Rewarding Bad Behavior: How Governments Respond to Terrorism in Civil War

Although violent organizations often use terrorism as a means to achieve political aims, recent studies suggest the tactic is ineffective because it fails to help groups gain concessions. While focused exclusively on concessions, these studies overlook other important markers of success, specifically whether groups are invited to participate in negotiations as a result of their use of terrorism. Extant studies also conduct statistical analyses on overly aggregated data, masking any effect terrorism has on important bargaining outcomes. Using new monthly data on the incidence of negotiations and the number of concessions offered to groups involved in African civil wars, this paper demonstrates that rebel groups are both more likely to be granted the opportunity to participate in negotiations and offered more concessions when they execute a greater number of terror attacks during civil wars.     

How to Manage a Party Brand: Empirical Perspectives on Electoral Probability and Internal Conflict

What happens when political party branding is modeled according to the preferences of either voters or party members? Employing the concept of brand identity and the analytical GAP model, this empirical study details the consequences of brand management decisions by political parties using the example of the two biggest parties in Germany. Strategic branding decisions have an impact not only on voting probabilities but also on their internal conflict potential, such as when a branding decision conflicts with the internal image a party maintains among its members. It thus can be highly beneficial for a political party to encourage its members to communicate their image of the party to other voters.     

Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management

This article examines how power-sharing institutions might best be designed to stabilize the transition to enduring peace among former adversaries following the negotiated settlement of civil wars. We identify four different forms of power sharing based on whether the intent of the policy is to share or divide power among rivals along its political, territorial, military, or economic dimension. Employing the statistical methodology of survival analysis to examine the 38 civil wars resolved via the process of negotiations between 1945 and 1998, we find that the more dimensions of power sharing among former combatants specified in a peace agreement the higher is the likelihood that peace will endure. We suggest that this relationship obtains because of the unique capacity of power-sharing institutions to foster a sense of security among former enemies and encourage conditions conducive to a self-enforcing peace.     

Veto Players and Civil War Duration

Civil wars show a remarkable variation in how long they last. Some end within days; others continue for decades. What explains the extreme intractability of some wars while others are resolved quickly? This article argues that conflicts with multiple actors who must approve a settlement (veto players) are longer because there are fewer acceptable agreements, information asymmetries are more acute, and shifting alliances and incentives to hold out make negotiation more difficult. This veto player approach to explaining variation in civil war duration is tested using a new dataset containing monthly data on all parties to each civil war begun since World War II. The statistical analysis shows a strong correlation between the number of veto players and the duration of civil war.     

Civil War and the Social Contract

In this contract-theoretic modelthe government promises a transfer to itspotential opponent in return for notengaging in a civil war. Two causes ofcivil war are identified: (i) imperfectcredibility increases the cost of therequired transfer, and may make itunfeasible; (ii) asymmetric informationfaces the government with the classicefficiency/rent-extraction trade off, andcivil war is used as a screening device.This problem can be solved by creating amixed army. The model determines whether amilitary regime or a redistributive stateprevails in a peaceful equilibrium. Astatistical illustration is presented,using African data.     

Leader Incentives and Civil War Outcomes

This article examines the influence that rebel and state leaders have on civil war outcomes, arguing that incentives to avoid punishment influence their strategic decision making during war.  Leaders in civil war face punishment from two sources: internal audiences and opponents. I hypothesize that leaders who bear responsibility for involvement in the war have a higher expectation of punishment from both sources following unfavorable war performance, and thus, have incentives to continue the fight in the hope of turning the tide and avoiding the negative consequences of defeat. These incentives, in turn, make leaders who bear responsibility more likely to fight to an extreme outcome and less likely to make concessions to end the war.  These propositions are tested on an original data set identifying all rebel and state leaders in all civil conflict dyads ongoing between 1980 and 2011.  Results support the hypothesized relationships between leader responsibility and war outcomes.     

Land Reform and Civil Conflict: Theory and Evidence from Peru

How does land reform impact civil conflict? This article examines this question in the prominent case of Peru by leveraging original data on all land expropriations under military rule from 1969 to 1980 and event-level data from the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission on rural killings during Peru's internal conflict from 1980 to 2000. Using a geographic regression discontinuity design that takes advantage of Peru's regional approach to land reform through zones that did not entirely map onto major preexisting administrative boundaries, I find that greater land reform dampened subsequent conflict. Districts in core areas of land reform zones that received intense land reform witnessed less conflict relative to comparable districts in adjacent peripheral areas where less land reform occurred. Further tests suggest that land reform mitigated conflict by facilitating counterinsurgency and intelligence gathering, building local organizational capacity later used to deter violence, undercutting the Marxist left, and increasing opportunity costs to supporting armed groups.     

