Militarism and Terrorism: The Deadly Cycle

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, destined to strongly influence world politics well into the 21st century, can be understood as part of a larger dialectic linking US militarism and what has become global terrorism. This destructive cycle is likely to deepen as elements of American superpower hegemony--economic, political, cultural and military--become more consolidated, and as the USA continues to pursue its unprecedented and ill-defined war against terrorism. The goal of US ruling elites is to make the world increasingly accessible to capital investment, free trade and corporate domination while simultaneously closing off viable alternatives to the neoliberal New World Order. Here terrorism in its different manifestations amounts to both a striking back at US empire--what might be seen as an especially virulent form of blowback--and the unintended relegitimation of this empire as it helps to bolster the war economy and security state. One of the debilitating consequences of the militarism-terrorism cycle is a further closing off of political discourse in the US in the midst of a resurgent national chauvinism, ideological conformism and militarised culture.     

China's security agenda after the cold war

The end of the cold war has changed China's basic perception of world politics and its conception of national security. In the cold war era, Chinese leaders tended to view national security from the perspective of global balance of power and China's strategic relations with the two superpowers. It was in Beijing's security interests to maintain a comfortable position in a strategic triangular relationship with the Soviet Union and the United States. When the Soviet Empire and the East European communist regimes collapsed, the structure of the postwar international system dissolved, and the old parameters for Beijing's security strategy disappeared. The Chinese leadership suddenly found itself in a totally new world in which China needed to reorient and redefine its security strategy on a new strategic axis.

Beijing's security strategy after the cold war is redefined by its domestic priorities, growing foreign economic relations, the new security environment in Asia, and concerns over territorial disputes. In a sense, the myopic conception of security based on war and peace is fading away. Beijing's thinking on national security becomes more inclusive, diverse, and complicated. The nature and intensity of external threats has changed. China's growing economic ties with the outside world have redirected Beijing's attention to economic interests and security. The Chinese leadership realizes that its security is affected not only by the military forces of other countries, but also by political, economic, societal, and environmental factors in international relations Beijing needs to employ both traditional military defence and non‐military actions to safeguard its territorial integrity and to realize its full capacity in world affairs.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse China's security agendas after the cold war. It first examines the impact of the end of the cold war on China's thinking on national security, then discusses Beijing's threat perception and changing defence strategy. This is followed by an examination of domestic stability considerations and economic interests in Beijing's security strategy. Finally, it discusses the implications of China's growing power for regional security.     

The United States,Japan, and the European Union: comparing political economy approaches to China

Abstract

This paper examines US, Japanese, and European political economy approaches to China, and their effect on US–Japan and US–EU relationships. Great powers with a greater security concern in dealing with another major country care more about power while those with less of a concern are preoccupied with calculations for wealth. China's rise and its actions have posed a far greater security challenge to the United States and Japan and are driving the two countries closer together. The political economy game involving China reveals a dominant welfare motive among the advanced market economies. The ambition to transform China politically has diminished. China's integration into the global market makes a relative gains approach difficult to implement. Globalization simply limits the ability of a state to follow a politics-in-command approach in the absence of actual military conflict, which explains why the political economy approaches of the United States, Europe, and Japan are not that different in the scheme of things. China's own grand strategy to reach out to the world to outflank the US–Japan alliance has also contributed to a divergent European policy toward China although there are severe limitations to Beijing's ability to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe.     

The new world [dis] order in the complexity of multi‐polarity: United States of America's hegemonic decline and the configuration of new power patterns

History tells us that the United States of America (US)'s hegemonic predomination materialized from a very long‐ideological battle and/ Cold War, sometimes referred to as the war of words lasted for about five decades from the mid‐1940s to 1989, and consequently stopped after the fragmentation of the Soviet Union Empire. Thus, in contemporary times, it is lamentably regrettable that USA has come to face oligopolistic challenge in the context of both political and economic dominion. The international system is slowly but surely experiencing the emergence of brand new political and economic power patterns vis‐à‐vis China, European Union (EU) and Brazil, Russian, India, China, South Africa (BRICS). In light of the aforementioned, this article assesses the symptoms of US hegemonic decline and how this helps shape the current global academic and/ scholarly debates on the strategic environment. Equally important is the adoption and application of Afrocentricity as the theoretical framework in the quest for ”relocation from the knowledge production margins” and the spirit of the anticipation of the DE‐colonial Political contemplation in South Africa's life‐time. As a theory, it is employed to answer the central question: Is it a reality or a myth that USA's dominion over the international system is coming to an end? Methodologically, this article relied on interdisciplinary discourse analysis and thematic content prevailing documents.     

