Government, interest groups and incrementalism

Abstract. This paper is concerned with the two underlying dimensions of the people's welfare – economic growth and social protection – and their realization in the diverse processes which determine the character of budgeting and of budgetary outcomes. These conflicting conceptions of welfare and the diverse agents involved in the budgetary process generate a government fiscal policy, which expresses the clash between ideology and political feasibility and between politicians' intentions and actual outcomes. This paper focuses primarily on the budgetary process in West Germany, but also makes some reference to fiscal policy in the UK and the USA.     

Social capital, lobbying and community-based interest groups

Recent discussions of social capital within the public choice literature have tended to focus on its role in solving collective action problems and promoting political accountability. Consequently, two areas of inquiry remain underexplored: (1) the role social capital plays in facilitating lobbying and rent seeking, and (2) the possibility that the availability of government resources can cause community-based groups to re-orient their stocks of social capital away from mutual assistance and toward lobbying and rent seeking. This article examines the relationship between social capital and lobbying in New Orleans??s post-Katrina recovery.     

The effects of decentralization on special interest groups

Public Choice - It is well established in the literature that the number of interest group organizations varies across countries and states, with economic freedom and other institutional factors...     

Political and public acceptability of congestion pricing: Ideology and self‐interest

Studies of the “stated preferences” of households generally report public and political opposition by urban commuters to congestion pricing. It is thought that this opposition inhibits or precludes tolls and pricing systems that would enhance efficiency in the use of scarce roadways. This paper analyzes the only case in which road pricing was decided by a citizen referendum on the basis of experience with a specific pricing system. The city of Stockholm introduced a toll system for seven months in 2006, after which citizens voted on its permanent adoption. We match precinct voting records to resident commute times and costs by traffic zone, and we analyze patterns of voting in response to economic and political incentives. We document political and ideological incentives for citizen choice, but we also find that the pattern of time savings and incremental costs exerts a powerful influence on voting behavior. In this instance, at least, citizen voters behave as if they value commute time highly. When they have experienced first‐hand the out‐of‐pocket costs and time savings of a specific pricing scheme, they are prepared to adopt freely policies that reduce congestion on urban motorways. © 2010 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Targeting inflation targeting: the influence of interest groups

Public Choice - We examine whether sectional interest groups influence monetary policy goals in a manner consistent with their interests as distributive coalitions. In particular, we explore...     

论中国利益群体参与公共政策制定存在的问题

处于社会转型期的中国,如何处理利益群体参政问题关乎改革开放的历史进程和社会稳定。中国的渐进式改革路径在保持社会稳定方面发挥了重要的作用,但是这种渐进式改革更多地表现在经济领域,而政治领域的改革,特别是公民参政权的落实则略显迟滞和不够。由此引起的矛盾和问题使人们产生了诸多不满和怨恨,因此探讨中国利益群体在参与公共政策制定上存在的问题,对于进一步完善中国利益群体参政的路径、提高政府的执政能力和管理创新能力,其理论价值和现实意义不言而喻。     

The courts,interest groups,and public opinion about abortion

Public preferences about the availability of abortion under various circumstances have remained fairly stable over time. Yet a standard CBS/New York Times abortion question indicates that a significant shift in opinion occurred during the 1980s, whereby the public became increasingly supportive of legalized abortion as it is now. These very different patterns of public opinion about abortion suggest that the public perceived a shift in the abortion status quo, toward more restricted access, over time, and became more supportive of current abortion policy.A model of support for legalized abortion as it is now is developed that incorporates the influences of court activities and interest-group behavior. The analysis indicates that the public reacted directly to the activities of the courts, becoming more supportive of current abortion policy in response to media coverage of court cases that challenged the abortion status quo and Supreme Court nominations and confirmations. Although absolute preferences remained largely unchanged, it appears the public perceived an increasing threat to the status quo and became correspondingly less enamored with further restrictions on the availability of abortion.     

Ideologies, vested interest groups, and postal saving privatization in Japan

The privatization of Japan’s postal saving system has been a politically charged issue since it first started being debated in the late 1980s, and yet it provides a useful setting in which political economy of economic policy-making can be investigated empirically. Analyzing the pre-election survey of the House of Representatives candidates in 2003 and also the voting patterns of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) members on a set of postal privatization bills in 2005, this paper asks why some politicians fiercely opposed (or supported) privatization. The econometric results show that multiple factors are important: the private interests of local postmasters and postal workers, politicians’ fundamental ideologies on the size and role of government, party disciplines and factional affiliations within the LDP. Legislative behavior on postal privatization in Japan, thus, turns out to be one case in which legislative behavior is more complex than any single theory predicts.     

