The rational behavior theory of voting participation: Evidence from the 1970 and 1982 elections

In recent years a substantial literature on the determinants of voting participation has been developed. In many of these studies voting is assumed to be an expression of rational behavior. That is, people vote when they expect that the benefits will exceed the related costs. Voting is largely an act of consumption based upon the widely held belief that one should vote to fulfill a civic duty or upon some combination of personal characteristics which is sufficiently vague to make precise measurement impossible. The rational behavior theory, however, holds that voting is influenced at the margin by personal and environmental factors which incrementally affect expected benefits and costs, making the act of voting more or less rational. Those factors which increase expected benefits will, ceteris paribus, enhance the probability that one will vote. Those factors which increase expected costs will, of course, have the opposite effect. This study is presented as a primarily empirical contribution to the literature which assumes that, since voting is an expression of rational behavior, it can be modeled and tested using standard economic analysis and methodology. The study is designed to fulfill several purposes. First, we update previous empirical work using data from the 1980 census and from the 1982 congressional elections. The results of our regressions strongly support the rational behavior theory. In addition, we test to determine whether it is less rational for southern blacks to vote as compared to their white counterparts. Our results suggest that the answer is affirmative. Tests of parameter equivalency between the 1970 and 1982 congressional elections are performed with some interesting results. Finally, tests for specification error provide evidence that the rational behavior model and congressional district data generate statistically valid estimates of the determinants of voting participation.     

Explaining Social Class Inequality in Voter Turnout: The Contribution of Income and Health

Occupation‐based social class is an important, yet under‐explored, factor in electoral participation. In this article, social class differences in voter turnout over time are measured, and how two other resources – namely income and health – mediate or modify this relationship is analysed. The analysis is based on an individual‐level register‐based 11 percent sample of the entire electorate in the 1999 Finnish parliamentary elections, and secondarily on smaller register‐based samples in the 2012 presidential and municipal elections. Results show that income mediates part of the effects of social class on voting, while social class and utilised health indicators exert mainly independent effects on turnout. Social class differences remain largely stable in all income and hospital care groups, except that no differences between classes are observed among those most severely affected by health problems. Results are also mostly similar between those of working age and the older population, and between men and women, and remain stable over time and in different types of elections. The findings imply that social class should be taken account in theoretical and empirical models of turnout.     

Does Economic Inequality Depress Electoral Participation? Testing the Schattschneider Hypothesis

Nearly a half-century ago, E.E. Schattschneider wrote that the high abstention and large differences between the rates of electoral participation of richer and poorer citizens found in the United States were caused by high levels of economic inequality. Despite increasing inequality and stagnant or declining voting rates since then, Schattschneider’s hypothesis remains largely untested. This article takes advantage of the variation in inequality across states and over time to remedy this oversight. Using a multilevel analysis that combines aspects of state context with individual survey responses in 144 gubernatorial elections, it finds that citizens of states with greater income inequality are less likely to vote and that income inequality increases income bias in the electorate, lending empirical support to Schattschneider’s argument.     

Cost and the calculus of voting

Downs's (1957) theory of voting maintains that individuals balance the costs of voting against anticipated benefits in deciding whether to vote. However, most empirical tests of his theory have concluded that costs play little role in individuals' decisions to vote or abstain, and that benefits are the determining factor. Unfortunately, the existing empirical tests of the theory have been inadequate, especially in regard to the measurement of the cost of voting. Using data from the Comparative State Elections Project, we develop an improved indicator of the cost of voting. When this measure of cost is used in a test of Down's theory, we find, contrary to most earlier research, that the cost of voting seems to be a more important determinant of participation than the factors associated with voting benefits in Downs's model.The authors shared equally in the research reported; the order in which they are listed was determined randomly.     

Whether one votes and how one votes

The aim of this paper is to determine if whether one votes effects the vote that is cast. Using an economic model of voting and observed voting results on nuclear power referenda, the answer is a resounding yes. Overcoming registration, turnout, and “roll off” hurdles dramatically increases the odds of voting against nuclear power. Indeed, participation swamps both economic and preference variables in the explanation of nuclear power voting outcomes. The lesson is that there is a structure to participation at the polls that should not be ignored by those interested in analyzing voting outcomes.     

Economic Conditions and Constituency Voting in Great Britain

The extent to which levels and trends in local unemployment and income influenced the Conservative vote in 633 separate British constituency elections in 1983 is estimated in several regression models. Long-term influences on voting are controlled by the endogenous variables of social class and territoriality. It is argued that this research design is superior to previous ones that have treated general elections as national elections in exploring the economic theory of voting. Sensitivity analysis (the use of several models to illuminate the research problem posed) suggests that, unlike America congressional elections, current rates and trends in local unemployment and income exerted a substantial and systematic influence on constituency voting.     

Gradient constraint in voting: The effect of intra-generational social class and income mobility on turnout

As the connection between an individual’s socioeconomic status and electoral participation originates from the socialization process in childhood and adolescence, inequalities in voting are often argued to be relatively stable throughout the life cycle. However, social mobility during adulthood may mitigate the effects of family background. Using individual-level register-based data, this study examines the extent to which changes in adults’ social class and income between 2000 and 2011 influenced voting propensity in the 2012 Finnish municipal elections. The results show that turnout among socially mobile voters settles between the stable members of their socioeconomic group of origin and destination. Our findings imply that intra-generational social and economic mobility can constrain the socioeconomic gradient in turnout.     

