Navigating differences: transatlantic negotiations over Galileo

The European global navigation satellite system, Galileo, entered its development phase in 2002 and is scheduled to become operational in 2012. Since its inception, Galileo has been yet another contentious issue in transatlantic negotiations. American concerns spanned economic and security-related issues, but, despite considerable tensions, a comprehensive agreement was entered into in 2004. This paper analyses the roots of the transatlantic dispute, as well as the negotiations that led to its resolution. It points out the vital and wide-ranging lessons that may be gleaned from this case. The European Commission has become a notable actor in the security realm via dual-use items such as Galileo. Technological progress has, in itself, become a bargaining instrument whereas time-honoured negotiation tactics have failed. Galileo sheds light on the ongoing recalibration of the transatlantic partnership in which autonomy has become a powerful motivation for European policy-makers. Constructive engagement, triggered by shared interests, only occurred when parties accepted each other as equals.     

Dwarfs in international negotiations: how small states make their voices heard

Students of international relations interested in cooperation through international regimes and organizations very often devote their attention to the role of a few big states rather than the numerous small ones. Small states tend to possess fewer administrative and financial resources back home as well as smaller and less well-equipped delegations at the international negotiation table than big states. This can easily translate into difficulties in preparing positions for all items on the negotiation agenda and in developing negotiation strategies in great detail, which might inhibit small states from successfully influencing negotiation outcomes. Yet, since international negotiation often rest on a one-state, one-vote principle and since small states can adjust priorities and redirect their limited capacities, there is a window of opportunity for small states to turn into important international actors and achieve significant outcomes in international affairs. In order to systematically shed light on the role of small states in international negotiations, this article outlines the conceptual framework to answer the following question: How, and under which conditions, can small states successfully punch above their weight in international negotiations?     

The effects of anger on negotiations over mergers and acquisitions

Conclusion The practical implications that have been drawn from this analysis of anger in mergers and acquisitions negotiations are just a few of the many that could be identified and further developed from future research. Future studies of conflict behavior can profitably go beyond the narrow focus on anger used here to consider other emotions and related states, such as fear, resentment, gratitude, guilt, or stress. Scholars and negotiators should be mindful not to ignore emotional factors in negotiation simply because emotions and their causes are complex. As I pointed out earlier, emotions are an integral part of the way human beings approach many conflict situations. Those of us who are interested in resolving disputes can only benefit by gaining a better understanding of emotions, the factors that trigger them, and their consequences. Joseph P. Daly is Assistant Professor in the Department of Management, Walker College of Business, Appalachian State University, Boone, N.C. 28608. He is nearing completion of his doctoral studies in organizational behavior at the Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University.This study was supported by a grant from the Dispute Resolution Research Center (DRRC) at North-western University. An earlier version of the paper appeared in the DRRC's working paper series as Working Paper Number 43.The author is indebted to the following for their suggestions on the research and writing of this paper: Bob Bies, Denise Rousseau, Jerry Fox, Tom Tripp, and Max Bazerman.     

The Rotten Carrot: US-Turkish Bargaining Failure over Iraq in 2003 and the Pitfalls of Social Embeddedness

Side-payments are commonly used in international relations to alter the foreign policies of states. Despite their frequent usage, however, our understanding is very limited as to why certain side-payment negotiations succeed, while others fail. This article tries to remedy this shortcoming. It argues that social embeddedness between actors involved in the negotiations has a major bearing on bargaining outcomes. Under ideal circumstances, social relationships can be used to reduce information asymmetries and increase trust. But in the presence of fractured social networks, social ties can foster information bias and distrust, ultimately increasing the likelihood of bargaining failure. The US-Turkish bargaining failure over the Iraq intervention in 2003 is used to illustrate and test this theory.     

