Endogenous sharing rules in collective-group rent-seeking

This paper examines the possibility of endogenous determination of intra-group sharing rules in a collective-group rent-seeking game. Collective-group rent-seeking is considered as a two-stage Nash-Cournot game in which sharing rules are determined prior to individual decision on voluntary contribution. The solution is subgame perfect and is obtained by backward induction. In competition between two groups of the same size, the Nash equilibrium sharing rule of each group is to distribute rent to each according to relative effort. Total rent-seeking outlays in this case are equal to those obtained by Tullock (1980). When more than two groups compete for a rent, the sharing rule based on relative effort is again likely to be the Nash equilibrium strategy of each group. The amount of total rent-seeking outlays is also equal to that in Tullock (1980). In a nutshell, the rent is substantially dissipated if sharing rules are endogenously determined.     

Rent-seeking with non-identical sharing rules

The primary object of this paper is to examine the role of differential sharing rules within a collective rent-seeking setting on the possible non-existence of Nash equilibrium. Focusing on groups that distribute part of the rent equally among their members and the residual according to relative effort, we show that in rent-seeking societies applying the two polar sharing rules equilibrium never exists. In the general case where groups apply different but not necessarily the polar sharing rules, we study the relationship between group variability in distributing rents and the problem of non-existence of equilibrium in the rent-seeking game.     

Collective Resistance under Authoritarianism: Elite–Mass Strategies in an Experimental Game

We create a collective resistance game in which elites control the distribution of resources if the masses are compliant. However, if the masses unanimously protest elite allocations, they can capture a greater share of resources for themselves. We study how Chinese villagers, randomly assigned to the role of elites and masses, play this game in repeated interactions under varying information conditions. We find significant variation in the extent to which participants gave weight in their decisions to (1) the amount of the elite allocation and (2) their beliefs about the likely choices of fellow group members. Many individuals made their decisions based primarily on the size of the elite allocation, choosing to protest if the elite offer fell below some threshold level. Only a small proportion of the respondents were attuned consistently to the behavioral intentions of fellow group members in deciding whether to protest the elite allocation. This heterogeneity of preferences among participants has significant implications for their prospects of achieving and sustaining collective action. Knowledge of the amount of resources controlled by elites at the start of the game affected mass calculations of the fairness of distributions and increased the frequency of mass protests. However, the elites exploited the decision rule of many mass members by buying off those individuals with the lowest thresholds, thus preempting or dissolving collective action. This research sheds light on elite–mass interactions under authoritarianism, and in particular on contentious politics in contemporary China.     

The Effect of Number and Size of Interest Groups on Social Rent Dissipation

This paper develops two models of the lobbying of interest groups to examine the effect of the number and size of interest groups on rent dissipation. In cases where individuals ignore the effect of the lobbying activities on the rent size, the number of groups is negatively related to rent dissipation and there exists an inverse relation between the extent of egalitarianism of within-group rent sharing rules and the total rent dissipation in the symmetric setting. Model two examines the case where each individual in each group takes into account the effect of lobbying activities on the total “pie”, of which she/he competes for a share through within-group and between-group interaction. The relation between the number of symmetric groups and the total rent dissipation is shown to be an inverted “U”-shape, contrary to the conventional wisdom that holds a monotonous relation between the two variables.     

Democracy and distributiveness: patterns of transition from hegemony in divided societies

Many culturally heterogeneous societies with functioning democratic regimes nonetheless fail to grant equal status to different ethnic and cultural groups within their borders. To a great extent, scholars discuss such inequalities within the analytical boundaries of the discourse on democracy and democratization. We argue that such discussions overstretch the concept of democracy. In this research, we offer a novel axis of inquiry, namely distributiveness. We define distributiveness as the egalitarian distribution of resources – political, material, cultural-symbolic, institutional, and territorial – among different ethnic, religious, or cultural groups which self-identify as collectives within society. The aim of this new conceptualization is to (1) restore conceptual clarity to the literature on democracy, (2) enhance our capacity to assess the allocation of resources within a given polity, and (3) elucidate the processes that lead to change in patterns of allocation.     