Income inequality,development and electoral turnout – New evidence on a burgeoning debate

In this article, we comprehensively analyze the macro-level link between income inequality and electoral turnout. First, we re-examine prior studies which affirm that higher inequality puts a drain on electoral turnout in wealthy industrialized Western countries. Second, we evaluate whether there is an association between the two concepts in a larger, more representative sample of democratic elections around the world. Third, we analyze if income inequality has a different influence on participation in the Western and non-Western countries. Controlling for nine theoretically informed covariates, we assess these claims in a multilevel framework with evidence from more than 550 democratic elections between 1970 and 2010. We find little evidence that electoral turnout is affected by income inequality. Our results also indicate that this “null” effect does not differ between the Western- and the non-Western world. However, we do find evidence that mandatory voting laws and more decisive elections boost turnout considerably.     

The Primacy of Race in the Geography of Income‐Based Voting: New Evidence from Public Voting Records

Why does the relationship between income and partisanship vary across U.S. regions? Some answers to this question have focused on economic context (in poorer environments, economics is more salient), whereas others have focused on racial context (in racially diverse areas, richer voters oppose the party favoring redistribution). Using 73 million geocoded registration records and 185,000 geocoded precinct returns, we examine income‐based voting across local areas. We show that the political geography of income‐based voting is inextricably tied to racial context, and only marginally explained by economic context. Within homogeneously nonblack localities, contextual income has minimal bearing on the income‐party relationship. The correlation between income and partisanship is strong in heavily black areas of the Old South and other areas with a history of racialized poverty, but weaker elsewhere, including in urbanized areas of the South. The results demonstrate that the geography of income‐based voting is inseparable from racial context.     

How husbands and wives vote

This article uses economic theories of voting behavior and household decision making to analyze the role of own and spouse earnings in determining political voting behavior. The main predictions from these models is that earnings is one of the factors that has an impact on political preferences and in households who share resources, voting behavior will be influenced more by the most representative labor income in the family. I investigate empirically the importance of individual vs household income, and find that the importance of individual income on voting behavior is contingent on employment. On average women earn less than their husband and vote according to their husbands income. If the wife is the maximum earner of the household or works fulltime, she votes more according to her own earnings.     

Compulsory voting and the dynamics of partisan identification

Compulsory rules are known to have far‐reaching effects beyond boosting electoral participation rates. This article examines the relationship between compulsory voting and partisan attachments. A theory of attachment formation and strength is engaged that argues that compulsory voting boosts the likelihood that one will identify with a party and, in turn, the strength of party attachments among identifiers. The statistical model accounts for both the hierarchical structure of the data (individuals in elections) and the dual nature of the dependent variable (individuals report a strength of attachment only for the party with which they identify). Using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, it is demonstrated that compulsory voting does indeed increase both the incidence and the strength of partisanship.     

Getting things straight: The effects of ballot design and electoral structure on voter participation

This paper considers the implications of the straight-party voting option (STVO) on participation in judicial elections. Voters using straight-party options (by definition) do not vote for candidates in nonpartisan elections. Consequently, ballot roll-off in these elections is more likely to occur when people are given the chance to vote the party ticket and complete the voting process quickly. This is the case because nonpartisan judicial elections are considerably less salient than statewide and federal partisan elections. This article separates out the effects of the institutional structure of the election on political participation with the effects of ballot design. We find that in nonpartisan elections, the straight-party option decreases voter participation since voters who utilize the straight-ticket option may erroneously believe that they have voted for these nonpartisan offices, or simply ignore them. However, in nonpartisan elections without straight-ticket voting, participation is increased compared to nonpartisan elections with straight-ticket voting. Additionally, both forms of nonpartisan elections have less participation than partisan elections, all of which have the straight-ticket option. Thus, voter participation is affected not only by the type of election, but the type of voting rules in the election.     

Approval and plurality voting with uncertainty: Info-gap analysis of robustness

Voting algorithms are used to choose candidates by an electorate. However, voter participation is variable and uncertain, and projections from polls or past elections are uncertain because voter preferences may change. Furthermore, electoral victory margins are often slim. Variable voter participation or preferences, and slim margins of decision, have implications for choosing a voting algorithm. We focus on approval voting (AV) and compare it to plurality voting (PV), regarding their robustness to uncertainty in voting outcomes. We ask: by how much can voting outcomes change without altering the election outcomes? We see fairly consistent empirical differences between AV and PV. In single-winner elections, PV tends to be more robust to vote uncertainty than AV in races with large victory margins, while AV tends to be more robust at low victory margins. Two conflicting concepts—approval flattening and approval magnification—explain this tendency for reversal of robust dominance between PV and AV. We also examine the robustness to vote uncertainty of PV in elections for proportional representation of parties.