Public Commitment in Crisis Bargaining

The "audience cost" literature argues that highly-resolved leaders can use public threats to credibly signal their resolve in incomplete-information crisis bargaining, thereby overcoming informational asymmetries that lead to war. If democracies are better able to generate audience costs, then audience costs help explain the democratic peace. We use a game-theoretic model to show how public commitments can be used coercively as a source of bargaining leverage, even in a complete-information setting in which they have no signaling role. When both sides use public commitments for bargaining leverage, war becomes an equilibrium outcome. The results provide a rationale for secret negotiations as well as hypotheses about when leaders will claim that the disputed good is indivisible, recognized as a rationalist explanation for war. Claims of indivisibility may just be bargaining tactics to get the other side to make big concessions, and compromise is still possible in equilibrium.     

Incentives to Rebel,Bargaining, and Civil War

To fully understand the effects of factors that encourage rebellion, we must differentiate between the way such factors influence mass decisions to join an ongoing rebellion and the way they influence the level of concessions offered by the government. We analyze a three-player bargaining model that allows us to do so. Our results indicate that governments tolerate a greater risk of conflict with their chosen concessions when any conflict that does occur is likely to take the form of a limited, rather than popular, rebellion. We demonstrate that rebellions are more likely to be popular when the general populace is relatively dissatisfied with the status quo and when the government is relatively incapable of putting down rebellions. Widespread poverty and low state capacity might therefore be associated with a lower likelihood of conflict, but a greater probability that the general populace will participate in any conflict that does occur.     

Bargaining over local public good provision in nested social dilemmas: A comparative study of variation from South India

In rural India, decentralized government schemes and assembly constituency development programs represent major channels through which local public good provision is realized. This polycentric governance structure confronts local leaders with a distributional conflict, which is nested in a social dilemma situation. Based on a controlled case study approach, we investigate the provision of small-scale infrastructure in three South Indian communities. Apart from roads and drinking water facilities that directly appeal to the residents of a community, local leaders bargain over infrastructure contracts, which serve as patronage resources in interactions with politicians from higher government levels. A comparative game-theoretic analysis of the results suggests that coordination through political party identities has translated into alternative bargaining strategies and hence varying distributional outcomes regarding contracts and local public goods in the communities under review. The study concludes with recommendations for polycentric institutional design.     

Regionalism's multiple negotiations: ASEAN in East Asia

This article explains East Asian regionalism as the product of two sets of negotiations. The first negotiation is between East Asia on the one hand and global forces and structures on the other. The second negotiation is intra-regional and includes a critical negotiation between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-Southeast Asia and East/Northeast Asia, which also provides the primary focus of this article. This article details ASEAN's extensions into East Asian regionalism as part of interdependent efforts to adapt transitioning global and regional systems. Conceiving these regional negotiations to be not just economic and utilitarian but first and foremost normative, this article details the opportunities and dilemmas represented by ‘East Asia’ for ASEAN, ASEAN-Southeast Asia and Southeast Asia as a meaningful organizing principle. Dilemmas associated with the ASEAN Plus Three process, an East Asia free-trade area and the ASEAN Charter provide illustrations of East Asia's understood challenges for Southeast Asia in addition to the ways that Southeast Asian agencies have been shaping the form and content of recent East Asian efforts and also how regional-global and intra-ASEAN negotiations continue to provide key constraints.     

Strategic issues in structuring multi-party public policy negotiations

Conclusion The protocols suggested here provide a framework for addressing the major strategic issues encountered in structuring multi-party public policy negotiations. A careful consideration of the procedures before substantive negotiations begin is the best assurance that these issues will not emerge as dilemmas and crises during the process itself. The protocols should be created by the parties to derive the full benefits of relevance and commitment. To borrow protocols created for another negotiation may result in both unrealistic and missing provisions.Having a good dispute, where the appropriate parties effectively explore and address their most essential and difficult differences, is the critical first step in effective dispute settlement. Gerald W. Cormick is regional director of The Mediation Institute, 15629 Cascadian Way, Mill Creek, Wash. 98012 and research associate professor at the Graduate School of Public Affairs, the University of Washington.An earlier version of this column was presented by the author during a panel on environmental and natural resource dispute resolution at a research conference sponsored by the Association for Public Policy and Management, 30 October 1987, in Bethesda, Md.