The legal status of abortion in the states if Roe v. Wade is overruled

This article explores the legal status of abortion in the States if the Supreme Court overrules Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), as modified by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Although an overruling decision eventually could have a significant effect on the legal status of abortion, the immediate impact of such a decision would be far more modest than most commentators-on both sides of the issue-believe. More than two-thirds of the States have repealed their pre-Roe laws or have amended those laws to conform to Roe v. Wade, which allows abortion for any reason before viability and for virtually any reason after viability. Pre-Roe laws that have been expressly repealed would not be revived by the overruling of Roe. Only three States that repealed their pre-Roe laws (or amended them to conform to Roe) have enacted post-Roe laws attempting to prohibit some or most abortions throughout pregnancy. Those laws have been declared unconstitutional by the federal courts and are not now enforceable. Of the less than one-third of the States that have retained their pre-Roe laws, most would be ineffective in prohibiting abortions. This is (1) because the laws, by their express terms or as interpreted, allow abortion on demand, for undefined health reasons or for a broad range of reasons (including mental health), or (2) because of state constitutional limitations. In yet other States, the pre-Roe laws prohibiting abortion may have been repealed by implication, due to the enactment of comprehensive post-Roe laws regulating abortion. In sum, no more than twelve States, and possibly as few as eight, would have enforceable laws on the books that would prohibit most abortions in the event Roe, Doe and Casey are overruled. In the other States (and the District of Columbia) abortion would be legal for most or all reasons throughout pregnancy. Although the long-term impact of reversing Roe could be quite dramatic, the author concludes that the immediate impact of such a decision would be very limited. This article is current through May 1st, 2007.     

COERCIVE AND NONCOERCIVE ABORTION DETERRENCE POLICIES: A Comparative State Analysis

The Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade ( 1973) limited the authority of states to prohibit abortions during the first two trimesters of pregnancy. Although they can no longer prohibit abortions, state legislatures have adopted a variety of coercive and noncoercive policies that might operate to alter the utilities associated with having or providing abortions. This article analyzes the relative impacts of these policies on two measures of abortion behavior: (1) state abortion rates in 1976 and (2) trends in states' abortion rates from 1973 to 1976. Multiple regression analysis reveals that neither coercive nor noncoercive policies are strongly related to these aggregate measures of abortion behavior .     

Abortion on demand in a post-Wade context: must the state pay the bills?

The legal issues involved with the application of the United States Supreme Court decisions in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton (1973) are reveiwed, particularly the question of whether an indigent pregnant woman now has the right to abortion on demand at public expense. The 2 decisions, based on the Fourteenth Amendment, established that a woman, in consultation with her physician, must be free to choose to terminate her pregnancy, at least in the first trimester. State laws are permitted only to regulate abortion procedures in the second trimester and may only regulate or proscribe abortion itself after the fetus becomes viable. The Court did not rule that indigents had a corollary right to the implementation of abortion, and thus free abortions do not appear to be constitutionally required. However, depending on the type of Medicaid coverage in which the individual state is participating, the medically indigent may receive Medicaid benefits for abortions, at least in the first trimester. Since Medicaid is voluntary for the state, it could drop out of the program entirely or the Congress could specifically exclude abortions from Medicaid coverage. Both actions appear unlikely, however, and abortions for medical reasons clearly seem to fall under Medicaid's purpose. Consequently, despite the Wade and Bolton decisions, the right to abortion is limited by the ability of indigents to pay for it. In the light of the serious complications of illegal abortion, it is concluded that legislators should insure the availability of legal abortions. Such a move would not in itself encourage abortions but would properly extend the right to abortion to all citizens.     