Relativists and Absolutists: Grand Strategies in a World of Fractured Norms

The current widespread renewed interest in the development of grand military-political strategies is a function of a rapidly changing global configuration of powers. From the bipolarity of the Cold War, which by its very construction limited either the United States or the Soviet Union from constructing much less implementing a unilateral framework, we have moved to a political and economic environment in which a variety of nations in parts of the world that did not figure into the power equations of the past century, invites such analysis. This article draws attention to factors profoundly limiting a grand strategy at the global level. It further indicates that the source of such push for grand strategy derives from inherited doctrines, largely of 19th European origin, which continue to emphasize absolutist doctrines based on theology, history and ideology. They are increasingly dysfunctional formulas in a relativistic universe of political systems and military technologies. The emergence of economic Diaspora in place of “three worlds of development” also serves to weaken approaches derived from imperial doctrines and political approaches that are no longer the monopoly of conventional armed forces. The essay concludes with the belief that one older element that continues to display cachet is diplomacy and face to face human initiatives. Bargaining rather than blustering may be the order of the age. In this, it is Metternich rather than Hegel that may prove a better source of negotiating a complex multi-national world order.     

American Progressivism and the Obama Presidency

US progressivism is half espoused, half rejected, by an ambivalent if talented President. The Republican image of the President as ‘socialist’ is one which the social democratic Democrats wish were true. The President's readiness to compromise has not tempered the extreme hostility of the Republicans. It has been exploited by the political agents of business and finance. It has used by the permanent war party: the campaign against ‘terror’ enables it to retain mastery of foreign and military policy. The New Deal's heirs, seeking more social democracy and less militarism, are bereft of new forms of political action. US democracy is threatened by an eruption of cultural and religious fundamentalism, racism, and xenophobia, as well as a compulsive refusal of social solidarity. Withal, the situation is open as well as complex, and the President in the long run may be much more successful than his angry detractors and disappointed supporters allow.     

Microblogs and the Adaptation of the Chinese Party‐State's Governance Strategy

The Chinese party‐state is currently adapting its governance strategy. The recent debate in China on the role of microblogs in the governance process, as documented in the reports issued by Chinese research institutes and advisory bodies, illustrates the efforts being undertaken by China's political elites to integrate microblogs into their new public management strategy. Mass protests and large‐scale online criticism—voiced via microblogs—directly threaten the regime's survival. As a consequence, legitimacy is no longer regarded as being inherent, but as something that has instead to be permanently regained and reaffirmed. To increase the system's efficiency and to generate a new kind of symbolic legitimacy, China's political elites tend to base the political decision‐making process on strategic calculations intended to be reflective of public online opinion. The turn toward a more responsive way of governing by the Chinese party‐state demonstrates once more the adaptability of authoritarian one‐party states in the digital era.     

The Influence of Foreign Voices on U.S. Public Opinion

Public opinion in the lead‐up to the 2003 Iraq War presents a puzzle. Despite the fact that domestic political elites publicly voiced little opposition to the invasion, large numbers of Americans remained opposed to military action throughout the pre‐war period, in contrast to the predictions of existing theory. We argue that some rank‐and‐file Democrats and independents expressed opposition because of the widely reported antiwar positions staked out by foreign, not domestic, elites. Merging a large‐scale content analysis of news coverage with public opinion surveys from August 2002 through March 2003, we show that Democrats and independents—especially those with high levels of political awareness—responded to dissenting arguments articulated in the mass media by foreign officials. Our results, which constitute the first empirical demonstration of foreign elite communication effects on U.S. public opinion, show that scholars must account for the role played by non‐U.S. officials in prominent foreign policy debates.     

Policy Lessons from Iraq on Managing Uncertainty in Intelligence Assessment: Why the Strategic/Tactical Distinction Matters

This paper focuses on how pre-existing policy priorities and goals among policy elites in the US, UK, and Australia encouraged the blurring of strategic and tactical intelligence assessment as a mechanism for legitimising the Iraq invasion. Through the selective use and interpretation of sometimes vague or unsubstantiated tactical and technical intelligence and the many uncertainties it contained, proponents of the war were able to undermine existing strategic assessments on Iraq by introducing a range of possible, but largely unsubstantiated, threat scenarios as justification for military action. The paper argues that in so far as intelligence reforms are needed, they should be focused primarily on the interface between analysis and policy making, and the issue of how policy makers interpret and understand the uncertainties that intelligence assessments necessarily contain.     