State‐targeted grievances and resources: Protest participation during economic downturns in Latin America

This article analyzes the determinants of protest participation in Latin America. Whereas most research emphasizes grievances over resources, or vice versa, this article explains protest participation as the interaction between individuals' state‐targeted grievances and material resources. I argue that grievances and availability of material resources interact and fuel protest among individuals whose income falls close to the middle of the income distribution, but not among the poor or the rich. Whereas the scarcity of resources mitigates the politicization of grievances among the poor, the relative abundance of resources and alternative channels of political influence produces the same effect among the rich. Analysis of survey data from Latin American democracies provides strong support for these arguments.     

Autonomy and Egalitarianism

In this article I consider the alleged incompatibility between individual autonomy and the achievement and subsequent maintenance of an egalitarian society. I argue that not only is there no incompatibility, but that it is only where an egalitarian society is in place that a like autonomy can be exercised by each citizen. To make out my case I discuss the three main grounds that have been advanced to show there is such an incompatibility. Opponents of egalitarianism contend that egalitarian goals can only be achieved with losses in autonomy; in particular, losses through infringements on the civil liberties of individual citizens, losses in the scope individuals have to exercise and exploit their own talents and losses in control over the income and wealth to which individuals are entitled as a result of the exercise of their talents. The first of these contentions is dealt with quite briefly but the second and third go to the heart of the matter and accordingly are given fuller discussion. None of the three can be convincingly made out because it is precisely where there are significant inequalities in income and wealth that significant differences exist in the scope individuals have to fulfil their life-plans and thus to exercise their individual autonomy.     

Pressure and the division of a public budget

This paper considers the division of a public budget among competing interests. The planner determines the optimal allocation by maximizing a weighted social welfare function. These weights reflect society's attitudes to different recipient groups, and are not constrained to be constant. By exerting “pressure”, the recipients can attempt to manipulate the weights and hence influence the division of the budget. The amount of resources used on pressure, and the effects on the preference weights are calculated. An important parameter in the model is the elasticity of pressure, for which an appropriate estimate is presented from the case of competition for a share of a health services budget in Norway.     

Rent-seeking,political influence and inequality: A simple analytical example

A simple model allowing an analysis of the interaction between economic policy decisions and rent-seeking by private agents competing for political influence, is developed. Rent-seeking may be of the directly unproductive type, requiring resources that are withdrawn from productive activities, or it may manifest itself as income transfers (corruption) to political decisionmakers. In the political-economic equilibrium of the model the extent of rent-seeking, economic policy decisions, income inequality, etc. are endogenously determined.     

Rent-seeking in natural resource quota allocations

This paper examines the incentives for rent-seeking in the allocation of natural resource quotas to competing user groups by political bodies. The political body has discretion in making the allocation, and competing user groups rent-seek to influence the allocation. We investigate ways in which the governmental body can affect the behavior of the players by setting the ground rules for the competition. A political body can affect an allocatively (Pareto) efficient outcome by choosing an appropriate default (pre rent-seeking) policy. Surprisingly, an allocatively efficient default policy is unlikely to minimize social costs. However, winner-take-all default policies are likely to maximize, not minimize, rent-seeking. A competitive post-allocation market reduces rent-seeking, but is not, either itself or in combination with an efficient default policy, capable of minimizing social costs. However, forcing winners in political redistributions to fully compensate losers both lowers the rent-seeking levels relative to a potential compensation criterion and, when used together with an efficient default policy, is capable of obtaining the first-best solution of an allocatively efficient allocation with zero rent-seeking.     

Property rights vs. redistribution: Which path to national wealth?

Recent empirical and theoretical research suggests that egalitarian income distribution may spur economic growth. Another different strand of research suggests that property rights are important. These two results are not at odds. A model of switching between a career of rent-seeking and wealth producing shows that for redistribution to boost national income, property rights need to be secure. A more equal distribution of earned income can induce rent-seekers to switch to wealth making, but only if they can be assured that their earned income will be protected from other rent-seekers. The model suggests new directions for empirical testing.     