Roe v. Wade and the lesson of the pre-Roe case law

The attempt is made in this discussion to demonstrate that the Supreme Court in deciding the Roe v. Wade case should not have decided an abortion case when it did and that the opinion was almost destined to be bad in that the Court could find no persuasive rationale in the pre-Roe cases for each of the points in its decision. In 1973 political forces were actively debating abortion. Abortions had been prohibited by most states, except to save a woman's life, since the 19th century. In the 5 years immediately preceding Roe, 13 states had revised their statutes to resemble the Model Penal Code's provisions, which permitted abortions if the pregnancy threatened the woman's life, if it would gravely impair her physical or mental health, if it resulted from rape or incest, or if the child would be born with grave physical or mental defects. 4 states had removed all restrictions on the permissible reasons for seeking an abortion before a pregnancy passed specified lengths. In short, in many states the political process had yet to decide on abortion, but Roe's rejection of Texas's statute voided almost every other state's statutes as well. Between 1970 and 1972, a flurry of constitutional challenges hit the courts. 3 years was hardly sufficient time for the judicial system to evolve sound analysis for such an emotionally charged issue as abortion. The Court could justifiably have allowed the dispute to simmer longer in the lower courts. There is some indication that a sounder case law might evolved if given time, but that was prevented by Roe. The Court could not find a rationale in 1973, but it decided anyway, suggesting a legislative rather than a judicial process.     

Legal abortion: the impending obsolescence of the trimester framework

Women who wish to terminate a pregnancy, and physicians willing to perform abortions, are subject to increasing harassment from groups which challenge the constitutional abortion right upheld by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade. Their vulnerability, in fact, parallels the vulnerability of the abortion right. This Article analyzes the inherent weakness and impending obsolescence of the trimester framework established in Roe. Present medical evidence of maternal health risks and fetal viability demonstrates that the trimester framework is inconsistent with current medical knowledge, and will likely be rendered obsolete by developments in medical technology. The Article suggests that adoption of an alternative constitutional basis for legal abortion is necessary to preserve the abortion right, and explores the utility of two arguments grounded in the equal protection doctrine. Finally, it discusses means of preserving legal abortion within the confines of the trimester framework established in Roe v. Wade.     

Criminal liability of physicians: an encroachment on the abortion right?

The Supreme Court in 1973 in Roe v. Wade established that decision of first trimester abortion is left to the physician, exercising his best medical judgment, in consultation with the patient. During this period the state may not regulate abortion determination since there is no compelling state interest; therefore a physician performing abortion will be precluded from civil or criminal liability. In second trimester abortion the state has a compelling interest in the health of the mother and may regulate the procedure to protect maternal health; although a previable fetus may be able to survive the abortion, Roe v. Danforth definitively places the woman's right to an abortion above the life of the fetus during the previable stage; therefore the state cannot seek to safeguard the life or health of the fetus during the abortion. Third trimester abortion implies a viable fetus; thus, a compelling state interest in the potential life arises and the state may regulate and proscribe abortion except when necessary for the life and health of the mother. The determination of when viability has been achieved is a matter of judgment resting with the physician who has the choice of techniques and operating procedures which may or may not be fatal to the unborn. It is a question of either termination of pregnancy or destruction of the fetus. In this last case the legal responsibility placed upon the physician is very serious, and involving a risk of civil and criminal liability. Uncertainties as to the boundaries of legal abortion and the threat of criminal liability can only result in a reluctance among physicians to perform second and third trimester abortions, which is against the fundamental right to abortion guaranteed by the Constitution. The Supreme Court will have to elaborate upon the scope of the abortion right, whether it encompasses fetal destruction or only termination of pregnancy, because it directly affects the extent and quality of maternal and fetal care that must be rendered by a physician. If only termination of pregnancy is included the Court must resolve whether the woman's health interests predominate, or whether the physician can be required to enhance fetal survival. Physicians have a right to know the full extent of legal ramifications and implications of legally induced abortion.     

