THE USE OF RISK ANALYSIS IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES: AN EXPLORATION1

This paper reports on an exploratory study of the role of risk analysis in seven federal agencies concerned with health, safety, and environmental regulation. Interviews with key decision-makers suggest that the use of risk analysis has increased in recent years, but that its employment in risk management decision-making varies considerably both within given agencies and across agencies and policy areas. Despite methodological and institutional constraints, risk analysis is likely to play a greater role in the future as demands for comparative assessment of technological risks increase.     

Regulatory inspection and the changing legitimacy of health and safety

The regulation of conduct via law is a key mechanism through which broader social meanings are negotiated and expressed. The use of regulatory tools to bring about desired outcomes reflects existing social and political understandings of institutional legitimacy, the meanings attached to regulation, and the values it seeks to advance. But these contextual understandings are not static, and their evolution poses challenges for regulators, particularly when they reflect political framing processes. This paper shows how inspection has been reshaped as a tool within the United Kingdom's health and safety system by changes in the meanings attached to the concept of “risk‐based regulation.” While rates of inspection have fallen dramatically in recent years, the nature and quality of inspection have also been fundamentally reshaped via an increasingly procedural and economically rational “risk‐based” policy context. This has had consequences for the transformative and symbolic value of inspection as a tool of regulatory practice.     

A theory of risk colonization: The spiralling regulatory logics of societal and institutional risk

Abstract

Explanations of the growing importance of risk to regulation identify three processes; the need to respond to newly created and discovered risks; the growth of regulatory frameworks; and the use of the risk instrument as an organizing idea for decision-making in modernity. Synthesizing these explanations, we propose a theory of risk colonization. We introduce a distinction between societal and institutional risks, the former referring to threats to members of society and their environment, and the latter referring to threats to regulatory organizations and/or the legitimacy of rules and methods of regulation. We argue that pressures towards greater coherence, transparency, and accountability of the regulation of societal risks can create institutional risks by exposing the inevitable limitations of regulation. In the first stage of risk colonization, framing the objects of regulation as ‘risks’ serves as a useful instrument for reflexively managing the associated institutional threats. This can be followed, in a second stage, by a dynamic tension between the management of societal and institutional risks that results in spiralling feedback loops. The very process of regulating societal risks gives rise to institutional risks, the management of which sensitizes regulators to take account of societal risks in different ways. We discuss links between this theory and the concept of governmentality and conclude with some speculations about the possible positive and negative consequences of risk colonization.     

The regulatory style of environmental governance in China: the case of EIA regulation in Shanghai*

The body of literature that examines how institutional contexts affect environmental governance in advanced industrial countries finds that style of environmental regulation is country‐specific. In the pluralist form of democracy like the United States, environmental policy formulation involves bargaining and compromises among interest groups and regulation enforcement through relatively formal and legalistic means. In the corporatist form of democracy like Sweden and Great Britain, in contrast, environmental policies are more accommodating to divergent societal interests and tend to be less formal in their enforcement. These variations in regulatory style have been attributed to differences in basic constitutional structures, regime types and cultures. How do institutional contexts affect the style of environmental regulation in China, which is both a non‐democratic and developing country? This article examines China's regulatory style by focusing on environmental impact assessment (EIA) regulation in Shanghai. The Shanghai EIA system is analyzed in terms of policy ideology, policy content, regulatory process, public participation and policy consequences. It is shown that China's being a single‐party regime with a ‘rule of persons’ tradition has heavily shaped its environmental governance. Based on Shanghai experience, China's style can be characterized as formal in requirement, agency‐dominated in the regulatory process, legalistic in enforcement, and informal politics as the substance of regulation. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Politics of Regulation: A Comparative-Historical Study of Occupational Health and Safety Regulation in Australia and the United States

Australia and the United States adopt radically different approaches to occupational health and safety regulation, even though their ultimate objectives in this policy area are effectively the same. The US regulatory style is more centralised, legalistic and adversarial, in contrast to Australia's state-based and more consensual approach. This difference in regulatory approach dates from the 1970s: for the 100 years prior to that, workplace health and safety regulation in both countries took a similar legal, institutional and administrative form. The reasons for the contemporary regulatory divergence lie in the distinct national configurations of state and societal institutions in the two countries and the different constellation of political actors involved in regulatory design and reform.     