     

Political Action Committee Spending and Senate roll call voting

This paper addresses how PAC spending affects the roll call voting behavior of U.S. Senators. Using a theoretical framework which draws broadly on the voting literature, we develop models that explain Senatorial voting behavior in a pre-PAC and post-PAC world. Testing both models we find weak support for a Downs-Black view of voting participation in the first model. The second model supports the alteration of voting incentives resulting from PAC spending. We find that PACs have a positive effect on voting participation. The conjecture remains whether PACs change voting outcomes, but it is clear that they buy voting participation.     

Ideology and the size of US state government

This paper theorizes that the impact of ideology on the size of US state governments increases with state income. This idea is tested using state-level ideology data derived from the voting behavior of state congressional representatives. Empirically the interaction of ideology and mean income is a key determinant of state government size. At 1960s levels of income the impact of ideology is negligible. At 1997 levels of income a one standard-deviation move towards the left of the ideology spectrum increases state government size by about half a standard deviation. Estimated income elasticities differentiated by state and time are found to be increasing with ideology and diminishing with income, as predicted by the theory.     

The Impact of Social Media Political Activists on Voting Patterns

This paper investigates how social media affects general voting patterns. Unlike previous studies investigating whether citizens’ use of social media affects political participation, this paper considers the connections that social media users have with political activists on social media, and how this connectedness influences general voting patterns, using data from Ghana. With contemporary theoretical perspectives and exploratory techniques, trends from past literature are presented, from a social media-based propagated survey with 420 valid responses. Structural equation modeling was used to test the conceptual model, which demonstrates that the connectedness with political and social media activists is significant and positively influences modifications in voting patterns. Online political participation and political affect also present an effect on voting patterns. The relationship between connections with social media political activists and online political participation is significant, as indicated by a strong covariance observed in the model. The results of the multigroup analysis also indicate some cultural and social issues to shape the phenomena for further investigation.

     

Third party voting and the rational voter model: Empirical evidence from recent presidential elections

This paper attempted to demonstrate that a rational voter model as derived by Barzel and Silberberg (1973) can be used (with modifications) to explain third party voting in presidential elections. The empirical findings strongly suggest that the rational voter model is applicable in explaining third party voting. This conclusion likewise suggests that people who vote for third parties do so under similar motivations as people who vote for the major parties. Thus, people do not appear to regard votes for third parties as wasted votes or engage in the voting process in an irrational fashion. Lastly, votes for third parties represent the transmission of individual preferences by people who believe that their vote is important and that in the aggregate their signal may be interpreted as a signal to alter the direction of current policies as run by the major parties. Therefore, it does not appear from the evidence presented here that we should distinguish between or treat differently voting participation for the major parties versus the minor or third parties in presidential elections.The author expresses appreciation to Charles Campbell, Gary Pecquet, Paul W. Grimes, and James E. McClure for comments and criticisms. The usual caveat applies.     

The electoral college and the rational vote

We have shown first, that if the electoral college was abolished the theoretically measured power of voters would increase and second, that in presidential elections the measure of voting power used does in fact have a highly significant impact on the decision as to whether or not to vote. Thus, the analysis predicts that the abolition of the electoral college would have a significant impact on voter participation. From a policy viewpoint, if we view participation in elections as desirable, this could be used as an argument in favor of direct election of the president. From a scientific viewpoint, we are able to make a strong and unambiguous prediction about the results of a (possible) future event from theoretical considerations. If the electoral college should be abolished, it will be possible to test our predictions. In addition, we have provided a further test of the rational behavior view of electoral participation and have shown that this model applies to presidential elections. Finally, we have shown that the theoretical measure of voting power does predict actual behavior.     

Modes of participation over the adult life span

Sidney Verba and Norman Nie, in their 1972 workParticipation in America, advance the notion that political participation is not unidimensional, but is comprised of different modes. In recent years, the availability of panel and cross-sectional time series data has led to greater interest in the temporal dimension of political participation. Using data from nine American National Election Studies, we confirm the Verba and Nie findings with respect to voting and campaign participation and expand upon them. We examine the factor structure of indicators used in composite indices of voting and campaign participation and find that the structure of participation is stable across age groups, cohorts, and periods, confirming that composite indices of voting and campaign participation are not confounded by age, cohort, or period effects.This study was supported by grants from the Wayne State University Graduate School and the National Institute on Aging (NIA 5 AG06344-02).     

Primary Voters Versus Caucus Goers and the Peripheral Motivations of Political Participation

Depending on their state of residence, Americans can participate in Presidential nomination contests either by voting in a primary or by attending a caucus. Since caucus participation requires more time and effort than primary voting, it has long been thought that caucuses must attract a more partisan, activist, and politically extreme cohort of citizens than primaries. This paper challenges the view that more burdensome electoral institutions necessarily ought to attract more politically engaged citizens. I propose a theory of peripheral motivations that predicts caucus goers and primary voters will not differ in terms of their political attitudes or interest, but they will differ in their levels of community engagement. The key insight is that many of the reasons why citizens choose to participate or abstain from politics actually have little to do with politics. Analysis of two surveys from the 2008 Presidential election substantiates the theoretical expectations.