Brief for 885 law professors in support of maintaining adherence to the Roe decision

This brief opposes the overturn of "Roe v. Wade" and resists weakening "Roe's central holding" that would allow states to overturn legal abortion. The brief was written for 885 law professors. "Roe" was not a "constitutional aberration," or "an exercise of raw, judicial power." Some members of the Supreme Court seem to think that the state has "an overriding interest" in protecting fetal life. Some Court members have questioned "Roe's" trimester framework. A person's decision to abort should be done privately. If women are not free to choose abortion, they will not have equality. There is an absence of "express rights of privacy and procreational freedom" in the Constitution. "Roe" was 1 instance of the Court's recognition of constitutional rights that are not named explicitly. Historical materials are drawn on to show the link between trends in society and the "judicial recognition of unenumerated rights." The most serious questions about "Roe" deal with its trimester framework. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion said that the 1st trimester of pregnancy was personal. "Roe" said that abortions created a medical risk at the beginning of the 2nd trimester. Therefore, the government was more interested in the health of the mother at that time. The state could then regulate abortion "in ways that are reasonable related to maternal health." The start of the 3rd trimester was when the fetus was viable. The right of a woman to end her pregnancy "offends powerful moral forces." Some of "Roe's" critics had their scientific facts wrong. Medical authorities think Justice O'Connor is mistaken when she says that "Roe" is "on a collision course with itself." The 23rd to 24th week of pregnancies where the fetal organs can "sustain life outside the womb." This has not changed since "Roe" was decided in 1973, nor is it likely to in the future. Some "amici" believe that the state can never have an interest in the fetus. The state can not have an interest in the fetus distinct from the woman who will give birth to it. During previability, restricting a woman's procreational rights would not be scientifically supportable. The state does have an interest in "upholding the value of human life." "Roe" is "within the mainstream" of constitutional jurisprudence and should be reaffirmed.     

Back to the future of abortion law: Roe's rejection of America's history and traditions

In Roe v. Wade much of Justice Blackmun's judgment was devoted to the history of abortion in Anglo-American law. He concluded that a constitutional right to abortion was consistent with that history. In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 281 American historians signed an amicus brief which claimed that Roe was consistent with the nation's history and traditions. This article respectfully questions Justice Blackmun's conclusion and the historians' claim.     

Conforming to the rule of law: when person and human being finally mean the same thing in Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence

The Fourteenth Amendment was intended to protect people from discrimination and harm from other people. Racism is not the only thing people need protection from. As a constitutional principle, the Fourteenth Amendment is not confined to its historical origin and purpose, but is available now to protect all human beings, including all unborn human beings. The Supreme Court can define "person" to include all human beings, born and unborn. It simply chooses not to do so. Science, history and tradition establish that unborn humans are, from the time of conception, both persons and human beings, thus strongly supporting an interpretation that the unborn meet the definition of "person" under the Fourteenth Amendment. The legal test used to extend constitutional personhood to corporations, which are artificial "persons" under the law, is more than met by the unborn, demonstrating that the unborn deserve the status of constitutional personhood. There can be no "rule of law" if the Constitution continues to be interpreted to perpetuate a discriminatory legal system of separate and unequal for unborn human beings. Relying on the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court may overrule Roe v. Wade solely on the grounds of equal protection. Such a result would not return the matter of abortion to the states. The Fourteenth Amendment, properly interpreted, would thereafter prohibit abortion in every state.     