风险规制中的信息沟通及其制度建构

风险社会中,信息沟通作为规制工具具有独特的比较优势,但我国目前风险规制实践中对信息沟通工具的应用及相关研究才刚刚起步。风险信息沟通工具具有广阔的应用前景,有必要发展出一套体系化的制度机制,帮助规制机构有效运用信息沟通工具,通过提供、传达信息而达成所追求的规制目标。     

Two spheres of regulation: Balancing social and economic goals

Independent regulatory authorities hold comprehensive policy mandates that cover both economic and social goals. They take on various roles in market regulation, competition policy, consumer protection, and labor inspection. This article questions whether policymakers are driven by different rationales when delegating the realization of social, as opposed to economic goals, and analyzes how regulators accommodate their various roles in practice. The conceptual framework links the literature on delegation and organizational models. Comparative analysis of postal policy in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom covers a serious area of potential conflict between social and economic regulation. Variation in delegation points to the relevance of instrumental considerations, but also to the politics of institutional arrangements. Variation in regulatory practice shows that organizational models make a difference in accommodating conflict. The article makes a strong case that social and economic regulation need to be addressed as two distinct, yet interacting spheres. © 2017 John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd     

Rationality,Power, Management and Symbols: Four Images of Regulatory Impact Assessment

Impact assessment is the pivotal instrument in the recent wave of regulatory reforms labeled ‘better regulation’. Although the economics of impact assessment has been the subject of a vast literature, less is known about its political properties. Within a comparative framework, this article provides conjectures on four images of impact assessment – that is, rational policy making, political control of the bureaucracy, public management reform, and symbolic action. Looking at six countries with a long experience of impact assessment and the European Union, the article first builds expectations about the diffusion of the images across countries, and then proceeds to measurement by using both objective and interpretative/subjective indicators. The findings seem to support the public management reform image – a conclusion that suggests further specifications about administrative traditions and change. Sweden and Denmark are not using impact assessment to foster instrumental rationality or increase the political control of bureaucracies and, together with the Netherlands, rank high on the symbolic action scale. The United States – and to a lesser extent Canada and the United Kingdom – have a multi‐purpose approach to impact assessment. The case of the European Union defies prior expectations, showing much more usage than anticipated.     

National styles of regulation: Child care in three countries

An analysis of child care regulations in Germany, Sweden, and the United States reveals distinctive national policy styles. A ‘social constructionist’ perspective, with its emphasis on variable problem definitions, helps to explain such differences. However, a full understanding of regulatory differences requires attention to regulatory solutions as well. By disaggregating the concept of regulation, we are able to demonstrate rather different rank-orderings of our three countries in their regulatory solutions. We attribute these differences to cultural, institutional, and political characteristics of the three countries.     

Institutional Differences and Local Government Performance: Evidence from Property Tax Assessment Quality

Abstract

This article examines the relationship between institutional differences embedded in local governance structures and government performance in the specific context of property assessment. In order to provide deeper insight into why certain governance structures perform better than others, we focus on the impact of nested levels of institutions—constitutional-level and substantive-level rules of governance—beyond the conventional perspective of the form of government. Based on panel data of cities and towns in New York State between 1993 and 2010, our analysis indicates that, among other institutional arrangements, municipalities employing the council–manager form with appointed assessors are most likely to achieve higher levels of assessment quality (uniformity) of the residential property. This indicates that having politically independent (more career-oriented), low-powered appointed governance structures rather than politically risk-averse (more voter-oriented), high-powered elected counterparts are more likely to be effective at reducing risk in tax equity issues, thus providing better financial performance.     

Regulating Rule‐Making via Impact Assessment

In their attempt to promote “better regulation,” governments have ended up with increasing regulation of rule‐making. Regulatory impact assessment (RIA) is a manifestation of this trend. This article draws on the positive political economy hypothesis that RIA is an administrative control device. Rational politicians—positive political economy argues—design administrative requirements to solve problems of political uncertainty. This is a rather abstract hypothesis but with clearly observable implications. Empirical analysis on Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the EU shows that the modes and level of control vary, with almost no evidence supporting the positive political economy hypothesis in Denmark and Sweden and more robust evidence in the other cases, especially the United States and the United Kingdom. The EU scores high, but control has both a political component and an infra‐organizational dimension. In between the extremes I find modest levels of political control in Canada and the Netherlands.     

Industry effects of medical device regulation: the case of diagnostic imaging equipment.

In 1976 Congress passed legislation authorizing the regulation of all medical devices. Some observers predicted that this regulation would have adverse effects on the newly regulated industries. This paper examines the major features of the medical device regulatory program and investigates how the regulation has affected the diagnostic imaging equipment industry. The results indicate that medical device regulation has not materially affected competition or innovation within established product classes in this industry. This suggests that, by choosing methods of regulation that differentiate among levels of potential risk to consumers, the goal of consumer protection can be achieved with fewer undesirable effects on the regulated industry.     

