朝日“绑架问题”上的日本外交方针分析

朝日"绑架问题"历经小泉内阁、安倍内阁、福田内阁,已成为朝日邦交正常化的重大悬案之一。针对日益僵化的"绑架问题",小泉内阁以"绑架问题不解决,日朝邦交不会正常化"为基本原则,回避历史问题,企图完全以"对话和压力"的外交方针来解决"绑架问题"。而安倍内阁则继承和"发扬"小泉的上述方针,一味地强调以"压力"来解决"绑架问题"。福田当选日本首相以后,多次表示一揽子解决日朝间的历史问题和"绑架问题"的意愿。     

Sir John Bradbury and the Reparations Commission, 1920-25

This article looks at a neglected episode during the work of the Reparations Commission of 1920-25 leading up to the Dawes Plan of 1924, when the British delegate to the Commission, Sir John Bradbury, drew up a plan to reschedule German reparation payments in an attempt to take the venom out of the debate over these payments. It takes as its documentary basis the previously unpublished papers of Sir John in his role as Britain's representative on the Reparations Commission from 1920 to 1925. The article concludes that Bradbury's plan had the potential to defuse at least some of the problems encountered in the political and economic results of the reparations policy and that it made a significant contribution to the thinking that emerged in the Dawes Plan.     

中韩建交15年:外交史上的奇迹 和平共处的典范

2007年是中韩建交15周年,也是中韩交流年。短短的15年中,两国关系不论在政治上、经济上还是文化上,都取得了举世瞩目的成绩,可以说是中国外交史上的一个奇迹,堪称和平共处的典范。中韩关系发展的前景是极其光明的,但也不能忽视可能影响中韩关系继续发展的问题。中韩友好局面需要双方共同呵护,实现"繁荣共赢"。     

Anglo-American Competition in Central America, 1905-13: The Role of Sir Lionel Carden

Lionel Carden's years as a senior diplomat coincided with the rise of American power in, and Great Britain's strategic disengagement from, the Caribbean region. This changing order naturally gave rise to complications: Great Britain had extensive economic interests in the region, and diplomatic personnel - Carden in particular - endeavoured to protect these interests while at the same time the Foreign Office sought to maintain a good relationship with the United States. Carden's vigorous defence of British economic interests in Central America earned him the reputation in Washington of being 'anti-American'. Carden, however, was most likely acting as a 'buffer' to deflect criticism from policy makers at home.     

国际冷战初期的一个地方热点 ——1945年至1950年间的中越边境跨国革命区

自1920年代起,东亚各国,特别是中国、朝鲜和越南的共产主义运动即互相交织并连成一片。东亚三国共产党之间的合作,促成了南北两个跨国革命区的形成,本文探讨的即是1945年至1950年间南方中越边境跨国革命区形成的条件、中越双方合作的方式,以及1950年前与1950年后中越同盟关系的区别。学术界对于1950年后的中越同盟关系已多有论述,但1950年前中共与印支共之间的合作则未引起同等重视。1950年前的中越跨国革命区值得探讨,一是因为这一时期的中越革命同盟关系实际上是第二次国共内战和第一次印支战争的延伸,也是这两场战争的连接点。这种联系突显了这两场战争的国际性,进一步证明第二次国共内战和第一次印支战争都是与冷战密切关联的热战,中越跨国革命区因此成为冷战初期的一个地方热点,并代表了国际冷战的一种地方形态;二是因为这一阶段两党之间的合作为1950年代至1970年代末期的中越关系奠定了基础。在国共内战期间,中共不仅得到了苏联共产党和朝鲜共产党的支持,也得到了印支共产党的援助,中共对于胡志明和越南革命运动的支持也是从印支战争爆发之日起即已开始,1950年后只是扩大了援助的范围,并提高了援助的规模和合作的级别。1950年前两党关系中发生的一些问题也将在1950年后重复出现并带来严重后果。     

唤醒沉睡的马中关系（1970—1974年）：马中建交前马来西亚华人在社会与文化互动中的角色

本文借助多种资料与文献,分析了1970年到1974年间以李引桐和曾永森为代表的几位马来西亚华人以及一些马来西亚华人团体和个人的活动,试图探讨马来西亚华人怎样通过社会文化互动来促成马中建交。因此可见民间渠道或跨国社会文化互动与官方渠道是相辅相成的。社会和文化互动不仅唤醒了沉睡已久的马中关系,最后还迎来了两国政府和人民的双赢局面。     

Invading Europe: The British army and its preparations for the Normandy campaign, 1942-44

The combat capability of 2nd British Army during the Normandy campaign has been much deprecated. This article tries to shed new light on these criticisms by examining three neglected aspects of the army's preparations for the campaign. It examines how the army was created from formations drawn from both Home Forces and 8th Army; it explores how its formations were trained in Britain before D-Day; it considers how senior commanders were selected to lead the army; and finally it demonstrates how athese issues had a significant influence on the combat capability of British troops in Normandy.     

中柬“特殊关系”的形成(1954-1965)

1954年日内瓦会议以后的10年是中国和柬埔寨关系发展的重要时期。在这一时期中,两国关系经历了一个从彼此缺乏了解到在国际事务中密切合作的过程。在冷战时期,中国领导人视美国为对中国革命和中国国家安全的主要威胁,因此,他们对外政策的一个主要目标就是要打破美国对中国的孤立和封锁。为了反对和削弱美国这个主要敌人,中国领导人在外交领域中运用统一战线策略,分化对手并争取中立势力。就柬埔寨而言,中国领导人的主要考虑就是如何赢得西哈努克对中国的好感,争取他的合作,防止柬埔寨加入美国组织的反华包围圈。此外,中国领导人也希望通过柬埔寨来扩大中国在亚非中立国家中的影响。     

The Press, Public Opinion, Arms Limitation, and Government Policy in Britain, 1932-34: Some Preliminary Observations

One of the least understood issues concerning interwar Britain is the connection between public opinion and the development and implementation of foreign and defence policy. And what is true generally of these crucial elements of interwar British statecraft is doubly so for perhaps their most nettled subset: disarmament. Public opinion polling did not begin in Britain till 1937; yet in 1932-34, when Britain played a leading role in the League of Nations-sponsored World Disarmament Conference, government ministers and their civil service and armed forces advisors sought to produce policy for this conference that would balance between limiting the national armoury and protecting national and Imperial security. Their reading of public opinion was crucial; but so, too, was the reading that the opposition parties and extra-parliamentary interest groups did and the subsequent pressures that they brought to bear on the government. This article offers some preliminary observations on the efficacy of using the national press as a means both of assessing public attitudes and of connecting the public debate over disarmament policy with policymaking within the British government.