Roe v. Wade and the history of abortion regulation

In "Roe," the Supreme Court found that the privacy right in the 14th amendment's view of "personal liberty" encompasses a woman's right to choose an abortion. The Court found that "abortion is a fundamental right." These conclusions are mistaken. The Court's analysis of "the history of abortion regulation" had a lot of errors and did not consider the state of technology in which abortion evolved. Sir Edward Coke, a 16th and 17th century jurist, said that abortion was a "great misprison." Quickening, the point at which a woman feels life, was used to determine fetal viability. State courts, therefore, viewed "abortion after quickening as common law crime." By the end of 1868, 30 to the then 37 states had passed laws restricting abortion. The Supreme Court said that the 19th century laws were passed to guard the mother's health "against the dangers of unsafe operation." In the 15 months before "Roe," 5 state courts said that their abortion laws were constitutional. They said that this was "intended to protect the lives of unborn children." Therefore, the Court's belief that "the state courts focused on the State's interest in protecting "the health of the mother" was unexplainable. The Court said that in many states the woman couldn't "be prosecuted for self-abortion." 17 states did "incriminate the woman's participation in her own abortion," but the Court did not note this. The Court's premise about the greater hazards of late abortions is mistaken. The states were concerned, in the late 19th century, about whether the attempted abortion caused the death of a child. The "right to an abortion" can only be seen as "fundamental" if it is "implicit" in the "ordered liberty" concept or "deeply rooted" in US tradition and history. "Roe" struck down the abortion laws of all 50 states and should be overturned.     

Brief for bioethicists for privacy as amicus curiae supporting appellees

Amicus, an ad hoc group of philosophers, theologians, attorneys, and physicians, believe that adults should consult their doctor when making personal decisions. The doctor-patient relationship would be protected under the Constitution. In "Griswold v. Connecticut," the Supreme Court said that a state law which forbid married couples from using contraceptives was unconstitutional; that the couples should have a right to privacy. In "Roe," the Supreme Court recognized that a patient and her doctor should have privacy. In "Doe v. Bolton," the Supreme Court found that the State of Georgia was violating the patients' and physician's freedom. In "Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth," the Supreme Court said that a general informed consent provision was alright because it did not take away the abortion decision. The post- Roe state laws were ways to control doctors and patients so that a particular philosophical view could be imposed. The major question in Webster is whether personal decisions should be made by doctors and patients or the state. Both parties must agree to the decision. Section 188.205 of the Missouri law was before the Court in Webster. This section makes it illegal for public funds to be used to encourage a woman to have an abortion that wasn't necessary to save her life. There are medical conditions for which abortion is reasonable - Tay-Sachs disease, for instance. The child usually dies by 3 years of age. Without genetic screening, many at-risk couples would abort all pregnancies. 95% of all prenatal screenings are negative. State medical treatment decisions are arbitrary and impersonal. Having control over important personal decisions is necessary for freedom.     

Personhood,property rights,and the permissibility of abortion

The purpose of this paper is to argue that the tactic of granting a fetus the legal status of a person will not, contrary to the expectations of opponents of abortion, provide grounds for a general prohibition on abortions. I begin by examining two arguments, one moral (J. J. Thomson's ‘A Defense of Abortion’) and the other legal (D. Regan's ‘Rewriting Roe v. Wade’), which grant the assumption that a fetus is a person and yet argue to the conclusion that abortion is permissible. However, both Thomson and Regan rely on the so-called bad samaritan principle. This principle states that a person has a right to refuse to give aid. Their reliance on this principle creates problems, both in the moral and the legal contexts, since the bad samaritan principle is intended to apply to passive refusals to aid; abortion, however, does not look like any such passive denial of aid, and so it does not seem like the sort of action covered by the bad samaritan principle. In defense of the positions outlined by Thomson and Regan, I argue that the apparent asymmetry between abortion and the usual type of case covered by the bad samaritan principle is only apparent and not a genuine problem for their analyses. I conclude with a defense of the morality of the bad samaritan principle.     