Constraint in European party activists' sympathy scores for interest groups

Abstract. This paper presents an analysis, country by country, of sympathy scores given by European party activists from 58 political parties in 11 countries of the European Community to more than 100 different national interest groups. In all countries but one, the left-right dimension is the predominant criterion for interpreting the sympathy scores given. In Belgium, the exception, a regional (Flemish-Walloon) cleavage line is most important. The analyses were performed with a new adapted version of the unidimensional Coombsian unfolding model. Bad fit to the unidimensional model is not remedied by postulating additional common dimensions, but by identifying and removing stimuli (interest groups) that do not conform to the unidimensional unfolding model. The nonrepresentability of these stimuli can be attributed to lack of agreement among activists about the location of these stimuli on the left-right dimension. More specifically, certain relatively popular stimuli are perceived by most respondents as close to their own location on the left-right scale, and, conversely, certain relatively unpopular stimuli are perceived by most respondents as distant from their own location.     

Putting the puzzle together: Why people join public interest groups

Why people join organizations, especially public interest groups, has been an unsolved puzzle. In this analysis, choice-based probability methods are employed to combine data from the 1980 National Election Study with comparable information about Common Cause members and to estimate models of the participation calculus that put the pieces of the puzzle together. The results demonstrate the primary importance of political interest and policy preferences for the membership choice. Citizens who are politically interested and have preferences that roughly match an organization's reputation find that associational membership has both greater benefits and lower costs for them than it does for others. Variations in the costs of communication — to the degree that they can be measured — are unimportant for the joining decision. An ability to pay is also irrelevant, regardless of educational attainment and despite members' high incomes. Organizational leaders deliberately keep the costs of membership low relative to most citizens' ability to pay; this encourages potential contributors to join in order to learn about the organization.I would like to thank Jeffrey Dubin for going beyond the realm of collegial obligation in providing programming and econometric assistance; Jeffrey Flint, for research assistance; and Kevin Grier, for wise advice. It should be emphasized, however, that all errors are exclusively the author's responsibility.     

Conceptualising the policy engagement of interest groups: Involvement,access and prominence

While much progress has been made in empirically mapping and analysing a variety of interest group activities in the last decade, less attention has been devoted to conceptual work that clearly defines and distinguishes different forms of policy engagement. This article contributes to this endeavour by developing a theoretical framework that explicitly links currently available measures of the policy engagement of groups to the distinct concepts of group involvement, access and prominence. It argues that greater conceptual clarity will lead to better accumulation of knowledge in the sub‐field and a better understanding of the role of interest groups in political systems.     

A computational electoral competition model with social clustering and endogenous interest groups as information brokers

We extend the basic model of spatial competition in two directions. First, political parties and voters do not have complete information but behave adaptively. Political parties use polls to search for policy platforms that maximize the probability of winning an election and the voting decision of voters is influenced by social interaction. Second, we allow for the emergence of interest groups. These interest groups transmit information about voter preferences to the political parties, and they coordinate voting behavior. We use simulation methods to investigate the convergence properties of this model. We find that the introduction of social dynamics and interest groups increases the separation between parties platforms, prohibits convergence to the center of the distribution of voter preferences, and increases the size of the winning set.     

意识形态转型:从政治意识形态到科技意识形态

在西方发达工业社会,意识形态发生了转型,科学技术成为了意识形态。科技意识形态与政治意识形态在理性基础、特点、运行机制、功能等方面不同。科技意识形态的产生对传统历史唯物主义意识形态理论造成了巨大的冲击和挑战,要求历史唯物主义做出回应。面对冲击和挑战,必须实现对马克思文本从知识论向生存论的重新解读。     

U.S. interest groups prefer emission trading: A new perspective

Public Choice - If there is to be environmental regulation, what kind of regulation would the main interest groups then prefer? This political distortion must be taken into account when designing...     

An examination of the factors affecting the formation of interest groups in OECD countries

Public Choice - Perhaps the best way to summarize the empirical results is to classify the hypotheses into three groups: those which can be readily accepted because they are supported in all tests;...     

‘Cleaning up’ while cleaning up? Pollution abatement,interest groups and contingent trade policies

This paper analyzes the political economy of environmental-policy formation in a trading economy with established rules for administered protection. We argue that the social costs associated with the adoption of an inefficient environmental regime are likely to be compounded by induced restrictions on trade when the effected industries are import competing. The preferences of interest groups for alternative environmental regimes tend to be linked to the legal-institutional setting in which trade policy is conducted. Under existing rules and practices in the area of administered protection, there is reason to believe that interest group preferences for an inefficient approach to pollution control will be strengthened because the adoption of such a regime is more likely to lead to a concomitant increase in trade barriers.