Insuring morality

This article describes and compares two forms of moral regulation employed in connection with insurance institutions. The first governs through moralized personal attributes or pressures like 'temptation' and 'character'. The second governs through moralized institutional or system attributes and processes described in terms of 'efficiency'. The article traces these forms of moral regulation from the mid-nineteenth century to the present, arguing that both continue to inform popular and specialized discourses of risk.     

From Performance Budgeting to Performance Budget Management: Theory and Practice

This article examines the decades‐long practices of performance budgeting in different countries and their associated challenges from a multilayered institutional framework. Based on theory and lessons learned, the article recommends an array of strategies to address institutional and organizational barriers. It also proposes to reconceptualize performance budgeting as a performance budget management system and suggests how multiyear budget planning, financial risk assessment, policy planning, the departmental budget cycle, the program budget cycle, stakeholder engagement, regular spending reviews, and performance audits should be integrated more closely to address the long‐term fiscal challenges faced by many governments and to respond to the public pressure on agencies to do more with less.     

Institutional Congruence, Ideas, and Anticorruption Policy: The Case of China and the United States

While international comparisons of anticorruption policies abound, whether these policies are transferable and how they change inside national boundaries remain debatable. Kaifeng Yang of Florida State University proposes an institutional framework that emphasizes the role of congruence and ideas in institutional change. In comparing China to the United States, the author concludes that anticorruption institutional change is path dependent, as it is nested in fundamental political structures and meta-narratives. Professor Yang proposes the possibility that new ideas may cause gradual changes with radical results.     

EU Regulation of Medical Devices and Pharmaceuticals in Comparative Perspective

This paper provides a comparison of European Union regulatory policy for pharmaceuticals and medical devices. The discussion highlights key similarities and differences in regulatory approach for the two sectors. More importantly, it explores the balance that has been struck between public health, health care, and industrial policy as “competing” objectives within the respective regulatory regimes. It is argued that, despite both sectors being affected by the same institutional rules and constraints at the EU level, and both being central to the delivery of high-quality health care in Europe, there are a surprising number of differences between the regulatory frameworks. That this stems in part from their different “launch” times, hence different institutional conditions of regulation, and commensurate political climates, as well as reflecting different aims and goals among member-state and EU-level policy makers, are among the paper's main conclusions.     

Co‐enforcing Labor standards: the unique contributions of state and worker organizations in Argentina and the United States

Labor inspection is a central response to the tremendous gap between formal regulations and outcomes for workers throughout the world. Scholarly and policy debates on labor regulation have focused on improving the targeting of enforcement, changing strategies of street‐level agents, and creating private alternatives to state regulation. This paper argues that these proposals, while important, fail to systematically incorporate the potential contributions of worker organizations and, as a result, overlook opportunities for co‐enforcing labor standards, a key element of labor inspection. By contrast, we develop a framework to analyze the relationships between worker organizations and state regulators that underpin co‐enforcement. We ground this framework empirically in comparative cases, set in Argentina and the United States, presenting two cases of co‐enforcement in highly different institutional contexts. In so doing, we seek to illuminate key attributes of labor inspection and guide attempts to enhance enforcement by forging partnerships between regulators and worker organizations.     

The Institutional Basis of Secessionist Politics: Federalism and Secession in the United States

According to the literature on secession, the most importantdeterminant of secessionist sentiment is a high level of grievanceexperienced by the would-be secessionist group. However, therationale behind using secession (as opposed to another strategy)as a grievance-amelioration strategy remains almost completelyunexplained. This article contends that the institutional settingin which political conflict and grievance are experienced playsa crucial role in whether secession is conceived of as a viableoption. This contention is tested by examining the institutionalenvironment of federalism and the role it played in secessionin the United States in 1860 and 1861. The United States wasuniquely vulnerable to secessionist pressures—as are allfederal states, potentially—because of institutional structuresthat gave constituent states a high level of institutional authorityand capacity; this, in turn, contributed to a discourse of states'rights that included the contested right to secede.     

Of change,training and public affairs in Europe

European public affairs practitioners need to be increasingly professional in their reactions to an EU undergoing transformational change. The paper offers a comprehensive summary of the subtleties of institutional change in Commission, Parliament and Council in 2004. In particular, the author argues that expansion from 15 member states to 25 has fundamentally changed the nature of the Union's politics and the skills required to influence it. This new EU requires more of practitioners than experience and amateur instinct: to achieve results and avoid restrictive regulation, the public affairs community must adopt effective training strategies, challenging competence targets and regular self‐assessment of its performance and ethics. Copyright © 2004 Henry Stewart Publications