Rewriting Roe v. Wade

Presented in this essay are suggestions for rewriting Roe vs. Wade, the case that resulted in the establishment of a constitutional right to abortion. Essentially, the argument is 1 of equal protection. It is suggested that abortion be viewed as presenting a problem that might be termed "the law of samaritanism" -- the law regarding obligations imposed on certain individuals to provide assistance to others. In American law it is a deeply rooted principle that an individual is ordinarily not required to volunteer assistance to another individual who is in danger or in need of aid. The argument presented maintains that if a pregnant woman is required to carry the fetus to term and deliver it, then she is being compelled to be a Good Samaritan. It is argued further that if the generally limited scope of obligations of samaritanism under current law are considered, and the special nature of the burdens imposed on pregnant women by laws forbidding abortion are also considered, the obvious conclusion is that the equal protection clause forbids imposition of these burdens on pregnant women. The argument is developed in a lengthy form and calls for an extended discussion of the law of samaritanism. The uniqueness of the abortion case also creates problems as the equal protection argument is approached, and an approach to equal protection questions is sketched.     

Public support for pro-choice abortion policies in the nation and states: changes and stability after the Roe and Doe decisions

In 1973 the United States Supreme Court ruled that abortion could be had practically on request during the first 3 months of pregnancy. This article discusses whether the decision led to more public support for that position, and where in the U.S. the increase in support has been most drastic. The most recent public opinion polls indicate about 60% public support legalized abortion, while it was only 45% before 1973. Support has also increased even if pregnancy is not judged to be detrimental to the mother's health, or if it is not the result of rape and/or incest, but even if it is simply requested for economic or purely personal reasons. People under 30, with college education, men and Protestants, seem to be the staunchest supporters of abortion on demand. There has also been an increase in the number of Catholics supporting abortion. Support for abortion increased in most states between 1969-1973, particularly in the West and in the Northwest. The fight to deny federal funds for abortion is still raging in Congress; some studies indicate that the religion of the legislators is the most powerful predictor of voting on abortion, and that the decision is a very personal one, and not easily altered by the lobbying of groups on either side.     

美国司法政治变迁的内在逻辑——从“罗伊案”说开去

美国的司法政治是司法与政治交互作用的产物。随着司法权的扩张,联邦最高法院突破"政治问题不审查"之传统,主动或被动地介入政治争议;随着政党对峙的尖锐,政治力量乐于将棘手的政治争议交由司法裁断;藉此,司法政治演变为常态政治,司法判例成为经久不衰的政治争点。自上个世纪70年代以来,围绕罗伊案半个多世纪的争议,不仅客观地暴露了美国司法政治发展的内在逻辑,而且也充分地展示出司法政治在美国的作用方式和涵摄空间。     

Roe v. Wade is constitutionally unprincipled and logically incoherent: a brief in support of judicial restraint

This "amicus curiae" brief was submitted by the Center for Judicial Studies and 56 members of Congress. They were concerned that "Roe" expands powers that belong to Congress and the states into the realm of federal government. Part I of the brief dealt with Missouri's claim that the laws that were at issue in "Webster" were permitted under "Roe" and shouldn't have been made invalid by lower courts. Most of the brief was in Part II. The thrust of it was that "Roe" was not based on any principle and is incoherent internally; "Roe" said that a privacy right existed under the US constitution. However, "Roe" didn't define this right of personal privacy. "Roe" cited a "line of decisions" to prove this point. However, none of the cases that "Roe" cited pretended to be based on the "right to privacy." They dealt with other issues. "Botsford" was said to be the beginning of the constitutional privacy right. It dealt with a "common law rule of evidence," not a right that was in the constitution. Therefore, it did not define the privacy right. "The process by which "Roe" moved from privacy to abortion was unfounded by judicial fiat." "Roe" said that it was protected by "the compelling interest standard," but did not give a reason why this was so. In "Roe," the woman';s interest in getting an abortion was analyzed in medical terms. But when talking about the State's interest in protecting potential human life, medical considerations were not controlling. Part III of the brief asked that "Roe" be overturned because it said that "a privacy right to abortion" was "devoid of any linkage to the text or history of the constitution." "Roe" should be abandoned because its "inadequacies" are "basic".     