Uncertainty and Incentives in Crisis Bargaining: Game‐Free Analysis of International Conflict

We study two different varieties of uncertainty that countries can face in international crises and establish general results about the relationship between these sources of uncertainty and the possibility of peaceful resolution of conflict. Among our results, we show that under some weak conditions, there is no equilibrium of any crisis bargaining game that has voluntary agreements and zero probability of costly war. We also show that while uncertainty about the other side's cost of war may be relatively benign in peace negotiations, uncertainty about the other side's strength in war makes it much more difficult to guarantee peaceful outcomes. Along the way, we are able to assess the degree to which particular modeling assumptions found in the existing literature drive the well‐known relationship between uncertainty, the incentive to misrepresent, and costly war. We find that while the theoretical connection between war and uncertainty is quite robust to relaxing many modeling assumptions, whether uncertainty is about costs or the probability of victory remains important.     

全球化与冷战后国际冲突

冷战结束后,全球化进入了一个崭新的时期。与此同时,全球化带来的国际冲突出现了和以往不同的特点,即碎片化、边缘化和国际化。而全球化正是使国际冲突产生这些新特征的根本原因。只有把全球化建立在更加公平合理的国际政治经济新秩序的基础上,国际冲突才会得到根本的解决。     

Bargaining and Fighting: The Impact of Regime Type on War Onset, Duration, and Outcomes

Recent research suggests that democracies have advantages and disadvantages in wars. Democracies are more likely to win the wars they initiate and the ones in which they are targeted. Wars initiated by democracies are also uniformly shorter and less costly than wars initiated by nondemocracies. However, democracies are also less likely to continue fighting and less likely to win as war drags on. Democracies are also particularly likely to be targeted. We present a bargaining model that reconciles these divergent findings. The model explains why democracies are more likely to win but are also more likely to settle and more likely to be targeted than other types of regimes. The model's explanation of these facts differs in important ways from existing explanations. The model also suggests several new hypotheses relating regime type to the terms of settlement and the onset of war .     

Bargaining in the Shadow of War: When Is a Peaceful Resolution Most Likely?

This article derives the optimal bargaining strategies of the belligerents when each side has private but incomplete information about the expected outcome of a war, should it take place. I show that the aggressor's demand curve can be below the defender's offer curve, that wars are possible even when both sides are jointly pessimistic, and that the relative cost of a war can radically alter the types of disputes that end in war. A simple diagram provides the intuition for most of the major propositions.     

Conflict,Accommodation, and Bargaining: The Implications of Using Politically Buffered Institutions for Contentious Decision Making

One type of new public management reform has been the devolution of services to quasi‐autonomous single purpose governments. This research examines the implications of using a particular type of single purpose government, known as a public authority, in a politically contentious policy setting. Public authorities are generally observed to be highly effective in accomplishing their desired ends in the face of political controversy. However, in examining cases of New York State public authorities siting and developing landfills and incinerators, this research found that they were far less effective than their general purpose government counterparts. The cases suggest that the public authorities created a paradox of power and professionalism. Many public authorities were created to protect professional decision making from political influence, but as a result, they had few resources to bargain in the political process. However, if a public authority had political resources, they had less need to be professional.     

United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil War

Does United Nations peacekeeping protect civilians in civil war? Civilian protection is a primary purpose of UN peacekeeping, yet there is little systematic evidence for whether peacekeeping prevents civilian deaths. We propose that UN peacekeeping can protect civilians if missions are adequately composed of military troops and police in large numbers. Using unique monthly data on the number and type of UN personnel contributed to peacekeeping operations, along with monthly data on civilian deaths from 1991 to 2008 in armed conflicts in Africa, we find that as the UN commits more military and police forces to a peacekeeping mission, fewer civilians are targeted with violence. The effect is substantial—the analyses show that, on average, deploying several thousand troops and several hundred police dramatically reduces civilian killings. We conclude that although the UN is often criticized for its failures, UN peacekeeping is an effective mechanism of civilian protection.     

Participation, Fragmentation and Union Response: The 1998–2000 ACT Public Sector Bargaining Round and the Workplace Relations Act

The current Australian Capital Territory (ACT) public sector workplace bargaining round lasted more than two years with most agreements involving a trade-off between low wage outcomes and protection of job security within performance improvement measures. The main focus of this paper is on government and agency experiments with bargaining structures and processes. The first was a limited and largely unsuccessful attempt in 1998 and 1999 at participative agreement making without the involvement of the key unions. The second, a selective decentralisation of bargaining to parts of a single business, was more successful: of 50 agreements, over 40 have been achieved. The procedural success of the decentralisation strategy is a significant outcome. However, the fragmentation strategy contained internal contradictions and required strong centralised policy control of bargaining agendas and outcomes, leading to delays and breeding distrust. Unions conducted effective defensive campaigns against non-union agreements and involuntary redundancies, but face their own dilemmas in finalising this round and preparing for the next.