Taiwan and the geopolitics of late development

Abstract

Through a case study of Taiwan, this paper seeks to address recent debates surrounding the transformation of developmental states in East Asia. Whilst a number of authors have cited the Taiwanese state as being both cautious and resilient in the midst of global restructuring, this paper seeks to critically engage with such arguments by highlighting the dynamic and mutually constitutive relations between the forms of social relations that underpin late development and the wider geopolitical system in which such development occurs. Specifically, Taiwanese industrialisation can be viewed as an outcome of the US intervention in the Chinese civil war and subsequent exclusion of China from the regional political economy in the period between the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The Kuomintang (KMT)'s retreat to Taiwan established the basis for the autonomous developmental state, and the US underpinned this state through military protection, aid and access to its own domestic market. However, the relative decline of US hegemony and the readmission of China into the international system have posed significant challenges to Taiwan's developmental state. The US sought to redress its trade imbalance with East Asia by placing pressure on Taiwan to liberalise its political economy. Furthermore, the very process of development itself served to undermine the autonomy of the state as it came under pressure from new social forces. Taiwan has more recently been faced with a dilemma of closer integration with the mainland or the maintenance of its de facto economic and political independence at the risk of becoming isolated from the global trading system.     

The Iraq War and the Responsibility to Protect: Uses,Abuses and Consequences for the Future of Humanitarian Intervention

Before the 2003 Iraq war, the political leadership of the United States and United Kingdom had to sell the case for war to their people and the world. This was attempted through a number of speeches that employed rhetorical justifications for the war. Two prominent justifications used during this period involved the employment of security and humanitarian narratives. The security narrative focused on claims regarding Iraq's undermining of international law, possession of weapons of mass destruction and threat to the world. The humanitarian narrative revolved around claims about human suffering in Iraq and the need to liberate its people. While it is widely assumed that security is the dominant casus belli in the post-9/11 world, there is much evidence to suggest that the humanitarian justifications that played a critical role in the military interventions of the 1990s were still important after 9/11. The use of humanitarian justifications for the Iraq war clearly has implications for the ‘responsibility to protect (R2P)’ movement, which has gained prominence since the December 2001 publication of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report. Based on an extensive content analysis of speeches by the US and UK political leadership before the war, this article will quantify the relative importance of each narrative and analyse what the findings mean for the ongoing debates within the ‘responsibility to protect (R2P)’ movement.     

Permanent war? The domestic hegemony of the New American militarism

Although there is an expanding body of excellent work on 9/11 and the War on Terror, and the changing forms of war‐making, militarism and imperialism, this literature lacks a sufficient critical synthesis of the historical and conjunctural events of 9/11 and its aftermath with the structural and systemic forms of US militarism and the military‐industrial complex. This article attempts a broad, critical‐theoretical analysis of the increased domestic hegemony of militarism in the US since 9/11. The article examines the complex social‐systemic interlocking of militarism with other historical, political, institutional, economic, cultural and psychological forces which tend to reinforce the hegemony of militarism and aggressive, preemptive foreign policy in the current period.     

A Critical Theory of the "Rationality" of US Foreign Policy: The Case of the American War in Vietnam

The attacks of September 11th, 2001, have increased the urgency of understanding the relationship between war-making and political culture. This essay uses Frankfurt School critical theory to analyze the development of the increasing "rationalization" of US foreign policy during the Cold War, focusing heuristically on the case of the US war in Vietnam. Particularly developing a Habermasian reading of these phenomena, the essay argues that, despite elite management and "steering" strategies, "subsystemic imperatives" are never completely "uncoupled" from the "cultural lifeworld." In the case of the US war in Vietnam, contradictions between elite political and economic instrumental rationalities and interests, and the broader American political culture and values, led to legitimation problems and loss of trust which have continued into the present period.     

Preemptive strikes and the war on Iraq: a critique of Bush administration unilateralism and militarism

Bush administration foreign policy has exhibited a marked unilateralism and militarism in which US military power is used to advance US interests and geopolitical hegemony. The policy was first evident in the Afghanistan intervention following the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, and informed the 2003 war against Iraq. In From 9/11 to Terror War, I sketched out the genesis and origins of Bush administration foreign policy and its application in Afghanistan and the build‐up to the Iraq war. In this study, I update and develop my critique of the Bush doctrine of preemptive strikes and its application in the 2003 Iraq invasion, concluding with a critique of unilateralism and militarism, and defense of multilateral and global solutions to problems such as terrorism, so‐called “weapons of mass destruction,” and “rogue regimes.”     

Japan's security agenda in the post‐cold war era

The radically changed regional security environment in the post‐cold war Asia‐Pacific poses serious challenges to Japan's security policy. Tokyo must develop a new strategic view of the region to complement its tendency to emphasize security based on economic growth and interdependence. Japan's relations with the United States, Russia and China have far‐reaching, long‐term regional security implications, yet Tokyo is barely managing to respond to bilateral political and economic issues as they arise. While the waning of the cold war security threat and budgetary considerations are putting increasing constraints on Tokyo's spending for both defence and foreign economic assistance, there are conflicting international demands and fears concerning expanded Japanese international security roles. At the same time, Tokyo's desire to participate more actively in United Nations peacekeeping and to gain a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council is hampered by the domestic constitutional debate and widespread pacifism, both legacies of the Second World War and the cold war. Tokyo must muster both domestic and international support for legitimate uses of the nation's enormous power potential.     