Where Have All of the Pro‐Choice Lawyers Gone? An Analysis of Post‐Roe Reproductive Rights Lawyering

A body of scholarship attests to the importance of experienced litigators before the U.S. Supreme Court. In this article, we specifically consider the role of experienced litigators in the thirty years of reproductive rights litigation that followed Roe v Wade . To that end, we divide the lawyers by their pro-choice or pro-life affiliations and ask (1) how often individual lawyers appear before the Court in reproductive rights cases, (2) who the lawyers arguing these case before the Supreme Court are, and (3) how their participation has changed over time. We find changes in the pro-choice and pro-life bars that mirror the reproductive rights movement at large. Pro-choice groups, which once employed a stable of elite lawyers with significant expertise, have been decimated by the retirements of pro-choice counsel with no lawyers emerging to replace them. At the same time, the pro-life bar and pro-life groups appear to be developing a strong litigation campaign complete with experienced litigators.     

THE CASE OF EXPORT CARTEL EXEMPTIONS: BETWEEN COMPETITION AND PROTECTIONISM

Most competition laws do not prohibit anticompetitive conductthat affects foreign target markets as long as there is no spillover effect on the home market. The U.S. in particular justifiesthis leniency towards export cartels by the aim of increasingefficiency in target markets that are suffering from high entrancebarriers for importers. Attempts to use the legal regime ofthe WTO to overcome private restrictions of competition arelikely to fail, because of the fundamental differences betweentrade policy and competition policy. Although a multilateralcompetition policy would be best suited to challenge exportcartels, the current state of the political debate makes itmore likely that second-best solutions such as capacity buildingin lesser developed target states will have to be established.     

The fetus as a patient: emerging rights as a person?

Dramatic scientific breakthroughs in medical technology have revolutionized the physician's diagnostic prowess in the art of obstetrics. Scientific procedures now reveal previously undetectable secrets about the womb's tiny inhabitants. In the last few years, perinatologists have not only demonstrated the ability to discern fetal abnormalities of an extraordinary variety, but also have become increasingly successful in correcting many of these defects in utero. This article identifies the potential medicolegal conflicts that may arise as fetal surgery becomes an accepted medical practice. It begins by surveying the legal rights of unborn persons with a particular emphasis on the role of viability in determining those rights. The article will then examine the concept of viability as developed by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade and later abortion decisions and concludes that the current judicial deference to the medical community in determining viability is adequate for balancing rights in the abortion context. However, conflicts among physicians and between the other and her unborn child that may arise in the fetal surgery context suggest that viability may be an adequate benchmark for resolving such conflicts. The article concludes with a recommendation to reform the current method of resolving the critical question of when a fetus becomes viable.     

Webster and women's equality

The National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL) and the Women's Legal Defense Fund (WLDF) co-authored an "amicus curiae" brief in "Webster." The brief was written for 77 organizations who believe in equality of women. The brief said that constitutional protection of a woman's right to choose is guaranteed by the right to privacy. The brief said that if abortions were illegal, women would not be able to take place in society equally with men. Liberty would be taken away from women. If the state interferes with abortion, the principle of bodily integrity is violated. In "Winston v. Lee," the Supreme Court found that the state could not compel a criminal to undergo an invasive surgical procedure to retrieve a bullet necessary for the state to prosecute with. 1 in 4 women have a cesarean section, which requires a larger incision in the abdomen, and has many risks. Bearing and raising children often puts a damper on women's employment opportunities. Therefore, if the Supreme Court denied women the right to bear children when and where they wanted, women would not have the right to plan their futures. If the Supreme Court were to agree that "interest in potential life outweighs" a woman's tight to procreate autonomously, states could declare all abortions illegal, investigate them to see if they were induced on purpose, and murder women who induced them. Contraceptive devices could be declared illegal. Laws could be used to force women to submit to cesarean sections and other fetal surgery. Pre-viability abortion restrictions should be rejected because they have old-fashioned notions of women's role in society. They reinforce stereotypes. Missouri's law stresses aiding "potential," rather than actual life.