Personal vote‐seeking in flexible list systems: How electoral incentives shape Belgian MPs' bill initiation behaviour

It is well known that different types of electoral systems create different incentives to cultivate a personal vote and that there may be variation in intra‐party competition within an electoral system. This article demonstrates that flexible list systems – where voters can choose to cast a vote for the list as ordered by the party or express preference votes for candidates – create another type of variation in personal vote‐seeking incentives within the system. This variation arises because the flexibility of party‐in‐a‐district lists results from voters' actual inclination to use preference votes and the formal weight of preference votes in changing the original list order. Hypotheses are tested which are linked to this logic for the case of Belgium, where party‐in‐a‐district constituencies vary in their use of preference votes and the electoral reform of 2001 adds interesting institutional variation in the formal impact of preference votes on intra‐party seat allocation. Since formal rules grant Belgian MPs considerable leeway in terms of bill initiation, personal vote‐seeking strategies are inferred by examining the use of legislative activity as signalling tool in the period between 1999 and 2007. The results establish that personal vote‐seeking incentives vary with the extent to which voters use preference votes and that this variable interacts with the weight of preference votes as defined by institutional rules. In addition, the article confirms the effect of intra‐party competition on personal vote‐seeking incentives and illustrates that such incentives can underlie the initiation of private members bills in a European parliamentary system.     

Sites and services schemes in Dacca: A critique

This paper presents a critical analysis of two sites and services projects in Dacca, in the light of previous studies of low income housing. The analysis demonstrates that resource limitation is not the most important factor preventing resolution of the low-income housing problem, that there is a perverse use of resources which makes the situation worse, and that this use continues because it is in the pecuniary interest of the dominant interest group. The conclusions drawn are far from optimistic: (a) without radical changes in the main direction of resource allocation, there exists little or no possibility for an improvement in the living conditions of poor families; and, (b) the provision of housing for the lowest income group is more a question of political will and social engineering than building technology.     

Income, assets, and health insurance: economic resources for meeting acute health care needs of the aged.

In this article, the authors use data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to examine the relationship between economic resources and acute health care needs among the aged. The circumstances of individuals who rely on Medicare as their only form of health insurance are considered in detail because they are potentially more vulnerable when faced with health care expenses. Particular attention is given to the amount of family income and personal contingency assets held by this group and the level of out-of-pocket liability for acute care they might have been expected to face in 1984. The authors point out that their research findings would be strengthened by linkage of a more current SIPP data set to Medicare program records and the development of Medicaid eligibility simulation capability in the SIPP context.     

SSI eligibility and participation among the oldest old: evidence from the AHEAD

The proportion of elderly SSI recipients aged 70 or older has been growing in recent years, perhaps because of rising life expectancies overall and a higher incidence of poverty among the oldest old. In 1999, 84 percent of all elderly SSI recipients were 70 or older. This article examines Supplemental Security Income (SSI) eligibility and participation among the oldest old. The analysis was based on 1993 data from the Study of Assets and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old that were used to build a detailed SSI eligibility model to identify individuals who meet the federal criteria for SSI income and resource eligibility. The participation rate among those eligible for federal SSI benefits is 53.9 percent, which is generally consistent with the findings of other studies. Furthermore, eligible participants would receive a significantly higher federal SSI benefit than eligible nonparticipants. Correspondingly, eligible participants have significantly lower incomes and assets than eligible nonparticipants. An econometric model is used to estimate the influence of various demographic, financial, and health care use characteristics on the probability of SSI participation among eligible individuals and couples. The model corrects for measurement error in calculated benefits and for misclassifying someone as ineligible. The empirical results show that the effect of higher SSI benefits on the probability of participation is substantial--a $100 increase in benefits would increase the probability of participating for an average eligible unit by 15 percentage points. Many of the demographic, financial, and health care use variables also are important predictors of SSI participation among the oldest old. The eligibility and participation models are also used to simulate the effect of increasing the SSI unearned income disregard from $20 to $125. Those made eligible by this policy change would receive a very low federal SSI benefit on average, suggesting that they are on the margin of eligibility under the original program rules. The simulated participation rate is 48.8 percent--5 percentage points lower than under the original program rules--reflecting the low benefit that new eligibles would receive. Only 36 percent of those made eligible by the new program rules are predicted to participate. These SSI eligibility and participation models are potentially useful tools for policy analysis. It is fairly straightforward to use these models to change a feature of SSI eligibility, reestimate the group of eligible individuals and couples, and predict participation among those who are eligible under the simulated program rules. New eligibles can be compared with those eligible under original program rules. New participants can be compared with old participants. Although these models focus only on individuals aged 70 or older, this type of analysis can be helpful in estimating the potential distributional effects of proposed SSI policy changes.     

