than those in 1980 and considerably smaller than the increases that took place in the 1970's. Employers paid $22.9 billion in premiums in 1981, less than 3 percent more than the previous year and the smallest annual increase since 1958. The cost-payroll ratio also showed a 12-point drop in 1981, the first such decline since 1959 and a sharp contrast to the almost 9 percentage point average annual rise in the 1970's. The Black Lung program, which made up more than a fifth of the benefit payments under workers' compensation in 1973, accounted for only about an eighth by 1981.