Building Civic Capacity Through an Elastic Local State: The Case of St. Louis

Since World War II the civic leadership of St. Louis has overcome the extreme fragmentation of public authority by building civic capacity through a variety of strategies and means. Three successive strategies for building civic capacity have unfolded in St. Louis to facilitate the revitalization of the downtown and other large‐scale initiatives. Between 1950 and 1965 a regime strategy was employed in which city hall and the city's corporate elites shared a common vision for urban renewal and the significant national resources that were provided to meet that end. By the mid‐1960s, however, a second strategy for downtown revitalization emerged that featured a corporate‐centered politics during which time the successful assembly of civic capacity hinged largely on the ability of the mayor to present and provide projects in which corporate elites and their companies would be willing investors. Since the early 1990s, building the civic capacity to undertake large initiatives has been made possible through the creation of a constellation of quasi‐public corporations and special districts. This third strategy of “shadow governments” are the most recent means of achieving civic capacity in St. Louis and we argue in this article that these new institutions are transforming the local state because they are capable of forging political coalitions, mobilizing resources, and making decisions that transcend general‐purpose governmental jurisdictions. For cities and for urban regions, the importance of this development is far‐reaching.     

Political obstacles to a clean environment

Abstract

Three wrongs of American politics are discussed—the fragmentation of policy‐making and implementation, its domination by business elites, and a tendency to muddle through public problems. After presenting evidence that environmental deterioration is widespread, despite many laws and substantial spending to combat it, I argue that these three wrongs are obstacles to environmental cleanup. Cleanup would require producers to internalize their environmental costs; it would slow growth and take privileges away from and impose heavy new obligations on the most important and powerful actors in the political system. Our present politics cannot produce such decisions. Environmental conditions will worsen until people feel the severe consequences of environmental deterioration and change old political patterns. I suggest ways to ameliorate the wrongs of American politics and our system of regulating environmental hazards before these systemic changes occur.     

中国的精英决策模式及发展趋势

概述了西方精英模式的基本观点,论述了中国公共决策模式为精英模式的理论依据与现实依据,分析了改革开放前中国精英决策模式的构成是政治权力精英主导的决策模式,具体表现为政治权力精英与一般政治精英的合作决策模式。阐述了改革开放后中国精英决策模式演变的过程,指出随着社会精英的崛起,中国精英决策模式逐渐向政治精英与知识精英、经济精英合作的模式演变。并从多角度比较分析了中国精英决策模式与西方国家精英决策模式的区别:指出我国的精英构成、社会精英的实际政治地位与西方国家的精英构成及社会精英的实际政治地位存在差异;我国精英决策不只代表精英的观点,也反映人民的声音;我国的经济精英影响政策的能力远逊于西方国家的经济精英;我国政治精英与知识精英的合作决策不同于西方国家的精英合作决策。分析了中国精英决策模式的优缺点,指出了中国决策模式的发展趋势是精英决策与大众民主的调和。     

Water policy and environmental sustainability: the case of post‐colonial Namibia

In semi‐arid countries, particularly in Africa, governments have evolved water policies oriented toward ‘techno‐giantist,’ grand‐scale schemes that have generally accelerated the depletion of national water tables. In Namibia, such a techno‐giantist water management strategy was utilized to reinforce the privileges of white minority farmers prior to independence, and was subsequently expanded to provide modern water facilities to the black African majority in the post‐independence period. The government has pursued not only the construction of a massive new system of pipelines and boreholes, but also the development of giant dam‐building and river canal schemes that are likely to result in watershed depletion over the long term. This reflects state leaders' belief in the imagery of political potency projected by the government's ability to build macro‐scale water systems. However, a water supply approach focused on more micro‐level extraction techniques through which aquifer recharge is prioritized is more likely to assure both local‐level water access and water table sustainability. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Discourses of popular politics,war and authenticity in Turkish pop music

Turkey and the United States (US) have had a close mutually beneficial political and military relationship since the end of World War Two. However, this relationship came under pressure when the US government and Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) tried to cooperate closely in the 2003 military invasion of Iraq. AKP's leadership failed to persuade Turkey's parliament to accept the deployment of US troops and equipment in Turkey partially due to public opinion. Despite Turkish media and its government being intertwined to the extent where subversive discourses are all but silenced, some popular music videos were able to articulate discourses which questioned AKP's military policies. This paper analyses lyrics, visuals and sounds of one of these songs to look at the way war and political issues become articulated through a form of simplified popular politics, despite being presented as serious and authentic by a number of key signifiers across the different modes. A number of scholars have addressed the issue of subversion in music both as actual political challenge and as popular counter culture. This case study is used to assess subversion in music in these terms in order to consider its likely place in political debate in Turkey.