Interest Group Competition and Coalition Formation

This article investigates how interest group competition, a state of conflicting policy preferences stemming from how organizational memberships are defined, can resolve into conflict or cooperation. The strategic choices of competing lobbyists are modeled as the results of a trade-off between the need to represent members and please legislators, and the additional advocacy resources they hope to gain by agreeing to form coalitions with their competitors rather than fight them in resource-draining conflicts. Hypotheses derived from the model are tested with data from interviews with lobbyists on six issues taken up by the U.S. Congress from 1999 to 2002. The results suggest that while group members do have some limited power to constrain the policy positions taken on issues by their lobbyists, it is primarily the pressures from legislators and competitor groups that push lobbyists into collectively supporting coalition positions different from those desired by their members.     

全球化背景下的地方政府竞争——提高政府核心竞争力的战略选择

市场经济的发展,使处于平等地位的政府主体为获取更多的资源、政治影响力和控制权而处在相互争取和竞争的状态。而目前处在全球化背景下政府竞争的发展态势,正从单纯的国内竞争向国际国内全方位竞争演变,从有形的资金、人才和资源的竞争向无形的制度、服务和管理水平的竞争演变,从不规范竞争向规范竞争演变。为避免政府的过度竞争及其消极影响,各级政府必须进一步明确角色特征,调整行为取向,切实维护公民权利,创造竞争机会;营造公平竞争环境,维护竞争规则;调整经济发展战略,制定适宜的社会政策,调节竞争结果;进一步在政府自身建设中,引入竞争机制,提高政府效能和政府竞争力。     

我国收入分配失衡的原因及其调节——以《资本论》关于资本运动的逻辑和方法为视角

《资本论》所揭示的价值规律、生产力发展规律等市场经济运行的一般规律,对今天我们建设中国特色社会主义仍然适用.《资本论》中关于资本运动的逻辑及其所揭示的社会经济发展的一般规律,对于合理调节我国目前收入分配失衡问题具有重要的指导意义.     

Fairness to non-participants: a case for a practice-independent egalitarian baseline

Proponents of practice-dependent egalitarianism argue that egalitarian duties and entitlements only apply among participants in morally relevant practices. In this paper, I argue that these views are implausible because they allow for objectionable treatment of non-participants. I show that it is impossible, on the basis of practice-internal considerations alone, to determine the extent to which the pursuit of practices can permissibly limit the opportunities of non-participants. There are opportunities beyond the current holdings of practices to which no one has a privileged claim (such as unowned natural resources), and the distribution of which is a matter of justice. A just distribution of such unowned distributive goods, though, requires a practice-independent distributive baseline. I further show that such a baseline can only be egalitarian because all alternative baselines face serious objections. From this I conclude that any plausible theory of distributive justice must accept some form of equal practice-independent distributive entitlements.     

A left-libertarian proposal for egalitarian world ownership

In this paper I advocate a left-libertarian approach to egalitarian world ownership that combines common ownership of land, following Henry George (where private appropriation is subject to the payment of rent), with joint ownership of finite and exhaustible resources such as oil (where use is subject to a collective decision-making process and tax paid at the point of extraction). This rent and tax together create a common fund available for global distribution. I argue that this approach offers improvements on Hillel Steiner’s proposal for a global fund, and Thomas Pogge’s proposal for a Global Resources Dividend (GRD) since it does not penalize states for the inclusion of valuable resources within their territory that are not being used, while it also does not allow states to benefit from the use of resources elsewhere while simultaneously refusing to exploit the resources within their own borders. Moreover, joint ownership need not conflict with the libertarian commitment to self-ownership, as is often thought to be the case, and when supplementing common ownership of land it can provide an egalitarian outcome as well as greater protection for future generations and the environment.